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Abstract 
This thesis argues that theology follows the address of God to the world in 
requiring complexity and in providing it. It contrasts the economy of 
eschatological theology with the protological economy of modernity. It argues that 
theology must begin with talk of God, go on to talk about the world, and return to 
talk about God as the future of the world. Theology offers an account of man and 
his act that requires and initiates conversations with philosophy and history. It 
disputes the claim of the autonomous discourses of modernity, claims an interest 
in their subject matter, tells their history, and promotes a continuing conversation 
with them. The complexity of the theological account is provided by a complex 
account of time, for which eschatology is the concept. This demands that we 
distinguish an account of being from an account of becoming, and that we 
distinguish between God's time for us, and the time we presently know and 
impose on one another. Theology is concerned to establish the possibility of 
freedom. It must therefore provide an account of persons that argues that persons 
may come into being in relationship with God, but presently, and outside this 
relationship, have neither freedom nor any stable being. I offer an account of time 
that ties time more closely into the action of God and of man. The thesis will argue 
that Christian theology requires a doctrine of the becoming holy of Israel, the 
people of God. In dialogue with biblical studies, it will examine the concept of 
sacrifice as the conceptuality for this action that, in Israel, man learns to exercise 
with God. To put the emphasis on action I have employed the term economy. I 
argue that man comes into a work which he may exercise freely under God. I ask 
whether modern theology provides an account of the oneness of God with his 
work -a pneumatology - and with 
it an adequate account of the coming into 
being of a new creature in a new economy of action. 
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This thesis contrasts the eschatological economy of theology with the protological 
economy of modernity. It contrasts the speech of God with the speech of the world to 
show that the latter is brought into an obedient and subordinate position under the 
former. It sets out a theological account of the world that is identified, challenged and 
transformed by this address of God and from which it will receive a new being, work and 
place. It argues that an account of God's action requires an account not only in which 
God speaks, but in which God is the first hearer of his word and the means of his 
speaking and this answering. God intends that we become the second hearer and 
respondent of his word, and that our speech comes to participate in his. God's address to 
the world transforms it into his new creation and creature. But this speaking and 
transformation is not without resistance, for another entity attempts to intercept the 
speech of God, to take it from God and employ it to other ends. This thesis insists that 
an account of the address of God to man must include an account of the resistance this 
address receives, and of the overcoming of that resistance. 
The economy of modernity intends to make itself the receiver of the word of 
God and so an usurper and opponent of it. It claims that the word of God becomes the 
many words of the world, so that in Western history, theological speech has given way to 
worldly and secular talk. This thesis offers an account of the resistance to the gospel, and 
of the word's overcoming of that resistance. The world, in the single hypostasis of Christ 
and the community he gathers, gives the answering word that the Father recognises as 
his own word returning to him. This thesis contrasts the modem understanding of being 
as that which underlies and causes all that is, with an eschatology, to show that this 
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protology does not succeed in holding out against the word of God, but is itself 
transformed and established by the eschatological action of this word. 
In the course of its talk about God, theology needs to talk about the world and 
modernity, and then return to talk about God. Theology must say something about the 
reality and time of the world. This is not a matter of simply saying what the world is. The 
world is not a settled thing, but many contesting words and counter-words. Theology's 
task is not to accept the world's own claims, but to contradict it and tell it what it is and 
may be in the determination of God. By contrasting the action of God with the action of 
modernity we establish that one has a coming reality and the other a fading reality, that 
the second is already made powerless by the first, but will also be given new being and 
employment by it. This thesis intends to talk about the world as varieties of action, some 
as self-defeating and so as failure of action. I shall call a field of action, an economy. An 
account of the oneness of the work of God requires two accounts of the work of God, 
one an account of God's election of a people, and another of the processes of the 
training and sanctification of that people - an account of being, and an account of 
becoming. While the Western philosophical and theological tradition understands 
modern society to be the function of a single time that is moving towards a unity, this 
thesis suggests that it is the task of theology to refute this protological claim by showing 
that the freedom of man is not the presupposition of his being, but the outcome of his 
history with God. Man becomes free. Man is brought up into his place and task by the 
action of God who, by denying reinforcement to options that do not lead to this 
outcome, draws him into the full freedom of the creature of God. God creates and forms 
for man an agency and freedom that man will exercise with God together, and provides 
the medium within which man may come into that freedom. God has chosen a people to 
be that medium. This people will become the labourer in God's creation who will bring 
to it the freedom God intends for it. Their worship of God in Israel's cult represents the 
taking up of that task. This thesis therefore also suggests that the realm of thought and of 
the university, must be a thinking about action, the action of the world, and therefore is a 
therapeutic service of commentary on the world for its sake, and is thus a liberating and 
evangelical work. 
The thesis sets out an account of resistance to the gospel which the non-modern 
Christian tradition has conceptualised as the bondage of the will, hardening of hearts, or 
rule of the principalities and powers. Theology must provide an account of the multiplex 
character of will, of the complex covenants and complicity of human being. Theology 
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must argue that the individual does not yet have a single mind and will. What being this 
mind and will may have cannot yet be known by us. This thesis therefore attempts to 
provide an account in which man is not already the agent, with one mind and set of 
desires and purposes. It argues that theology must identify modern and Kantian 
anthropology as premature. A theological anthropology must sustain a sense of struggle 
the outcome of which is not yet known. Will man appear finally at the end of the story, 
or will other logics and entities prevail over man? 
Talk about the one economy of the God, who is God for man, and will in his 
own time be God with man, requires identification of two economies, one of being and 
one of becoming. Theology requires these two parallel accounts, of being and of time. 
The latter may not be reduced to the former. Time may not be ruled out of any account 
of what is. Rather the question of what time it has and can sustain must continually be 
put to all that is. It is the task of the Christian community to say that there is no final 
statement about this world that can yet be made. 
This thesis discusses the economy of modernity under both terms. The economy 
of modernity claims to be an economy of being purely, and not of becoming and passing away 
again. The economy of modernity presents itself as the two economies of nature and 
freedom which make a single economy of being. I will argue that the coming together of 
these two economies is not the implementation of its unity that the economy of 
modernity takes it to be, because they just collapse into one protological economy of 
nature that cannot support persons, sociality or freedom. The economy of public and 
political speech and encounter has become the internal economy of individualism of 
desires that neither derive from public discourse, nor sustain or promote it. The 
economy of modernity claims to have been brought together by history, but to be no 
longer subject to time. I argue that this economy cannot secure itself against the time 
imposed on it by God. The word of God identifies Western being as a failure of action 
and thus as a failure of being. We may not yet know whether the outcome of this history 
will be the emergence of man. The outcome is unknown other than as theological 
knowledge of the resurrection and emergence of the one man to the side of God. 
The argument of the thesis. 
The first chapter sets out a theory of persons in constitutive relationship. The concept of 
person prevents the reduction of the person to being, nature or will. What is unfree does 
not form the basis of what is free. The work of each creature is the being-and-freedom of 
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all other creatures. Freedom results from an active and ongoing relationship of creature 
with Creator. An account of man must therefore include an account of the place and 
work into which he is to grow, of the co-labour of creation as (1) task (2) product and (3) 
ongoing act. The perfection of creation is dependent on the finished and perfected 
freedom and personhood of man. Freedom is not what man presently has, but is what will 
result from God's determination not to cease from his work until that freedom has been 
reached. The freedom of man is the task of God, and the task into which man is 
introduced by God. 
The second chapter offers an account of the coming into being of the holy 
community. This account is given in terms of learning. Learning accounts for the 
relationship between Israel's elect being and her holy becoming. It relates the doctrine of 
sanctification to training, law and to time. It shows that the secular concept of history 
intends to open a gap between God and his action, to take God's action out of his hands 
to form a secular history. Israel, however, keeps narrative in conversation with law, each 
disciplining the other, which allows Israel to refuse this foreign secular history along with 
all such concepts of nature and fate. God fashions for himself a people. This fashioning 
includes his own commentary on this intrinsically linguistic work. I argue that we need to 
make explicit the schemas and cosmology of modernity; each schema should be under 
the control of all the others, so none predominates. They must not be collapsed into a 
simple contrast of interiority and exteriority, mind and world, that has resulted in the 
predominance of issues of truth and epistemology over those of performance and 
formation. We are in an economy of complex reciprocity of voluntary and involuntary 
action which we enforce on others, and oblige others to enforce on us, which makes 
problematic particularity and plurality. 
The third chapter argues that the doctrine of the trinity does not allow us to 
separate God from his work, either from his activity, or from its result. This grammar of 
God's work is not the function of an independent logic, by which God could be called to 
account for his work in terms not of his own making. God's election of a people is the 
beginning of his speech and action for, and to, his creature. God elects a new Adam 
who, setting his hand on the head of the creature, supplies what it lacks, so it no longer 
lacks anything. God is speaker and listener, commander and obeyer, judge and amongst 
those judged. He is also the means of this speaking and listening, commanding and 
obeying, and the language spoken, the medium shared and judgement made. The chapter 
relates the doctrines of creation and reconciliation and anthropology with an account of 
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the worship of Israel as the paideutic work that forms a holy people who may obediently 
receive the earth as creation. For Israel-theology and creation-theology to support each 
other would involve a recovery of a non-modern dogmatic theology in which the 
creature and creation become (subordinate) actors. A trinitarian and Irenaean view of 
Israel's anthropology sets man in a single symbiotic ecosystem with the creation of which 
he is member, mediator and climax. Man is hosted by God and brought up by him into 
the practice of God's hospitality. This relationship of man to world is made visible by the 
act of sacrifice in which man's hand is set on the creation in the form of the animal. This 
event is not a one-time, episodic or mechanical mode, but the whole relationship of man 
in the world in obedience. The elect and baptised community learns this relationship by 
being brought up in the conceptuality of sin and righteousness. In her political 
cosmology Israel understands herself to be mandated by God to rule his creation with 
him. Adam is set over creation as its lord, and Israel is Adam-in-waiting. By her action 
Israel transforms what we do from our estimation of it, to God's estimation of it. Israel 
undoes the alternative creation of old Adam, and re-binds it into the living and lasting 
creation of God. Israel deconstructs the myth of the single agent in combat with his fate. 
That the Father and Son share a single action, means that the Son is able to face and 
oppose the world, to copy and imitate it, and so in gathering it up and re-playing it, to 
transform and redeem it. 
The fourth chapter argues that as creation the world is the medium in which we 
are presented to the Son and, in him, made present to each other. We are to be joined in 
the person of the Son by discovering the character of the Son (law) by rehearsing the 
actions of the Son (gospel). There is world and place, role and office for us. The Holy 
Spirit supplies the medium and language in which we can be given to the Son, and 
adopts all creation as the medium within which he gives us the being of the Son. The 
Spirit is the medium of finitude into which baptism transfers us. We are baptised into the 
new environment brought into being by the meeting of God and man on the cross. The 
God-man who is with God releases the Spirit to alter our environment. He acts on us, 
without trespassing against our integrity, to produce that transforming switch-work by 
which the greater freedom-reproducing capability of the Spirit is settled upon his people. 
The Holy Spirit supplies the biological and material modalities by which he will establish 
us as members of the Son and bring us to the Father. The Spirit creates our increased 
embodiment, not disembodiment. I review a selection of biblical and systematic 
scholarship in search of a conceptuality in which to say that this nation becomes holy, and, 
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in response to this scholarship, sketch an Adam theology in which man has a place and a 
task, and in them, a new action and freedom. 
The fifth chapter points to the responsibilities of theology and so to the range of 
audiences and conversations which theology should engage. I ask what is at stake in 
accounts of the disappearance of theological accounts of mediation, of the secularisation 
of the West and arrival of modernity. I suggest these are narratives of the fall, but that 
unless related to some concept of paideia they are just stories. I attempt to arbitrate 
between accounts of secularisation. I examine accounts of the changing ontology and 
epistemology that made God one being amongst others, and removed the need for the 
scriptural and liturgical mediation of theological knowledge and the training of the 
community that could acquire it. I consider accounts of the seventeenth century divorce 
of nature and culture, body and action, the changing concept of religion, cultivation of 
interiority and story of the disenchantment of the world. I argue that theological 
discourse must include an account of the medium in which the theological account is 
rendered, and that under a number of definitions the public and political world must be 
that medium. For much of the theological tradition Aristotle conveniently provided the 
complex conceptuality for this account. From the seventeenth century this gave way to a 
simpler conceptuality that made difficult any discussion of man as creature nested in 
nature or as work in progress. I argue that we must nevertheless provide such a complex 
account. 
In the final chapter I argue that, though it has no knowledge of it, the world is 
already commandeered and re-employed to bring us to God. It is the economy we think 
we are able to hold closed against God, but in which God encloses us. The closed 
economy is a function of the open economy. God provides the boundaries and 
structures, and commandeers the structures and discourses of the world to be this 
medium to us. He moves back the boundaries as the sanctified community becomes 
ready for them. Each economy is an economy of cause, but it is driven by an economy of 
participation, the continuity and faithfulness of God's determination and action for us. 
The triune God releases us from all rival powers and from the protological economy that 
we know as the unified economy of Western time. The trinity is not only a doctrine 
about God, but a rule about how to talk about the God who in the course of addressing 
himself and corresponding to himself, addresses the world, defeats his rivals and gives 
the world his own speech. It is a rule for talk about ourselves that corresponds to our 
future as his creatures, as those can talk about him because they have been not only 
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addressed by him but won by him and taught by him. The doctrine of the trinity is our 
means of talking about the One and the Many, and oneness and plurality as such, 
without putting one before the other. It requires the giving of two forms of account at 
once, one in terms of being - an eschatological account - and the other in terms of becoming 
- an account of the work of this eschatological being. It is the grammar that corresponds 
to what God does and in our time has still to do, a practice that must be learned, and it is 
the practice of the particular community to which he gives it. 
Accounting for newness requires, as we shall see, a concept of plural agency. A 
trinitarian eschatology is the grammar of plurality. By it persons, and within the 
relationships of persons, the world of things, may become, so that there is not merely a 
repetition and representation of what was, but a new thing. We cannot lay out such a 
grammar of plural agency before us to see it all at once, for it is not the function of our 
action alone, but also the means by which we are acted on, and changed from a simpler to 
a more complex grammar of action. It is not therefore our time that lays out this 
grammar, but rather this grammar of the action of God that lays time out for us. It is 
plural in that it allows for and opens the freedom of two parties, God and man, man and 
God. By the trinitarian conceptuality of eschatology, freedom is described not as an 
anomalous local breakdown of necessity, but as incremental under the rule of God. It is 
not as if the gods may be wilful and free, and man unfreely subject to them, or that man 
may work out the period of his tutelage to the powers, slowly freeing himself and 
harnessing them. It is that God and Man may be together free, both free, and that this is the 




1.1 Theology as address to the world. 
This thesis points to the responsibilities of theology and so to the range of audiences and 
conversations which theology should address. It argues that theology must follow the 
word of God as it engages, contests and commandeers the world. It is the task of 
theology to show that the freedom of man is not the presupposition of his being. Man 
may become free by being grown and eased into his task and into his place as the 
creature of God. God creates and forms for man an agency and freedom that he will 
exercise with God together, and provides the medium within which man may come into 
that agency and freedom. Theology must provide a complex account of the will and of 
the complicity of human being. It must argue that we do not yet have a single mind or 
will, but what mind and will we may come to have is for our sake still concealed from us 
by God. This first chapter attempts to provide an account in which man does not yet 
have one mind and set of desires and purposes, and is not yet able to sustain his agency. 
Such a man of settled identity and mind exists only in the single hypostasis of the God- 
man who sits at the right hand of the Father. The being that is his is made available to us 
as the Spirit, so not as object of our knowledge, but as overseer and motor of our 
formation within the hypostasis of the God-man. A theological anthropology must 
sustain a sense of struggle, the outcome of which is not yet known, other than as this 
theological knowledge. 
The logic of the economy of modernity asserts that we are already all-present, 
that we are not in a process of formation, and that our capabilities are not touched or 
altered by what we do. This modern being is a single form of behaviour and sociality that 
has become dominant in this economy. The action of this economy produces a being 
which acts as frame and platform of future action. We call the external aspect of this 
action, world (technology, environment), and its internal aspect, mind or self. To treat 
either apart from action and being is to separate ontology from the modality of being, 
making being something other than act, and so to understand being not as verb but solely 
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as noun. It is to fail to understand that everything material is in time and process, and 
that our mind, body, place and environment are all brought into being by the processes 
driven by the totality of action. Our talk about being and doing puts us permanently in 
the active voice, as though we were only ever agents, never the passive objects of other 
agency. I argue that the individual has no action and therefore no being, because being is 
an emergent product of what two people do in the company of a third party-. 1 Talk of 
what is, and of being, must be accompanied by talk not only of what time this being 
occupies, but what time it generates, what place it has and what space it makes, and thus 
what sociality created it and is created by it. We are the ones brought into being by the 
action of others. Our actions do not create something that is alien to us, but create the 
capabilities, character and practices of which we consist. 
This first chapter therefore sets out a theory of persons in constitutive 
relationship. The concept of person prevents the reduction of the person to being, nature 
or substance. The work of each creature is the being-and-freedom of all other creatures 
and the result of an active and ongoing relationship of the Creator with his creature. An 
account of man must therefore include an account of the place and work into which he 
is to grow, of the co-labour of creation as task, product and act. 
1.2 Persons 
In this first section I argue that it is not the case that we are already free agents. We are 
not free, but bound, and complicit in our binding. There is no plateau of clear or stable 
human identity. The individual self has nowhere been reached. Such a Kantian and 
modern theology and anthropology is reliant on belief in the availability of things 
mediated by the knowing subject himself, and thus under the immediate conceptuality of 
the mind. ' It does not understand that knowledge is difficult or that things have to be 
learned, the necessary abilities taught and built and so the whole worked for. The limits 
Kant outlined for theology suppose that we are as individuals already able and ready to 
hear the Word of God and that the world is a place of peace in which every such claim 
can be freely heard and weighed. 3 Kant enforces a premature unity and uniformity that 
prevents the emergence of the man and anthropology that he describes. 
I will argue In 2.7 
2 This claim will be discussed in 5.2. 
3 This claim will be discussed in 5.1 and 6.3. 
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1.2.1 Trinitarian persons. 
Trinitarian theology must meet this Kantian theology and anthropology with an account 
which says that the world must first be released from the compulsion that creates this 
single being, and this being must be addressed both as not-yet-one and as not-yet-many. 
Trinitarian theology provides an eschatological account of anthropology. 
An eschatological theology of personhood is offered by John Zizioulas. Zizioulas 
distinguishes between the individual and person. 4 The individual is a demonic and tragic 
being, removed from the whole sum of the relationships by which he was constituted. A 
person, on the other hand, is an intrinsically plural being, who sums up and makes 
present the whole relationship world. The identity of a particular person is not to be 
found somewhere deep inside him or her: he has no self, centre, soul or other form of 
private existence prior to his entry to the world of relationship. The identity of each 
person is spread across the whole nexus of human personhood. It is not hidden in a 
monadic place without extension; it is constituted and sustained everywhere and by 
everyone. A person is not the function of some other persons, for then the question 
would be which persons and which community? Rather, each person is the function of 
all persons. All the persons in the whole history of the world, future as much as past, will 
be constitutive of the being of each and every person in the world. 
Certainly all the fallen creatures of the world together are not sufficient to sustain 
the being of a single creature, to bring even one of their number to perfection, so the 
logic of such a statement must be eschatological. But this world has no other logic than 
as the creation of God, and its Creator is free to be present to his creatures in it, one 
economy with them. The persons of the Trinity must therefore be included amongst the 
persons who constitute the world. As the trinitarian persons are constitutive of each 
other, so they are also constitutive of all other persons of creation. The persons of the 
Trinity are therefore the full and sufficient condition of human persons: the conditions 
of personhood for all are met. The whole nexus of humanity contributes to the 
identity 
of each one of us. The sum of Adamic humanity is not of itself sufficient to 
do this, but 
the identity of Adamic humanity, and with it the particularity of each, is really given and 
secured by the Father, Son and Holy Spirit. It is not available either to `humanity' or to 
individuals to give away or to add to. God is already society, and `human' society is not 
4John D. Zizioulas Being as Communion, Studies in Personhood and the Church. London: Darton, Longman & 
Todd 1985; `Human Capacity and Incapacity: A Theological Exploration of Personhood' Scottish Journal of 
Theology 28 1975. 
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(yet) society. Our personhood is the work of the divine persons, and now, in the Church, 
the whole personhood of Adam's race becomes our eucharistic co-work. 
Without persons, there is no being. Being is not a substrate that underlies persons 
or forms their basis. The persons of the Trinity are persons to one another, and are fully 
able to correspond to each other: their being and doing does not require the supply of 
any being-stuff, nor leave any remainder of being-stuff behind it. 5 Persons are already 
entirely plural; particularity and diversity are equally safeguarded by personhood and may 
not be played off against each other. The fundamental assumption of the incompatibility 
of one-and-many that is the basis of much sociological, political and ethical debate is 
mistaken. A concept of persons in constitutive relation contests the familiar individual- 
versus-community definitions of humanity and sociality, systematised in the social 
sciences and assumed by much theological anthropology and ethics. This represents a 
comprehensive deconstruction of the protological ontology, and its replacement by 
eschatological ontology, a move not to be found in any other tradition, and which 
establishes man and God as free. 
1.2.2 The tragic-biological hypostasis 
God's intention is to come to man and be with him. This coming to man is not an event 
initiated by the fall, though the fall now dictates that salvation must be the idiom of this 
coming. The fall does not make sin constitutive or allow us to talk about it abstracted 
from its dissolution in salvation. Zizioulas argues that though only sin is possible for 
bodies determined by death, death also sets the limits to what sin can achieve.? Sin 
cannot become terminal or speak a defining word: it is contained and sealed off in the 
damage-limitation exercise of the biological hypostasis, the world and those bodies, 
human and other, of which the world consists. Considered on its own terms this body is 
also tragic. 8 By its bounds this body of ours is made for communion with others, driven 
by its desire to meet and be with others - and by its bounds that communion is denied 
it, 
it is divided from other bodies and left to its own dissolution. 9 Sin takes the form of 
individualised being - being an individual. This is not a problem 
for which a new, 
extrinsic solution has to be sought, for it is already part of a solution. God has, from the 
first, kept man safe within the biological hypostasis of the world, held where he cannot 
Zizioulas Being as Communion 40-1. 
6 Zizioulas Being as Communion 39-40. 
Zizioulas Being as Communion 50-53,102. 
8 Zizioulas Being as Communion 51-53. 
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do any serious damage to himself 10 God does not have to cross alien ground to reach 
man, no to recover him from some state that he has achieved and sustains for himself 
from his own resources. There is no stable human nature, nor have we accomplished for 
ourselves a stable entity we can call fallen human nature. The tragic form taken by our 
biology is not merely a function of our fallenness, but of God's arrangement to nullify 
and redeem our fallenness. This will be completed when the resurrection turns the 
biological body into a meta-biological body, the eschatological ecclesial body-11 
Man's identity has been linked to an identity he is supposed to have achieved by a 
primal act of disobedience, and so has too often been confused with his fallenness. 12 
Because his identity is not in his own possession, man's fallenness will not finally succeed 
in constituting him. Freedom is not the cause of a problem. God intends no less than 
perfect freedom for man, so it is because he was not able to exercise the priesthood for 
which he is made that man fell, not because he demanded the freedom proper to this 
priesthood. 13 Without man to make it free, creation cannot achieve its telos, and apart 
from it, has become so disordered that nothing acquires its proper form and everything 
can result only in sin. 
In one theological tradition it has been supposed that there was no death before 
the arrival of man in creation, death came as a punishment for Adam's disobedience, and 
that God himself introduced this evil which he then had to remove through his Son. 
Against this tradition Zizioulas argues that things have their own proper demarcation and 
boundaries, and as they have beginnings, so they have ends, and mortality is intrinsic to 
the world. Boundaries - and with them mortality - are necessary to allow the organism to 
move through stages on its way to freedom and duration. `Nothing was created perfect 
from the beginning. Everything, including especially the human being, was meant to 
grow into perfection-114 Isolated from the eschaton, the organism remains stalled 
in each 
early form of life, the whole adds up only to mortality, and mortality results 
in sin. But 
we may not talk about sin apart from eschatology, for there cannot 
be a concept of sin 
apart from the concept of freedom as the end towards which everything 
is orientated. Sin 
not deviation from an original state, but from what will 
be. 
Zizioulas Being as Communion 47. 
10 I discuss the place and time of this tragic-biological hypostasis in 2.5-6. 
11 Zizioulas Being as Communion 53. 
12 Kant `Speculative beginning of human history' in Perpetual Peace and Other Essays ed. T. Humphrey 
Indianopolis: Hackett 1983,51. See 3.6.2. 
13 Zizioulas `Preserving God's Creation': Three Lectures on Theology and Ecology', King's Theological 
Review 
12 & 13 (1989-90), Third lecture, 3. 
14 Zizioulas `Towards an Eschatological Ontology', paper given at King's College, London, 1999,6. 
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The hope of creation is dependent on man's hope of absolute freedom. 15 If man 
is not free the creation cannot reach its own proper order and loses its hope for survival. 
It is better that Adam retained his claim to absolute freedom, and fell, than that he 
renounced this claim to freedom and so lost hope of it. And yet, as it is viewed from 
what it will be, it is the actual condition of the world on its own terms - sin - that makes 
it impossible for the creation to raise itself from these boundaries and make itself free. 
So we have to think of history as a double movement, toward the end for which 
the world was created, and from that end. Though the world consists of all movement in 
all direction, the movement from the eschaton grasps this movement and makes it 
correspond to itself, to the end. It is the outward movement of the eschaton that makes all 
other movement, movement toward the eschaton. Movement that does not correspond to 
this is mere deviation and without telos or being. Evil is not, as the tradition stemming 
from Origen believed, a deviation from the beginning, but from the end, an irrational 
movement towards things other than the end. 16 The creation is contaminated by evil, and 
those processes which should have been ongoing are instead brought to nothing by non- 
being. Since the end decides finally about the truth of history, only those events leading 
to the end will be shown to possess true being, being as such. The historical events of 
revelation, therefore, are true and real because they lead to the end from which they 
came into being. Not even the cross has a meaning of its own; it is the resurrection that 
makes the cross the event it is. Though everything may be said to end in death, only one 
death, that of Jesus Christ, was taken up by the movement of the end and made to 
correspond to itself. By this event of encounter with the eschaton this death has been 
made the saving death, the death that gathers in death and brings it to nothing. It is the 
movement from the end that makes the movement to the end. `It is the eschaton that 
gives being to history. '17 
15 Zizioulas `Preserving God's Creation', Third lecture 3 `If Adam ought not to exercise an absolute 
freedom, why did God give him the drive towards it? ... 
it was not a question of exceeding the limits of 
freedom... . 
if man gave up his claim to absolute freedom, the whole creation would automatically 
lose its 
hope for survival. ' 
16 Zizioulas `Towards an Eschatological Ontology' 6. 
17 Zizioulas `Towards an Eschatological Ontology' 10. 
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1.2.3 High priesthood 
According to Zizioulas, creation is in a state of mortality because it had a beginning. It 
awaits the arrival of the being determined not by a beginning but by the end - Man, the 
perfecter of creation. 
`A personal approach to creation would thus elevate the material to the level of 
man's existence. The material creation would in this way be liberated from its 
own limitations and by being placed in the hands of man, it would itself acquire a 
personal dimension; it would be humanised-118 
Had Adam acted as priest of creation, within the freedom of the end rather than the 
constraint of his origin, he would have overcome the mortality inherent in these 
beginnings and ends, and so freed all creation for the life of the creature of God. Adam's 
fall represented his reluctance to overcome the mortality inherent in creation. Being 
dependent on a creature, who had not yet learned his freedom and grown into it, 
creation was not liberated from its mortality. 
But it is the end that is determinative, not the beginning. The end re-determines 
the beginning. 19 The beginning is reckoned from him who is at the end and from whom 
all beginnings and ends come to take their orientation. By taking the world into his hands 
and creatively integrating it and referring it to God, the new Adam liberates creation 
from the failed priesthood of Adam the individual. The future is determined by the 
Adam who is man-with-God, the creature who is with his Creator. Jesus Christ is the 
vindication of Israel, the moment in which Israel is revealed to have been Adam-in- 
waiting, and as the head of creation, the telos of all biology. 
God is free, and free is what he makes his creation. As the Father and the Son are 
free for each other in the Spirit, so they are free to be for this creation and for us. It is 
not by the coming into being of creation that he is the Father, but because he is the 
Father of the Son who by the Spirit is able obediently to call him by this name. Since, in 
the Spirit, the Father is free to be Father to the Son, the creation is not a necessary 
function of their being, and since the creation does not have a two-way dependent 
relationship with its Lord, it is able to come into existence-and-freedom. Zizioulas has 
been challenged on the issue of the Father as aition, usually translated `cause', but his 
18 Zizioulas `Preserving God's Creation' Third lecture 4. 
19 Zizioulas `Towards an Eschatological Ontology' 9 `If we take Irenaeus and Maximus again as our 
guides, we have to think of history as a movement consisting of two kinds of directions: one is the 
direction toward the end for which the world was created; the other is away from this end. Since the end 
decides finally about the truth of history only those events leading to the end will be shown to possess true 
19 
insistence on the monarchia of the Father is a part of his eschatological ontology. 2') _-lition is not however a synonym for arche; it would be better translated `agency' so we can 
confess the Father as agent, the starter because the finisher. The agency is not merely the 
Son's; Jesus Christ is not alone, working his own work, as individual. It is the Father's 
work he is about, and what he does he does with the Father, and because he is not alone, 
his agency is valid. To say the Father is the cause is not to say the Father's agency is 
necessary because it originates in the Father as individual; it is not to attempt to explain 
the Father's agency, to ask further about rationality or origins. 21 It is to say that this 
agency is both plural, `of the Son' because `of the Father', and that it is the single agency 
of the One God, thus is not divisible. In this way it rules against the further and 
inappropriate use of cause or agency language. That there is one God is our liberation 
and means that necessity is not intrinsic to our createdness: this `monotheism' and 
`monarchy' is our freedom from the other gods, forces and guises of necessity. 
Is Zizioulas's theology the premature triumphalism of the Church, or inner- 
Churchly language game? Should we not say, against him, that there is real sociality apart 
from the Church? One expression of this concern comes from Alan Torrance. He asks 
how the `trans-subjectivity' of the Church is the foundation and cause of human 
relationships on what he calls a `wider scale'. '-' We must be careful not to imply that the 
world is a wider space and the Church a narrower. The world has a vanishing duration, 
while the Church and therefore the new creation inaugurated in it, has an expanding 
duration. The Church is a eucharistic and thus an eschatological being, not a special case 
of relationships the possibility of which is established elsewhere. God, acting in his 
Church understood on its eschatological definition, holds together what, on all other 
bases, floats apart. The Church sustains this `wider' world, which is not Wider at all and 
has no unity of its own, and so it is that future that will indeed make the world both wide 
and free. In raising Jesus Christ and calling out the Church, God has elected the human 
race, and elected the Church to be its future, the guarantor of its continuity and identity. 
As the Church is one, it works this priestly task of making the world one world, and no 
part of the world is able to secure itself in unfreedom, against this end. The doctrine of 
being or being tout court. The historical events of revelation, therefore, are true and real only because they 
lead to the end from which they came into being, not in themselves. ' 
20 `Causer' or `agent' might be a more adequate translation of aition. Alan J. Torrance Persons in Communion: 
Trinitarian Description and Human Participation Edinburgh: T&T Clark 1996,288-91 and Thomas G. 
Weinandy OFM, Cap. The Father's Spirit of Sonship Edinburgh: T&T Clark 1995,61-4 discuss Zizioulas on 
`cause'. 
21 Zizioulas `The Father as Cause': A Response to Alan Torrance', Paper given at King's College, London, 
1998. 
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creation is an eschatological doctrine that sets out the future of man as the priest of 
creation, a future in which he is freely with God. 
1.3.1 Ontology and eschatology: Debt is counted from the end. 
It is persons who make persons present to each other. The triune persons of Father, Son 
and Holy Spirit are determinative of the possibility of all other persons. If we do not 
obediently, with God together, constitute one another, much of each of us remains 
missing and never comes to be. We are all equally in debt, and each other is precisely 
what we owe each other. If much of what any person can be is not in fact brought into 
place by those related to him, all parties are stalled. It is the real task of each of us to 
come up with the whole of the rest of us, a whole that is coincident with the end that 
God works. Each of us owes all others this future and it is to this end that we are 
determined and from which we are measured. The future is not an aspect of time, but 
time is the future's work-in-progress. The future God has for us represents the end of 
our time, not a confirmation of it. 
Debt of being is therefore owed to the end, not to the beginning. Anselm argued 
that even if a man could pay all his righteousness he would have no excess and that it is 
impossible ever to catch up the unpaid instalments of righteousness. The foregone 
honour and the lost time can never be made up. 23 The very strong reality he attributes to 
evil makes Kant believe, like Anselm, that no man can ever pay his own debt of being, 
much less anyone else's. Relationship cannot be swapped between persons because 
relationship is not a stuff and is therefore not transferable. It is impossible to catch up on 
unpaid relationship, and the debt of being that we do pay is a useless sacrifice because it 
does not come from the good of the individual disposition. 24 Anselm and Kant are not 
to be held responsible for the juridical idiom of the Western discourse of being. Ours is 
the Roman tradition, and the Roman thought-world is expressed in terms of property, 
penalty and control. If Kant is right, there is no rationality to sacrifice, and talk of 
sacrifice is an outrage to the God-given dignity of man. 25 
The conceptuality of personhood demands we think about time. But time cannot 
be examined with the conceptuality we use to discuss substance. Time is to be 
understood as action in an economy of action and passion, in which temporality is the 
22 Torrance Persons in Communion 358. 
23 Anselm Cur Deus Homo Book 1, chapter 12& 13, Book 2, chapters 19-24. 
24 Kant Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason 6.72 `This original debt... cannot be erased by somebody 
else'. 
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question of who suffers change the impact of whom. 26 Here we must relate the concept 
of time to the determination of God to be for man. God makes time for us. We are in 
the time he makes for us, not he in the time we concede him. But though we give him no 
time, he is more at home in it than we are. He takes it from us and returns it to us 
redeemed. He attributes being and honour to us, and this is the means by which we are 
able to attribute honour to him and so to each other. Time does not relate to, and is not 
measured from, One, but to two and more, and so to persons. It is the mode and 
expression of their relationship. The question of time is a question about God's 
condescension to suffer and bear us, to take our weight, be measured and timed by us, 
and so bring us to him. These propositions, argued through the length of this thesis, will 
contribute to the case for the eschatological economy. 
On the modern view we steadily increase our distance from the events of Jesus 
Christ, and leave the Church behind, just as the Church left Israel. Robert Jenson insists 
however that Israel is not back there in the past, but here: the actual presence of the 
Jewish people is the theological datum. Her survival is evidence of God's faithfulness, 
and the guarantee of this re-definition of this time as the joint time of Israel and God, 
into which we are also called and gathered. '? If we refuse to acknowledge this people as 
the elect people we cannot make a coherent claim on the concept of time. But the idea 
of historical progress represents the reduction of the people of Israel to the idea of Israel, 
and the turning of the idea against Israel to oust her. According to the idea of progress 
we move forward, as though to meet someone. But our movement can be said to be 
forward only if it corresponds to something other than itself. It is the movement of God 
to us that really moves, finds and meets us, and our movement can only be described as 
such retrospectively, inasmuch as God takes it to correspond to his movement to us. 
Only in this way can we speak of a unity of direction and single unified time. 
We must ask about the recursivity and eschatology involved in this theory of 
persons in constitutive relation. How can the future affect `the past'? 28 What is present to 
one is not present to another, so there is no canonical version of the present. 
Any time 
or present has only a local presence within a conversation. Wolfhart Pannenberg asks 
why Augustine, who borrowed so much from Plotinus, did not borrow 
his insight that 
25 I discuss the office and action of sacrifice in 3.7.4. 
26 See 5.6 
27 Robert W. Jenson Systematic Theology New York: Oxford University Press 1999, Volume 2 336 `Thus until 




eternity produces time. 29 Time is the work of eternity. But Augustine, failing to link time 
and history to the doctrine of God, set time and eternity in opposition, making time that 
from which spiritual beings had to be rescued. Pannenberg argues that in the same way 
Kant is wrong to believe that time comes from the subject, but would have been more 
correct, if he had said with Plotinus that time originates in the soul, understood as whole 
social continuum. 
Being is constituted by the whole economy of action in which we give and 
receive our identities. The demand we make of the other is that they give us something 
of themselves, and that that something should be an account of themselves in which they 
sketch some place which we may come to share with them. The man who does not 
acknowledge and name his fellows and offer some account of himself among them, 
leaves himself without anyone to return his identity to him. 3° In refusing to offer them 
his account of their identity, he cuts himself off from his identity-givers and has no third 
party to offer any account of his being. The accounts we make of each other and which 
we offer to each other constitute the whole currency and medium of human 
interaction. 31 If being is both the action of recognition-giving and the fabric that is 
created by it, it can be damaged by infringement or lack. When praise and reputation is 
not given there is a deficit of being, both as fabric (substance) and as action. Praise and 
recognition are due to God as the issuer of this economy - but they are also due to every 
member of the economy of God. 32 
Colin Gunton relates the ontology of personhood to the atonement in the idiom 
of justice and the lawcourt. Anselm is the chief exponent of the language of the lawcourt. 
`God is the one to whom certain obligations are due: `to sin is the same thing as not to 
render his due to God'. 33 It is God to whom these obligations are due, but we must spell 
out a little further that because they are due to God the Creator they are due also to his 
28 In Chapter 2 we will find cognitive science arguing that there is no single version of the present, or 
single point at which it is settled, but the present is a matter of contending movements and directions. 
29 Wolfhart Pannenberg Metaphysics and the Idea of God Edinburgh: T&T Clark 1990,97 and Systematic 
Theology Edinburgh: T&T Clark 1994 Volume 2,89-95. 
30 See 3.7.4 
31 See 2.7. When our behaviour appears deviant we are obliged to give public account of ourselves in a 
court of law. 
32 This doxological ontology is often understood to be true merely of religious discourse (and it is this 
belief that makes that discourse religious discourse) but it is true of the world too. Such a doxological 
theology appears in D. W. Hardy and D. F. Ford Jubilate Theology in Praise Darton, Longman & Todd 1984, 
157 `If life is the process of self-refinement which occurs in praise, and if the condition for this occurs 
when the excellent-in-itself is present, it can be said that the praise of God actually constitutes the life 
which we live'. 
33 Colin. E. Gunton The Actuality of Atonement A Study of Metaphor, Rationality and the Christian Tradition 
Edinburgh: T&T Clark 1988,89 quoting Anselm Cur Deus Homo 1 xi. 
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creatures - not because creatures have a right, but because it is the will of their Creator 
that these creatures grow up into the estate he intends for them. The lawcourt represents 
the making explicit of the crisis caused by a breach in the fabric of being. `Anselrn's 
argument depends upon a particular conception of justice. He holds that God cannot 
simply overlook breaches of the universal law. '34 Gunton argues that the "`plausibility 
structure" supporting Anselm's work is the belief in a divine universal order in which 
God, man and the creation are to be in harmonious relation. 35 Such breaches are missing 
person-fabric which God fore gives. God does not forgive by announcing that the past is 
of no account, but rather makes up what is missing from it. He notices the missing fabric 
- there is judgement and wrath - and himself supplies what is missing. His account will 
restore the account that has been given so nothing is lost or lived in vain. This embraces 
Kant's insistence that one cannot substitute for another, and meets the claim of justice 
that the poor are supplied with what has been withheld from them. 36 What God does is 
obvious only within the medium he supplies. We may not say God gave us his Son, or 
talk about what goes on in the Temple under the rubric of sacrifice and loss, without 
giving an account of the medium shared by God and man in which this is meaningfu1.37 
We can talk about profit and loss, exchange and transaction only when we are dealing in 
a common currency, and it is precisely the establishment of this currency that must be 
shown to be everywhere at issue, and to be founded only in the doctrine of God. To say 
that God provides the currency, is to confess this world as the economy of his creation. 
He provides the medium, currency and `world' in which men may meet and find each 
other, and exchange accounts of each other, and in this account-giving, confess God. 
The action of God opens three and more dimensions to us, but it must be represented in 
the two dimensional terms of exchange and of loss. We must talk about the action of 
God in the terms of a finite economy in which a gain here is a loss there. We must be 
able to say God faces loss and out of this loss brings us into being. 
34 Anselm Cur Deus Homo Book 1 chapters 12-15, Book 2, chapter 18b, 221-93. Gunton The Actuality of 
Atonement 89 `It is sometimes dismissively observed that _-Anselm takes 
his view of legality from the 
medieval feudal order, and the suggestion is that this is to liken the 
deity to an arbitrary or oppressive ruler. 
The fact is, however, that the opposite is the case. It was the duty of the feudal ruler to maintain the order 
of rights and obligations without which society would collapse. ' We return to this 
issue in 4.4. 
35 Gunton, review of Steindl Genugtuung Biblisches Versohnungsdenken - eine QuellefurAnselms 
Satisfaktionstheorie? 
Journal of Theological Studies 43,1992,284. See R. W. Southern SaintAnselm 
A Portrait in a Landscape 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1990,226 `God's honour is the complex of service and worship 
which the whole Creation, animate and 
inanimate, in Heaven and earth, owes to the Creator, and which 
preserves everything in its due place.... another word 
for the ordering of the universe in its due 
relationship to God. In withholding 
his service, a man is guilty of attempting to put himself in the place of 
the Creator. '. 
36 We return to this topic in 3.4.5 
37 1 discuss this medium in Chapter 4. 
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1.3.2 Being and persons. 
Talk of being refers to an end. The terms debt and credit denominate the movement to 
that end, the becoming of that being. But being is the function of an economy not just of 
talk, but of social intercourse and turn-taking on the widest definition. 38 I have said that 
theology must identify modern and Kantian anthropology as premature, an anthropology 
that may represent a man who has as yet no being. 39 I will now argue that the concept of 
honour will help extricate us from an economy in which being means only substance and 
will (interiority). Honour belongs to an economy in which men are public beings. We are 
members of the honour economy by virtue of what we do and what is done to us. The 
honour economy pre-dates Socrates' turn to interiority which has allowed the West to 
believe that our real being is precisely not where we are committed to each other in the 
public square, so the public square represents a threat to our self. 40 I will argue that ours 
is no less an honour economy than was that of the ancients, so modern selfhood is a 
function of this economy. The conceptuality of guilt has to do with debt and credit. To 
be shamed is to be found without adequate resources of reason and being. Guilt is 
defined in abstraction from human doing, as something interior and a priori. 41 The 
concept of honour allows us to avoid reducing the world to the conceptuality of 
substance. I will argue that we should re-think the dichotomy of presence and appearance 
formalised by Kant that makes us prisoners of a specious present. Kant saved ousia-talk 
and cause-talk by locking it into a closed economy of nature, where all is object of pure 
38 Social science, the science of social being, has adopted discursivity to describe its turn to performance. 
Being is account-rendering. In Chapter 2 we see Harre argue for discursive agents in constitutive relation 
and the array of public and interpersonal linguistic and practical acts as the `primary reality'. 
39 According to Q. Skinner The Return of Grand Theory in the Human Sciences Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press 1985,46 Foucault believes that `Kant is precisely the one who fell into this anthropological sleep with 
his Copernican revolution in philosophy which put `man' at the centre of things, and thus condemns the 
post-Kantian tradition to an unfortunate anthropologism, or idealism, or humanism. ' Foucault The Order of 
Things The Archaeology of the Human Sciences London: Tavistock 1970,341-2 `What is man? This question, as 
we have seen, runs through thought from the early nineteenth century: this is because it produces 
surreptitiously and in advance, the confusion of the empirical and transcendental. . . 
We find philosophy 
falling asleep once more in the hollow of this Fold; this time not the sleep of Dogmatism, but that of 
Anthropology. ' Anthropology is the new ontology. 
40 Kant Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals ed., \I. Gregor, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1997 
4.4.32 (40-1) believes that `It was seen that the human being is bound to laws by his duty, but it necessarily 
occurred to them that he is subject only to laws given by himself but still universal and that he is bound only to act 
in conformity with his own will ... 
I will call this basic principle the principle of the autonomy of the will in 
contrast with each other, which I accordingly count as heteronomy. ' (Kant's emphasis). 
41 The discussion provided by the contributors to M. Carrithers, S. Collins & S. Lukes The Categoy of the 
Person: Anthropology, philosophy history Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1985 is typical of the 
philosophical-social scientific literature for which the ontology is understood in the conceptuality of centre- 
and-boundary, not of social roles, with the result that the person is first individual, and only subsequently 
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knowing. I will argue that we hold apart as different discourses our material presence as 
bodies in the presence of other bodies, and the action of these bodies in presenting 
ourselves via decisions about what to do and say by which to make ourselves noticed, 
give ourselves presence and make ourselves presentable. We sustain a dichotomy of 
ontology of substance and an ontology of action and actuality. The conceptuality of 
persons-in-constitutive-relation understands that we are what we do. I argue in Chapter 2 
that we dress one another in bodily being as surely as we dress ourselves in clothes - the 
dressing and formation of bodies merely takes place over a longer cycle. 
The whole claim of philosophy of reflection is that thought represents, that it does 
not make our acts, but merely makes them again, gesturing to what is always already there 
before us. On the basis of representation, everything we do refers only to what already is, 
and so to an origin, the status of which cannot itself be established. All action of ours is 
merely mimesis. 42 What is really there we cannot change. 43 Heidegger also argued that 
the arche is not the origin that lies behind all logos and causes it, but its end. 44 It is not a 
matter of presence, but presenting, bringing into prominence and making conspicuous. 
We could attempt to use `being' as a transitive verb. The being and reputation (not 
merely doxa but ousia) of each of us is in the hands of our peers, constituted by what 
takes place publicly between them, and is only subsidiarily also a function of our own 
action. I will argue that two accounts are always required. One says that together we co- 
constitute the world, that all our acts alter the world, and give and take its ousia. The 
second says that showing is all that is required to establish the being of what we do. I argue 
that all making present is re-presentation, all ousia is doxa, a showing and showing off 
until everybody accepts your claim, but that it is nevertheless really ousia that results. 45 
Here I have simply equated being with honour, and related honour to effort and time. 
These represent promises that will have to be made good in the course of this thesis. 
social. Pannenberg Anthropology in Theological Perspective Edinburgh: T&T Clark 1985,170-9 discusses 
`antagonism between self and society'. 
42 Castoriades C. The Imaginary Institution of Society Cambridge: Polity 1987,189-98 protests against this 
mimetic ontology, which he attributes to Plato, that does not allow we can bring anything new into being. 
43 Hemming L. `Nihilism' in Milbank et al Radical Orthodoxy: A New Theology London: Routledge 1999,101 
protests that being has become substance, instead of a project and conatus, `being present' has entirely taken 
over `becoming present'. He points out that substance cannot be the basis of discursivity. 
44 See Heidegger Pathmarks Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1998,185-230. 
45 See 2.7 
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1.4 Theological control on talk of persons. 
Talk of persons is theological and eschatological talk. The Holy Spirit is the mediator of 
the persons of the Trinity. All the movement of the Son to the Father is the work of the 
Spirit, who calls, sends, trains and makes him obedient, and who raises him and seats him 
on the right hand from where he now works. God is both enthroned and at rest, and 
God is in action for us now, working a creation for us. God has a time that is now 
perfect and complete. This perfect time now extends to us a time in which we are being 
worked to perfection and completeness - two times, and two discourses. God is at work 
because there is work still to be done. The Son is with us by the Spirit, such that we are 
visible to him but he is not visible to us. He extends being to us with the purpose that we 
become able to receive it from him and return it to him. We receive our being from him 
as we learn to return what he gives, and to receive from him again in an economy of 
action. It is God's intention that man should be with him as the free and finished 




God elects a people to share his holy character. In communion with him, this people 
receives a new set of skills, a new sociality and body. In communion with God, Israel 
rehearses and learns the practices of life with God. What constitutes life with God is in 
process of settlement by God and Israel together. Israel's cult represents this work of 
formation. Knowledge of Israel's relationship with God, or the status of her performance 
and cult, is not available to the world of the gentiles. The progress of Israel is measured 
by the time of God, not by the time of the gentiles. Israel is the recapitulation and 
transformation of the world of the gentiles into the world of God's creation. Modem and 
Kantian theology asserts a crass an opposition between the two unchanging natures, 
divine and human. But the man of such an already-fixed and stable human nature cannot 
come to know God, because his nature cannot be changed by this relationship and 
knowledge. Instead we need an account of how such a stable human nature may first 
come into being, man may become man, as he comes into the fullness of relationship with 
God. This requires a conceptuality in which we can say that man is notyet man. To 
prepare for this argument, this chapter links the concepts of law, mind, will and the body 
of the community in order to sketch a paideutic and dynamic conception of the 
creaturely being that God intends for us. Learning is a social process that involves 
anticipation of its end. The lesson is modelled, the learner is supervised, allowed only to 
reinforce good performance, and taught how to articulate and improve on it. The learner 
is educated not merely into new language, but into a new and larger idiom of sociality 
and embodiedness. The scripture of Israel describes the form of the sociality that Israel 
is 
being grown into and provides the support, shelter and body by which Israel may grow 
into it. 
2.1 Two analogies for learning. 
Learning to commentate and articulate. 
We have to show how learning takes place in freedom that allows a subsidiary and 
second agency and freedom under God to come into being. The subject of learning will 
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be introduced in this chapter first by analogy. Let us imagine a sportsman introducing a 
beginner to his game. He not only works on the learner's stroke, but plays the game with 
him, and therefore against him. Scoring is part of the game, and must be taught in the 
course of playing. By scoring the instructor teaches the beginner how to assess his game 
so he can recognise that he is winning or losing, and that one game has gone better than 
another. He will teach the learner how to assess his stroke by analysing which muscles to 
employ or relax at each point in his stroke, discuss together how to name the sensations 
involved in each movement and, by breaking each movement into units, teach him how 
to observe his performance for himself. The teacher will teach the articulation of each 
movement in order to give the learner the means to assess and improve his 
performance. 46 
Talk about what is wrong with his game serves to improve the learner's 
performance. It allows him to become aware of his own mistakes, so he develops the 
skill of identifying mistakes and a feel for the bodily shapes of which the game is 
comprised. Talk of what is missing or wrong - and talk of sin therefore - refers to a 
teleology. 47 It is only inasmuch as someone reckons that you should look forward to the 
day when you are a good player, that it makes sense to talk about your present 
performance as not yet good. Talk about the game accompanies the play, and is intrinsic 
to the game. Giving an account of what is yet to be learned, an account in terms of lack 
and fault, is part of the game. Our instructor teaches us a new vocabulary, and the 
conceptuality of winning and losing, in order that we can discover for ourselves how to 
improve on the movements we make. We have to learn the zero-sum language of 
exchange as the means of appropriating the three-and-four dimensional language which 
makes it possible for us to move into the n-dimensional space of the truly proficient 
action, there to be at home. 48 Only after a lifetime of experience of individual cases 
(casuistry) do we become expert enough to improvise or to create new law and modes of 
instruction. 
The instructor offers commentary on the performance of the student until the 
student is ready to provide his own commentary. Performance and commentary inform 
46 The point of commentary - articulation - is performance of the game. Articulation is not itself the whole 
game. Reason must be understood as commentary on action in the service of better action. It must serve 
the formation of sociality and the body that supports it. 
47See3.5.2 
48 We could refer to these as 3- and n-dimensions, or as closed and open economies. The closed we might 
call the paideutic or orthopaedic economy, the open we could also call the eschatological economy. The 
orthopaedic economy is created to bring us into the eschatological economy. The eschatological economy 
creates and powers the orthopaedic economy to this end. 
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and improve each other. In the case of the people of Israel, scripture is commentan- on 
the action of the ritual. Ritual is intended to teach this people the holy action of their 
God. Ritual is commentary on scripture and on Israel's current experience, and enlarges 
Israel's reading of scripture and re-description of life. Israel is taught self-criticism. The 
vituperation of the prophets directed against Israel, which includes promises of assured 
condemnation, must be understood as the words of a coach to his team, not intended to 
be heard by outsiders. Israel is not in any real sense losing for, against God, Israel is not 
yet good enough to lose. Gradually over time there does grow an implied integrity of 
action between Israel and God. Israel makes progress, and takes on the character of 
God, because she spends time in no company other than that of her instructor. Since he 
is at her side her failure is not allowed to develop any momentum of its own. 49 Israel's 
mis-shots are identified as such, repented of, and not allowed to remain constitutive of 
her performance. 
The concept of failure - sin, in Israel's vocabulary - has a function only within 
the concept of learning and making progress in which good shots are recognised as such 
and reinforced, bad shots recognised as such and count for nothing. Though it is her 
poor use of her body that accounts for her poor performance, and all her performance 
can be traced back to a body not yet mature, yet it is not the case that Israel must wait 
until she is perfect before she may begin her proper action. It is relentless reinforcement 
of the right pattern that makes bad patterns more difficult to repeat, and which finally 
replaces them. Israel will find it difficult to remember how to play badly, finding it easier 
to make a good move than a bad one. The specific form of life of Israel does not exist 
prior to her relationship and interaction ('game') with God. It is not that God invented 
the hoops that Israel then had to leap through. Rather, Israel's mind is formed by the set 
of events and references experienced and articulated by Israel and God together. Israel 
constitutes with her God together the record and law of their relationship. 50 
A second analogy may help establish the complexity of the link between the 
doctrines of creation and reconciliation. God makes the world new by picking up and re- 
using what is to hand, without this being any the less entirely his own work. 51 Building a 
house is a relatively unproblematic business involving right-angles and uprights. Building 
a house as the means of bringing up a gang of delinquent children to adulthood on the 
49 This is the hermeneutics of 4.3.3 
50 See 3.5.2. 
51 The doctrine of creation requires two accounts, in one of which creation is ex nihilo, and in the other of 
which God wrests his creation away- from the would-be rivals, so that its creation takes the form of re- 
creation, of a battle and victory. See 4.3.2. 
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other hand would be less straightforward. For the children for whom this will be not 
only a first time building anything, but a first time for any social behaviour, the builder 
would have to combine all that the children did and undid into the simpler work of 
angles and uprights. It is not that their education is an interim goal, and the building of 
the house an ultimate goal. Neither goal can be subordinated to the other. The house 
must have the objective reality of a building, and be the place in which they can live. It 
must also, however, be the wherewithal by which they grow to be adults, and are 
provided with support that increases and decreases at every stage as appropriate to each 
learner. I will argue in Chapter 4 that the temple is that model house that prepares Israel 
for life in the house and household of God. It is not enough to say that creation is 
analogous to building a house, and bringing up the children is analogous to the work of 
reconciliation. Neither children nor house is prior: they refer to each and together point 
away from themselves to God. The doctrines of creation and reconciliation refer 
together to the doctrine of consummation. 
2.2 The child as learner. 
For a second approach to the concept of paideia let us consider the case of bringing up a 
child. Augustine produced a celebrated account of this process. According to Brian 
Stock, Augustine understood learning to be a form of passively accepting labels as it were 
from the things themselves. 52 He believed infants learn to talk, matching word for thing, 
in the same way that adults learn a second language, matching a word in the new 
language to a word in their first language. It has been an influential theory, but, as Hacker 
has shown, it is wrong. 53 We learn from the communities that bring us up, and we do not 
learn language alone, but learn language, body, sociality and world all at once. 
It is the mother's attribution of intentionality to her child that brings about the 
learning of the child. It was not the infant Augustine who strained to grasp and name, 
but his mother who named his inchoate movements as reaching and grasping, and the 
noises he made as the attempt to pronounce whatever she decided that he was reaching 
for. She rewarded his movements by the stimulus of smile and conversation, which he 
'z Stock, Brian Augustine the Reader. Meditation, Self-Knowledge and the Ethics of Interpretation Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press 1996 23-5. 
53 Hacker P. I. S. Insight and Illusion: Themes in the philosophy of Wittgenstein Oxford: Clarendon 1986,130-1; 
see also Kerr Fergus Theology after If 7ttgenstein London: SPCK 1997 38-44. 
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learned to solicit by producing the behaviour she was looking for. 54 We learn by 
prolepsis, the work of anticipation afforded not by us but by, someone else who has plans 
for us. 
Persons are available to each other only within the set of rules that has evolved 
with them, and been learned by them. The rules are learned with the relationships. 
Consequent on the relationships, we learn rules by which to abstract rules from 
relationships, and use them to build new relationships. The infant knows of no object- 
world for which to reach out, because it is not obvious to a new-born that there is a 
world, and bodies and objects: this has to be taught, and is a social business. Because his 
mother is a social animal, she interprets his movements proleptically, and so they come 
to be. World and body and mind all arrive simultaneously with our first language. There 
is no set of dualities - of body and mind, or world and thought, or world and language 
about it - that is fundamental. Such dualities are not givens of the world. They are 
heuristics. 
It is not only language that we are learning, but a way of being in our bodies, and 
by a particular idiom of being bodily, being available to each other in the world. It is not 
merely that we must learn words that we do not know in order to refer to the things that 
exist in the world, but that the utterly unformed chaotic movements of the infant body 
must be ordered into complex arrangements which we can refer to as intentionality and 
as action. The exercises taught by a sports instructor lay down specific pathways in the 
body of the learner to form a new ergonomic grammar. The pathways are this body: 
were the pathways to be taken away no body would remain. The sports analogy suggests 
that physical being is linguistic, and that language is somatic. Bodies are informed by a 
bodily grammar, and language is an additional idiom of bodily being. We use language to 
be more efficiently bodily in this or that particular respect. The conventional, and thus 
language, is always characterised by the analogue, the actual rude movement of bodies, 
and the conventional and linguistic is an emergent feature of the analogue. There is no 
gap between semantics and syntax, or between language and bodies in the world. This 
section has sketched a way of avoiding the dualism of body and mind, that renders 
unnecessary the dichotomy of material and spiritual that has informed too much modern 
54 Augustine Confessions 1.8.13. By groans and various sounds and various movements of parts of my body I 
would endeavour to express the intentions of my heart.. My grasp made use of memory: when people gave 
a name to an object and when, following the sound, they moved their 
body towards that object, I would 
see and retain the fact that that object received 
from them this sound.. their intentionality was evident from 
the gestures which are, as it were, the natural vocabulary of all races'. 
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theology. 55 The argument of this section will form the hermeneutics employed in the 
discussion of the political and cosmological theology of Israel in which there is no prior 
gap between language and bodies in the world. 
What Augustine attributed to the innate power of his infant mind belonged to 
the labour of his mother who formatted the infant into the complex space of the body- 
and-habitus she determined for him. Language is an extrapolation of the prosody of the 
movement of the bodies of our parents. 56 Our posture and our place in the social world 
is a function of their verbal correction of our posture and bodily performance. Our body 
is not merely the envelope of flesh, but the habits, regularities and institutions in which 
we are present with others. We use the idiosyncratic way in which we are in our own 
body and nearest relationships as the foundation for learning the reductive and therefore 
shareable symbol systems and rules of behaviour which make us members of institutions, 
and by which we interact with our environment. Because we learned to be precisely 
ourselves, we could increasingly easily learn to slip into the sketchier but also more 
uniform `selves' of these social bodies and routines. 57 The world is `bodies' of behaviour 
that exist in perichoretic and shifting hierarchies and ethologies. It is others who clothe 
and dress us in our bodies. 
Introducing these points here by analogies from sport and child development has 
allowed them to be made without interruption. They are important to the argument 
against the autonomy of reason and mind, and their separation from bodiliness, sociality, 
and the extended `body' of a tradition. I will establish them again in conversation with 
the cognitive science literature, where the connections between play, iteration, emulation 
and freedom will be made more explicit. We must provide a third term so the 
distinctions of body and habitus, letter and spirit, presence and absence do not become 
first dichotomies and then separate economies. This will prepare us to understand that 
one task of theology is to confront the metaphysics of will and world. 
35 In 5.7 I argue that theology must also employ and respond to a non-dualist metaphysic which 
does not 
contrast body and mind, material and spiritual. 
56 This is the argument of Terence W. Deacon The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of Language and the 
Human 
Brain Harmondsworth: Penguin 1997,364 and Horst Hendriks Jansen Catching Ourselves in the Act: Situated 
Activity, Interactive Emergence, Evolution and Human Thought Cambridge: MIT 1996,289. 
57 It is others who make us available to themselves. We are able to inform their performance and co- 
determine our availability - we can mediate. The multiple drafts theory of 
Daniel C. Dennett Consciousness 
Explained Harmondsworth: Penguin 1991,101-37, suggests that our `self is a moment of mediation 
between competing sets of others, and that our present is a provisional version made 
from many 
competing versions of time, each 
intending to make itself definitive by referring its claim to an origin. This 
I shall call the protological economy. 
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2.3 Mind as mode of embodiment 
Language is an idiom of animal behaviour. The elements of language that are most easily 
taken up by infant language-learners are the elements that become its most stable 
features. These evolve from being items of vocabulary to elements of grammar and then 
the categories in which we think. Each element of a language competes to secure its 
place in our linguistic stock by making itself indispensable to our communicating, bi 
allowing us to do so with less effort. 58 Speech is the more efficient way of moving your 
own and other bodies, and writing is a further way of economising the effort of 
embodiment. 
Julius Kovesi argues that there is no important distinction to be made between, 
say, a piece of furniture, and any other much more obviously intentional event, like an 
act of murder. We do not need to say that murder is wrong, because wrongness is part of 
the concept. It is called murder for this reason. The `sittingdownableness' of a chair is 
intrinsic to the concept. If it is called a chair, it is because it is conforms to a convention 
on what constitutes `sittingdownableness'. The chair is an article of sculptured 
intention. 59 The world is full of facts that are already structured, value-and-significance- 
laden, the result of human action, and though these facts do not constitute all facts of the 
world, they do co-determine the world. 
Herbert McCabe expands on Kovesi's argument. GO The animal vitalises and 
endows its world with significance. The world is the extension and clothing of the 
animal's body. The simple moral certainties of the pre-human animal world, the clear 
inhibitions, the fixed social structures of the animal have broken down and the human 
animal is faced with a much more complex world. Everything man shares with other 
animals is transfigured by being that part of animality that issues in language. 61 The 
linguistic animal creates its own modes of response to the environment, of constituting a 
world, so he is not the prisoner of his environment. The signal codes of animals are not 
58 Deacon The Symbolic Species 125-6,302. 
59 Julius Kovesi Moral Notions London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1967. Burrell Aquinas: God and Action 
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1979,128 asks `How can we conceive actions for what they are: the acts 
of persons? In Aquinas's analysis it is not any decision that makes this the act of a person, 
but it is by a 
`much more prosaic process whereby acts accumulate into stable principles of action, principles generically 
called habitus or dispositions, also named virtues. ' `Aquinas 
identifies a feedback process whereby actions 
not only accomplish the deed intended, but also develop a 
facility in the agent for acting likewise in the 
future. ' 
60 Herbert McCabe Law, Love and Language London: Sheed & Ward 1979,71-91. Wolfhart Pannenberg 
Anthropology in Theological Perspective Edinburgh: T&T Clark 1985,27-79 reviews the literature that attempts 
to identify what is specifically human and relate it to the Imago Dei and the vitalist tradition represented 
by 




something distinct from the rest of their bodily behaviour, but communication by bodily 
behaviour reaches a new intensity in man when it becomes language, the free structuring 
of structure that is already there. McCabe argues that the relation of action and ethical 
judgement is a question of modalities and therefore an aesthetic question. Kovesi and 
McCabe have provided us with a more Aristotelian notion of human being. ' 
Martha Nussbaum is also impressed by Aristotle's account of animal being. 
Aristotle used the concept of orexis, lunging and seizing, to describe the animal form of 
being. 63 Animals are complexes of movement. Aristotle offers accounts of animal motion 
in terms both of appetite and intention, and of muscles and sinews, keeping together 
what animals are accustomed to do with what they therefore can do. Over the long-term 
the one co-determines the other, so behaviour determines species, doing determines 
being. 64 Aristotle showed that rational and intellective action is similar to other sorts of 
animal motion, and is responsiveness not to the world as such but to the animal's own 
view of it, the species-specific world of the animal. Kovesi, McCabe and Nussbaum 
suggest that language is structure, continuous with the structure of both the moral and 
animal and therefore `natural' world, and this structure opens a particular local world. 
`Meaning' is a moving and shifting within the whole space of man's intrinsic animality 
and process of its re-definition. 65 With language mankind is not doing anything non- 
animal, but more reflexively animal. Animality consists in taking advantage of existing 
patterns of action, complexes of patterns that are navigated around, powered by a non- 
analogical, physical consumption of the resources of the animal continuum. 
As every 
animal looks for a less effortful way to be itself, we also compete to 
do what the other 
does in a single economy of emulation and competition. 66 
61 McCabe Law, Love and Language 68-78. 
62 We return to this Aristotelian notion of the virtuousity of public 
human being in 6.6. 
63 Martha C. Nussbaum The Fragility of Goodness Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1986,265,273. 
Animals are complexes of desires and appetites that combine to create simple units of emotion, motives 
and self-propulsion. 276 `The intention of orexis accomplishes several purposes 
directly. First it makes us 
focus on the intentionality of animal movement: both 
its object-directedness and its responsiveness not to 
the world simpliciter but to the animal's own view of 
it. Second it demystifies rational action by asking us to 
see it as similar as other animal motions. 
' Orexis is usually translated appetite or desire: animals are animate 
because they have anima, viva vis, propulsive force. 
64 Action results in the development of skills and faculties, or 
in Dennett's terms, the software becomes the 
hardware over the longer term. There is a dialectic between action and character, and our accounting 
for 
either must be an accounting 
for both, an accounting in two periodicies. 
65 Elaine Scarry The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the IF"orld Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 
1985,253 `Thus the hand is not only the organ of labour, it is the product of 
labour. The hand is also an 
artefact, gradually altered 
by its own activity of altering the world. ' 
66 This prepares us for the argument of 4.3.1. 
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2.4 The limits of representation. 
I have said that an account of persons requires an account of the world as the place of 
persons. The philosophy of representation however assumes a world that does not 
change, and therefore is not changed by our relationship to it. We need to find the means 
to show that the world is not changeless, and that its changing is to some degree 
determined by our action, including our action of knowing. The philosophy of 
representation conceives of our knowledge as solely a reflection of what is there, and 
allows that we owe the world no further duty than to know it. It relies on an input- 
output model that relates to the assumed priority of mind (inside) over world (outside)"67 
The philosophical tradition has assumed that an explanation of the underlying 
mechanisms of behaviour must take a Cartesian view of `inside' and `outside' and relied 
on the conceptuality of inputs and outputs and the internal representations between 
them. 68 Rom Harre, however, argues that a theory that understands everything as turn- 
taking, conversation and discursivity removes the need for a concept of mind, and for 
opposing an inside world to an outside world. He argues that we should study discourse, 
actions, interpersonal networks and historical developments, and understand that these 
are linked by norms, not by causes. 69 We cannot place intentional acts within the 
framework of causality. Human beings are simultaneously involved in two modalities, the 
modality of causality and the expressive modality of performative acts. 70 Cognition is 
conversational in character, so mental states and processes are not entities of some 
mental substance or the properties of individual brains. Our actions are what we say they 
are only because our group of language-users decides that they fit relevant norms and 
conventions. We cannot say what actions are, without there being a normative 
understanding of what they are supposed to be, thus cognition is not a matter of 
computation but of social action that aims at moral agreement. 
67 The philosophy of representation is attacked by Richard Rorty Philosophy and the 
Mirror of Nature 
Princeton: Princeton University Press 1979,7-10, and by Antonio R. Damasio Descartes's Error. Emotion, 
Reason and the Human Brain London: Macmillan 1996,243-51. 
68 The input-output model is not redundant. I suggest in 5.6-7 that we need both a discourse of 
inside and 
a discourse of outside, and then a number of other schemas altogether. 
69 Harre Berkelyan Arguments' 36-50 in Johnson , 
David M. & Erneling, Christina E. The Future of the 
Cognitive Revolution New York: Oxford University Press 1997. In her `Afterword' to The Future of the Cognitive 
Revolution Erneling argues 377 that though Descartes, Locke and Hume made mind into a separate area of 
study, Kant separated mind from epistemology, thus making psychology a separate 
field of study from 
philosophy, the pure rules of understanding and rational structures on one 
hand, and humans' bodies and 
psychological functions that could 
be studied empirically on the other. 
70 See Stanley J. Tambiah Culture, Thought and Social Action: An Anthropological perspective Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press 1985,2. 
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Harre believes cognitive science is founded on hierarchies of interpersonal 
relational structures, the units of which are acts and a hierarchy of personal skills, the 
existence of which is a necessary condition for the existence of the relational structures-11 
Meanings are immanent in networks, mental models are immanent in hierarchies of 
personal skills, so the primary cognitive reality is the array of public and interpersonal 
linguistic and practical acts. Our job is to describe these arrays of nested acts, and the 
hierarchies of skills by which persons perform acts in the carrying out of tasks. 72 Though 
people have to learn the majority of these skills, this is not behaviourism because skill is a 
normative concept, requiring a semi-permanent state of the body of the skilled person, 
and some meta-personal system of norms. Skills are located in persons, not in their 
brains. 
According to Michael Polanyi, we learn within the body of a tradition of 
knowledge. 73 The research project of pragmatics has built on Polanyi's insight. Mark 
Johnson has argued for the conceptuality of body schemas or orientation schemas to 
replace the too simple modern account of the relationship of the subject to the world he 
knows. There is no direct transition from light into our eyes to the view we receive, no 
depiction or immediacy. Johnson sees imagination as a capacity for ordering mental 
representations into unified coherent meaningful wholes. 74 We understand our progress 
by mapping states onto physical locations. Prepositions such as in, out, near, under have 
meaning only because we have an embodied notion of containment. He argues that 
metaphorical projections are not arbitrary: it is not the case that anything can be mapped 
onto anything else. 75 Words, images, spaces belong to codes that are learned. The 
concept of affordance has been used by cognitive science to describe this tradition- 
71 See Harre Berkelyan Arguments' 337, and Hendriks-Jansen Catching Ourselves in the Act 319 for a similar 
argument. 
72 Harre 'Berkeleyan arguments' 346 argues that since `discursive acts do not cause each other, a hidden 
realm of linguistic acts cannot be supposed to cause the elements that appear 
in the overt world of 
discursive acts. Mental models cannot exist as mental entities behind or transcendent to, the cognitive and 
material practices to which they are relevant, together with the open sets of rules, conventions and customs 
that define the necessary skills. ' 
73 Michael Polanyi Personal Knowledge. Towards a Post-critical Philosophy London Routledge and Kegan Paul 
1958,53-6. 
74 Johnson, Mark The Body in the Mind., The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination, and Reason Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press 1987,194,133-115. 
73 Johnson The Body in the Mind 21 argues that `from the beginning we experience constant physical 
containment in our surroundings 
(those things that envelop us). We move in and out of rooms, clothes, 
vehicles and numerous kinds of 
bounded spaces. We manipulate objects, placing them in containers (cups, 
boxes, cans, bags etc). In each of these cases there are repeatable spatial and temporal organisations. 
In 
other words, there are typical schemata 
for physical containment'. 
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embodied teleological aspect of perception. 76 J. J. Gibson argued that opportunities 
(affordances), not things, are the primitive objects of perception. 77 Animal behaviour is 
best understood in terms of alertness to opportunities for action: animals move in 
attunement with the affordances of their species-world. As we have seen, different 
animals show different degrees of complexity in their appreciation of multiplicities of 
affordances available in particular parts of the surrounding environment. Worlds (in the 
plural) of objects and events are carved out of the world (in the singular). All animals 
perceive affordances, and the human animal is better able than others to create and 
communicate subtle multiplicities of affordances in his environments. 78 To touch any 
part of this tensed environment is to release a force that closes and opens another set of 
surfaces and options. 79 These affordances are not causally related to the different 
behavioural capacities of different organisms, but are another way of expressing these 
different capacities. This ecological psychology makes no strong contrast between the 
organism and its environment, because environments are organism-indexed parts of the 
world. 
2.5 Place. Whose economy is this? 
Some account of our location in a world is required by any account of persons coming 
into being. Man is grown and eased into his place and task by the action of God. The 
human realm is the economy and work of God for us. God does not have to gain 
permission from humanity before he can enter the human realm. The human city does 
not succeed in holding out against the divine city, nor earthly and human history succeed 
in establishing any definition of humanity against God's definition of humanity. Jenson 
and Pannenberg treat space in terms of God's action, and thus in moral terms. 80 They 
76 This discussion of affordance will be taken up again in discussion of practical philosophy, the 
situatedness of knowledge, and the process of deliverance and purification required for knowledge of the 
world as God's creation that will contribute to my argument for mediation in Chapter 5. 
77 Gibson J. J. The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception Boston: Houghton Mifflin 1986; Gibson' position 
is summarised by Sanders `Affordances' in Weiss, G. & H. F. Haber Perspectives on Embodiment: 
The 
Intersections of Nature and Culture London: Routledge 1999. 
78 Frederick A. Olafson What is a Human being? A Heideggerian View Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
1995,166-7 gives a more sophisticated version of the account offered by McCabe and Nussbaum above. 
According to Pannenberg Anthropology in Theological Perspective 43 Herder's starting point in discussion of the 
origin of language is that man is peculiarly deficient, naked and unarmed, and that this accounts 
for the 
origin of the human mind. Frederick C. Beiser The Fate of Reason: German Philosophy 
from Kant to Fichte 
Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 1997,146 argues that for Herder `the mind and body are not distinct types of 
substance but different degrees of organisation and development of a single 
living power. ' 
79 I will be using this conception for my hermeneutics of scripture 
in 6.1. 
80 For more discussion see Douglas H. Knight `Jenson on time' in Colin E. Gunton 
Trinity,, Time and 
Church: A Response to the Theology of Robert IF Jenson Grand Rapids: Eerdmans 2000; Gray, Marion `Time for 
Jenson' Paper read to the Institute for Systematic Theology, King's College, London, 2002. Pannenberg, 
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understand that the human city and history have a merely provisional and propaideutic 
status that is the function of the work of the divine city and history. 81 God employs the 
earthly city for a double function. In it he keeps us, in some measure, secured in and by 
our self-deceit, so our own self-destructive ends are prevented. And God uses it despite 
us to bring us to his own end, the full freedom of the creature. In Chapter 4I shall argue 
that, for Israel, the temple is the model of the earth, and earth a model of the larger 
eschatological economy of heaven-and-earth. By practising on this model, Israel will pick 
up the skills of householding for God and his creation. She has been entrusted with a 
little, so that she may come to be entrusted with much. 
But we cannot yet give God his place. We are placed by, and contained within, 
the world of God's working, and by the same working this world is broken open. 82 In 
this world God places us before him, placed and closed by the crucifixion, and placed 
and opened by the resurrection. As Jenson points out, the Church before the sacraments 
is the location of heaven, and of Jesus, for us. 83 The God-man at the right hand of the 
Father is the source of the integrity and unity of the Church in the place and time the 
Spirit now supplies to it, and supplies to the world through it. Wannenwetsch and Hütter 
discuss the advantages of the discourse of outside, Church as polis, and show that the 
inner `natural' world of individual bodily needs, becomes in the Church the open public 
world of equal citizens. 84 The closed mechanistic economy is the falsehood we inflict on 
one another. But it has also been imposed on us by God. He subjects us to the working 
of this economy that, by enclosing and containing us, prepares us for life in a single open 
economy with God. 85 We should consider space under the concepts of action and work, 
and thus as a moral concept, and relate it to the action of bodies together. We must re- 
state the claim of the public, the outside, marketplace and public arena over the claims of 
interiority given priority in the Cartesian and Kantian tradition. We may not reject the 
Wollhart Metaphysics and the Idea of God Edinburgh: T&T Clark 1990,97 argues that Plotinus knew better 
than Augustine that time is generated by eternity, and that it is not sufficient to set the two in simple 
opposition. Edward S. Casey The Fate of Place: A Philosophical History Berkeley: University of California Press 
1997 offers a fuller historical account of the concept of space that understands space to be determined by 
relationship. 
81 Jenson Systematic Theology New York: Oxford University Press 1999 Volume 2,76-81,204-6. Pannenberg 
Systematic Theology Edinburgh: T&T Clark 1994 Volume 2,81 and Amos Funkenstein Theology and the Scientific 
Imagination from the Middle Ages to the Seventeenth Century Princeton: Princeton University Press 1986,193 
suggest that the concept of space is derived from that of spirit. 
82 In 1.2 I called this the tragic or biological hypostasis, and will refer to it in 3.7.2 as God's response to 
Adam's fall. In 4.3.3 Douglas shows that Israel represents its atonement as being given the shelter of a 
series of covers. 
83 Jenson Systematic Theology Volume 1,205. 
84 See Reinhart Hütter Suffering Divine Things: Theology as Church Practice Grand Rapids: Eerdmans 1999,158- 
71 and Bernd Wannenwetsch `The political worship of the Church' Modern Theology 12 1996. 
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discourse of inside, or of input and output, but we must also find another discourse 
which does not merely contrast outside and inside, but which understands the world as a 
function of alternation, conversation and linguisticality. 86 Next we must turn to an 
approach that gives action a role to play in the definition of place. 
2.6 Time, turn-taking and recursivity. 
Time is a register. There are many registers and many times. 87 The economy of 
modernity does not succeed in acting as a meta-time that orders them sequentially into 
one time. Time is recursive. It is the coming and going of time-schemas, a continuum of 
registers and their units. It is not simply a forward flow, but has `undercurrents, 
tributaries and reversals, floods and islands'. 88 Dennett introduces the `multiple drafts' 
model or the `scenario-spinning' model of consciousness, in which there are at any point 
in time multiple drafts of narrative fragments at various overlapping stages of editing, not 
in one place but at all places in the brain. 89 Kontopoulos sees the process of accounting 
`not as an activity that occurs after the completion of interaction -a recollective 
gathering of the meanings produced - but a constitutive process of the very interaction 
itself and of the meanings deployed in it. '9° 
If all consciousness is consciousness of something all time is the time of 
something or time for something. Time is not some thing, but some affordance, an 
opening for a happening that involves more than the individual. Two agents make time 
for each other. Time may be said to be generated by their meeting and acting together. 
Discursivity and diffuse intentionality are required to understand agency as plural and as 
the work of persons. 91 Discursivity describes the turn-taking or alternation that 
characterises conversation. Diffuse intentionality relates to the expert audience of 
85 See 6.1 
86 See 3.2.3 for Janowski's semi-closed economy of response. The brute contrast of closed and open 
economies indicates that the concepts of open and closed are no more adequate than those of presence 
and absence in accounting for the complexly asymmetrical nature of the relationship of God with man. 
87 See 5.7. Dalferth Gedeutete Gegenwart: Zur Wahrnehmung Gottes in den Erfahrungen der Zeit Tübingen: Mohr 
Siebeck 1997,239 `Die Zeit gibt es nicht, nur eine Vielfalt von Zeiten'. For discussion of time as many 
registers, see Alfred Gell The Anthropology of Time: Cultural Constructions of temporal maps and images Oxford: 
Berg 1992 and John Bender & David E. Wellbery Chronotypes: The Construction of Time Stanford, California: 
Stanford University Press 1991. 
88 Gallagher, Shaun The Inordinance of Time Evanston: Northwestern University Press 1998,200. 
89 Dennett Consciousness E. <plained 126-34. 
90 Kontopoulos, Kyriakos Al. The Logics of Social Structure Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1993,99. 
genrtein London: Routledge 1998 makes the 91 Simon Glendinning On Being with Others Heidegger-Dernda-Vitt 
philosophical case for discursivity and diffuse intentiuonality; Bradd Shore, Bradd Culture in Mind: Cognition, 
Culture and the Problem of Meaning New York: Oxford University Press 1996 makes the social anthropological 
case. 
40 
commentators whose participation gives mere movement the significance of the action 
of persons. 
2.7 Plural action. 
I have been arguing for a plural, trinitarian concept of agency that will allow for the 
pneumatology which I will develop in Chapters 3 and 4. Our action is action only when 
it is the work of two, and it is the work of two only when an appropriate audience is 
convinced by this work, so in any account of action, a third party constituted by an 
expert audience is required. Speech-acts are acts of agreeing and contracting that make 
up the whole action that constitutes the world. 
2.7.1 The expert audience. 
I suggested in 1.3 that we demand an account of each other. We demand from the other 
whatever account he can give of the world and himself. Accounts of the world and of 
each other are what we give one another. This exchange of accounts is the idiom in 
which relationship is articulated. ' Our complex covenants of reciprocal account-giving 
are both to be entertaining and hospitable, and to grip and hold us captive. We demand 
to be enraptured by whatever story the other has to tell. All action involves convincing 
an appropriate audience of your action, by established routines of demonstration until 
this audience signals its acknowledgement. ' Such exchange and acknowledgement of 
accounts are the means whereby we enter contracts and create business relationships. 
The event of a contract is inseparable from the process of the creation of a 
narrative, and records of that narrative, and symbols that are abbreviated forms of those 
records and that narrative. But symbols, formalities and ritual are not secondary. 94 
Making a public contract involves the manipulation of symbols and employment in ritual 
of a number of tokens. Records on paper, or in the ancient world, blood, are what make 
an occasion not only memorable, but a binding contract. The minutiae of terms set down 
92 For this claim see Dalferth in 3.2.3. 
93 Bourdieu Language and Symbolic Power Oxford: Polity 1991,77 `Utterances receive their value (and their 
sense) only in relation to a market'. 
94 Contracts in the ancient world created the sense of occasion by the employment of animals and their 
blood. Sacrifice was in the ancient world the mode of making contracts. Such ritual is documented for 
ancient sacrifices by Burkert Greek Religion: Archaic and 
Classical Oxford: Blackwell 1985. Victor Turner 
Dramas, Fields and Metaphors SymbolicAction in Human Society Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1974, pioneered 
an anthropological literature on performance and ritual: 
Mary Carruthers The Book of Memory: A Study of 
Memoy in Medieval Culture Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1990 and Paul Connerton How Societies 
Remember Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1989 summarise the literature on the art and technology 
of pre-modern memory. 
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on paper are a public demonstration by the two parties to the witnessing and sponsoring 
community of the earnestness of their intent. The gesturing with these various props and 
tokens is intended to create a narrative that will win an audience that will ensure that the 
contract is subsequently honoured. The audience bound by this narrative is the guarantor 
of the contract. The paperwork and other ritual of the contract are the means with which 
this community is gathered and the contract is written, we might say, on the memory of 
the community that witnesses and judges it binding. 95 The action of the lawcourt is 
casuistry, the discussion of case histories. In court the two sides offer analogies from 
previous cases: when these are accepted as analogies by the court, they argue from them. 
Argument (logic) follows analogy (analogic, narrative). 
The domination of the philosophy of reflection has resulted in our failure to 
understand ourselves within skeins of expectation and involvement. But philosophy and 
theology have not remained in conversation with the law faculty, which does understand 
that we make things happen by contracting and making oaths. The result is that these 
disciplines, along with social science, have had to look for other ways to prevent that 
action that cannot be reduced to the individual from appearing simply incomprehensible 
and irrational. The interest in speech acts and the concept of perlocution is an attempt to 
show how words are binding and constitute valid contracts and acceptable sacrifices 
while on another occasions, identical words are not. 96 What to the Victorians looked like 
primitive and superstitious attempts to manipulate the world or its gods should instead 
be seen in the much more mundane terms of commercial interaction. 97 The sacrificing of 
ancient societies was speech-act by which they performed the very same chores of 
economic and institutional encounter we do. The concept of speech-act serves to 
represent the binding and contracting effect of all public performance and which creates 
9' In 3.4.2 I discuss the performative hermeneutic of `echoes' and `resonances' presently being constructed 
by some New Testament scholars. This relies on a single world-fabric of explanatory memes set in 
narrative and teleology, an affective continuum that is a function of all that is said within it. I will ask 
whether they realise that what they hold to be the case for the ancient world (in which Jesus told parables 
and performed symbols), is also true for our world. I ask whether New Testament scholarship has any right 
to a theory of symbol unconnected to a narrative and cosmology that belongs to Israel's creation theology, 
or that does not also hold good for us moderns. The modem world equally consists of the exchange of 
narratives and abbreviated narratives, record and symbols - albeit that the narrative of modernity is about 
the end of narrative, the loss of symbols. I discuss this thesis of disenchantment, secularisation and the 
collapse of mediation in Chapter 5. 
96 See John R. Searle Expression and Meaning Studies in the Theory of Speech-acts Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 1979,1-29 for a statement. 
9' See the discussion of Frank Cioffi IYlittgenstein on Freud and Frager Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
1998,80-92. 
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all public relationships. 98 Language is in itself sets of laws regularities. It is the tissue of 
attachment, connectedness, and contract, and is thus the medium of public performance. 
The discussion by hermeneutics of speech-acts represents ignorance of the legal and 
commercial discourse of oaths and trust. It is of a piece with the failure of modern 
theology to conceptualise the plurality and therefore the situatedness of human 
interaction, and which has therefore made resort to the concept of metaphor to fill the 
gap. 99 
2.7.2 The turn to performance. 
To achieve this more active ontology that understands action as dramaturgy we may 
perhaps say that the actor on stage shows the audience its own action, and that the 
audience recognises itself in the actor's performance. 100 The actor shows the audience its 
action complete with its result, and demonstrates that it never manages to complete an 
action without interrupting it with another. The unforeseen continually interrupts our 
action. Our action consists of adopting and discarding again a succession of behavioural 
memes, with the result that all our action comes to nothing. 101 We claim that our action 
is exclusively our own. But the actor's performance shows that he can repeat what we do, 
and since we cannot show that we succeed in out-doing the other man by doing what he 
98 Law is what language does. Reason is what language does. Language is not in the first place representation 
(reflection) and only secondarily and more problematically performance and (speech-)act. Bindingness is an 
equation of attraction and repulsion that creates the tension by which the whole is held together. 
Tim W. Murphy The Oldest Social Science? Configurations Of Law and Modernity Oxford: Clarendon 1997 
106 argues that trust is a matter of `implicature'. This has had to be laboriously established by Austin and 
Searle by appeal to Wittgenstein. Ochs, Peter `Rabbinic Pragmatism' in Marshall, Bruce Theology in Dialogue: 
Essays in Conversation with George Lindbeck Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press 1990 establishes the link 
between scripture and law. Anthony C. Thiselton Interpreting God and the postmodern self on meaning, manipulation 
and promise Edinburgh: T&T Clark 1995, Sue Patterson Realist Christian Theology in a Postmodern Age 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1999 and Kevin Vanhoozer Is there a Meaning in this Text? The bible, 
the reader and the morality of literary knowledge Leicester: Apollos 1998, along with that majority of theological 
discussion of hermeneutics that does not connect speech-acts and law, represent the failure of biblical- 
theological hermeneutics to understand itself also as political-theological hermeneutics, a failure I discuss in 
Chapters 5 and 6. 
99 See 4.6. 
100 The actor has licence to look to imitate, parody and frighten us. James W. Fernandez 
Persuasions and 
Performances: The play of tropes in culture Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1986 and Erving Goffman 
Interaction Ritual: Essays on Face-to-Face Behaviour Doubleday, Anchor Books 1967 and The Presentation of Self in 
Everyday Life Doubleday, Anchor Books 1959 for discussion of the use the conceptuality of actor, audience 
and dramaturgy in daily life. 
101 Charles L. Griswold Adam Smith and the Virtues of Enlightenment Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
1999,109 argues that `without a mask we cannot be actors either to ourselves or to others, and 
do not exist 
as human or moral selves. In this sense 
human life is fundamentally theatrical. It is not simply that we 
cannot be known as we really are; 
it is that we are not unless we are known by the spectator. ' Further 
support for Griswold's case can 
be found in Michael Billig Arguing and Thinking A RhetoricalApproach to 
Social Psychology Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1987 49-53; Christopher P. Smith The Hermeneutics 
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cannot do, our claim that our action is ours exclusively, fails. All drama is parody of life. 
The point of all drama is to wrench its audience into new realisation of the limits of their 
own action. 
We see in Chapter 3 that what members of Israel did in the temple can be 
understood as the mode of the formation of the house of Israel, and in Chapter 4 that on 
the cross one member of Israel performed this to the satisfaction of God. 102 By God's 
better performance towards us in the single dramaturgical economy he maintains for us, 
we are shamed into leaving behind our inept action and imitating his virtuoso action. 
God out-acts us, and so draws us into his more convincing performance so that it 
becomes truly our own. 
Practical knowledge is the medium of knowledge, and the aesthetic is the mode 
of practical knowledge. We are driven to seek a mode that will allow greater economy of 
effort. In knowledge too, we are driven to find an easier way. Theological and 
philosophical enquiry that insists on looking for a new and specific telos for each action 
does not allow for the frivolity and indifference of the greater part of our doing. Most of 
our activity has no particular rationale but only the general rationale of all performance - 
that it feels good and looks good. We should ask not why, for what specific reason, but 
how? How well is it done? With what success? The question of how holds good for the 
whole effort of the formation and education of the body and so for the sphere of public 
interaction and politics. Good politics, in the form of new opportunities for the 
formation of the body, arise in the medium of emulation and competition in which all 
our mundane contracting together takes place. We must resist the impulse to examine 
every move only under the twin concepts of truth and good, but also employ the 
aesthetic as the category of work, efficiency and purposes. 103 This prepares us for 
Augustine's comparison of two regimes and modes in Chapter 6. 
All the forms of action by which we hold ourselves together and negotiate our 
way through moral space were formed by the social body into which we have grown. 104 
Those body schemas that the community ceases to name come to determine that 
community. They devolve into the dichotomies of inner and outer, and higher and lower, 
of OriTinalArument. " Demonstration, Dialectic, Rhetoric Evanston: Northwestern University Press 1998,97,236- ,g 
42, and Alfred Gell Art and Agency: An Anthropological Theory Oxford: Clarendon 1998,14-23,99-104. 
102 We will discuss narrative and enthralment in 3.2 and 4.5 in the issue of who may read the scriptures and 
4.5, and in 3.1 and 3.5 on Israel's liturgy and sacrificial office of Israel. 
103 The concepts of the aesthetic and efficiency relate to the discussion of fit, bodily effort and the single 
continuum of emulation. 
104 According to Robert W. Jenson `You Wonder Where the Body Went' in Essays in the Theology of Culture 
Grand Rapids: Eerdmans 1995,221 `What bodies really are, is availabilities that enable freedom. ' 
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that derive from the priority given to the one over the many in the protological ontology. 
The Christian community has to bring such body schemas back into public thought, 
keep them in use and continually re-integrated into the social body. 105 I will use the 
resources sketched in this chapter to argue that the forms of action of the economy of 
modernity have given all our movements a crampedness that God does not intend for his 
creature. God calls us into a larger territory. This allows us to say that we resist being 
moved beyond the familiar bounds of nature and necessity into the larger place of God. 
Apart from this commandeering by God, all our pathways and orientations become 
cosmologies and paganisms, forms of the recalcitrant and merely animal life. In Chapters 
3 and 4I will argue that under God's direction, and with his enabling, Israel obediently 
builds the house where she may be with him. In building this model she learns God's 
action. Israel learns to pull down rival constructions, redeeming the earth from other 
claimants to make it the creature and creation of the one God. This destruction and 
building are a single act. Israel's address to the gentiles is always a commandeering and 
abuse of their conceptuality, but by sketching the new creation over the old, 
Israel points 
to its redemption and looks forward to a new being. 
105 Hegel insisted that they have to be thought and re-thought, and when 
they are not re-animated bý 




God and his servant and their work. 
This chapter sets out a discussion of God's freedom to be for us, with us and really to 
determine us for himself. It offers an account of atonement. It does not discuss the 
oneness of God apart from his determination to make us one with him. Making one is an 
action of God, that has the double form of distinguishing and reconciling, separating and 
bringing together. I will not therefore tackle the issue of models and metaphors of 
atonement in a separate discussion. This would then require a further and disastrously 
separate discussion of metaphor and religious language, and so the reinforcement of a 
sphere of distinctly religious concerns. Instead I will continually relate hermeneutical 
issues back to the doctrine of God, referring the issue of what scripture says to the issue 
of the community to whom scripture is addressed. In Chapter 6I will argue that only the 
doctrines of God and of creation secure for us a world which is one, and in which 
therefore we can know, and be known by, one another. I do this here in terms of the 
Jewish and Christian discussion, and thus through the issue of supersession and salvation 
history. I recount the history of Israel and the Church as the one ongoing work of God, 
and relate this single salvation history to the concept of time. This will take the form not 
of an examination of the scriptures themselves but of the range of resources that biblical 
studies are able to provide for theological questions. 
Israel is the work of God on the world of his creation, and the medium of that 
work, apart from which there is no knowledge of God. Israel is the election of 
humanity 
by God to the office of steward of creation, and to leadership of the peoples of the 
world. The nations have no means to know the identity of Israel and her 
God other than 
through the people God elects for this purpose. 
3.1.1 God and his servant. 
We turn to the issue of God and his servant, and God and his work. The freedom of the 
creature is the purpose of God, and the concepts of person and creature allow us to talk 
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about this purpose. The creature is in relationship with God; creatureliness therefore 
represents a high status, not a low one. But we do not yet have the full status of creature. 
The question of the identity of God's creature and agent must be referred to God, not 
the agent. To answer it by referring to the agent would be to divide God from his 
messenger, and to turn the messenger back on the grounds that he is not God himself. 
But God allows no identification of himself apart from the one race of people he has 
chosen: inasmuch as they are his property and have his Name, they are the agent of God 
for us. It would be wrong to say they are him if that is all we said, but with the trinity we 
have the conceptuality to provide two distinct but simultaneous accounts of God's action 
in order to demonstrate its freedom. 
Is God still Yahweh, the God of Israel? Have Yahweh and his servant been 
engaged from the beginning in a work that has never ceased to be successful? Or should 
we say in more supersessionist mode that the time of the many generations recorded in 
the Old Testament was just the passing of so many generations that have now vanished? 
Though this time might have been productive, as it turned out it was not, because, 
though God always expected Israel finally to spring into life, Israel never did. Is it a story 
of delay and final failure? This is how it may seem if time is understood as a stuff that, at 
least in dealing with men, God has to endure. But God does not endure time as 
something that sprang from some other and rival source, but rather himself makes time, 
and gives it its telos. Indeed it is not properly time until it is united with its telos. In this 
case we can say that the Old Testament was both the real time of God and Israel 
together, and that it is their continuing time. It is not past, but is the ongoing time in 
which Israel is borne to adulthood and the full office of creature and servant. 
Some scholarship identifies the trinity as the concept that separates Christians 
from Jews. It assumes that the way to Jewish-Christian dialogue is to emphasise 
monotheism and play down the doctrine of the trinity. James Dunn tells us that 
`Christianity is only Christianity when it is monotheistic. Only so can Christians remain 
true to their roots, to their heritage within the religion of Israel. '1 Francis Watson 
counters, `If "monotheism" here refers to a view on which Jews and Christians agree, 
over against classical Christian trinitarianism, these statements would 
have to be reversed. 
Christianity is only Christianity when it is trinitarian. Only so can Christians remain true 
1 James D. G. Dunn ed The Parting of the Ways between Christianity and Judaism and their Significance for the 
Character of Christianity London: SCM 1991,247. The `Parting of the Ways' 
debate identifies supersessionism 
as error but continues to rely on the concepts the error 
has created. It is an inverse supersessionism, in 
which some anachronistically-defined temporally-static community 
(Christianity) is guilty of causing the 
break of which it is the product. 
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to their Jewish roots and to the Jewish scriptures within their canon. A `Christian' 
unitarianism is not a Christian faithfulness to Jewish roots and scripture. '2 I will argue 
with Watson that the trinity is the doctrine that puts Christians together with Jews. 
There were many Judaisms, some inherited by Judaism, some by Christianity. 3 It 
was only with regard to what it called Christianity that Judaism insisted that it was one 
Judaism and not many. Likewise Christianity insisted it was one only with regard to what 
it called Judaism. Considered apart, they make two. But apart from Israel, the Church 
may not confess itself one. The unity of each community is the function of the indivisible 
work of God. Each side played up the differences, and claimed that the other party had 
moved away from its origin. In actuality neither side took anything away from the other, 
or made it impossible for the other to make proper use of the scriptures. What in the 
Apologists' period became Christian theology was not a fixed quantity but competition 
for the resources of scripture. Patristic and conciliar theology did not arise as part of a 
growing away from Jewish resources or living from its `own' resources, but as a continual 
process of the rising to expression of Israel's scriptures as address to the world. 
3.1.2 Election 
The doctrine of the election of the Jews was returned to the centre of dogmatics by Karl 
Barth. 4 God is faithful and worthy of trust to the extent that he continues his promise to 
this people. Eugene Rogers wants to take Barth's project on by supplementing his 
biblical pair of election-rejection with the Spirit. 5 `To identify God by the Holy Spirit is 
to refuse to abstract from God's concrete self-determination to be for Israel. '6 
Z Francis Watson Text and Truth: Redefining Biblical Theology Edinburgh: T&T Clark 1997,329n. 1 8. 
3 Jacob Neusner `Judaism and Christianity in the First Century' in Philip R. Davies & Richard T. White 
Essays on Jewish and Christian Literature and History Sheffield: JSOT Press 1990 254. The analogies of 
quarrelling siblings or failed marriage rely on the prior existence of more than one entity. It seems much 
safer to start with Neusner from the point that what we have too casually called Judaism was always a 
coalition of parties - judaisms - gathering round competing readings of the Scriptures, readings that could 
not be reduced to a single canonical version. 
4 Barth Church Dogmatics IV, 3 edited by G. W. Bromiley & T. F. Torrance Edinburgh: T&T Clark 1961,878 
`Thus it (the Church) still owes everything to those (the Jews) to whom it is indebted for everything. ' 
5 Eugene Rogers `Supplementing Barth on Jews and Gender' Modern Theology 14,1998,61 believes Barth is 
the `father of many late twentieth century doctrines of Israel that improve on him'. Wolfgang Kraus Das 
Volk Gottes Zur Grundung des Ekklesiologie bei Paulus WUNT 85 Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck 1996 356 agrees: 
`Die paulinische Gottesvolk-Konzeption im Rahmen der Rechtfertingungslehre - wie sie im Rom begegnet 
- ist die einzige 
Konzeption innerhalb des NT, die fähig ist, das Problem Israel-Heiden so zu lösen, daß die 
Einheit des Gottesvolkes gewahrt und zugleich beiden Seiten Rechnung getragen wird, d. h, sowohl die 
Berechtingung des christlichen Selbsverständnisses als endzeitliches Gottesvolkes als auch die bleibende 
Erwählung Israels als Volk, dem Gott sich unerlöslich verbunden hat, ihr Recht behalten. ' 
6 Rogers `Supplementing Barth' 62 argues that '[F] or Gentiles redemption is the plot, consummation the 
denouement; for Jews consummation is the main plot, redemption the subplot, the outcome of which is 
never in real doubt. ' 
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Consummation, not redemption is the model for Israel. The power of Jesus Christ is an 
abstraction if not bound to the act of a particular community. Barth avoids an 
abstraction from Christ but abstracts from the Spirit. Though God has a particular 
relation to Israel, Barth cannot make plain what it is, because he does not show that 
God's relationship to the Jewish people is ongoing. The `Old Testament in abstracto' for 
Barth, is the `passing' form of the human being, and to the extent that for Barth the 
Synagogue is that which human beings need to be saved from, it is Spirit-bereft. Jenson 
proposes as supplement to Barth's `Jesus Christ is the electing God', that `the Holy Spirit 
is the electing God'. 7 Barth's recovery of typology, in the form of pairs of election- 
rejection, man-woman and Jew-Gentile, made possible the recovery of the whole Old 
Testament for christology. Rogers wants to supplement each of these with the Spirit as a 
third term, for it is not individuals but community, this specific community, that is elect. 8 
We should then identify God not by focusing on Jesus Christ as individual, but on Jesus 
and the community the Holy Spiritgives to him. By doing so we refuse to abstract from God's 
concrete self-determination to be for Israel. 
Kendall Soulen identifies three forms of supersessionism. Economic 
supersessionism is the idea that from the beginning God's purpose for carnal Israel in the 
economy of salvation was destined to be fulfilled and completed by Christ's coming, 
after which its place was to be taken by the Church. Punitive supersessionism is the idea 
that God has abrogated the covenant with Israel in anger because of Israel's rejection of 
the gospel. Structural supersessionism refers to the classical ordo salutis (the creation-fall- 
redemption-consummation pattern) that is present whenever the Old Testament does 
not shape Christian doctrine. 
Barth repudiated structural and punitive supersessionism, and made God's 
election of Israel central to God's faithfulness. But he is still vulnerable to the latent 
semi-Gnosticism of the classical model in which redemption tends to mean deliverance 
from history. Soulen wants to see `the classical account of trinitarian relations originating 
from the Father... supplemented by relations originating from the eschatological 
dominion of the Holy Spirit. '10 He declares that `the name Jesus (Y'shua) means 
7 Jenson `You wonder where the Spirit went' Pro Ecclesia 2/3 1993. 
8 Rogers `Supplementing Barth' 70 Barth's I-Thou categories `hide the presence of third parties and the 
mediation of disciples, crowds and 
friends. Christ promises to be with human beings not each individually 
but when two or three are already gathered in his name. ' 
9 Kendall Soulen `Karl Barth and the Future of the God of Israel' Pro Ecclesia 6.4,1997 
10 Soulen K. `YHWH the Triune God' Modern Theology 15 1999,44. 
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"YHWH saves"', and that this has been interpreted since Irenaeus in a trinitarian sense. 11 
Soulen concludes that `The name Jesus Christ may thus not unreasonably be said to 
contain internal reference to the name YHWH and to the triune shape of the evangelical 
history as this history is packed into the title Christ. '12 The resurrection is the resurrection 
not of an individual but of Israel, and by it Israel is vindicated and established. Soulen 
asks two questions. Can Christians concede that God's election of Israel, and the 
consequent distinction between Israel and the nations, is as permanently relevant to 
God's consummation of the world - past present, future - as for instance, the distinction 
between Creator and creature? Can Christians see the two scriptures without claiming 
that the Old Testament is `exhausted by or even primarily located in its reference to 
Jesus'? 13 
Robert Jenson also argues that God is himself a participant in Israel's history. 
`What the Lord does to Israel he does to himself, in that the shekinah shares Israel's lot 
and the Lord's being'. 14 The angel to Abraham, for example `is a messenger `op God 
who nevertheless refers to God in the first person. He is God himself as a participant 
within Israel's story, who is nevertheless related to God as the one who sends him and 
who determines Israel's story. '15 Jenson's approach prevents the Old Testament being 
reduced to the New Testament by a promise-and-fulfilment pattern. `Until the Last 
Judgement and our resurrection, ' says Jenson, `Christ has not yet come in the way that 
fully consummates Israel's history. '16 The New Testament can be understood not only as 
a reading of the Old Testament, but as the reading made by the One who may open the 
scroll. 17 But this Reader is not here, so the New Testament is that reading in which God 
has left us to go elsewhere, there to prepare a place for us. This argument is supported by 
Douglas Farrow, who insists that the ascension and thus the withdrawal of Jesus is the 
11 Basil On the Holy Spirit, quoted by Soulen 46 agrees: `To address (Jesus as the Christ) is a complete 
confession of faith, because it clearly reveals that God anoints the Son (the Anointed 
One) with the 
unction of the Spirit. ' 
12 Soulen `YHWH the Triune God' 44-5; see also Seitz, Christopher Word Without End: The Old Testament as 
Abiding Theological Witness Grand Rapids: Eerdmans 1998,234. 
13 Soulen `Karl Barth and the Future of the God of Israel', 427. 
i4 Jenson Systematic Theology Volume 1 New York: Oxford University Press 1997,76 With the phrase `the 
Shekinah', the rabbis gathered a whole range of biblical discourse that speaks of God as `settled' to and 
within Israel while not ceasing to stand over Israel. ' 
15 Jenson Systematic Theology Volume 1,76. 
16 Jenson Systematic Theology Volume 2,336; Soulen `YHWH the Triune God' argues that Jenson has not 
gone far enough. In his `eagerness to underscore the claim that the 
Trinity is the distinctively Christian way 
of identifying God (up to the claim that 
Father, Son and Holy Spirit constitute God's proper name), Jenson 
fails to give the name YHWH the significance that 
it achieved in Barth's thought. ' Jenson `historicizes the 
God of Israel on the one hand, and turns 
it into the instantiation of a metaphysical truth on the other. ' The 
name `Jesus' is the 
divine name in the phrase `Yahweh saves'. 
17 See 6.1 
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major teaching of the New Testament. He is not here - he is ascended. `Worse than the 
world's ignorance of Jesus's absence. . . is the Church's failure to proclaim the absence 
clearly, to witness in its every act of worship that it really is `looking for his coming again 
with power and great glory'. ' Jesus is seated at the right hand of the Father, from where 
he has released to us his Spirit, and by him sends his own spiritual flesh to clothe us-18 
Some biblical scholarship has responded to the issue of the relationship of 
Church and Israel by downplaying the doctrine of God, election and atonement. As we 
shall see, some of the discussion that stresses the centrality of the people of Israel also 
tends to minimise Israel's cult, or not to allow discussion of the cult to meet dogmatic 
talk of representation and substitution or of Israel's ongoing action and office. 
3.1.3 The trinity as the concept of God, his servant and his work. 
The Torah is given to Israel to become her native language. For the gentiles brought by 
baptism into Christ though, it is a language they have to learn. Because it was not their 
first language they had to discover its grammar for themselves. In making the Torah 
explicit to themselves, the Christians realised that the grammar of the dealings of God 
with Israel is plural, non-periodic and open. Because the Torah concerns God's lordship 
and the future he has for us, it is not determined simply by what is past. Since Israel 
never had to learn the grammar of their language the hard way, they did not make 
explicit to themselves that God is speaker and listener, commander and obeyer. In each 
case he is also the means of this speaking and listening, commanding and obeying, that is 
the language spoken, the medium shared and inhabited. This logic may be called 
trinitarian. 
The doctrine of God the Creator is a doctrine about God who is with his 
creature. The Trinity is the conceptuality by which we can express this. 19 Barth 
insisted 
that the covenant of election is the internal basis of the covenant of creation to this 
end. 2° On the basis of natural theology, creation is a synonym 
for existence: on such a 
natural basis we believe that we already know, prior to the gospel, what a creature 
is and 
that God cannot be one. But creation is a doctrine taught and confessed 
by the Church: 
it is not a statement about what is, or what is visible, but about what will 
be the case 
18 Douglas Farrow Ascension and Ecclesia Edinburgh: T&T Clark 1999,272. 
19 There is no prior difference between God with his creature, and 
God who is that creature whom God is 
with. The difference 
between with-creature (relation) and is-creature (beinj) is a difference that is established 
by God's creating action, not one prior to creation. 
I argued for such a relational ontology in Chapter 1. 
20 Barth Church Dogmatics Volume III. 1 § 41. 
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about the world. 21 The doctrine of creation is that the world is someone's piece of 
property. The question is not therefore what is the nature of this piece of property, but 
whose property it is? What is the character of its owner? 
This allows us to say that Israel is the only people holy enough to recognise the 
mediator between man and God. It takes the Son (Israel) to know the Father. The Father 
has been everywhere at work, but to know him and recognise him requires co-familiarity 
with him. By the Spirit the Son gets the practice and acquires the skill correctly and 
obediently to return to God that recognition. Israel hides from the office of lord that is 
hers, and yet the Church must confess that this hiding is an option that Israel finally 
turns from. Each generation of Israel has produced those who watched for the coming 
of the bridegroom: in their priestly performance they have obediently witnessed to him, 
learned the name to call him by, and prayed for his return to Israel. In the form of the 
high priest, the Son has always been at work, working and serving the Father. God is a 
member of Israel. 22As this member God is responsible, and of course also solely 
responsible, for Israel's faithfulness, holiness and survival. So we can say that God is 
always with and among Israel. The Spirit is always at work to make Israel holy and her 
election good. In Jesus the Spirit succeeded in making one single instance of Israel, one 
man who is man with God. By making copies of this obedient Son, the Spirit will 
succeed in making many sons for Abraham. This is the outcome of reading the Old and 
New Testaments as the single testament of the triune God. 
In response to this challenge to show more adequately the plural aspect of the 
electing action of God this thesis attempts to let the concept of Israel function as a 
pneumatology. This requires that we do not attempt to speak theologically of Israel apart 
from her king and her head, or of God apart from the one and the many whom he has 
made the means of his self-revelation to us. Christ is totus Christus, Christ-with-his-people, 
and Christ with the Spirit and by the Spirit. There will therefore be no explicit statement 
21 This is argued by I. U. Dalferth `Creation - Style of the world' International 
Journal for Systematic Theology 1, 
1999. 
22 Jenson Systematic Theology Volume 1,83 explains that there must be a `difference between an Israelite who 
stands over against Israel and the people without whom this one is not 
himself... Were there only a singular 
creature who in his own person as `one of the Trinity', in his instance, the 
difference between God and 
creature would simply be abolished; but, in that the one person 
is the one he is only as identified with a 
community whose members are not, in their singular persons, 
identities of God, the one Israelite's 
membership in God in fact sustains the difference 
between God and creature. ' An Aristotelian logic of 
either-or is (necessary but) not sufficient 
for theological statements involving relation, perichoresis and 
transformation. N. Appel Kanon und Kirche 376 argues that `Das Selbstbewußtsein 
der Kirche ist schließlich 
das Selbstbewußtsein desganZen Christus, des Hauptes und Leibes', quoted by John Webster `The dogmatic 
location of the canon' Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie 
43,1 2001,27. The self 
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about whether human or divine Israel is being referred to, but where the one is referred 
to the other must be understood. This pneumatological discourse is of course not a 
sufficient discourse. It must be accompanied by a separate discourse that employs the 
language of two natures, to distinguish the human from the divine, and creature from 
Creator. The distinction between God and man is driven by God-who-is-with-man, the 
Father who keeps the Son, clothed as creature, at his right hand. Pneumatological 
discourse enables the discourse of Father and Son, and of persons therefore. 
3.1.4 The attempt to separate Israel and Jesus. 
The Old Testament addresses itself to the many societies that come into confrontation 
with it, and the New Testament is the way it does S0.23 Much biblical scholarship 
however treats the New Testament as a separate and autonomous testament. Such 
scholarship deals with the first century in ignorance of all previous and subsequent 
centuries, as though in the first century alone Israel had to start to articulate her 
relationship with the world. But Israel has seen many empires, and the Old Testament is 
her considered response to them: it expresses her knowledge of herself as steward of the 
world and of her mandate to rule it. I will ask whether exegesis can read Israel's 
scriptures as political-cosmological world-claim, and understand the public and 
performative nature of Israel's action as one that anticipates and practises a new 
economy of action. That biblical exegesis which makes Israel's rites, purity teaching, 
sacrifice and temple problematic serves only to render invisible the action given to Israel 
for our sake. 
I will argue that Jesus is the messiah who makes all Israel messiah, a single entity 
that takes its identity from him. With his people Israel Jesus is the oneness and 
indivisibility of God in his work. God's work and being are not divided into before Jesus 
and after him. If it were, Jesus would represent the division and therefore the destruction 
of God's work. Historical criticism identified Jesus as the first individual, and we must 
therefore ask whether it has not used Jesus to separate God from his work. New 
Testament scholarship that does not allow the unity of Christ and Israel would be in 
continuity with the unitarian christomonist theology of Jesus spirituality that seeks an 
awareness of the church is ultimately the self-awareness of the whole 
Christ, head and body. Christ is 
determinative of the awareness and self-awareness of his body. He is its understanding of what (who) 
it is. 
23 Markus Bockmuehl Revelation and Mystery in Ancient Judaism and Pauline Christianity Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans 1997,124 argues that `[N]ew and Old stand in a reciprocal relationship: new revelation is always 
meta-revelation, given shape and texture 
by a charismatic reading of the old; yet once accepted and 
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individual. This scholarship would be looking for someone it has decided does not 
belong to his people or they to him, an individual subject of narrative (Jesus) or notional 
individual author of narrative (Paul). It would be searching the first century for the 
pioneer of twentieth century man. 24 On this basis Jesus would be the first of many men- 
without-relation, the sure object of science who, to be identified, must be separated again 
by historical criticism from the crowd he gathers around him. 25 Such a New Testament 
studies would be unitarian: it would incline to separate Jesus from Israel because it 
refuses to take with him the manyness of the hands employed by the Word of God, with 
the effect of creating a new time - Modernity - defined in contrast to the time of God for 
Israel. It would tend to resist the claim that Jesus is the messiah whose world-rule all 
Israel participates in. I shallrather argue that Jesus, with his people Israel, is the oneness 
and indivisibility of God in his work. 
3.1.5 Wyschogrod and Segal on the incarnation. 
For Michael Wyschogrod `the divinity of Jesus is.. . 
incompatible with true monotheism. ' 
Wyschogrod is of course right to say `there cannot be any individual.. . whose relationship 
to God is unilateral ... with the people of Israel not being the decisive presence serving as 
the purpose of the relation. '26 But this is no basis for saying that God, who is not alone, 
accorded its rightful status, this new disclosure becomes in turn instrumental for the understanding of the 
old, the `proto-revelation'. ' 
24 Making this accusation are for example Stephen C. Neill & N. T. Wright The Interpretation of the New 
Testament 1861-1986 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1988; NT The New Testament and the People of 
God London: SPCK 1992,6-28; Francis Watson Text, Church and World: Biblical Interpretation in Theological 
Perspective Edinburgh: T&T Clark 1994,30-45 and Watson Text and Truth: Redefining Biblical Theology 
Edinburgh: T&T Clark 1997,127-68. Marius Reiser Jesus and Judgement: The Eschatological Proclamation in its 
Jewish Context Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1997,161argues that `[T]he decision of the individual for one or 
other group (that determines one's eschatological lot) assumes greater significance; indeed this is the first 
moment at which such a thing is demanded at all. Liberal Protestantism, however, saw precisely in this the 
unique character of Jesus's message. ' Susannah Heschel Abraham Geiger and the Jewish Jesus Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press 1998,223 points out that `[T]he Jesus of past hundred years has been 
portrayed primarily in opposition to the allegedly materialistic, superficial and even oppressive Judaism of 
his day, in recent years Jesus has been portrayed as opposing the Jewish laws of ritual purity. ' 
25 It is certainly true that, as Ian McFarland `Christ, Spirit and Atonement' International Journal of Systematic 
Theology 3.1 2001 86 argues, that `[I]f Jesus is to be confessed as fully human, his actions must have their 
source in a distinctly human mind and will'. But this distinctly human mind, will and set of opinions must 
be related to the mind and sensus communis of the host of Israel. To fail to do this is to tolerate a modern 
concept of mind, a pneumatology of interiority, not publicly contestable or responsible. A theological 
pneumatology must answer Rogers' demand (3.1.2) that it represents the plurality and community brought 
into being by the Spirit, so the host of Israel is the source of Jesus' thoughts - that he had learned from 
them, and thus that he was in a measure their work. 
26 Michael Wyschogrod `A Jewish Perspective on the Incarnation' Modern Theology 12 1996,198 argues that 
`[T]he Church found God in this Jewish flesh. Perhaps this was possible because God is in all Jewish flesh. ' 
This is not a doctrine of election and freedom, but of substance and therefore necessity. `Perhaps the 
Church... could not see this incarnation in the Jewish people but could see it in this one Jew who stood... 
for his people. ' 
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without company or glory, may not become man, or may not make `man' the proper 
predicate of his work. God is Spirit, and as such is able to move freely on both sides of a 
Creator-creature, divine-human line. Two-natures language is intended to state the 
doctrine of creation, not problematise it. Such a line is a membrane, not a barrier: the 
distinction between Creator and creature is of God's making, and is sustained with the 
single purpose of preparing us to receive him. 
Has Wyschogrod determined that God may not be at home in the world, at 
home in his own work? Is the divine-human or Creator-creature distinction absolute and 
prior to any divine action, so that this creaturely world is closed to God? Israel may not 
be considered apart from God. `By faith' means that Israel is Israel by association - 
association with God. If what is perfect may not be broken is it conceptually coherent to 
say that Israel was perfect and entire but then ceased to be so? The doctrine of the 
Church is that Israel will become entire and perfect. Does the supersession debate rest 
on a protology, and on a failure to understand the eschatological nature of scriptural 
statement? 
Alan Segal also allows that God was found in this Jewish flesh, but that the term 
`the form of God' (Philippians 2.6) is ambiguous enough to bring it within the range of 
the many figures of Jewish apocalypticism. 27 The Christian community awarded to Jesus 
`the name which is above every name', Kyrios, the term used to translate and avoid the 
tetragrammaton YHWI I. Philippians 2 says that Christ has the divine morphe. But Segal 
does not want to link this moiphe to what Paul has to say about God's work taking the 
morphe of suffering and opposing the gentiles. The Christian confession is not only that 
Jesus took the form of God, but that suffering our opposition is the form God's working 
took. Against Segal we must say that the form of God is his being with his people, the 
form of a servant, who works and in his working suffers. 28 It is a suffering that must be 
related to God's ongoing relationship both with the exiled people of his election and the 
27 Alan F. Segal `Paul's Thinking about Resurrection in its Jewish Context' in New Testament Studies 44 1998 
400-419.411 Segal believes that `[TJhe Christ was depicted as an eternal aspect of divinity which was not 
proud of its high station but consented to take on human shape and suffer the fate of humanity, even death 
on a cross... This transformation is followed by the converse, the retransformation into God. ' This is to 
understand the incarnation as reversible and reversed. The relationship of notions of suffering and 
martyrdom to the idea that God is at work, in and with the diaspora will be discussed in Chapter 4. In `He 
who did not spare his own son... ' Segal argues that there was pre-Christian use of Isaac's martyrdom, and 
exegesis did understand martyrology and vicarious atonement. The concept of resurrection is linked to the 
problem of theodicy raised in the period of the Maccabean revolt, when resurrection was understood to be 
the reward for martyrdom. Isaac is pre-eminent among the martyrs. The Christians joined the messiah 
conceptuality to that of the servant who suffers. 
28 Wright `Jesus Christ is Lord: Philippians 2.5-11' in The Climax of the Covenant 57-71 and see 4.1 for this 
argument. 
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groaning creation. The physical-bodily being of Jesus is not merely enthroned and 
restored to divine mode, but both enthroned and therefore at work, bearing his people. 
Segal understands Jesus, Paul and every other visionary to be an `incarnation' of 
Yahweh. 29 But this is an account that can only be made in the absence of discussion of 
the ongoing history of God's action with Israel -a work that includes bearing the 
resistance that Israel herself inflicts on God. 
But has this New Testament and biblical scholarship properly represented Israel 
as the servant of this Lord? The starting-point of religious studies is that Israel cannot 
identify its own object or end, and therefore has no handle on how to lead and rule and 
sustain its own unity. 30 All interrogation of her asks whether Israel is a religion, ethnicity 
or ethic. Israel must refuse any identification that involves division under these 
autonomous domains and insist that what Israel does receives its proper definition only 
from Israel's Lord. Israel is knowable to him, not to any definition offered by the gentile 
world until that gentile world comes to her through baptism for its own re-definition. In 
becoming that faithful servant Jesus makes Israel the Son and so inaugurates the rule that 
Israel must exercise over the world, even in the face of its resistance. 
3.2.1 Israel as Son. 
The next question we have to ask biblical studies is whether it allows itself the means for 
this theological definition of Israel as God's ongoing work. We introduced Adam as the 
son who would not take up the work of God. Although New Testament scholarship has 
always referred to Adam Christology, it has not found a role for it. I will argue that Jesus 
has been made the Son by the Spirit. The point, James Scott argues, is to provide an 
account of the becoming of the Son who learned obedience. `By ignoring this 
methodological starting point, Pauline studies currently labors under some confusion 
about the subject of divine sonship in general. '31 This section will ask whether the 
issue 
29 Segal `Paul's Thinking about Resurrection in its Jewish Context' 413 n. 21 argues that `This glorious 
body 
of the Christ is the spiritual body into which the believer will 
be subsumed, not the physical body of Jesus'. 
30 See Gillian Rose Mourning becomes the Lazy: Philosophy and Representation Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press 1996,86 for a vigorous rebuttal of this charge. 
31 Scott, James M. Adoption as Sons of God Mohr: Tübingen 1992,267 Uiothesis, being made a son, `is part of 
the stock of Hellenistic terms of adoption, and as such 
it denotes `adoption as son(s)' Hence any attempt to 
translate uiothesia in Paul as simply `sonship' sets the study on the wrong 
foot from the start. ' 268 `Christ is 
the heir of Abraham (Galatians 3.6) and the messianic 
Son of God promised in 2 Samuel 7.12 and 14 
respectively. ' `Adoption' 
is the appropriate concept for divine sonship. 269 By ignoring this 
methodological starting point, 
Pauline studies currently labours under some confusion about the subject of 
divine sonship in general. ' Despite the argument of 
Frances M. Young `Understanding Romans in the light 
of 2 Corinthians' 
Scottish Journal of Theology 48 1991,434 that `Paul will not operate according to the 
56 
of holiness and purity can be more closely related to the issue of the production of a Son 
who is an obedient servant, and so to Israel's cosmology and creation theology. 32 This is 
also to ask whether New Testament studies has not been driven by a continued antipathy 
to the frankly biological character of what it finds in the bible to maintain a dichotomy of 
spirit and flesh, that holds Israel's theological claims apart from her biological claims and 
so to reduce the degree to which her cult looks like a fertility cult. I will suggest that we 
should understand that biology may be adopted as one idiom and instrument of the 
Spirit's preparation of many sons. 
Does Israel assume that the gentiles will either be attracted or defeated by Israel's 
own greater fecundity and success at producing sons for Abraham? 33 Does the priestly 
teaching on Israel's purity and holiness represent the coming into being of this Son, a 
theology of the coming of the Christ and thus of the coming into being of Adam? In the 
hope of being corrected by a more adequate account I will attempt to sketch the 
biological idiom of Israel's political claim. The Israelite who sees semen on the sheets 
(Leviticus 15.16) sees something more consequential than himself there. 34 He sees the 
life-substance of Israel, the combined presence of all generations, preceding and 
succeeding. Though it came out of him, it is the life-stuff of Adam and Abraham: it is 
not his but theirs and it returns to them. The single Israelite is no complete instantiation 
of Israel and his children are not the affirmation of his individuality, but the gift he must 
return to the Lord. The Lord gives children, and a man must take them, sew them in his 
wife, nurture and bring them up, present them to him in the temple where the Lord 
patronage system', patronage, adopting sons and making them members of your household is precisely the 
right concept. Patronage means making sons, by elective biology, and `affiliation' translates being made a son. 
32 Alexander T. D. `Messianic Ideology in Genesis' in Philip E. Satterthwaite, Richard S. Hess & Gordon J. 
Wenham The Lord's Anointed. - Interpretation of Old Testament Messianic Texts Carlisle: Paternoster 1995, and 
Whitsett, Christopher `Son of God, Seed of David: Paul's messianic exegesis in Romans 2: 3-4' Journal for 
Biblical Literature 119,4 661-681,2000 attempt to make this connection. Interest in the biological idiom of 
Israel's claim did not continue to serve discussion of Israel's theology, and in the nineteenth century 
became a separate discipline, that of the history of religions. 
33 The concept of the seed of Abraham is the concept that unites the two testaments. Kraus Das Volk 
Gottes Mohr-Siebeck: Tübingen 1996,359 argues that `Vom hier aus gibt es dann einen Oberbegriff, denn 
Paulus verwendet hat, um die Einheit des alt- und neutestamentlichen Gottesvolkes auszusagen: sperma 
Abraam. ' 
34 Jacob Milgrom Leviticus Volume 1 New York: Doubleday 1991,927-33 talks about the seed only in terms 
of impurity, not giving semen any theological significance or distinguishing it from any other discharge; 
Milgrom, Maccoby and Neusner agree that the rules about washing out semen relate to the distinction 
between life and death, but leaves life and death uninterpreted. This is surely not life as such, gentile life, 
life held in common with the world, but God's life for Israel. Social anthropology does not share the 
fastidiousness about sex and reproduction biblical studies has inherited from Christian distaste for talking 
about the demands and products of bodies. Biblical studies has not yet managed to talk about fertility as 
motive and explanation for human behaviour. 
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accepts them back from him, and accepts him by accepting his gift of his children. 35 
Without children he has no continuing being in Israel. A man's membership of Israel is 
confirmed by the arrival of the fruit of the seed given to him to plant in his wife. If his 
children also turn out to be obediently fertile, he is born again, not of a potential intrinsic 
to the flesh, but of the Seed of Israel. Not all are Israel who are simply born to people 
who are, or whose parents were, Israel: they are Israel when they are born again of the 
living and enduring Seed and Spirit. 
This seed does not always succeed in making a child for Abraham. The child 
becomes a son for Abraham when he later himself produces a son who is himself 
obedient, and himself produces a son and so on. My eschatological reading of Genesis 22 
will indicate that the status of the whole line is waiting on the obedience of the very last 
son, so Israel is a function of the obedience and arrival of the last and completing event 
of Israel-sonship. The period of seven days (Leviticus 15.13) allows the seed time to 
come to fruition in the marriage, or to return to the temple. An Israelite went to the 
temple to show what moral and procreative acts his husbandry of the seed-and-blood of 
Israel had produced. The semen or menses on the sheet is as much the life of Israel as 
the blood in the Temple. It must not remain on the sheet, but as long as purification 
sacrifice has not yet returned it to the Temple where it belongs, it is out of place, and 
makes impure whoever comes into contact with it. The blood of Israel is not confined to 
this present generation, but is the function of all generations past and to come. The men 
of this generation are not of themselves capable of giving their wives children: the men 
and women together have to have children fathered on them by the patriarchs. The 
blood is the living and enduring life of Israel, and each individual Israelite must by the 
observation of purity, demonstrate his obedience to the task of the production of sons 
for Israel. 
3.2.2 Affiliation as the priestly work of the Son 
Adam is the father of mankind because Adam is himself re-fathered by the Son of the 
Father. 36 Adam's seed does not succeed in making many obedient sons. But Christ, set 
35 Lawrence A. Hoffman Covenant of Blood: Circumcision and Gender in Rabbinic Judaism Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press 1996 and Howard Eilberg-Schwartz The Savage in Judaism: An Anthropology of Israelite Religion 
and Ancient Judaism Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1990 provide discussions of paternity. Only 
gender studies is prepared to talk about reproduction. Nancy Jay Throughoutyour Generations Forever. Sacrifice, 
Religion and Paternity Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1992 argues that sacrifice is the idiom of male 
reproduction. 
36 See Richard B. Hays The Faith of Jesus Christ: The Narrative Substructure of Galatians 3.1-4.11 Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans 2002,131-2; James D. G. Dunn Theology of Paul the Apostle Edinburgh: T&T Clark 1998,385-79 
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upstream of Adam, can transform the effect of Adam's death-replicating gene into that 
of a life-replicating gene. It changes the metabolism so that Adam's fatal metabolic 
failure is integrated into a larger and more complex metabolism. Here Adam's 
permanently-activated death-hormone functions healthily at its place in the whole life- 
generating economy of the God of Israel. 
Christ adopts us as his sons, and like a good son presents us to his Father. This 
sonship is available because Jesus has supplanted Adam from Adam's position as father 
to a new position as son. Jesus has re-fathered Adam, and is able not only to make sons 
of us, but to make of us obedient sons, ourselves able to bear sons to the Father. Then 
he hands back this lordship and fatherhood to his Father, and receives us back from the 
Father again as brothers. In this relationship what is biological is not prior, but serves as 
a mode of his determination to be father to us. The relationship into which we are 
adopted is spiritual, the work of the Spirit. It is the possibility of, and acknowledgement 
and realisation of the possibility of, that decision of Son for Father and Father for Son by 
which the Son presents and the Father adopts many sons. 
Time is what the Father has for the Son and Son for the Father. The Father and 
the Son determine that we be both sons and fathers, and live in a generation that 
succeeds and is succeeded, in time. Our time takes a tragic or narrative form. 37 We are 
bound to exert a lordship and selfhood against our fathers, and have it exerted against us 
by the generation that succeeds us. The one wish of fathers is to produce sons to keep 
their name alive in the world. 38 To do this the ancestors work with each generation to 
recycle the material of life. Blood is supplied to the ancestors and it returns as seed, as 
another generation of sons. Adam christology is a successful response to and take-over 
of this logic of life in the many formulations of pagan cosmologies. A miasma of seed, 
spores, yeasts, moulds and rashes constitutes our environment. The regulations of 
Leviticus 13-15 are dedicated to ensuring that these alien stoicheia do not contaminate 
Israel, but Israel continues to be determined purely by the life of God in the Seed of 
Israel. 
on the discussion that renders pistil Christou `the faithfulness of Christ', rather than `faith in Christ'. On the 
genealogy of Jesus, see W. D. Davies & Dale C. Allison Matthew The International Critical Commentay volume 1 
Edinburgh: T&T Clark 1988,167-88, and Richard Bauckham Jude and the Relatives of Jesus Edinburgh: T&T 
Clark 1990,326-42,376-7. 
37 See Zizioulas Being as Communion 42-52 and the argument of 1.2.2-3 above. 
38 See Albertz R. A History of Israelite Religion in the Old Testament Period Louisville: Westminster 1994, 
Volume 1,96-101 on the family cult. According to Hebrews a priest is the man who by continuing the 
family line is going to do the right thing by his fathers, to ensure their continuation by redeeming them. 
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3.2.3 The economy of sonship 
In this chapter I will argue that sacrifice represented the commissioning of Israel to the 
office of steward of creation. The temple sacrifice represents the work of the Son in 
bringing many sons to the Father. In Chapter 1I introduced the concept of persons in 
constitutive relation, and with it those concepts of incorporation and participation that 
allow that persons make persons present to one another, and may therefore be 
represented by one another. I suggested that selection, promotion, adoption and 
representation represent the whole economy of action (doxa is comprehended in ousia). 
In the Kantian anthropology in which all already have the full status of persons, there is 
no room for understanding the being of a person as a work shared amongst many-39 The 
anthropology does not allow that persons receive their personhood from the trinitarian 
persons of God, and so rules out the sacrificial, liturgical creation theology and mediation 
of Israel by which this could happen. 4° The rationality of sacrifice is dependent on such a 
view of Israel's commissioning and employment in the persons-formative work of her 
God. Kant's anthropology might seem to deliver a blow to a representational and 
substitutionary view of the purpose of sacrifice. E. P. Sanders, for example, argues that 
ancient Israel did not understand sacrifices to remove the sin of the individual by 
representation or substitution. 41 In Dalferth's summary `It is not enough to say he has 
died instead of us or in the place of us... nor for the sake of us - these are all vicarious, 
whether legal/penal or sacrificial/cultic. They involve the substitution of one party for 
the other and these presuppose an ontological individualism. '42 
According to Sanders, atonement for Israel was not so much a response to 
something that had gone wrong, but the whole everyday business by which the temple 
registered all the status changes through which members of Israel progressed in the 
course of life. 43 Temple sacrifices were not related to individual moral misdemeanours, 
so were not in the first place about guilt-removal. In Milgrom's description the 
atonement rituals do not describe a priest atoning an individual Israelite, but the 
atonement of the Temple itself. Stowers and McLean believe this disallows talk of one 
39 In 2.7 I argued that being a person involves multiple roles, in which a person represents other persons 
in 
multiply nested conversations and roles without being any the less 
himself. 
40 Kant Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason 6.72,6.74. Kant can tolerate no account of hospitality and 
possession in the constitution of persons. Dalferth I. U. Der auferweckte 
Gekreuzigte: Zur Grammatik der 
Christologie Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 1994,237-315 provides an important, yet not comprehensive, 
theological discussion of sacrifice. 
41 Sanders Paul and Palestinian Judaism 474-511. 
42 I. U. Dalferth `Christ died for us' in Sykes, Stephen W. Sacrifice and Redemption: Durham Essays in Theology 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1991,320. 
43 E. P. Sanders Judaism: Practice and Belief London: SCM 1992,112-16. 
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man atoning for another and so of Jesus taking our place and atoning for us. 44Although 
individuals came to the Temple to have their sins removed, this should be understood as 
part of the maintenance of the whole Body of Israel, incorporation both as single 
inaugural event and as regular task. 
All New Testament scholarship is determined by the problem created by Kant's 
rejection of the possibility that one person represents another. German biblical 
scholarship recognises that it must find an expression of biblical anthropology able to 
withstand the Kantian criticism of representation. 45 According to Gese and Stuhlmacher 
an inclusive event of cultic representation of the people's life before God was effected 
for Israel when sacrificial blood, the life substance (Lev 17.11), was splashed over the 
holy objects, in particular the mercy-seat. Blood was the medium that `brings people to 
God'. 46 Worshippers experienced death and resurrection in the death of the animal with 
whom they identified. Righteousness is not a personal quality gifted to an individual but a 
cosmic power by which one is brought into the corporate people of God as a result of 
being freed by baptism from the power of sin and death. Stuhlmacher argues that sins 
were saved up to be dealt with in yearly instalments. In order to deal with them Jesus was 
made the hilasterion. With Christ, the new age of the righteousness of God has broken 
through to sweep all sins finally away. Whether hilasterion means the event or the site of 
atonement, the sins of Israel were all dealt with together on that one day in the year. The 
atonement of the high priest is not merely a technical matter of preparing the place to 
perform that function, but is the atonement of the whole people. 47 Missing from the 
account offered by these scholars is what makes blood symbolic and the meaning of this 
death obvious. But a theological account cannot remain content with natural symbols. A 
more theological interpretation of death might suggest that it is that gentile existence 
from which Israel is redeemed - and which since it is a passing form of existence may be 
said to be dying. 48 But this Tübingen scholarship refers to extrinsic theories of symbol, 
44 Stanley K. Stowers A Rereading of Romans: Justice, Jews, and Gentiles New Haven: Yale University Press 
1994,206-13; B. H. Mclean The Cursed Christ: Mediterranean Expulsion Rituals and Pauline Soteriology Sheffield: 
Sheffield Academic Press 1996 and David Seeley The Noble Death: Graeco-Roman Martyrology and Pauls Concept 
of Salvation Sheffield: JSOT Press 1990 dismiss theology informed by the sacrificial conceptualities 
presented by the Old Testament in favour of the portrayal of Christ's death as an example of (Hellenistic) 
martyrdom in the tradition of the Maccabeans. I owe these references to Dan Bailey and Richard Bell. 
4' Specifically, Janowski and Dalferth on `the Tübingen response' in `Sühnopfer' in Der auferweckte 
Gekreujigte 241-83. 
46 This is the argument of Peter Stuhlmacher Biblische Theologie des Neuen Testaments Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1992-1999,316-48; assessed by Dunn The Theology of the Apostle Paul212-23. 
47 This is argued for by Dan Bailey `Christ as kapporet' Cambridge PhD thesis 1999. 
48 See 4.1.1-2. 
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with little indication of who may determine these. 49 It transfers the problem from one of 
atonement to one of hermeneutics and epistemology, rather than of the theological self- 
understanding of the community addressed and formed by the word of God. 
Such resources seem now to be forthcoming from Bernd Janowski and Ingolf 
Dalferth. Janowski argues that the concept of retribution is not simply a law of revenge. 50 
The deed returns to its doer, not by a closed economy of necessity, but in an econom'- of 
response, in which it is not objects that are exchanged, but those forms of action that 
promote the relatedness of their agents. 51 In Dalferth's view `the relational ontological 
structure of the total soteriological event calls for interpretations of the credal statement 
that Christ has died for us which do justice to the irreducible relationality of the reality 
expressed. '52 `Identification is reciprocal, ' says Dalferth: 
Localising something is identifying, not merely describing it... It is a cognitive 
process in which something is identified to someone in such a way that the 
addressees of the identification are localised relative to one another. 53 
We expect the other to situate himself so we can orient ourselves by him. This return of 
identity is what the concept of talion and retaliation refers to. Though talion means paying 
back it does not mean getting your own back, but returning to the other the being and 
relationship missing from his action towards you, supplying to him what he was not able 
to supply to you. 54 
To Kant's problem of the irreducibility of the person we may offer the concept 
of task and office as a solution. In reply to Sanders' claim that Lutheran talk of 
49 The contributors to Bernd Janowski & Michael Welker Opfer. Theologische und kulturelle Kontexte Frankfurt 
am plain: Suhrkamp 2000 do not seem to have attempted the sort of creation theology or cosmology 
required here, or to have learned from Mary Douglas. 
so Janowski "Die Tat kehrt zum Täter zurück': Offene Fragen in Umkreis des "tun-ergehen- 
Zusammenhangs"' in Die Rettende Gerechtigkeit Neukirchener: Neukirchen-Vluyn 1999 links the concepts of 
retribution, talion and return. 
51 Janowski `Die Tat kehrt zum Täter zurück' 190-1. 
52 Dalferth `Christ died for us' 320. 
53 Dalferth Theology and Philosophy 204. 
54 Janowski `Der Tat kehrt zuruck' calls it `a category of social interaction that refers to our acting-to-and- 
for-one another in a complex economy in which we may have confidence that, despite all appearances, 
there will be justice and our being will be returned to us. ' I have called this nexus of act-and-reaction (Tun- 
ergehen Zurammenhanj an economy of response. Bruce J. tiialina The New Testament World: Insightr from Cultural 
Anthropology London: SCM 1983 argues for such a single nexus, an economy of honour. Rene Girard 
Violence and the Sacred Baltimore: John Hopkins Press 1977 argues for an economy of emulation or rivalry. 
Some part of the theological tradition opposes ransom or penalty because it believes this punishment or 
penalty can only be owed to Satan. Yet the concept of ransom belongs to the perichoretic metaphysic, 
referred to in Chapter 1, within which we all own and possess and account for each other and bear account 
to each other. When this metaphysic is abandoned, ransom is certainly a problem, but so also is 
representation. Payability to someone else is problematic precisely because the status of anyone else, of others as 
such, is a problem. The work of Janowski and Dalferth complements the scholarship of the 
faithfulness of 
Christ (pistil Christou) which understands that persons are made by mutual constitution (determined by the 
decision of Christ), for which see Hays The Faith of Jesus Christ. 
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representation and substitution is alien to Israelite sacrifice, I suggest we should see Old 
Testament talk of atonement of place as solution, not problem. If we make a hard 
distinction between individuals, and persons defined by relation, we can say that 
Israelites came to the Temple as individuals and left as persons. It is precisely 
individuality, the state of being with insufficient relationship, that was atoned for by the 
supply of relationship with God. It is not about swapping places. The Son of Man comes 
to us in our place, but he occupies a bigger definition of the place than we do, so we are 
not pushed out of it, but out of our way of occupying it and into his way of occupying it. 
Place should be understood in terms of fibres that can be parted and more space woven 
in. We are given place, and given more place, and the means to occupy it, so by a process 
of paideia we are levered up into a fuller and more complex appropriation of the place 
God has for us. 55 I said that Tübingen scholarship refers to a concept of symbol. I 
argued in Chapter 2 that symbols have meanings in structures, and structures grow out of 
the life of a community, and have meanings because they have functions, they do things, 
transform things and open and close ways of life within that community. There cannot 
be an account of persons without an account of the world, which understands the world 
as sets of regularities and local purposes. In the course of any theological account of 
persons, the world is set into and transformed by an eschatological context, in which it is 
identified and received as creation, the proper place of creatures. As Janowski points out, 
what we are given is not an object, but a new action, a new behaviour and behaviour- 
world. 56 Man is given a place and a job to do in it. 
3.3.1 Israel and her king. 
The next question to ask is about place. Has New Testament studies found a way to 
accommodate Israel's claim that God has given the world to Israel as her place and her 
mandate? Can New Testament studies read the Old Testament as Israel's response to 
and refusal of the empires of the world and thus understood cosmology -a doctrine of 
creation and possession - as the whole idiom of Israel's polity, politics and self- 
consciousness? Or has New Testament studies only succeeded in making the New 
Testament a discussion of the Hellenic and Roman empires, without understanding that 
55 Dalferth Der auferweckte Gekreuzigte 306 refers to a `creaturely place'. `Es wird auch der personale 
Charakter des Heilhandelns Gottes in Jesus Christ gänzliche unterschlagen, also verdunkelt, daß es nicht 
nur oder vor allem um das geht, was 
Jesus tat oder litt, sondern um das, was er in seinem Tun und Leiden 
ist- der geschöpferische Ort der sich selbst erschließenden 
Gegenwart der schöpferischen und Neue 
schaffenden Liebe Gottes. 
' 
56 Janowski `Die Tat kehrt zum Täter zurück' 190. 
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the Torah resists all foreign political claims equally? If New Testament studies reads the 
New Testament as a separate testament, and in deliberate ignorance of all the previous 
and subsequent centuries of Israel's address to the gentiles, it will treat the first century as 
though Israel had never encountered gentiles before and thus perhaps as utterly 
vulnerable to Hellenism. We must look for a less Marcionite New Testament studies, 
better able to contribute to a politically more sophisticated theology. 
N. T. Wright has the strongest version of the meaning of messiah, and so of the 
claim of Israel. The all-embracing royal and religious claims of Caesar are directly 
challenged by the equally all-embracing claim of Israel's God. `The more Jewish we make 
Paul's `gospel', the more it confronts directly the pretensions of the Imperial cult, and 
indeed all other paganisms whether `religious' or `secular'. It is because of Jewish 
monotheism that there can be `no king but God'. '57 `The Pauline euanggelion is based 
firmly in Judaism; at the same time, and indeed precisely for this reason, it functions as 
the royal announcement which challenges the pagan principalities and powers. '58Wright 
holds together covenant and apocalyptic. `The real apocalypse has taken place in the 
resurrection of the messiah Jesus but that event can only be understood and its 
significance elaborated through an exploration of the covenant to Abraham. '59 Israel had 
a clear idea what restoration would look like, and what has happened to Jesus 
unmistakably fits this idea. `Judaism in Paul's day, as all Jews knew, had not in fact been 
redeemed within its own terms of expectation'. 60 Paul sees that God has really given 
Israel justice. Jesus had won this restoration which was clearly what was promised to, but 
not won by, anyone else in Israel. According to Wright, Paul realised that Jesus was 
therefore: 
that which his supporters had claimed, namely Israel's messiah; that this Jesus, 
the crucified and risen messiah of Israel, was now enthroned as Lord of all, Jew 
and Gentile alike; that these events were indeed the inauguration of `the age to 
come"... As a result of this whole complex of thought (complex for us, 
reconstructing it; plain sailing for a first century Pharisee) the pagan idolatry of 
the world has been decisively defeated, and that those who adhered to it - that is, 
57 N. T. Wright `Gospel and Theology in Galatians' in L. Ann Jervis & Peter Richardson Gospel in Pauk 
Studies on Corinthians, Galatians and Romans for Richard N Longenecker Sheffield: Sheffield 
Academic Press 
1994,228 When their god, Jahweh, acted within history to deliver his people, the spurious gods of the 
heathen would be defeated. If and when Jahweh set up his own king as the true ruler, 
his true earthly 
representative, all other kingdoms would be confronted with their rightful overlord. 
' Wright's argument 
depends on the conceptual henotheism argued for by Seitz Word without End 255. 
I shall use this conceptual 
henotheism in Chapter 6 to argue against a dichotomy of religious language and non-religious language that 
would confine theological claims to a 
domain of untestable and therefore non-public religious discourse. 
58 Wright `Gospel and Theology in Galatians' 228. 
59 Wright `Gospel and Theology in Galatians' 232. 
60 Wright `Gospel and Theology in Galatians' 234. 
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the gentiles - were to be summoned to give allegiance to this strange and 
subversive Jewish messiah. ' 61 
Wright argues that Jesus is the arrival of Yahweh in a world of real and political conflict, 
hence `the gospel of Christ' - of the ruler named Jesus. 
The temple was the court of the great king who gives justice; the nations were 
attracted to Jerusalem because it was their belief that there was justice for them there. 
But the first century leadership of Israel had managed to create a divided, oppressed and 
therefore unclean nation: the temple had become the possession of Israel the envious 
elder brother. Jesus enacted Israel's king riding into Jerusalem, simultaneously in 
vindication of Israel, and in judgement of her, the revenge of the gentiles against her. 62 
The Temple cleansing was a claim to kingship, judgement and revenge. The gentiles who 
crucified Jesus and destroyed the Temple were doing God's work, so God was acting 
here, publicly and politically. As the gentiles represent all that is cursed and separated, 
dead and dead-making, the arrival of the true Yahweh-Israel took the form of Israel 
hanging curse-like on a tree. The messiah has been gentiled, and has gentiled Israel, handing 
her over to the gentiles. 63 
3.3.2 Jesus inaugurates the rule of Israel. 
Israel is God's word of refusal to the gentiles. God's word is No. Israel can really be said 
to speak and to be this speech-act in which she is distinguished from the gentiles as a 
holy nation because this is not hers alone but God's word. Israel may deny her election 
but God's word does not return to him empty. Israel participates in the defeat of the 
gentiles, and is their new hope. 64 
Israel is the Lord of the nations. It is not by chance that Israel finds herself 
subjected to the nations and fighting for her identity, always under the threat of 
absorption which would make her indistinguishable from them and no longer holy. The 
61 Wright `Gospel and Theology in Galatians' 234. Wright represents the exception to the charge of Oliver 
O'Donovan The Desire of the Nations. Rediscovering the Roots of Political Theology Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 1996,128 that biblical theology succumbs `to the persistent Western temptation (evident 
in atonement theories from Anselm to Moberly, and not excusing the excellent Grotius) to abstract the 
death of Christ and interpret it on its own, thereby radically depoliticising the central saving event of the 
gospel. ' 
62 N. T. Wright Jesus and the Victory of God London: SPCK 1996,639 Jesus came into Jerusalem at Passover, 
on a donkey, and crying for Jerusalem, `the symbol and embodiment of 
YHWH's return to Zion'. 
63 Wright `Curse and Covenant: Galatians 3.10-14' in The Climax of the Covenant, 151 `The crucifixion of the 
Messiah is... the quintessence of the curse of exile, and its climatic act. ' 
64 The relationship is not causal. Israel does not change anything or cause anything, 
but she is the medium 
in which everything is made utterly 
different, as I describe in 4.4.1.1 argue with Wright that Israel 
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new Christian form of Israel's being is distinguished by the realisation that what is 
significant is not that Israel is oppressed by this or that nation, but that Israel has to bear 
all the nations. She may not fight or disown them, but may only confess herself to be, in 
fact, both servant and lord of all. The messiah who is king of Israel is king of the nations 
too, rival to Caesar and to every individual and institutional world-hegemony: he is king 
of kings. 65 To make the same point again, if Jesus is messiah, all Israel is messiah. Christ 
and Israel are not yet synonyms, but when the new Adam is at once one and many, they 
will be. Warnings against trinitarianism rely on an individualism that would leave God 
without servants or speech. The first clause of the Decalogue that God is alone and is the 
only God, does not clash with the equal imperative that his servants are his, and have no 
identity other than the identity he gives them. The Spirit, in the history of Israel, built and 
assembled one full man, and when that man was successfully entirely with God, creature 
and Creator together on the same bench, the Holy Spirit was able to replicate his 
character in a new community that spans and unites heaven and earth. 
3.4.1 Who can read the scriptures? 
The question of who can read the scriptures is the question of who can read Israel. Jon 
Levenson puts a strong version of the difference between the scripture reading of the 
two communities. In Jewish reading of scripture, Jewish history has wrongly come to 
overtake Jewish belief as determinative of Jewish being. 66 Scripture is narrative, the live 
and continuing history of this people in biblical and post-biblical periods, which has to 
be lived and performed correctly again by each generation. The telling of the law as story 
belongs together with the keeping of the law as commandment. `Nothing is more 
delicate than the interplay of universalism and particularism in traditional Jewish 
theology. Take away the theology, and the interplay disappears or mutates. ' 67 
But Levenson plays down the ontological difference expressed by the doctrine of 
election. That `Israel was not chosen on merit' is not at issue. 68 What is at issue is 
whether we can and even must say that having been chosen and tested, Israel becomes 
different from the nations. This would involve arguing about what constitutes evidence 
participates in the defeat of the gentiles, and against Wright that the obedience on the cross of one member 
of Israel is `retroactively' causative of the obedience of all Israel. 
65 See 6.5 
66 Levenson J. D. `Why Jews are not Interested in Biblical Theology' in Jacob Neusner, Baruch A. Levine & 
Ernest S. Frerichs Judaic Perspectives on Ancient Israel Minneapolis: Fortress 1987,281-307. 
67 Levenson J. D. `The Universal Horizon of Biblical Particularism' in Mark G. Brett Ethnicity and the Bible 
Leiden: Brill 1996,169. 
68 Levenson `The Universal Horizon of Biblical Particularism' 159. 
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for this transition, or who is to decide what constitutes such evidence. Do the gentiles 
have the means to recognise the real and growing holiness of this people? The actual and 
real superiority of the Jews is not the possession of the Jews, and may be empirically as 
inaccessible to them as it is to the gentiles, yet it must be their confession. On the other 
hand, can we speak of difference without understanding that Jews and gentiles compete 
for the good and may indeed be measured against each other? Is Jewish reluctance to 
speak more clearly on the doctrine of election a matter of good taste? Is it bad taste to do 
anything but leave the matter alone, or must Christian theology assert itself to express the 
difference? Israel is not claiming to know only what any nation really might know, but is 
claiming that the nations fail to worship the one God and his one covenant and law, 
worshipping instead many other rival gods by whom they are held in misery. 
Is there one set of scriptures shared between two communities, Jewish and 
Christian? Has one of them better right to these scriptures by virtue of having acquired 
them first, such that the community which came to them later, has a weaker claim, or 
even represents a falsification of them? Alternatively, are there two distinct sets of 
scriptures for two communities, for Jews the Jewish scriptures, and for Christians the 
Old and New Testaments? In Why Jews are not Interested in Biblical Theology', 
Levenson has argued that biblical theology is in fact always Protestant exegesis rather 
than engagement with Jews or Jewish scripture. 69 Is it the case that the Old Testament is 
Jewish and the New Testament Christian, so there is the Hebrew Bible, but no book 
called the Old Testament? Is the inclusion of the Torah and Prophets in the Christian 
scriptures even a `scandalous annexation'? 70 Is Levenson right in saying that neither 
Jewish nor Christian scholarship is anything but very marginally either Jewish or 
Christian, both neutered by a third worldview that reigns in universities? The extent to 
which the Christians read the Old Testament is precisely the extent to which they are 
Christian, and the extent to which they read the New Testament to the exclusion of the 
Old Testament is the extent to which they are Marcionite rather than Christian. Do 
students of the Christian scriptures too glibly refer to their discipline as New Testament 
studies, failing to realise how much we are all the unwitting students of Gabler, de Wette 
and others responsible for the disciplinary division between New Testament and Old 
69 Levenson `Why Jews are not Interested in Biblical Theology' 303-4, and Levenson `Theological 
Consensus or Historicist Evasion? ' in Brooks & Collins Hebrew Bible or Old Testament? Roland E. Murphy - 
`Old Testament/Tanakh - Canon and Interpretation' in Brooks & Collins 12-27 rightly argues that the 
Hebrew bible and the Old Testament are different books, and that this is a question of canon, a fact of 
literary description, not a matter that historical criticism can determine. 
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Testament scholarship? Does this disciplinary division divide the indivisible witness and 
testament of the one God? 71 
3.4.2 Who can tell the story of the Son? 
Next we must ask who is able to tell Israel's story and recount the scriptures such that 
they are the Word of God that not only goes out to man, but returns bringing with it 
man to God. The question of who can read the scriptures is the question of who can 
read Israel. If, as Leo Purdue believes, narrative (literature) is replacing history as the 
major interpretative paradigm for scripture, the question becomes one of Who has the 
right to any scriptural narrative? '72 Stephen Fowl asks Who can read Abraham's story? '73 
Fowl argues that every narrative places its teller and hearers, so a story cannot be told by 
just anybody, but only by those constituted by it. Whoever can tell this story must know 
how it ends, and to do this they must be able to distinguish themselves from the story, 
such that they can tell it - it is not just the sum of the things they are. The God who 
raised one of our number from the dead can tell our story in such a way as to make it not 
necessary, so our failures do not become finally definitive of us. God is both audience of 
the story we tell about ourselves, and its judge and corrector who can improve on our 
endings, turning our disaster into redemption. 74 This, I will argue, makes the story of the 
collapse of mediation a warning story, not one the truth of which is finally settled. The 
task of telling the story of Israel must be accompanied by a separate conceptual work 
that maintains the language of the story in good order. 75 Such conceptual work Israel 
calls the law. The story and the law are in mutually constitutive relationship. The law 
70 This is the suggestion of Hans-Georg Geyer `Solus Christus' in Klaus Wengst & Gerhard Sass ja und 
Nein: Christliche Theologie im Angesicht Israels Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener 1998,16. 
71 Christopher R. Seitz `Two Testaments and the Failure of One Tradition-History' in Figured Out: Typology 
and Providence in Christian Scripture Louisville Westminster John Knox 2001 discusses the unity of this 
witness. 
72 Leo G. Perdue The Collapse of History: Reconstructing Old Testament Theology Minneapolis: Fortress Press 
1994,232-4. The different metaphors of NT studies and early Christianity derive from the different 
hermeneutical histories of the two disciplines. NT studies relate to text as the record of history. But 
without salvation history or teleology, can there be history? Can NT studies work on the paradigm of 
history if it has ruled out talk of God's dealings with man? See 4.4 Law and accommodation. 
73 Stephen E. Fowl `Who can read Abraham's Story? ' in Engaging Scripture: A Model for Theological Interpretation 
London: Blackwell 1998,134 points out that `[T]he internal coherence of Paul's reading presupposes and 
requires that Abraham's story be read within the context of an ecclesia. ' 
74 Seitz Word Without End 11 argues that `[H]istorical-critical methods and hermeneutics of assent will stand 
outside and fail to grasp that God is reading us, not we him. ' 
77 In 5.1.2 I argue that exegesis must understand itself to be in conversation both with dogmatics, as the 
tradition of exegesis, and with philosophy as the work of referring the conceptuality of exegesis and 
dogmatics to the discipline of wider public speech. 
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makes holy the community, and only the holy community can tell its story in a way that 
corresponds to God's account of it. 
New Testament scholarship increasingly approaches scripture as commentary on 
other scripture. Richard Hays argues that the reader is required to interpret a citation or 
allusion by recalling aspects of the original context not explicitly quoted. In this manner 
scripture comes to inform all the instincts and imagination of its readers. 76 It is the sons 
who may read the scriptures and tell the story of Israel, but equally reading the scripture 
makes a son of you. 77 Narrative, parable and enacted symbol are means to conceptualise 
the scripture-reading in which audiences find themselves not only implicated but 
constituted. 78 Parable-telling obliges listeners to assess for themselves which roles in the 
scriptures they are involuntarily playing out, and thus provides an opportunity to identiý- 
which story is going to end badly, and to swap to the winning side in the history of Israel. 
These stories are not mere entertainment but the whole grammar which allows that 
society to say and do some things and not others. 79 This performative hermeneutic of 
echoes and resonances relies on a single world-fabric of explanatory memes set in 
teleology and narrative, so it is a theory about an affective continuum that is a function 
of all that is said within it. For the sake of our comprehension of the bible these scholars 
are building a theory about the cement that holds a society together and makes it a single 
albeit warring entity. 80 
New Testament studies approaches scripture as text, but before the appearance 
of reader theory, dealt with texts as though they were things with essences which we 
reach by stripping away the exterior. But a text is not a simple object. It is a fabric of 
associations and relations, which must, in the case of the scriptures, be related to the 
determination of the persons of the trinity to share their sociality by making persons of 
76 Hays, Richard B. Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul New Haven: Yale University Press 1989; Scott J. 
Hafemann `Paul, Moses and the History of Israel' in Evans, Craig A. & James A. Sanders Paul and the 
Scriptures of Israel Sheffield: JSOT Press 1993, and N. T. Wright The New 
Testament and the People of God 137-43 
and Jesus and the Victory of God 133-44 set out similar hermeneutics of texts and reading communities 
in 
mutual constitution. 
77 Scott Adoption as Sons of God 268 argues that `Christ is the heir of Abraham (Gal 3.6) and the messianic 
Son of God promised in 2 Sam 7.12 and 14 respectively ... 
Believers who are thus baptised into the 
messianic Son of God and take up his very cry of `Abba' to the 
Father (Gal 4,6) participate with him in the 
Davidic promise of divine adoption. ' 
78 See Fowl Engaging Scrzpture 75-91,113-19 for similar argument. 
79 See Wright Jesus and the Victory of God 125-44 for this argument. 
80 Despite the new interest in performance, in honour and in speech acts, Hays, 
Wright and Fowl have not 
bought far into the philosophy of performance, but still hold most stock in the voluntarist philosophy of 
reflection where the effective assumption 
is that a fabric of obligations, expectations, narratives, and forms 
of contracting-together 
is truer of first century society than of our own because moderns are not in the 
same way the creatures of narrative and relationship. 
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us. 81 We cannot strip away the relationship to find what is beneath either text or persons. 
Questions about the identity of the embodied person of Jesus, the Son who sits at the 
Father's right hand can be answered only by pointing to events of relationship of Father 
and Spirit. Jesus is the source and definition of all that relationship and history that he 
names Israel. 82 It is our task to establish an account that understands scripture as form of 
action initiated by God and in which God brings up Israel. This we started in Chapter 2 
and will return to in Chapter 6. 
3.4.3 Supersession and dialogue. 
Why has the Church called this testament Olds 83 It could perhaps be that it was from the 
beginning, original and therefore genuine. Because it is the original testament it is the 
actual and continuing basis of creation and re-creation, it is ever alive and new, and 
makes all things new. The structure and logic of this house - which determines what is 
possible in it - was laid down as the house was built. Any other logic or testament 
written later, unrelated to the event of its building, is spurious. This testament is ever 
alive because it is that covenant and economy within which the world was built and by 
which it is sustained in life and allowed to come to no ending other than that that 
satisfies the original testator. The new testament is an introduction to the scriptures 
written for gentiles, a special form of attachment whereby gentiles are brought into 
compatibility with the Jewish scriptures and thus able to draw life and sustenance from 
them. Of course, a testament is the work of a testator, the witness of someone who 
witnesses to himself. 84 
Does reading the bible and offering any summary of its contents by, for example, 
taking one concept - salvation history or covenant - as central and confessional, 
do 
violence to the plurality of what is there? Does it impose a limit on the communities that 
81 Webster `The dogmatic location of the canon' Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und 
Religioniphilosophie 43,1 2001 26 argues that `Paying attention to the canon as ecclesial concept may help 
extract a theological account of the Scripture from giving too formal or juridical an account of the relation 
of the canon to the church by stressing that canonicity is best understood in terms of its 
function in 
`establishing and governing certain networks of relationships' (quoting Fowl Engaging Scripture, 3). ' 
82 See 3.6.1 on the ascended God-man. 
83 Watson Text and Truth 179-80 argues that it is called the Old testament in relation to the New, but also to 
some degree because the New testament brings something not present 
in the Old testament. Watson asks 
whether Childs is setting the Old Testament alongside the new 
`in a relationship of pure simultaneity' and 
whether this threatens their proper 
difference. Seitz `Christological Interpretation of Texts and Trinitarian 
Claims to Truth' Scottish Journal of Theology 52 1999 asks whether Watson is able to establish that the Old 
Testament is determinative of the meanings of the New, albeit that the meanings of the New may not be 
read out of the Old apart 
from the New. 
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may read it and be liberated by it? Are von Rad or Brevard Childs, or is any Christian 
reading, attempting to bring the variety of the material in the biblical text under a control 
not theirs to impose? Walter Brueggeman wants to maintain in complete freshness the 
admission that God's action is violent, sheerly other and bafflingly unknowable. 85 Yet 
one aspect of this violent and unknowable action of God is that it obliges us to say that it 
is surprising and alarming not only because God is unknowable, but much more because 
God is knowable. 
It is not in the gift either of Christianity or of Judaism to prevent itself making 
too expansive or too modest a reading, or to prevent itself from effectively ruling out the 
real and different reading the other community makes. Any reading of the Old 
Testament runs the risk of being a reduction of it and a closing of the possibilities of 
reading the Hebrew bible. Any reading of the Hebrew bible risks being a closure of the 
possibilities of reading the Old Testament. Has academic biblical studies decided that the 
community which wrote the scriptures, and did so for its own benefit, is the community 
from whose clutches this text must be taken? Is it the mission of biblical studies to rescue 
the biblical texts from the Christian community? 86 But neither the Christian nor Jewish 
community, neither half of the single community of God, is its own possession. The Old 
Testament is not lost in the New Testament, is not diminished or threatened by or forced 
into it, for amongst other things, the New Testament is the teaching that God is not 
here, and the end is not yet. 
Is not a chief part of the unaccountable, and therefore perhaps violent, action of 
God that he elects a people? Might it not be that it is precisely the elect who lead the 
protest about this action? Israel might well try to find some less conspicuous form of 
being. It is unaccountable that God chooses, and he chooses a number. It is no more 
reasonable that he choose many than that he choose few, or one rather than none. This 
is scandalous to that protological ontology of supersessionism that understands only that, 
because God is one and humankind plural, God can only represent a threat to that 
plurality. The question of who has the right to read which scriptures reflects the politics 
84 Lindbeck `Postcritical Canonical Interpretation' in Seitz & Greene-McCreight Theological Exegesis argues 
that Childs' use of the concept of witness must be augmented by the narrative-symbolic approach, 
represented by Hays, and the authorial discourse approach, exemplified by Wolterstorff. 
85 Brueggemann Theology of the Old Testament 359-99. 
86 Markus Bockmühl "To Be or Not to Be': The Possible Futures of New Testament Scholarship' Scottish 
Journal of Theology 51 1998 290 makes the criticism that P. Davies wants to confiscate the bible from the 
community that owes its existence to 
it. Biblical studies must always be tempted to claim the bible as its 
exclusive object. 
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of twentieth century Jewish-Christian dialogue. 87 Some scholarship has preferred to read 
the New Testament as a Greco-Roman phenomenon rather than as an expression of 
Israel's cult to avoid trespassing on Jewish scholarship or religious sensibilities. ',, And- 
supersession-ism may become so scrupulous that it becomes a falsification of Jewish 
theology against which the New Perspective on Paul scarcely prevails. 89 
We have asked whether the scholarship of dialogue may not represent a playing 
down of the scandalous particularity of Israel's status, and a refusal of the doctrine of 
Israel's election. Can New Testament scholarship join the notions of suffering and 
martyrdom to the idea that God is at work, and at work in and with the diaspora and 
therefore still at work today? Is the New Testament the outworking of the political 
theology and cosmology of the Old Testament? This is surely required by the theological 
claim that Israel's work is directed towards the world and that a public claim on the 
world is intrinsic to the identity of Israel. In asking about the doctrine of election as a 
doctrine about God and his servant I have asked whether Israel has an autonomous 
status and no responsibility to the nations, or whether Israel under God must be 
involved in dialogue and contest with the nations. Now we must ask about the resistance 
represented by Western being to the doctrine that takes the form of the Western 
understanding of time. 
Israel is the eschatological working of God. Israel may not be separated from 
God to be analysed under alien criteria. Israel cannot be accounted either as singular or 
plural until God is accounted the determinative member of Israel. If there are two, and 
one is perfect, both are perfect, for the perfect one perfects the other. The obedient 
priest sets his hand on the head of the creature, supplying what the creature 
lacks, so he 
87 I argue in 5.1 and 6.2-3 that all reading should be understood as political claim. 
88 The question is whether the New Testament is a Jewish or Greco-Roman 
book. Hafemann S. `Paul and 
his Interpreters' in Gerald F. Hawthorne, Ralph P. Martin & Daniel G. Reid Dictionary of Paul and his Letters 
Leicester: IVP 1993,678 `The fundamental issue since to be resolved in Pauline studies is the 
determination of the primary religious or theological context within which 
Paul's thought is to be 
understood. This is the great watershed among students of 
Paul... one's view of Paul will be determined, 
above all, by whether one interprets his letters, predominantly against the 
Greco-Roman philosophical and 
religious world of Paul's day, as Bultmann argued over 
fifty years ago, or in the light of the Hellenistic- 
Jewish world of the first century and its scriptures, as 
Adolf Schlatter proposed in the early decades of this 
century. ' 
89 The work of Malina, Crossan, and 
Girard and some liberation theologians, may be said to be based on 
the accusation that rabbinic Judaism 
had become an oppressive regime from which Jesus was defending the 
exploited. Susannah Heschel 
Abraham Geiger and the Jewish Jesus Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1998, 
232 criticises Käsemann for making 
Jesus who `cannot be integrated into the background of Jewish piety of 
his time' into this sort of figure suffering an oppression - 
inevitably imposed by Jews. The old polemical 
opposition of law and grace 
has been replaced by the opposition of purity and compassion. ' Perrin's 
criterion of dissimilarity - the authenticity of a 
NT teaching ascribed to Jesus determined by uniqueness, 
241 `found not in the things he shares with 
his contemporaries but in the things wherein he differs from 
them' is the principle 
driving the scholarship of the historical Jesus. 
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no longer lacks anyth. ing. '° This is the relation of the Creator and his creature. The 
activity of many members of Israel together make the One. They do not merely 
symbolise him or stand in for him but are adopted by the Spirit as the constituents from 
which the One is assembled. They stand in for him in the sense that they are proved to 
have been really practising, waiting, and by being with him by his Spirit, becoming part 
of him. Thus eschatologically and retrospectively, all those in the history of scripture who 
appear to have been simply waiting for something to happen were in fact waiting 
faithfully and were being built together to become the faithful witness. On the modern 
view we steadily increase our distance from the first century event of Jesus Christ. But 
Israel is not contained by the past. The survival of the Jewish people is evidence of 
God's faithfulness, and the guarantee of this re-definition of this time as the joint time of 
Israel and God, into which the peoples of the world are also called and gathered. 
How successful are Jewish scholars at the demythologisation of this time of 
modernity? Is there a Jewish eschatology? Is the history of the West the history of the 
supplanting of the election of this people, the specific people of God's choosing, with a 
generalised version by which God's action was abstracted to meaninglessness? The idea 
of progress was the beginning of the reduction of the people of Israel to the idea of 
Israel, and the turning of the idea against Israel to oust her. When time is used to name 
the relationship of God and Israel, it must be understood to be determined by their 
movements towards each other. Israel grows into the space God provides, for God on 
the trinitarian conception is not only agent but the host and enabler of all other agents. It 
is because God came to Israel, that it can be said that Israel comes to God. Then we can 
say that time is nothing but the determination of God for Israel and Israel for God, and 
this is the ground of possibility for a world of agency. 
3.5 The work of God. 
This chapter inquires into the relation of the two doctrines of God's immediate work of 
election and his mediate work of making holy. It attempts to understand each as the 
basis 
and expression of the other. God is the mediation of his work, so 
it may be said to be 
both mediate and immediate. It argues that God is a worker, that he works a people to 
become participants in his work, and that Israel's liturgical task is the labour of 
imagining, modelling and preparing for the new creation, and so of participating in 
its 
arrival. Israel will become God's co-worker 
in the creation. It discusses Sabbath and 
90 See 3.7.4 
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eschatology as concepts for God's work. It provides an account of the resistance to the 
work of God in the form of the son who would not work, the man described by the 
history of Western secularisation who seeks no participation in the work and working of 
God but succeeds in establishing no alternative economy. 
Israel prevents all forms of human being from becoming determinative of God's 
creation other than the form he intends for it. Israel represents the knitting together of 
the various ends of the gentile world into the single end God has for the world as 
creature of his economy. Israel's theology is therefore creation theology. God speaks and 
is heard, and the world returns his speech. The Word of God halts, defeats, breaks up, 
re-gathers and re-employs the words of the world and returns them to God as his Word. 
All other rival words are merely estranged creatures of God. Because they belong to 
God's estate, it is God's logic that, unknown to them, will come to inform them so that 
they are no longer opponents but creatures. Those who consume the Lord's substance 
live off his estate, participate in his work and gain the economy of action he intends for 
them. 
3.5.1 The hospitality of the estate. 
The question of being is the question of to whom the economy of being belongs, and 
thus a question of the identity of its creator and his ability to sustain it against rival 
economies. 91 Israel is servant of her lord inasmuch as she takes up her work and place as 
steward of the economy of his creation. The doctrine of creation therefore entails that it 
is Israel's task to host the gentiles. Israel is God's servant and as such is lord of the 
gentiles. Israel must bring the gentiles into the house of her Lord, providing them with 
the support and supplying them with the being he intends for them. Life is the specific 
life a particular lord and his economy supplies. There is no life in general or life outside 
one or other lordship. The rationale of Israel's holiness and purity teaching is to witness 
to Israel's freedom from the claims of other lordships and forms of life, and that this 
freedom derives from her office as servant of God. The exercise of this hospitality 
involves allowing its recipients also to become participants in it. Their host gives his 
clients the means to play host and return hospitality. ' Lordship is not about the simple 
91 O'Donovan The Desire of the Nations 148 believes that `If one of the three elements of political authority 
could be seen as privileged in Israel is must surely be that of possession. ' 
92 Patrick D. Miller `Israel as host to strangers' in Israelite Religion and Biblical Theology JSOTS Sheffield: 
Sheffield Academic Press 2000 on this hospitality. Bruce D. Chilton Feast of Meanings: Eucharistic theologies 
from Jesus through Johannine Circles Leiden: Brill 1994,50 believes that Jesus taught that what is offered should 
be and be seen to be one's property. 
Israel is the tenant of the vineyard, and is given talents to invest in it. 
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exercise of domination, but the exercise of hosting and bringing up people into the form 
of life enabled by that economy. Who will, by successfully hospitable dominion, be 
confirmed in the task of stewardship of land and people? 
In Israel's cosmology it is Israel herself who works the ecosystem of the world. 
The world does not work without her. 93 Sacrifice displays the fruits of the obedient 
husbandry of the land given to Israel, amongst which fruit must be accounted the well- 
being of all members of Israel. Israelites understand that they host and feed each other. 
Food is always someone's property and invitation to eat; nourishment is inseparable from 
the obligation to play host and have your property affirmed to you by sharing it with the 
poor. 94 In the concept of bread is included all the work of making and keeping the land 
fertile, of planting and harvesting that is required to put bread on the table when the 
guest arrives. All food is accompanied by a set of obligations which by eating we make 
ourselves subject to. Food is related to the possession, control and the constitution of 
our own body. If we eat his bread, his work enters and constitutes us, and we become 
his. God works the world - it does not produce bread for us of itself. 95 
3.5.2 Liturgy as work. 
The sacrifice, worship and teaching of Israel constitute a unity. We will approach them by 
means of the concepts of performance and commentary. Teaching took place in the 
synagogues and the courts of the Jerusalem temple: rabbinic colleges addressed 
hermeneutical problems in the same spirit of healthy competition as modern 
interpreters. 96 Teaching took place in the cloisters, and sacrificing at the centre of the 
temple. All action was watched, commented on and served to determine the next round 
of action and the discernment of scripture. Scripture involved the work of writing, 
copying and collating, teaching and learning by rote by the interpretative apparatus of the 
93 In 5.1-2 I argue that the temple generates the productivity of the land and generation of sons. 
94 Jacob Neusner `Judaism after the destruction of the temple' in John H. Hayes & J. Maxwell Miller 
Israelite and Judaean History London: SCM 1977. I argue in 5.2 that the land is a metonym for all the persons 
that live on it and the ecosystem that binds land and people to each other as creatures of God; the Creator 
is householder and husbander of his property and estate and his land and its product counts as his 
substance and being. 
95 Peder Borgen Bread from Heaven: An Exegetical Study of the Concept of Manna in the Gospel of John and the 
Writing of Philo Leiden: Brill 1965 Jesus's response to the disciples in John 4.32 
`I have bread' is that he is 
not ready to sit down and eat, to be Lord and head of the table, 
for he is still a servant working to bring to 
the table another, not-yet-gathered set of people. 
96 See Sanders Judaism 170-82; Bockmuehl Revelation and Mystery in Ancient Judaism 9 argues that `The bearer 
of revelation whether priest or prophet 
(or both) is almost never properly independent of the cult. ' C. 
Rowland The Open Heaven: A Study ofApocalyptic in Judaism and Early Christianity SPCK 1982,318 shows how 
the diversity of opinion from the second-century rabbinic 
debates is indicated by the story of the four 
rabbis who entered the garden, only one of whose 
hermeneutic procedures allowed him to survive in it. 
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oral law. 97 Ritual and scripture constituted a single work of the formation of this people. 
This single work and tradition did not cease either before the first century, or subsequent 
to it. 98 
Temple ritual interpreted scripture. The congregation of Israel assembled before 
the high priest. In the high priest the congregation saw God in the form of his servant, 
and in the congregation the priest saw God, in the form of his servant-99 Each took one 
part of the conversation of the Father and the Son, and repeated the conversation of 
God into which they themselves were being incorporated. Each aided the other into the 
role and office of obedient servant. God elects and transforms this conversation to his 
own speech and work. Israel understands itself to be both standing opposite God and 
sitting with him, linked in these two idioms by the whole economy of God's action. 
It is Israel's liturgical labour to participate in this conversation of Father and Son. 
Apocalyptic is one mode of Israel's formation in this participation and its dramaturgy. 
The Father speaks, and the Son hears and receives his speech. The Father tells those he 
intends to add to his Son, about his Son. The Son is telling those he wants to present to 
the Father about his Father. God is telling us about himself in the third person. In this 
way he draws and assembles us into his narration, so the story of God's action is a story 
about our coming into his action, and this narration constitutes the two-dimensional 
form of our coming to participate in this action. The action of God in telling, hearing 
and receiving constitutes the whole economy in which we will receive our being. God's 
telling us about himself, in the story of himself and his servant, is his means of letting us 
find our identity and place in this servant, and so become that servant. The story gives 
us a place, office and work. God tells us about God by playing alternately his role and 
ours in order that we come to play our role for ourselves. 100 By this telling and acting out 
Israel is drawn into the character and action of God. 
97 According to Bockmuehl Revelation and Mystery in Ancient Judaism 98 God himself has taught Torah to the 
tribes of Israel, and he spends three hours a day studying Torah. 113 `The idea of the dynamic presence of 
revelation in both written Torah and oral tradition is present at least in nuce already prior to the fall of 
Jerusalem. ' 30 n40. Willi-Plein `regards the angel as almost a hypostasis of interpretation. ' Riesner `Jesus as 
Preacher and Teacher' in Henry Wansbrough Jesus and the Oral Gospel Tradition Sheffield: JSOT Press 1991, 
191 argues that `One cannot overstress the importance of the synagogal teaching system as a background 
for the formation and transmission of the Gospel tradition'. 
98 Bockmuehl Revelation and Mystery in Ancient Judaism 61 argues that `There are sufficient indications to 
show that at least some form of priestly or Levitical `prophecy' continued 
in the post-exilic age. ' David E. 
Aune Prophecy in Early Christianity and the Ancient Mediterranean World Grand Rapids: Eerdmans 1983,104 
agrees: `It has become increasingly recognised that prophecy 
did not disappear in Judaism during the 
hellenistic and Roman periods. ' 
99 I return to apocalyptic in 4.5.2. Apocalyptic 
is Israel's political witness to the nations in pictorial mode. 
See C. Fletcher-Louis Luke Acts: Angels, Christology and Soteriology Tübingen: Mohr 1997,205-11. 
100 1 discussed this dramaturgy in 2.7.2 
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All that is performed in the Temple and synagogue serves as an interpretation of 
Israel's history with God and the world God has given Israel. The actions of the priest 
have a place in a series familiar to all Israel. Where everybody already knows what is 
going on, or are united in offering competing versions of it, each action is interpreted by 
the next action in the series. The priest may be telling more than one story at a time, 
telling one story in the mode of another, undoing and re-performing the version of a 
story told by rivals. All these represent a parody and deconstruction of the ideologies and 
claims of the nations of the gentile world. This cultic parodying involves being able 
expertly to manipulate the many modalities of the animal-lexicon of the bodily-world. 101 
Though it was subject to the processes of dispute and translation, it did not allow itself to 
be interpreted into alien terms. 102 The congregation saw what they saw because they had 
been taught it: what they saw was not visible to non-practitioners. 103 The being of Israel 
was constitutively reiterated and shaped by these movements of priest and congregation 
to make a single paideutic effort and nation. 
Law and scripture are that set of propositions that describe a particular human 
body, the eschatological-biological body of the God-man, Jesus Christ. This is a body 
captured in an instant of time and space, but includes its whole history, skills and 
relationships. It is therefore not the body of an individual, but of a community present as 
one person. It is a propositional teaching, but also a being inducted into a new way of 
life, a transition from a simpler to a more complex form of creaturehood. Can biblical 
scholarship find a way of showing how God and Israel may be in one action together, 
and that Israel is drawn into the action of God? 
101 In the animal semiotics of Israel and the ancient world each dynasty and nation has an animal emblem, 
which may serve as a proper name for that nation or its ruling house. See the 
discussion of Douglas `The 
Pangolin revisited: a new approach to animal symbolism' in R. G. Willis Sign ingAnimalr 
Human Meaning in 
the Natural World London: Unwin Hyman 1990. 
102 Aristeas in C. T. R. Haywood The Second Temple: A Non-Biblical Sourcebook London: Routledge 1998 gives a 
description of the movements of the priest in the sacrifices, though without naming them. 
It may be that 
much of the action of the priests 
is lost to us, or remains before us in Scripture, but which have not been 
recognised as priestly stage 
directions. 
103 Christopher Rowland The Open Heaven A Study ofApocalyptic in Judaism and Early Christianity London: 
SPCK 1982,347 argues that `Rabbinic exegesis of Genesis 1 and Ezekiel 1 has left us with the impression 
that what started as an expository exercise soon turned 
into a vision, as parts of the chariot and the cosmos 
appeared in the imagination of the visionary. 
' For vision and its object, see 6.5.1. 
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3.5.3 Biblical studies on liturgy as Israel's work. 
Israel has no work that is not first God's. Worship of God is Israel's work. This work of 
worship includes the confession that the life God intends for Israel he intends to extend 
through Israel to all creation. 104 Some Old Testament scholarship understands worship in 
this way. 105 Samuel Balentine believes that `covenant-making and covenant-keeping recall 
and renew God's creational designs, ' and that `the liturgy of covenant-making can be 
properly understood as a liturgy of creation-keeping. '106 He argues that Israel's temple 
represents the practice of a creation theology. `The Torah also presents worship as the 
principal means through which God's creative design for the world is established, 
sustained and restored'. Balentine believes that the claim to participate in the labour of 
creation is the key to Israel's understanding of history. With the collapse of the history 
paradigm has come the move to re-conceive history in terms of creation theology.. . while 
this has led to a more balanced view, it has not produced an alternative to the history 
paradigm. It simply subordinates historical (human) time to `cosmic time'. '107 Can the 
turn to performance in Old Testament studies produce the conceptuality of 
transformation that would allow God as agent, and as provider of the first account of his 
agency? 108 As Perdue identified the move from history to text, Balentine intends to 
identify the movement from text to worship understood as liturgical work. By it Israel is 
brought up to the status of God's co- worker. 109 
104 I argue for the liturgical context of Scripture-reading in 4.4. 
105 See Brueggemann Theology of the Old Testament 117-228, Miller Israelite Religion and Biblical Theology 269-336, 
and Bernhard W. Anderson From Creation to New Creation: Old Testament Perspectives Minneapolis: Fortress 
1994,208-11 for examples. 
106 Samuel E. Balentine The Torah's Vision of Worship Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress 1999,126. Balentine 
believes that as symbolic act (75) `ritual has the capacity both to mirror and to transform a society's 
worldview and ethos, and priestly ritual must be understood with priestly creation theology. ' F. H. Gorman 
Jr., The Ideology of Ritual: Space Time and Status in the Priestly Theology Sheffield 1990,59 describes ritual as a 
means of `world construction'. 
107 Balentine The Torah's Vision of Worship 22. 
108 Balentine seems to dichotomise worship and teaching, arguing that the historical-critical approach has 
given way to an emphasis on doxology. Gorman `Ritual Studies and Biblical Studies: Assessments of the 
Past: Prospects of the Future' Semeia 67 1994,13-36. Brueggeman Theology of the Old Testament 653 counters 
that `it is in worship, not in contextless, cerebral activity, that Israel worked out its peculiar identity and 
sustained its odd life in the world. Worship life, over time, takes on an internal logic of its own in the 
community of practice, an internal logic not available to outsiders and about which the community does 
not trouble to speak very clearly or precisely. ' 
'09 Balentine The Torah's Vision of Worship 87 believes that `treated separately Genesis land 2 have 
traditionally been construed as affirmation of two ideas: God's independent (or in religious terms, 
transcendent) and unassisted creation of the world (Genesis 1); and humankind's depend and totally passive 
receipt of divine imperatives (Genesis 2)... In the vision of Genesis 1-2, however such a simple view of 
God's cosmic design is inadequate. Close attention to creation's liturgy makes it clear that in the world God 
creates, God chooses to remain open and responsive to acts of 
`creaturely creativity'. God and creation are 
portrayed as engaged in a relationship of mutual creativity. 
' 
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3.5.4 Work complete with its outcome. 
The Sabbath does not represent the cessation of work but the teaching that the outcome 
of God's work is already present in that working. 11° The Sabbath is a doctrine of 
eschatology-111 The Sabbath is God's work understood both as present action and as 
completed action together with its result, an action completed in his time, not ours, but 
which provides a time that is still future promise to us. 
The Sabbath in Neusner's view, `a this-worldly moment that bespeaks eternity', 
stands apart from the profane week of the gentiles, whom Israel has to meet and do 
business with. 112 `Keeping the Sabbath makes us like God. Not working on the Sabbath 
... 
is a way of imitating God'. 113 So why, ask Neusner and Chilton, did Jesus not heal all 
week, and then, like God, observe the day that timelessly reflects the finishedness of 
heaven? We must reply that the work is not over and the earth not yet a finished article, 
ready to be appreciated in stillness. The Sabbath now takes the form of our suffering 
participation in his labour and therefore in the cross; this labour is constant, but it is the 
light yoke of priestly office. The Sabbath prevents those who, by adding day to day in 
unbroken series, intend to accumulate the fruit of other men's work in order to build an 
alternative creation of their own. 114 All God's working is entire and complete, a single 
Sabbath that other days cannot interrupt. 115 The Sabbath restricts and brings to nothing 
all other projects and destinies. It keeps the world open and prevents itself from knitting 
together into any other form. 116 The active absenting work of God tells us that the 
messiah is not here, and that what is here does not amount to the messiah or to the 
110 In 4.1-2 I argue that there must be two accounts, in one of which the outcome of God's work is present 
with him, and in the other of which he suffers the resistance of the world. 
111 Anderson `Creation' The Interpreter's Dictionary of the Bible Nashville: Abingdon Press 1986 Volume 1,730 
states that `Creation is fundamentally an eschatological doctrine'. Levenson Creation and the Persistence of Evil 
109 is sceptical about the coherence of the view that the Sabbath could mean that God stops work and 
withdraws. 
112 Neusner & Chilton Judaism in the New Testament London: Routledge 1995,136. New Testament 
scholarship has shown little interest in Sabbath, perhaps because it seldom puts the question of work 
in 
terms of the doctrine of creation, rather than of soteriology or understands the relationship of the 
latter to 
the former, and has underplayed the Sabbath as as the commission to take up the exercise of God's 
dominion of creation and the exercise of hospitality for the weak. 
113 Neusner and Chilton Judaism in the New Testament 136. 
114 LaCocque & Ricoeur Thinking Biblically 46 `According to Leviticus, at some point the earth can decide to 
take the Sabbaths that Israel did not grant her; she may refuse to produce. ' 
115 Terence E. Fretheim Exodus Atlanta: John Knox 1991,230 argues that `Sabbath-keeping is an act of 
creation-keeping'. Levenson `The 
Jerusalem Temple', in Green, Arthur Jewish Spirituality London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul 1986,52 also believes that `The Sabbath is a kind of democratisation of the 
Temple experience, and the land of Israel 
is an extended Temple ... 
The Temple is the world as it ought to 
be. ' 
116 The seventh day is the unity of the six 
days, and thus `rest' is the whole of what God has worked, not 
something experienced after this work, 
by giving it up or ceasing this effort. 
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totality of what is to be. What the world presently is, is not the end. 117 The temple 
worship is the product of the celebration that overflows from around the throne and 
interrupts life below. 118 The king is not here, but nonetheless he ensures that nothing else 
comes to usurp his place. To say he is not here is to say only that we are not yet made 
ready to receive from him our co-presence with each other. It is part of our liturgical 
labour to say this and lament it. 119 
3.6.1 The work of the Servant. 
The Son does not act alone. The Son works with the Father to do the Father's work. The 
Son does the work of creation, stewardship and of bringing many sons to the Father. 
According to Hengel, Paul assumes that both the Father and the Son can be addressed as 
`Kyrios'. 12° Both are addressed as the coming judge and credited with creation. There is a 
`unique soteriological connection between Psalm 110.1 and 4, between the "sitting at the 
right hand of God" and the heavenly high priesthood of Christ including his 
soteriological intercessio. '121 The throne is a bench where Father and Son sit together. The 
high priesthood of God is God's whole mode of being for us. The high priest takes what 
is the Father's and gives it back to him in the form of the Son who pleases the Father. 
The Son is the form of the creature in full. The Father intends to extend this form to all 
his creatures, and through them, with all the natural history of the world of his creation. 
The creed correctly maintains that he sits at the right hand of the Father in opposition to 
that Gnostic docetism which cannot tolerate the bodily resurrection of a creature to 
God. 1" The Jesus who sits at the right hand of the Father is the whole pleroma; with the 
entire creation we are with him there. 123 There is a single speech and conversation of 
117 See 2.1.2. 
118 See 0. Hofius `Gemeinschaft mit den Engeln im Gottesdienst der Kirche' Zeitung für Theologie und Kirche 
89 1992; see also Preuss Old Testament Theology Volume 1,256-8. 
119 It is part of our confession to say that the messiah is not yet here. See the distinctions made in 4.1 
between purposeful and pointless suffering. 
120 Martin Hengel `Sit at My Right Hand' in Studies in Early Christology Edinburgh: T&T Clark 1995, vii. 
Seyoon Kim The `Son of Man' as the Son of God Tübingen: Mohr 1983,99 argues that With the `Son of Man' 
Jesus designated himself in reference to the heavenly figure who appeared to Daniel. . . 
Jesus saw himself 
destined to realise the heavenly counsel revealed to Daniel. ' 
121 Hengel `Sit at my Right Hand' 147. See also 0. Keel The Symbolism of the Biblical World. - Ancient Near 
Eastern Iconography and the Book of Psalms London: SPCK 1978,256-68. 
122 Hengel `Sit at my Right Hand' 159 argues that `the exalted Lord is no deus otiosus. His continual 
intercessio 
as the consequence of his atoning 
death and has its parallel in the intercession of the Spirit in the believer 
on earth. ' 
123 Israel's aniconism understood that the creation could 
be fully itself in the meso-form of one person. The 
creation is the macro-version of 
Jesus, the person of the creation who includes and sustains all persons. He 
waits, looks forward, re-members and assembles the 
dismembered and scattered limbs of past and future. 
Jesus is the creation as pure object present to the Father, though not yet present as object to us. 
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Father and Son, and the Son - as both creature and the world of the creature - returns 
the Word of the Father to the Father, now not only as the Father's Word but also as the 
word of the world. 124 Accounts of the resistance of the world, and of loss and of fall may 
be told only as resistance overcome. 
From the right hand of the Father the Son sends the Spirit. The Spirit replicates 
the Son to us and we to the Son. According to Douglas Farrow, we must begin from 
`God with us', the `descent and ascent of the God-man'. 125 This is provided by a 
trinitarian identification of God and Jesus, the new Adam in which all men and their 
world have their future. This will provide a correction for `the tradition's tendency to 
undo the incarnation. 1126 Whereas the gnostics saw in the redemptive work of the Logos 
`the separation of what was unnaturally united, ' Irenaeus saw in Jesus the reunion of 
what was unnaturally separated. `In teaching the coherence of all things around the 
incarnate Word, Irenaeus was safeguarding not only the integrity of Jesus but the 
integrity of every particular. '127 Irenaeus understands the Christ-event as the climactic 
moment in a long history of God's approach to man. `Only after a protracted period of 
preparation does the Word appear among us - not as a retort to the old covenant or its 
deity, but as that very deity in person. . . 
it is under their tutelage (the prophets) that we 
are slowly readied to receive him, for he does not come to us unannounced. When he 
finally does come of course a great threshold is crossed and a new age begun; under the 
tutelage of the incarnate one, in the communion of the Spirit, we ourselves may now 
advance towards God. '128 
The conversation of Father and the Son is spread by the Spirit from heaven to 
earth, and is picked up and rehearsed in the temple by Israel. The sessio of the Father and 
Son makes itself present in the temple as a dialectic of people and priest in the 
dramaturgy of apocalyptic, the condensed theological product of Israel's liturgical labour. 
The congregation of Israel stands in the court of the Temple, before the high priest. 
The 
congregation sees the figure of God in the high priest, while the priest sees the 
figure of 
124 This must be our answer to the question of the 
location and reality of the church. Jenson Systematic 
Theology 1 206 `Heaven is where God takes space in his creation to be present to the whole of 
it; he does 
that in the church. ' 
125 Farrow Ascension and Ecclesia 249. 
126 Farrow Ascension and Ecclesia 249. 
127 Farrow Ascension and Ecclesia 55. 
128 Farrow Ascension and Ecclesia 76 argues that `As Irenaeus sees 
it, our evolution has actually become our 
devolution the Son does not appear at the middle of history, then, 
but at the end; not somewhere near the 
top, but at the bottom. 
' 
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God in the congregation of Israel. 129 The worship takes the form of the cooperation of 
these parties as they participate in the conversation of God as his servant. Their 
conversation narrates the story of God and his servant. In the course of the narration 
each awards the other the role of the Lord and takes the role of servant, and God 
conforms this doxological playing-out to the triune conversation. 130 As they have 
represented it so, with the Spirit's mediation it comes to be. Congregation and priest are 
together bound to God in the economy of his action. All sacrifice and worship reiterates 
God and Man being together, bound by the many modes of the mediating action of 
God. 
Israel is the work of God. Israel's cult is the theological description and 
deconstruction of the world of the gentiles, and its transformation into the finished 
creation of Israel's God. 131 The various behavioural memes of the nations of the world 
are diverted from their own ultimately inconsequential trajectories into this path. By its 
action it captures the whole phenotype of the alternative creation of old Adam, undoing 
it and re-binding it into to the living and lasting creation of God. Israel deconstructs the 
myth of the single agent in combat with his fate. The Father and Son share a single 
action: the Son is able to gather up and re-play the whole behavioural history of the 
world trans formatively and redemptively so it becomes the history of creation, the action 
and economy of Father and Son together. It is the argument of this chapter that Israel 
demonstrates that the isolated individual has no action of his own, but that Israel is 
drawn into the action of God. Israel has an action precisely because it is the dual action 
of creature exercised with his Creator. The Son is the one who acts as servant. The 
servant who is raised by the Father is the Son. 
3.6.2 The son who would not work. 
There is no work that originates in the individual. His work may be added to him if it is 
built with God as master workman, thus only inasmuch as he does not work alone. 
Otherwise he is building his house on sand, tearing down his barn to store what he will 
never live to enjoy, sowing for another man to reap. Nothing belongs to the individual, 
129 Does the congregation see the single figure of the Son, while the high priest sees the host of Israel, the 
Spirit? 
130 For such dramaturgy see 2.7 
131 This dramaturgy is discussed in 4.3.2. Israel performs in the knowledge that the nations are looking on, 
and understand her performance to refer to themselves, and see 
5.4. 
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and he does not gain alone from his own action. 132 The belief that sacrifice is the violent 
act by which the individual wrests something out of another individual and consumes 
him, the myth of Marduk and Tiamat, is the teaching that the Genesis account of 
creation refutes. One individual cannot propel another into being or motion. Human 
action, and included with it, sacrifice, cannot be understood as the action of propelling 
the inert other into action, thereby bringing something out of nothing. 
Without God, their host, mediating between them and the fruit, the first man 
and woman were unable to find a reply to the serpent and exercise their authority over it. 
Adam lost the faculty by which he could take what God gave. As a result he has only the 
moment of his choosing in which he surveys the world (the fruit) and God's work (the 
garden) and yet does not receive it, and the commission it represents, from God. He is 
stalled in this moment, in which he, man, weighs God against some other possibility of 
man's own invention. The Adam of the Western ordo salutis is the individual whose choice 
is to continue to re-choose such that he can never actually choose, be satisfied and finish 
that act and be ready for another. 
The Western tradition of which Kant is representative teaches that everything is 
subsequent to and constituted by the fall of Adam. 133 Yet the Adam who fell thereby 
ceased to be the first and constitutive Adam. It is the second Adam who becomes the 
source and beginning of Adam's race. 134 The supercession debate has its origin within a 
protology, an assumption that what is, is already autonomous and settled. But we mai- 
not measure God's work by how far he succeeds in returning the situation to one that 
preceded this fall. This would problematise the relationship of our action and his by 
making it a question of who initiates and permits the action of whom, God or Man. But 
the work of God is its own measure; he gives it its autonomy, and pronounces when it 
has that autonomy and ensures that all that shall be does not detract from or threaten but 
fits and renders perfect all that has been made. 
Adam understood his encounter with God as a meeting with an equal with whom 
he could agree on separate fields of operation, to cooperate or conduct turf-wars. Adam 
did not recognise that his own body and resources were the possession and work of the 
132 That the individual has no work, or that all agency is dual and plural, I argue in Chapter 2 and against 
what I shall call an enlightenment view in 5.2. 
133 Kant `Speculative beginning of human history' in Perpetual Peace and Other Essays ed. T. Humphrey 
Indianopolis: Hackett 1983,51. See also Christof Gestrich The Return of Splendour. The Christian Doctrine of Sin 
and Forgiveness Grand Rapids: Eerdmans 1997,84-117. 
134 According to James D. G. Dunn `1 Corinthians 15.45' in Bamabas Lindars, & Stephen S. Smalley Christ 
and the Spirit in the New Testament London: 
Cambridge University Press 1973,140 `Jesus became Last Adam 
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God who addressed him. The sum of things that Adam does do not belong to him, and 
the things of his world do not recognise Adam or come willingly to him. Had Adam 
acted as the priest of creation, acting within the freedom of the end rather than the 
constraint of his origin, he would have overcome the mortality inherent in these 
beginnings and ends, and so freed all creation for the eschatological and free life of the 
creature of God. 135 But, not having learned and grown into his freedom, Adam did not 
have the maturity to be the priest of creation, and did not succeed in liberating creation 
from its mortality. It is the end that is determinative, not the beginning. The end re- 
determines the beginning; the beginning is reckoned from him from whom all beginnings 
and ends take their orientation. By taking the world into his hands and creatively 
integrating it and referring it to God, the new Adam liberates creation from the failed 
priesthood of Adam the individual, re-fathers Adam, and allows the future to be 
determined by the Adam who is Man-with-God, the creature who is with his Creator. In 
Chapter 5I will argue that the story of secularisation and evolution of the economy of 
the modern West derive from this story of the man who does not understand himself as 
creature of God under the command of God. In Chapter 6I will argue that this Son has 
already been overcome by the obedient Son who does the Father's work. 
3.7 Sacrifice and Law. 
The new being and action sent as the Spirit by the Father and the Son is supplied to 
Israel only as fast as Israel receive it, learn it and make it part of her own character. God 
gives Israel the law as the set of skills by which to live on the estate and in the household 
of God. 
3.7.1 Genesis 22 
The Decalogue exemplifies the character of God and announces the freedom of the 
people who are his. 136 Each article amplifies the first command to worship the one God. 
The sixth, the command not to murder, describes one aspect of the new life set out by 
the first command. Israel is the people no longer subject to the imperative of murder. 
Abraham's sacrifice of Isaac - the Agedah - is not only the enactment of the sixth 
at his resurrection. ' As the first Adam came into existence at creation, so the last Adam (as such) came into 
existence at resurrection, so the resurrection marks the 
beginning of the humanity of the second Adam. ' 
135 the argument of Zizioulas `Preserving God's Creation' Kinds Theological Review 13 1990, III, 4. 
136 This is argued by S. Hauerwas `The Truth about God: The Decalogue as Condition for Truthful 
Speech' in Sanctj Them in the Truth Edinburgh: T&T Clark 1998, and see Brevard S. Childs ExodurA 
Commentary London: SCM 1974,393-427. 
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commandment but the inauguration of the new economy of freedom it opens. 137 I find 
the majority approach here unsatisfactory, and will be asking whether it is the proper 
reading of Genesis 22. I will be setting out a new version, which if it is correct, must also 
be an old one. It tells the Aqedah as the whole story of Israel as the story of the Son who 
goes to do his Father's work. 
The climax of the Aqedab has been understood to be the moment when 
Abraham raises his knife. But the tension of this moment in the story is not however 
because Abraham knows he is going to do a horrible thing. Abraham is an Aramean, for 
whom child sacrifice is a customary, not an awful, thing. 138 The tension is because we do 
not know how God's promise is going to win out over this ancestral practice. In this 
event this act is for the first time portrayed under the new concept of murder, and 
understood to be horrible. It is understood in this way precisely by that holy people who 
are to spring from Abraham as a result. 139 So the command `Take your only Son and 
sacrifice him as a burnt-offering', is not the story, and the raising of the knife not its 
climax. They are the scene-setting. It is the divine command that follows that constitutes 
the story. 
Abraham's hand is halted by a word from God. The whole story is located in the 
climax and punch-line of the command, `Do not lay a hand on the boy'. 140 Does God 
command Abraham to kill his Son, or does he forbid killing, with the result that he gets 
many sons who are holy? Which way to read this story? We have to employ the whole of 
the scriptures to determine that this is a teaching about the whole work of God with 
man. It embraces generations and millennia, but flattens out the eschatology into a 
palimpsest, as though a three-frame cartoon, illustrating past, present and future, were re- 
drawn superimposed in a single frame. We have to decide whether this is a story about 
an origin, and thus about how we got to be the way we are, or whether it illustrates 
timeless truths, or whether it teaches that we are to receive a future that is different from 
our past. 
137 The majority approach is represented by James L. Crenshaw A Whirlpool of Torment: 
Israelite traditions of 
God as oppressive presence Philadelphia: Fortress 1984; Philip R. Davies & Bruce 
Chilton `The Aqedah: A 
revised tradition history' Catholic Biblical Quarterly 40 514-46 1978; Raymond E. 
Brown The Death of the 
Messiah From Gethsemane to the Grave: A Commentary on the Passion Narratives in the Four Gospels Anchor Bible 
New York: Doubleday 1994 Volume 2,1435-44. R. W. L. Moberly The Bible, Theology and Faith: A Study of 
Abraham and Jesus Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2000 seems to 
be moving in a direction similar 
to my own. 
138 Milgrom Leviticus Volume 2,1588, and see Levenson and Strenski below. 
139 Attributing horror to Abraham's state of mind is a reading back, one of those anachronisms resorted to 
for heuristic reasons. 
140 Genesis 22.12 Do not lay a hand on the boy.. Now I know thatyou fear God becauseyou have not withheld from me 
your son, your only son. 
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As Aramean, Abraham believes the death of a son releases a stream of sons and 
prosperity, an economic conceptuality that understands that to get something out you 
have to put something in. 141 The original commandment of self-restraint reflects 
mankind's subjection to nature and necessity. But the Aqedah commandment, Do not 
murder, establishes that Israel is not subject to this economic logic that determines the 
rest of the earth. The identification of the death of the firstborn as murder frees Israel 
from the forces and compulsions of nature. God's staying the knife is the first lesson in 
the establishment of a new polity, and the meaning of this knife-staying lesson and the 
accomplishment it represents is only slowly subsequently realised. It requires many 
generations of life with God for Israel to begin to learn the character of God summarised 
in the Sinai Decalogue of freedoms. 
I am arguing against a tradition which interprets Genesis 22 as a story either 
about the fall as the origin of man's freedom, or a timeless truth about the seizing of 
freedom through breaking through limits, `the suspension of the ethical'. Both 
interpretations understand that Abraham was selected because he was obedient, because 
in some way he chose himself. This story has been read as the founding moment of 
man's antinomianism, of God's invitation to break the law of God and leave it behind. It 
would encourage us to believe that choosing yourself is the real form of choosing. Such 
readings, primarily that of Fear and Trembling, have ignored the Decalogue and the rest of 
the bible, which is reason enough to make us suspicious. 142 Jon Levenson provides a 
substantial recent treatment of the Agedah in this tradition. He finds that Reformed 
discussions of Abraham's faith, such as von Rad's, ignore the contextual verses around 
141 According to Albertz A History of Israelite Religion 102-3 If you want sons and offspring for your flocks 
you have to prepare a place for them in the body of a son given as a firstfruits offering. For a social 
anthropological statement of this sacrificial logic see W. Burkert W. Homo Necans The Anthropology ofAncient 
Greek Sacrificial Ritual and Myth Berkeley: University of California Press 1983,39. In Chapter 6I argue that 
closed (zero-sum) and open economies should not be set in a strong contrast but set in a teleological logic 
that allows that the God of Israel commandeers and transforms the conflict of histories into salvation 
history. 
142 Kierkegaard Fear and Trembling ed W. Lowrie Princeton: Princeton University Press 1941. Before 
Kierkegaard's reading, the tension was between divine command and paternal affection, not not between 
divine and moral law. Derrida Given Time Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1992 
follows Fear and 
Trembling in reading the Aqedah as a Jewish potlatch which, by giving everything for nothing, intended to 
wreck the rationality of bourgeois faith in deferred gratification. 
John D. Caputo The Prayers and Tears of 
Jacques Derrida: Religion without Religion Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1997,196 believes that 
Abraham all the time he has, but has no idea if this will buy the future promised. 162 
When Abraham 
raised the dagger and resolved to plunge ahead, to give 
(death) without a return, without knowing where 
this mad leap would land him in the next moment, then, 
in that very moment when the angel stayed his 
dagger from Isaac's breast, Abraham severed the circle of time and left it gaping open. ' Milbank `The 
Sublime in Kierkegaard' Heythrop journal 37 1996, also believes that this is a reckless gift 143 `This is a total 
sacrifice of self and others'. 
144 `Abraham's sacrifice of Isaac is an anti-sacrifice because it is a completely 
pointless sacrifice: not the ancient sacrifice performed within 
the city to ensure its survival. ' 
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Genesis 15.6, the bible as a whole and rabbinic commentary. 143Levenson argues that 
child sacrifice played a continuing part in the religion of Israel. 144They were the 
continuation of the sacrifices to Baal, the god who offers up his only begotten or beloved 
son to immolation. 145 'The impulse to sacrifice the first-born remained potent long after 
the literal practice had become odious and fallen into desuetude', becoming transformed 
into `a sublime paradigm of the religious life. '146 The sacrifice of the first-born son is part 
of a larger biblical theology of the first-born and his relationship to his father, which is `a 
matter of more significance to the relationship of the theologies of the people Israel and 
the Church than has heretofore been recognised. '147 If Abraham had not obeyed the 
command to sacrifice Israel he would, according to Levenson, have elected Isaac as his 
own son over Isaac the Beloved Son and a place in the `larger providential drama'. The 
Aqedah `tests whether Abraham is prepared to surrender his son to God who gave him. 
To say with Kierkegaard and von Rad, that he is prepared to do so because through faith 
he expects to receive Isaac anew (as indeed happens) is to minimise the frightfulness of 
what Abraham is commanded to do. '148 Levenson, in line with Jewish medieval 
commentary, sees the sacrifice as a test of Isaac more than of Abraham, and sees father 
and son as undivided in their obedience to God. Ivan Strenski asks Levenson whether we 
can `move so easily from deploring the "obviously" barbaric to the plainly "sublime". '149 
But all these ever more extravagant portrayals of Abraham as individual and 
originator of subjectivity represent a failure of eschatology and thus a false start. Israel's 
sacrifices should be seen not as killing, and thus not as killing sons, but as commentary 
on the practices of the world - which feature killing sons. 150 Israel's theology is the refusal 
143 Levenson `Why Jews are not Interested in Biblical Theology' 137. 
1-14 See J. D. Levenson The Death and Resurrection of the Beloved Son: The Transformation of Child Sacrifice in Judaism 
and Christianity. On human sacrifice De Vaux R. Ancient Israek" Its Life and Institutions London: Darton, 
Longman & Todd 1961,441-6. 
145 Levenson The Death and Resurrection of the Beloved Son 34. 
146 Levenson The Death and Resurrection of the Beloved Son 52, x. 
147 Levenson The Death and Resurrection of the Beloved Son 34. 
148 Levenson The Death and Resurrection of the Beloved Son 126. 
149 Strenski `Between Theories and Speciality: Sacrifice in the 90's' Religious Studies Review 22 1996,10 asks 
`What kind of religion or society could place child sacrifice anywhere, much less apparently at the centre of 
their ceremonial life? Strenski Durkheim and the Jews of France Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press 1997,103 
points out that `Frazer wrote that ancient Hebrew human sacrifice and the death of Jesus were part of a 
`surviving' Jewish culture trait of bloody sacrificial victimisation. ' 
150 To understand Israelite sacrifice as killing is to ignore the dramatic and 
didactic character of this event 
and its liturgical remembering in temple sacrifice. 
Israel intends to represent this as the horrible act of the 
gentiles who can know no better. 
It is a dumb-show of son-killing that Israel is performing in the 
knowledge that the son-killer nations are watching and know that they are meant. Only the non-expert 
(modern) onlooker who is ignorant of this complex mimetic relationship of Israel with 
her audience could 
conclude that this is an act of son-killing, rather than of 
halting the son-killers. By ignoring the audience of 
the surrounding gentile nations, modern 
hermeneutics, refusing to be the expert audience (2.7) reads the 
Agedah and Israel's sacrifice generally as precisely the reverse of what 
Israel intends. 
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and refutation of accounts of violence or necessity as origins of economic rationality. 
The Aramean practices of Abraham pre-date the election of Abraham and the 
commencement of the training and character formation of Israel. Israel's sacrificial 
practice does not originate in the sacrifice of first-born. The Aqedah represents the 
election from the gentiles of a new holy God-dedicated line. Abraham is a gentile 
plucked from the gentiles. At the origin of Israel's coming into being is all the practices 
of the gentiles from which Israel has been elected and removed. She is elected and re- 
created against the background of this chaos and violence. These are not the basis of her 
election, however, and she refuses them as violence and chaos only as she is trained to 
identify them as such. That all the behaviour of the world is chaotic and violent, is not 
obvious to gentiles, but has to be learned by the elect community. Violence is what the 
gentiles amount to, and as such it is the background against which, and even on which, 
Israel's new character is written and formed. 
Abraham is not tested to see what he is as individual, to see whether there is 
enough faith-substance in him to make him worth God's while. Testing and judgement 
belong only with the process of the formation of the elect community. 151 It is the fiction 
of individualism that the individual contains the whole world in microcosm, a sufficient 
source of world to himself - but that it is a fiction is precisely what Israel is teaching us. It 
is only a story about Abraham inasmuch as it is about the generations who, by obediently 
referring to him as father, make him their father. He tests positive for fatherhood 
because of their obedience, not because of any property of Abraham the individual. The 
redemption of Isaac from Abraham's knife is not a second event subsequent to 
Abraham's call but a further lesson in Abraham's election, his being recruited to the task 
of making many holy generations. It is the teaching in summary and the story in diagram 
form. The situation is that mankind is inseparable from the habit of killing; the story is 
that one instance of mankind is prevented from killing, and the consequence 
is that this 
character is the father of many children who are to become strangers to the earlier ways 
of mankind. Out of the Do no Murder command, comes Isaac, the guarantee of 
Abraham's line. 
151 Moberly The Bible, Theology and Faith 99 interprets `tests' as `refines', not `tempts'. If refining relates to 
training and becoming, it allows for the paideutic version of sacrifice 
I am arguing for and the necessary 
expressivist rather than causal 
logic that it requires. Childs Biblical Theology of the Old and New Testaments 327 
also opts for a sense 
for `tests' that looks forward to God's ongoing action. 
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3.7.2 The Fall 
If we understand the story to be that God tests Abraham by telling him to sacrifice his 
Son, it becomes merely a repetition of Adam's fall. Abraham's significance would then be 
as the individual constituted by his own decision, by himself in absence of relationship. 
Adam would then succeed in doing something precisely inasmuch as he does it himself, 
without God. This is the Kantian ordo salutis, on the basis of which Adam's fall and being 
without God would be the beginning of the real history of man, understood as man- 
without-God. 152 Instead we should follow Irenaeus in speaking of the fall only in terms 
of its correction and recapitulation by the second Adam, that is in terms that show that 
the fall did not succeed in being a fall. 153 The fall is not an action which man achieves by 
himself. The Creator was not too feeble to hold on, and his creature did not slip from his 
grasp. 154 The fall was not a free fall through empty space, but was a falling and being 
caught and placed in a particular God-determined time and place, a soft place within 
which, though we are sin-damaged, sin is effectively limited by death and cannot make an 
end of us. Sin and death are theological, not publicly given, concepts. Death is not its 
own master, but is confined to this world-container, placed from the beginning by God, 
for God's purposes. So within this death-delimited place of our falling and landing is the 
world which, because it is the world of God's working, has enough `give' and flexibility in 
it to withstand the whole excess and deficiency that our sin represents. 
152 In Kant's exegesis of the fall as the `Speculative beginning of human history' Perpetual Peace 51 Man 
`discovered in himself an ability to choose his own way of life and thus not to be bound like other animals 
to just one. ' The fall was man's breakthrough into self-production 53 `Whether man has gained or lost as a 
result of this change can no longer be asked, at least if one looks to the vocation of his species, which 
consists in nothing other than progress towards perfection'. Similarly G. W. F. Hegel Lectures on the Philosophy of 
Religion Volume 3 The Consummate Religion edited by Peter C. Hodgson, Berkeley: University of California 
Press 1985,104-8 (41-5). According to C. Gestrich The Return of Splendour in the World 86 `Hegel believed he 
could take from this verse (Genesis 3.22 The man has become one of us, knowing good and evi4 the idea that Adam 
and Eve's sinful falling away from the image of God given to them when they were created was not only a 
source of evil in the world but at the same time the source of a very positive opportunity for the 
development of humanity since now the knowledge of the good also became possible. ' But Gestrich points 
out that (88) `Adam has not moved into a position directly under the position of God by a fall into sin. On 
the contrary, Adam's authority to name all living beings and gain power over them was decisively reduced 
by the fall. ' See the remarks of Pannenberg Anthropology in Theological Perspective Edinburgh: T&T Clark 1985, 
47-60, and Barth Church Dogmatics 4,1,382. 
153 According to Irenaeus Adversus Haereses 3.21.10 `So also by the obedience of one man, righteousness 
having been reintroduced, shall cause life to fructify in those persons who in times past were dead... so did 
he who is the Word, recapitulating Adam in himself, rightly receive a birth, enabling him to gather up 
Adam (into himself) from Mary. ' Adversus Haereses 3.22.3 `Luke points out that the pedigree which traces 
the generation of our Lord back to Adam contains seventy-two generations connecting the end with the 
beginning, and implying that it is he who has summed up in himself all nations dispersed from Adam 
downwards. ' 
154 The fall has been constitutive in a certain \t'estern understanding of the relationship of God's space and 
time and man's that has led to the belief that man is able to defend his own space against God. 
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Rather than attribute the fall to any necessity or nature as the Western ordo salutis 
seems to do, I want to rely on a more paideutic and Irenaean account. The Fall was a 
wandering and a failure to maintain a direction or discover any orientation. Adam's being 
is that of being in a house without a host, a society without other members: it is an 
autism. 155 By never getting around to the task and work of co-creation with God 
together, he commenced by default another work that amounted to dismantling God's 
creation to make something much poorer with it, never reckoning whether he had the 
wherewithal to complete a city of his own. By following Adam in failing to recognise the 
owner of this creation and its own implicit order, we also fail to take advantage of the 
place intended by God for our flourishing, and succeed only in running it down. In the 
wilderness Jesus declined to continue this refusal or be party to this estrangement. He 
turns away from Adam's refusal and Satan's account of alternative creations, and takes up 
God's work again. Jesus does not come to a business gone into receivership but to his 
own vineyard and house; he re-assumes the office of householder, and the estate 
recognises the voice of its master. He puts his hand to the plough and goes to prepare 
the place for us. So to apply this more Irenaean version of Adam to Abraham, we cannot 
understand Abraham as individual, but as Israel, the obedient servant and witness of 
God-156 
3.7.3 Murder: Israel's estimate of gentile being. 
God's giving of the concept of murder is one act with his election of the people of Israel. 
The concept of murder is not one apparent to all the world, a commandment that the 
gentiles could keep if they wished. The commandment is precisely to be not-gentile, to 
have nothing to do with those forms of life that Israel lumps together under the term 
gentile. 157 The command `Do no murder' is the election of Israel in imperative mood. 
God's word is the unity of description and imperative, of speech and its being heard-and- 
iss Irenaeus understood Adam as immature. Adversus Haereses 3.22. Adam and Eve `having been created a 
short time previously had no understanding of the procreation of children; for it was necessary that they 
should first come to adult age. ' 
156 Wyschogrod is mistaken in understanding either Jesus or God as individual, unaccompanied by his 
Word and the hearer of that Word. With the personhood he has from the Father by the Holy 
Spirit, Jesus 
persons Abraham too. 
137 E. Feldman Biblical and port-Biblical Defilement and Mourning Law as Theology New York: Yeshiva University 
1977 believes that Israel is not so much concerned with death as physical phenomenon as in 
demythologising death, by demonstrably rejecting those routines and observances that surround death in 
other societies. Von Rad 
Old Testament Theology London: SCM 1975 Volume 2,350 agrees: `What is 
astonishing is the way 
in which this mysterious world (of death) is entirely divested of its sacred character. ' 
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acted on. Within this concept of murder come all species of gentile being, all summed as 
`death'. The command returns to the idolaters what they have offered, a case of paring 
them back in their own coin. Worship of some other god is death, and putting to death 
what is death belongs to the act of confession of God as the only Lord. 158 
If Moriah, the mountain of the Jerusalem temple is the key, the sacrifice of Isaac 
refers us to the whole range of the sacrifices taught in Leviticus and Deuteronomy and 
practised in Jerusalem. 159 This worship is the practice of the husbandry of the creation 
into which Israel has been set. 160 It is a creation theology, which prepares and trains 
Israel up to become that entirely unforeseen creature, the man who is with God. By 
unlearning the patterns and orientation-less deviations which represent Adam's endless 
failure to make a start on the job, and starting on an apprenticeship as priest of creation, 
the old creature becomes the new creature. What goes on in the Jerusalem temple is the 
training by which this people will come to realise that killing, which characterises all 
other nations, is a way no longer open to them. No blood whatsoever may touch the 
ground of the holy land of Israel. No intrinsic significance is given to blood, but all the 
practices of the gentiles involving blood for the ancestors are demonstrably reversed in 
the Temple - the blood is simply poured away down the drain around the altar. 161 It is, as 
Milgrom shows, not a matter of safely disposing of a dangerous substance, but of 
comprehensively disarming and de-paganising death, sin, blood and purity. It is part of 
the heuristic intent of the liturgical practices that teach the status of Israel and character 
of her God. 162 Comprehension and appropriation of them is not secondary to the rituals 
of atonement themselves, for the rituals are responsible for the formation of Israel's new 
mind. 
According to Jacob Milgrom, all Israel's sacrifice is about demonstrating publicly 
- and thus at the altar - that the animal killed falls within the definition of meat that may 
be eaten by Israel. Each killing must be shown to be the permitted killing of the animals 
within the covenant and thus to be not a case of murder. To make this is a permissible 
sacrifice, the Israelite is required to return the blood, otherwise his own blood will be 
158 according to Moberly `Towards a Definition of the Shema' in Seitz & Greene-McCreight Theological 
Exegesis 135 `Deutronomy 7 presents herem as a metaphor for religious fidelity ... 
The rationale for herem is 
election and holiness, the essential counterpart to the confession that Yahweh is One and Israel is to love 
him unreservedly. ' Herem, `putting to the ban', means destroying everything and everyone associated with 
pagan cult, and tolerating no mixture or intermarriage. 
159 See Moberly The Bible, Theology and Faith 108-18. 
160 See Perdue Collapse of History 115-40. 
161 See Milgrom Leviticus Volume 1 704-6,49. The gentiles are told just to pour the blood out, but Israel 
must do this on the altar (Lev 
iticus 17.11). See Maimonides on Israel's sacrifice as reversal of pagan 
practices in 5.4. 
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forfeit. Only the permitted animals may be killed, and that only when the blood of a 
proportion of them is publicly disempowered at the temple. 163 Man's violent nature 
cannot change, but it need not pollute the earth if, according to Leviticus 11, he obeys 
one law, to abstain from blood: human blood must not be shed and animal blood must 
not be eaten. The life is God's and must be returned to God. Israel enjoys the repeated 
use-value of the permitted animals by not consuming the whole life (blood) of creature. 
Since this blood prohibition is not to be found in Israel's neighbours it `must be adjudged 
as the product of a rational, deliberate opposition to the prevailing practice of its 
environment. '164 
The liturgical labour of the temple represents the becoming-holy of the nation. 
The temple is the process of the establishment of the new creation in which Israel is 
Adam, finally set to work. Jesus is the Israel, who having undergone baptism, turns away 
from the possibilities of alternative regimes and creations of the gentiles to take up the 
Father's work. 
3.7.4 The office and action of sacrifice. 
Man is given a new action. Man is to be drawn into the co-work of creation, and that 
action we can summarise as `sacrifice'. This is the means by which he is drawn into this 
new action. 165 Leviticus instructs that `he is to lay his hand on the head of the burnt offering and it 
will be accepted on his behalf to make atonement for him. '166 'In the Old Testament cult the 
consecration takes place by placing the hand on the head of the sacrificial animal, 
extending to it the personhood of the sacrificer, to identify the sacrificial animal and the 
offerer of the sacrifice. '167 The high point of the sacrifice is the laying of hands on the 
162 See Milgrom Leviticus Volume 1,44-5. 
163 Milgrom, Douglas and Neusner leave open the question of whether this fear of the signs of murder is 
purely to avoid suspicion of human murder, or because the ecological ruling says that killing an animal 
really is equal to murder of a man (Douglas' view), or because all animals represent either Israel inside the 
covenant or the gentiles outside it. 
164 See Afilgrom Leviticus Volume 1,706. In the same way, semen is holy because it is the life-substance of 
Israel, and has a periodicity longer than the individual Israelite who produces it. 
165 See Dalferth Der auferweckte Gekreuzigte 271-83, Preuss Old Testament Theology Volume 2,238-44 and 
Pannenberg Systematic Theology Volume 2,421-28 on christological employment of Old Testament concepts 
of sacrifice. 
166 Leviticus 1.4. 
167 According to Dalferth `Mythos, Ritual, Dogmatik: Strukturen der religiösen Text-Welt' Evangelische 
Theologie 47,1987,278 There are `three stages to the action of the Old Testament sin-offering: the act of 
consecration by which an animal became the symbol of the Lord of the sacrifice, the act of killing the 
animal which is significant only as the means of obtaining blood, and the act of symbolic incorporation of 
the man into salvific communion with God. ' It creates a transfer or extension of agency and an 
identification of the offerer and his offering ('.. es zur `Subjektübertragung', zur Identifizierung von Opferherr 
und Opfertier kommt. ') 
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sacrificial animal. In laying his hands on this creature he is appointed its steward. He is 
given the office of the steward and priest of God who is mandated to exercise the 
authority of Israel's God over his creation. 168 With this office the sacrificer received a 
new mode of personhood and new existence. But it is not only a single event but part of 
the process of training and instructing him in this task. By this hand gesture the Israelite 
takes up his task, and through the sacrificial animal he will have access into the court and 
presence of the Lord. 169 Jesus's death is the meeting in one place of God and man. This 
meeting should be understood as the building and consecration of a temple, a house 
where the two of them may be together. 170 
In Israel's economy sacrifice refers to and instructs the sacrificer in the return of 
being. This is, Janowski argues, `a category of social interaction that refers to our acting- 
to-and-for-one another in a complex economy. '171 Being is what is supplied, and it is 
supplied as a particular opportunity of action. Old action gives way to and makes place 
for new action, and new action does not remove old action but secures it and supplies 
what is missing from it. Paying back means responding to the demand to be offered 
some token of relationship. The demand we all make of the other is that they give us 
something of themselves. This should be an account of themselves in which we feature - 
that they lay out for us some place which we share with them. The law of return of like 
for like (talion) is not only about criminal law and vengefulness. It is also the basis of civil 
law, compensation and the provision of a basis for negotiation to start the process of 
making good. The satisfaction theory should be understood not in terms of punishment 
but of the giving and receiving of being from one another. Wrath and punishment refer 
to that moment when this process has stalled, and there is a collapse in Israel's economy 
of being until God re-starts the process of giving and receiving with a new injection of 
giving. `Anselm and the Bible agree that satisfaction is not opposed to the idea of 
forgiveness but is its presupposition, and reconciliation takes place at the initiative of the 
guilty. ' 172 
168 See Zizioulas `Preserving God's Creation' Third lecture, 6, discussed in 1.2.3; and Anderson From 
Creation to New Creation 111-31 `Human dominion over nature'. 
169 See Janowski Sühne als Heilsgeschehen Neukirchener: Neukirchen-Vluyn 2000,199-221 for discussion of 
the laying on of hands. The animal's persona and therefore death is extended to 
include the Israelite who 
offers him in the Temple. 
170 Kraus Tod Jesu als Heiligtumsweihe argues that the death of Jesus is the consecration of the temple in which 
man will be with God. 
171 Janowski `Der Tat kehrt zum Täter zurück' in Die Rettende Gerechtigkeit Neukirchener: Neukirchen-Vluyn 
1999. See also C. Gestrich `God takes our Place: A Religious-Philosophical Approach to the 
Concept of 
Stellvertretung' Modern Theology 17.3 2001. 
172 C. E. Gunton review of Steindl Genugtuung: Biblisches Ilersohnungsdenken - eine Quelle für Anselms 
Satisfaktionstheorie? Journal of Theological Studies 43,1992,285. 
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The animal represents the whole ecosystem, medium and world which God 
provides for his people. Because animals represent places in an ecosystem, they function 
as a semiotic technology, the basis and middle term of all communicative action. Animals 
bear political meanings. Leviticus lists the animals that may enter the Temple and be 
sacrificed to represent the elect nation, while animals which are not acceptable represent 
the gentiles outside the covenant. 173 The animal is the creature and instrument of the 
Lord of animals-and-the-nations. Grasping the animal in the way instructed in Leviticus 
is taking and accepting the appointment as officer or lord over the gentile and animal 
world. To take this animal is to take its Lord and receive his word and command. God 
has his hand on the animal and when by this consecration man's hand is placed on the 
animal too, the animal includes the agency of the two of them. The man enters the place 
of the Lord sponsored and accompanied by the animal, and as the animal is the servant 
and representative of the Lord, we can say that the Lord escorts the man into the place 
of the Lord. Man and animal do not swap places, but the agency of the animal is 
extended to include the man. Like a court usher the sacrificial animal accompanies the 
man through the courts of the king to the throne room where the king sits. In this place 
he will receive from his king his own place. The animal is the whole world and medium 
God gives man and man obediently receives. It is a lease and commission. It is given only 
as long as it is obediently received and returned and received again. 
Though there are two parties to every sacrifice, it is not the case that one is 
sacrificed to the other. Rather the one is inducting the other into creaturehood, an event 
and process of paideia. This is an event, in which one party mandates the other, and a 
process, in which one is trained by another into the skills by which he can receive and 
exercise this mandate. The two parties comprise a teacher and a learner, a man 
sacrificing, and his Lord supervising his learning and correct performance of sacrifice, the 
exercise of the priestly office. The sacrifice is not for the benefit of the lord, but is part of 
the practice of the husbandry into which the Lord inducts his servant. Every process of 
teaching and learning is accompanied by a process of testing and inspection. By the 
performance of sacrifice and bringing some of the results of her husbandry to the temple 
for inspection, Israel's progress in appropriating the land and learning the holy practices 
of husbandry of her God are tested. I said 
in Chapter 3 that the identification and 
isolation of sin is a component of this process of progress-checking which 
is itself a part 
of learning. 
173 See Douglas Leviticus of Literature Oxford: Oxford University Press 1999,225, 
discussed in 4.3.3. 
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Leviticus tells us that God puts his hand on the world in the form of the animal, 
and keeps his hand on it to ward off other gods and claimants. The instruction of 
Leviticus 1.4 `He shall put his hand on the sacrifice and it will be an atonement for him', is a 
summary statement of the relationship of God to his world which man under God is to 
participate in. This description of this gesture represents Israel's deconstruction of the 
teeming hand-movements and obeisances of the pagans. It is the relationship expressed 
in the Aqedah, that Abraham obediently played the part God gave him to play, God's 
own office. He put his hand on Isaac, the future of Israel, gaining for man a place at the 
head of creation, a place he is to keep his hand on. We can therefore say that at one 
point Israel has only and precisely one member. God is this member. God distinguishes 
himself from us. The Son is at the right hand of the Father, one God, and God with man 
his work. Other than God, no member of Israel is capable of sustaining their own 
identity or supplying identity to others. Perhaps we can also say that Israel never 
expected anything else than that God be her vindication. The ancestor through whom all 
Israel must march is not Abraham, but Jesus. Only as a result of passing through Jesus 
does Abraham's line continue and his fatherhood achieve duration. We may therefore say 
that the product of the eucharistic industry and economy of Israel is no divisible 
commodity, but creatures who have the character and image of the God of Israel. They 
are members of his staff and household, and are therefore persons, free and able to open 
new action and freedom to each other. Next I must say something about the medium 
employed by this account. 
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Chapter 4 
The medium of God's work 
We must now ask about the medium and economy in which God distinguishes himself 
from us and reconciles us to himself. God is the medium of his work. This theology 
requires a pneumatology that will reflect the many forms of this work of God. 
4.1 Accounting for cost. 
The Lord is the Spirit. A spirit is fine enough to enter anywhere but is not divisible, and 
therefore may not itself be divided or penetrated. ' The Spirit is one, and makes his work 
one with him. The Son is employed in the work of the Father. Their unity, discussed in 
2.1 and 3.1, cannot be divided, analysed or known where the Spirit does not make the 
Son known. The Spirit can penetrate our economy, but nothing in our economy can 
divide the Son from the Spirit. The Spirit is therefore able to act as the medium by which 
we are brought out of many economies into the single economy of their action. The 
medium of God's action is first God himself. Subsidiarily it is also those other economies 
God brings to an end, and to a new beginning, in the economy of his creation. 
Chapter 2 argued for the importance of a medium by which to articulate 
performance, and by which to recognise failure in order to improve that performance. 
Sin is the conceptuality by which an account of the holy character of Israel's God may be 
given and that holiness brought into being in his people. The sins of Israel do not 
succeed in coming between Israel and God. The enmity of Israel never prevents God's 
coming to this people; the earth can cope with and bear Israel's sins. This much must be 
said, though it is not yet a sufficient statement. In the first place sin is childishness. God 
does not do anything with Israel's sin, but puts up with it as a parent puts up with the 
false pronunciation of a child which disappears in the eventual speech of the adult 
person. This sin has no cost. Since the gentiles are without any parent or instructor to 
bring them up, they cannot develop to leave sin behind. But where mixing with the 
gentiles means that Israel continues to pick up their behaviour and be re-infected by it, 
II shall argue in 5.6 that a pneumatology 
is a monist, not dualist, account. It does not distinguish two 
natures, divine and human. 
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sin is also serious and in need of atonement. The diaspora is threatened by proximity 
with the gentiles. With the end of Israel-Judah as autonomous kingdom, the gentiles, and 
thus the diaspora existence, come to the land of Israel itself. The pollution of the land 
caused by the mixture and mayhem of uncontrolled murderous gentile appetites really 
does threaten the whole world. Where else will salvation for the gentiles come from if 
not from the holy people? 
In her infancy, God overlooks Israel's sin and counts it for nothing. We will see 
Milgrom and others offer such an account below. But this is not yet an adequate account. 
God is also angry at sin. He condemns it, and destroys it. 2 Israel is the judgement of God 
against the gentiles. Gentiles kill and eat, fail to hold together, die and are reclaimed by 
the earth. Death is built in to them and is the working-out of what they are and do. ' 
Fallen creation goes beyond its boundaries yet fails to grow into its proper limits. The 
boundaries given to enable it to progress to fullness of life now serve only to keep it 
from progressing from one stage to another. It is stalled in an earlier form of life. 
Mortality is necessary at every stage so the organism can move through and out of that 
stage, but considered apart from the causality of the end, the whole adds up only to 
mortality and futility. The doctrine of sin defines chasing, rutting, tearing and killing as 
typical of the species man. This species will never become anything that it is not already. 
It is only the arrival of the Law to one people, the elect community of Israel, that makes 
the behaviour of man murder. We must say this as a corrective to the Kantian 
anthropology that has guilt and sin as almost intrinsic to our dignity. That man is given 
over to death is not a piece of natural theology. 4 It is only Israel that terms all they do as 
sin, and all they are as death. Death is what the gentiles do and what they amount to. It is 
Israel's name for the gentile world. ' 
2 See J. D. G. Dunn The Theology of Paul the Apostle Edinburgh: T&T Clark 1998,62-70 for an account of 
judgment of sin, 102-14; H. D. Preuss Old Testament Theology Edinburgh: T&T Clark 1995 Volume 1 128-37 
on Yahweh as warrior and as war; W. Brueggemann Theology of the Old Testament Minneapolis: Augsburg 
Fortress 1997373-84 where God's judgement seems to become God's violence, negativity and irrationality. 
3 See Zizioulas Being as Communion Studies in Personhood and the Church London: Darton, Longman & Todd 
1985,51-53. 
4 S. Hauerwas Sanct Them in the Truth Edinburgh: T&T Clark 1998,66 asks `[w]hy is talk of Christ 
considered `fideistic' but not talk (ie natural theology) of sin? ' 
Mary Douglas In the Wlilderness: The Doctrine of Defilement in the Book of Numbers Sheffield: Sheffield 
Academic Press 1993,24 argues that `[t]he nature of the living God is in opposition to dead bodies. Total 
incompatibility holds between God's presence and bodily corruption. God is living, life is his. Other gods 
belong to death, contagion and decay. ' Similarly Jon D. Levenson Creation and the Persistence of 
Evil: The Jewish 
Drama of Divine Omnipotence Princeton: Princeton 
University Press 1988,29 explains that `The Adversary 
overcome in Isaiah 25: 6-9 
is not Leviathan under whatever name, but `Death'. It is best to see in this term 
the name of a deity, because the same word 
(mt) denotes in Ugaritic the name of one of Baal's foes, lllot, 
the deadly son of El, who succeeds 
in swallowing Baal. ' Yahweh swallows Death rather than the reverse. 
Against Levenson we must say that the opponents of Yahweh are opposed to 
him only in being his rivals 
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But more than this, the gentiles are also the judgement of God against Israel. Sin 
is most visible in Israel for Israel is a worse sinner than the Gentiles, and Gentiles will be 
employed as Israel's punishment. Yet even in disobedience, Israel still bears witness to 
the action of God. ' So on the one hand the gentiles are innocents, and what they do is 
not yet even sin. On the other, they are the dogs, outside any law, and therefore are sin. 
Their sin threatens even the holy people. 
Jesus is handed over to the world. Although Jesus is the circumcision, baptism 
and anointing, he is circumcised, baptised and anointed. ' Although he is the resurrection, 
the one who may never die, he suffers and dies. He suffers the world, and is worlded. He 
calls out from the world what is most intrinsic to it - death - and calls it together at the 
single point of the cross. When Jesus calls, death comes out of the world. The Spirit 
makes the Son indivisible and so impregnable: he can divide the world, but it cannot 
break him. He is able to break open the world and separate death from it. ' The 
indivisible Spirit drives division out. The world is Jesused. Death has no claim on him, so 
finds nothing in him by which it can gain purchase. Death is deathed. God has allowed the 
tares to grow in the field, and though they, like all the kings of the earth, grow very 
confident, their destruction is assured, for he has all this time prepared a place for them, 
a no-place. In entering that container God himself is not contained, but breaks open 
what only he had held shut. 
As Israel suffers the gentile onslaughts she is half-persuaded that she has to 
compete with the gentiles as an equal rather than as their lord. She has to fight them as 
though she were one of them, rather than bear them as a parent does a child. Inasmuch 
as Israel succumbs to this temptation, she sins, she gentiles. In persecuting the followers of 
Jesus, Saul had been opposing the God of Israel. He had understood himself to be doing 
a righteous thing in ridding Israel of all traces of the rebellion led by Jesus, a man publicly 
displayed as shamed and punished for rebellion. But the confrontation with God on the 
Damascus road shows Paul that all Israel is rebellion against God, acting as wildly as any 
gentile people. The man on the cross was the righteous Israelite who 
did what it was 
given to the whole people to do. He bore the aggression of the world. 
He bore it until 
for us, not because they are intrinsically able to oppose 
him. See Anderson B. W. From Creation to New 
Creation Minneapolis: Fortress 1994,195-206. 
6 All prognosis of disaster coming upon Israel is the speech of the prophets to 
Israel, and is not intended 
to be overheard by the gentiles. 
7 Jesus is baptised by John `to fulfil all righteousness', discussed by Marius Reiser Jesus and 
judgement: The 
Eschatological Proclamation in its Jewish Context Minneapolis: Fortress, 1997,181-6. 
8 See, for example, Luke 4.35 Be quiet', 
Jesus said sternly. `Come out of him'. Mark 5.8 Jesus had said to him `Come 
out of this man, you evil spirit. 
'The legion of spirits return to the gentile animals to which they belong. 
98 
the force of it was broken and exhausted by fighting against God, and is taken captive to 
God. The act of crucifying Jesus was a pagan attack on the God of Israel, and thus a 
pagan sacrifice. 9 In killing Jesus, the regime made the sacrifice that put the whole people 
out of relationship with their God. Yet this was not finally definitive about this act. Jesus 
made this the sacrifice that was righteous and life-generating. The cross was the act by 
which the regime gentiled itself and Jesus righteoused himself, and as such this was the joint 
act of God and men, in which the act of men was redeemed by God. 
Jesus bears the fighting and resistance which is the gentile mode of the world. 
Whose blood flows? The statements `It is by his wounds thatyou are healed, and `Wle have 
redemption through his blood, the forgiveness of sins' have different intentions: their middle terms 
have to be supplied. 10 We need two accounts. His blood flowed for the healing of the 
nations. But this blood does not flow from wounds opened by the blows of the nations. 
Jesus judged the nations. " The gentiles are punished. 12 Though the blow delivered by 
God, it is struck by each against all. The gentiles become the punishment of God to each 
other. They have to drink from their own cup. But this takes place in the idiom of the 
blood of only one of their number, one of the nations elect for this purpose - Israel. Her 
blood runs, and therefore their blood has run. The gentiles are let, and Israel is the blood 
that flows out. All the blood shed by the gentiles is pointless suffering from the wounds 
they inflict on each other. Yet Israel's king really suffers in that his people, those he 
9 Martin Hengel Crucifixion in the ancient world and the folly of the message of the Cross London SCM 1977; Harries 
J. Law and Empire in Late Antiquity New York: Cambridge University Press 1999,140 and Kyle D. G. 
Spectacles of Death in Ancient Rome London: Routledge 2001,168 show types of punishment represent places 
on the shame scale. On the cross Jesus was hung up and displayed. Acts 5.30 The God of our fathers raised 
Jesus from the dead, whomyou had killed by hanging him on a tree. (10.39,13.29) John 3.14 As Moses l ed up the 
snake in the wilderness, so the Son of man must be lifted up. 
1. To be hung up is to be shamed, to have all the honour and life drain out of you, until you have no 
honour or resources of reputation or support left to you. In the course of this being hung up the Son 
descends through all intermediary levels of status and being until he has no being left -a state of total 
shame. When he is raised from this lowest status those who shamed him are now shamed because they 
could not keep him down. 
2. The animal is demonstrably lifted up and waved so it can be seen to be distinguished from all others 
(Leviticus 7.30). The blood is shown, and if the blood is acceptable in this first born then the blood of the 
whole flock is acceptable (Romans 11.16). It is made acceptable because in this event this particular lamb 
and sacrifice and intercession has been accepted, by God. 
3. The animal is held up so the blood pours out, in such a way that it can be seen that blood is flowing 
(Exodus 29.12, Leviticus 4.18) - like a drink offering (Philippians 2.17) - that is not exhausted or 
interrupted because this is a living sacrificer (Romans 12.1) who pours, and continues to pour, his 
inexhaustible life into our economy, with the result that it is re-determined by him. 
101 Peter 2.24, Ephesians 1.7, Romans 3.25,5.9. 
11 Reiser Jesus and judgement 255 believes the scholarship of apocalyptic `separates judgement and salvation 
as if they were not two sides of the same coin, two aspects of the one eschatological event.. Judgement is 
the obverse of salvation, and its necessary precondition. ' See also O'Donovan Desire of the Nations, 141 
Restoration of Christ from death is judgement against Israel and for Israel. 
12 The cross is the event of putting to the ban (herem). The holiness of God is such that his very- approach 
causes things to burst into flame and what 
is not holy is burned away. 
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regards as his own substance, are wounded. He bears them and is covered in their blood. 
But because he has determined that they belong to him, their blood is his blood. Because 
it is his determination to drive them to atonement through this crisis, it must be laid to 
his account, yet he did not shed it. He is wounded because those who are his fight him 
and each other, and bleed. He is not wounded because they inflict wounds on him: they 
have no means of touching him. Death inflicts injuries on Jesus that the resurrection 
demonstrates have no duration or lasting reality. Yet their wounds are healed and lacks 
are supplied by him, in the form of his own substance - his blood. But this blood does 
not come from his wounds. It is the opponent that receives the wound that is fatal, and 
whose blood runs. The wounds are returned to the wounder. 13 God redeems his people 
from Egypt but does not have to pay Egypt back an amount of some neutral substance 
(blood). God pays Egypt back in Egypt's currency, that of violence and fury. God refuses 
and returns this currency. The medium of this atonement is the whole economy of man, 
which is commandeered, seized and given a new function within the eschatological 
economy of God. 
4.1.1 Baptism. 
God's time resists our time and suffers no resistance. 
Jesus and the Father are one and together in the work of the cross. For this reason it is a 
mistake to understand that death dealt finally with Jesus on the cross. On the cross Jesus 
called death together and deathed it. 14 The cross extracted death from the world and balled 
it together into a place of no extension. The crucifixion is one event with two agents. We 
crucified him and God raised him. The cross is our act transformed by God into God's 
act with us and against us - resurrection. 
15 There are not two acts involving two agents 
13 Mary Douglas Leviticus as Literature Oxford: Oxford University Press 1999, suggests that this is the sense 
of retribution. Gunton C. E. The Actuality ofAtonement 88 suggests the question of to whom the payment is 
made should be avoided. But here we see the devil paid back in his own currency. 
14 MIy argument will be in line with that of Thomas G. Weinandy, OFM, Cap. Does God Suffer? Edinburgh: 
T&T Clark 2000 to which the answer is a sophisticated but emphatic No. It will be against that of Hegel 
Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion Volume 111 322-27,326 'But this humanity in God - and indeed the most 
abstract form of humanity, the greatest dependent, the ultimate weakness, the utmost fragility - natural 
death. `God himself is dead', it says in a Lutheran hymn, expressing an awareness that the human, the 
finite, the fragile, the weak, the negative, are themselves a moment of the divine, that they are within God 
himself. ' Rather than follow Hegel, and the twentieth century theology that has followed him in this, for 
example, J. Moltmann The Crucified God: The Cross of Christ as the Foundation and Criticism of Christian Theology 
London: SCM 1974, I will attempt an approach that brings the cross into closer relation to the Old 
Testament portrayal of the utter refusal by the God of Israel of the gods of the nations. He names them 
death, engages them in battle, suffers their resistance and breaks it. 
15 Zizioulas `Towards an Eschatological Ontology' 9 `Since the end decides finally about the truth of 
history only those events leading to the end will be shown to possess true being or being tout court. The 
historical events of revelation, therefore, are true and real only because they lead to the end from which 
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here and so there is no problem of how the second agent engages and refers to the first 
act. It is not us, alone and by ourselves, that make a first act. Our rebellion does not 
construct some real position we succeed in holding against God. Even our rebellion is 
contained and co-opted, and made to serve no other future and hypostasis than 
resurrection. His resurrection is his being with men, albeit that this being-with sets 
mankind permanently under the canopy of the cross. The resurrection is not a moving 
away from the cross but is the vanishing of the sinful hypostasis that contained and 
secured us and the appearance of the Son who was always ahead of us. It was the coming 
together of Man with God. 
Our crucifixion of him was not an act we succeeded in exerting over him by 
ourselves. The crucifixion was not our sole act that made God's act of resurrection 
possible. Rather, resurrection is what becomes of our act of crucifying him. The cross - 
our attack on God - is not the first act that sets us up as autonomous beings who have 
sent God 16 Rather this death is just the sum of the deviations that represent the 
gentile mode. God has protected us from the consequences of our acts, but in the cross 
God no longer holds back. He lets us have the consequences of all our acts. We are 
punished by the return of all the violence we released into the world. He unites us with 
our act. It is not the act that we did alone, but our act with him, and thus his and our 
single co-work. " Crucifixion of us, in the form of the crucifixion of our one 
representative, is the form in which resurrection comes to us. 
4.1.2 Who pays? 
The failure of the time of the Son who would not take up the Father's work. 
Everything that the pagans do amounts to grief, decay, waste, fruitless suffering. They 
want what will never come. It is therefore bitter and pointless. 
Christ's suffering 
consisted in refusing and returning to them the projects of the gentiles. 
18 Their designs 
shatter on Christ. He retrieves the gentiles and bears them to that other set of 
designs 
which God has for them. Paul's own pre-conversion 
life consisted of avoiding suffering 
they came into being, not in themselves. 
In such a view, not even the cross can have a meaning of its own; 
it is the Resurrection that reveals the meaning of the cross. 
' 
16 On Luther and Nietzsche's `God is dead' see Jüngel 
God as Mystery of the World Edinburgh: T&T Clark 
1983,55-104. 
17 Death and crucifixion is Christ 
in our medium; resurrection is Christ in his own medium. But our 
medium has no purpose other than to allow us 
to be readied for emergence into his medium - so our 
medium is only ours 
because it is his for us. I have reduced an explanation to a description. 
18 O'Donovan The Desire of the Nations 276 `The 
first consequence of this reorientation of society to 
individual wants is that suffering 
becomes unintelligible. ' 
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the gentiles. Now Paul understands that it is God's will precisely that Israel bears and 
suffers the gentiles. This realisation becomes a hermeneutic of the cross. From the very 
beginning of God's history with Israel, God had borne Israel, and borne her against her 
own resistance. ' He bore her not so that she should suffer a gentile fate, but that by re- 
birth Israel should be delivered from the gentile hypostasis. God has suffered and waited 
and been patient, not so this state should continue and be ratified, but so that it should 
come to an end and Israel be elect and released from slavery to the gentile mode. The 
cross is therefore two sorts of suffering. It is the suffering of the gentiles, which is 
without purpose, and which God refuses. And it is the suffering of God which is patient, 
merciful and purposeful. Apart from God we are subjected to pointless, fruitless 
suffering - the problem identified by theodicy. Such suffering has no time and no end. 
But the suffering of God is the patient and purposeful waiting that redeems a people 
from futility. Since they are not their own but God's, the suffering of Christians is not 
fruitless but God's purposeful suffering and labouring by which the world is borne into 
new life. 20 The purposeless gentile mode will pay. 
The event of the cross represents the gentiles having their way with Israel. The 
cross is a compressed symbol for the temple and thus for the whole cosmology of Israel. 
It is the microcosm and sign-system that I will discuss in 4.3.2. The tree that is induced 
to bear a single fruit represents Israel's Son-reproduction cosmology. By his performance 
of the cross Jesus imitates and parodies the world, performing the world's script in such a 
way as to take its script away from it and leave it bereft. 21 The obedience of the Son takes 
the form of suffering alone the contradiction and resistance of the whole world. There is 
no one who follows the messiah to the cross, so Israel is a set with a single member. 
Jesus' recognition of what he has to do comes with the realisation that he is alone against 
the world. The Servant is not a mass movement but a single Israelite who has to undergo 
the baptism of the enmity of all. They are not his hosts and fellows, but his enemy, the 
river he has to go through and the drink he has to drink. Only by passing through him 
can they become the river of healing that flows from him, and through which even the 
19 See Bockmuehl Revelation and Mystery 142-4 and Dunn The Theology of Paul the Apostle 499-532 for 
discussion. 
20 See Dunn The Theology of Paul the Apostle 482-87 and S. J. Hafemann Suffering and the Spirit Tübingen: Mohr 
1986,219 on Paul's `imagery of a triumphal procession, with himself as the captive slave of God who is 
constantly being led to death. With this image Paul graphically portrays that it is through his daily 
experience of death = suffering that the glory and power of God are being revealed. ' 
21 The gentiles act alone, without and against the God of Israel. In Israel the God of Israel shows them that 
he holds all their action and that they have no answer to his challenges. This theory of the cross and Israel 
as deconstructive imitation relies on a continuum of action, such that action must be seen as new, so if it is 
foreseen (pre-parodied) it is not free and cannot be action, as we saw in 2.7. 
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gentiles may pass into Israel. God has fulfilled his righteousness against Israel, in Israel's 
despite, doing what Israel could not do. 
4.1.3. Resurrection as generation and articulation of God's time for us. 
The cross is the work of God seated on the throne in his rest and glory. 22 It took the 
form of the alien sacrifice in which Israel played the part of the enemies of God and 
defiled herself. The resurrection demonstrated the cross to be the enthronement and 
exaltation of the God of Israel over his enemies. He is raised from them, but the cross 
which is the form of his exaltation over us remains the covering thrown over us, 
permanently characterising us as the conquered. 23 The resurrection baptised the world in 
this work and the medium it created so this medium lies over the world as the protective 
covering of this present age (saeculum). Baptism is the outer, and circumcision the inner, 
mode of this new medium. 
By our baptism into this medium the cross also becomes our orthopaedic and 
our light and easy yoke. The resurrection is not the undoing of the event of the cross, but 
the transfer of that event from our fallen cosmology to God's place in which it is the 
finished work. The cross is a new environment that we are baptised and immersed in. It 
re-determines our metabolism. In it we learn to make one another present. The cross is 
the path, opened up by the Son, along which the Spirit now leads us into the territory of 
the resurrection. By the Spirit, the Son drives us across the same territory of the cross, 
acquiring the shape, skills and instincts he has acquired. Their way must be through the 
territory opened by this crucifixion, and it must be learned as a set of skills and form of 
action. We are the ones who must become other than we presently are. He will meet us, 
not as we were, but as we will be, transformed to become the people who work the estate 
and live in the house of the Father. He has come to us, as the one Son. He is with us as 
the many, the Spirit, in such a way that we are graspable to him whilst he is not graspable 
22 Thus Pannenberg Jesus God and Man London: SCSI 1968,278: `Luther agrees with the main line of the 
patristic doctrine of reconciliation in seeing the cross as an action of God in and through 
Jesus, not as an 
accomplishment of the man Jesus in relation to God. ' According to Hengel `Sit at my 
Right Hand' 162 the 
unity of action of the Son and the Father in the death of Christ on the cross 
(2Cor5.19) parallels the 
heavenly communion of Father and Son on the throne. 
23 The cross becomes that tragic or biological hypostasis in which we are confined until we are readied 
for 
a greater economy. T. F. Torrance Space, Time and 
Incarnation Edinburgh: T&T Clark 1969,85 believes that 
`If we refuse to abstract it (the resurrection of 
Jesus Christ) from the field of living power disclosed in the 
Person of Christ, who is after all the subject of the resurrection, and think of 
it not only in terms of the 
successive and coherent structures of 
his life and work on earth but in terms of his whole space-time track 
in the cosmos' then `we are able to 
discern the operational principles which... emerge at this level and 
control the boundary conditions 
left open at the lower level without abrogating them. ' 
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for us. The coming again - the general resurrection - will be the completion of the 
resurrection in which this one will lead and stay with this many. 
The cross replaces and re-establishes the earlier abortive beginnings of the 
world. It is the moment when God was united with his work and creature. The cross is, 
and remains, the beginning and basis of the creation, the coincidence of creation and 
new creation. It is the ongoing work of the Son of Man who opens to us the two 
territories of earth and heaven as a single territory. 24 It is because he is the end, who 
works this end for us, that the cross is this beginning for us. Thus it is the true beginning 
of time. The reconciliation of God and man in this event is the beginning that 
corresponds to the end God has prepared. We call the action of God new because it 
makes all complete, present and ever-new. The question is therefore not how much is old 
and how much is new. This would be to ask what units the work of God lets itself be 
measured in. The work of God lets itself be measured by the units of his devising that 
measure it good and make it good. This measure achieves that good shape and 
dimension that fits uniquely each particular, and fits each particular to the one end of its 
Creator. 25 Because it is new all the old is present, at last in its proper place. 26 Now the old 
will always be new, and never be disparaged or threatened by the possibility of being 
overtaken. It will be originating, of the beginning and thus original and true. The Father 
places Jesus first. He is appointed to the position of origin, pattern and principle. He is 
the first man, and time has no other meaning than proximity-and-orientation-and- 
movement in relation to him. Thus he is before Abraham and Adam. He is before all the 
founding figures named by gentiles. He is, as it seems to us, retrospectively, first. It is not 
the case that a first draft was abandoned, but rather that the world was competing drafts 
without number. 27 It is not then pre-existence but re-positioning the existence of 
everything that comes to compose the whole world. 
The resurrection of Jesus was precisely not the general resurrection, but the 
provision of a longer gentler way to the general resurrection. This resurrection that is 
both commenced and delayed is the mode of God's hidden work of holding and training 
24 By travelling through all levels of the cosmos the God-man intimidates all would-be rebellious 
forces. 
Matthew 22.6-7 The rest seised his servants, ill-treated them and killed them. The king was enraged. 
He sent his army and 
destroyed those murderers and burned their city. In the face of this threat the rebellious 
forces desert their leaders 
to return to the leadership of the one God. Isaiah 24.21 
In that day the Lord will punish the powers in the heavens 
above and the kings on the earth below. They will 
be herded together like prisoners bound in a dungeon. 
25 See 2.2. Measure is agreed upon by the parties as a subsidiary work to the work of improving their 
performance. 
26 Bockmuehl Revelation and Mystery 124 argues that `new and old stand in a reciprocal relationship: new 
revelation is always meta-revelation, given shape and texture 
by a charismatic reading of the old... 
instrumental for the understanding of the old, the `proto-revelation'. ' 
27 We met a multiple drafts model with 
Dennett in 2.6. 
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a people, by the Spirit. 2M The resurrection was the crucifixion of the many by the One. It 
took the form of the crucifixion of one by the many. The crucifixion and resurrection of 
that one without the many made this many the dead he was raised from. The many have 
been corralled by the death that his resurrection has imposed upon them. Their death is 
now not at all their death, but entirely his death, the death that holds - not him - but 
those he has imposed it on. Now they can be taught and slowly be supplied, by the Spirit, 
with the resurrection. It can be supplied by the one who has risen from them and is 
therefore able to be with them, without their sin and death. The resurrected one is the 
Lord, the Spirit, the true and faithful servant who will not waste his talents or lose a 
single member of the flock he has gathered. He has worked, and his work is united with 
its harvest. He has paid. 
4.2 The indivisibility of God's time. 
The one testament and witness. 
Does the Spirit work in the same way in the Old Testament and the New? Does he work 
differently after the crucifixion, or resurrection, or ascension? The character of the 
worker and of his labour do not change, but the work itself alters. On the seventh day, 
the day that includes all days, this Servant sat down at the right hand of the Father. The 
Old Testament action of the Spirit - that is the spiritual salvation history of Israel - is 
woven together to make one man, a single exempla of the creature who is with God. The 
trauma involved in the impact of this meeting of God and his creation registers as the 
crucifixion 29 It is an impact only because the creation is fallen, not perfected, but this 
impact represents the instantaneous perfecting of that creation. The resurrection is the 
joining of that finished work with the worker who has finished his creation and is 
together with it. The crucifixion is the instant of the completion of the work, the world 
transformed from fall to completion in a moment. It is the completion of the single 
testament of the one God. 3o 
28 Pannenberg Jesus God and Man 66 `The earthly Jesus's expectation was .. 
directed 
... toward the universal 
resurrection of the dead, which would of course include himself should his death precede it. Then when 
his disciplines were confronted by the resurrected Jesus they no doubt also understood this as the 
beginning of the universal resurrection of the dead. ' 
29 See Gerhard Forde `The Work of Christ' in C. Braaten & R. W. Jenson Christian Dogmatics Philadelphia: 
Fortress 1984 on the encounter of God and man as collision. This collision theory of Forde avoids putting 
the encounter of man with God on neutral ground, so the question of how does not seek an extrinsic 
answer and thus one in terms of an outside causal and explanatory nexus, a mechanism. The encounter is 
on God's territory and terms, or, in the terms I shall use in Chapter 5, in his medium and economy-. 
30 Thus Wright Climax of the Covenant 151 Because the messiah represents Israel, he is able to take on 
himself Israel's curse and exhaust it... The crucifixion of the Messiah is, one might say-, the quintessence of 
the curse of exile, and its climatic act. ' 
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In the course of the history of Israel, the Spirit assembled and built up Israel to 
the status of the one completed and ascended man who sits with the Father. When that 
man was with God, creature and Creator together on the same bench, the Holy Spirit 
could replicate that man, and the freedom of creation that he represented, everywhere. 
So though there were many false starts, they were not finally false because as a result of 
them the full man arrived, born of the virgin. There was no discernible process building 
up to him other than that represented by the whole history of this people. The fullness of 
time, the Ancient of Days, himself arrived. By the arrival of this fullness of time, all 
Israel's time and waiting was redeemed. Time, on this theological definition, is the union 
of God's work and its fruit, time complete with its outcome. The eschatological economy 
of God, which we discussed above as the Sabbath, cannot be interrupted by the other 
economies of time of other rival lordships. The seventh day creates these (six) days. He 
creates for us these defined economies of time in which we may increasingly participate 
in the fullness of the resurrection, the eschatological economy of God. 
The activity of the Many together make one man, the Son. 31 I said in Chapter 2 
that they do not merely symbolise him but are the parts adopted by the Spirit out of 
which the Son is assembled and made. They stand in for him in the sense that they are 
proved to have been really practising, waiting, building and so by his Spirit properly being 
him, the Coming Man. Thus eschatologically and retrospectively, all those in the history 
of Israel who appear to have been waiting vainly, were in fact waiting patiently as faithful 
witnesses. If he never comes this time would be wasted time, invested but without 
return. Until he comes we cannot say in what sense this has been time at all. But if we 
wait for him it will be not lost time but the time in which we learned to ask him to come 
to us, to do his work, to receive him and become his people. Then we will be entrusted 
with much more time. 
Since the Son did come in the single person of the God-man, time was redeemed 
and none of this waiting was in vain. The man who is with God can count time and tell 
history complete with its end. 32 He can open the scroll and from it bring Israel alive. This 
instructor can make the scriptures of Israel's own self-articulation effective for the 
transformation of the gentiles too. He can tell times apart, setting live and formative time 
on one side, and barren and still-born time on the other. This sort of lived time will be 
31 `Homoousion' means `one', `united': it does not mean one entity or one single stuff defined by an 
concept of substance. Being 
does not qualify oneness: triune oneness and manyness qualifies being. 
32 He is the one who can open the scroll and from it bring Israel alive, and the instructor who can make the 
scriptures of Israel's own self-articulation effective 
for the transformation of the gentiles too. 
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found to have been the time in which God's servant learned his work. The righteousness 
of Israel that achieved no actuality has ceded its place to the righteousness that did. Since 
no previous Adam succeeded in holding on to his office and place, the God-man has 
become on the cross the retrospectively real and lasting Adam. 
If Jesus is Christ, all Israel now is Christ. Israel has been Christed. 33 If Christ 
triumphs, and he insists that we are with him, then we have triumphed with him. Then 
retrospectively we can say that the children of Israel were indeed waiting for him, and 
that they were also -rewarded with him. He is their reward, for they will have become 
children of Abraham by the faithfulness of Christ. 
I have suggested that Israel's political claim must be related to Israel's cosmology. 
The work of the Servant takes the biological idioms of reproduction, respiration and 
consumption, and commandeers all would-be autonomous nature for the work of God. 
The issues sketched in this chapter can scarcely be answered by a biblical studies that 
does not understand itself as biblical theology. I argue in 5.1 that autonomous exegesis 
without constitutive relation to doctrine and philosophy cannot read Israel's scriptures as 
a political-cosmological world-claim, that is as a claim to commandeer, transform and re- 
employ the world. Without an understanding of the commanded nature of Israel's action, 
as action that points to and participates in the new economy of action opened to God's 
people, modern biblical studies problematises Israel's liturgical labour and therefore her 
ritual action, sacrifice and temple. Must the academic attempt to give an account of Israel 
divide Israel from her God? Must it fail to hear Israel's word as offer and command? 
Does it not just represent the claim of those forces that intend to divide the one creation 
of God into the separate and autonomous realms of nature, on the one hand, and the 
intellectual, cultural and religious realms of subjectivity on the other? Such an academic 
project divides the people of Israel from their king, the body from the head, the people 
from their theological purpose and eschatological determination. It divides the indivisible 
work of God. We have discussed the world as God's task, place, and reward 
for Israel. I 
have suggested that the conceptuality, of on one hand, relatedness, participation and 
incorporation and, on the other, of command and transformation must form the whole 
centre of theology. 
34 Jesus Christ appears against the resistance of what is, in the twofold 
form of (1) substance, nature, biology, and (2) politics, violence and the contest of 
33 The obedience of the Son takes the 
form of suffering of the contradiction and of being alone, so that 
Israel is a set with a single member. 
34 Such participative conceptuality appears 
in this thesis as affiliation, adoption, friendship, kinship, the 
exercise of hospitality and possession, righteousness, 
the economy of response and affective continuum. 
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claims. Twentieth century New Testament studies has perpetuated the modem division 
of discourse between cosmology and politics, between nature and action. 
Can biblical studies talk about Israel's cosmological claim as a theological claim to 
be the first creature of the creation of God? The cosmological and political idiom of the 
Old and New Testaments has been neglected by biblical studies. Perhaps this neglect is 
inevitable to any New Testament studies that does not understand itself to be fully a 
study of the Old Testament. 35 I have suggested that pneumatology must include 
discussion of blood and seed, of sonship and the messiah, and holiness and purity. This 
cosmology must play a greater part in the theological account. It is a cosmology of 
creaturehood, an economy that receives its definition not from an autonomous economy 
of nature, but from the action of God who draws his creatures into his action. We must 
understand `spiritual' to mean greater biological reality, not less, greater embodiment, not 
disembodiment. The language of biology that describes reproduction is not to be set in 
any strong contrast with the language of spiritual election. Kinship requires the two 
modes of elective and biological kinship. One may not be set over another. " It makes 
little difference whether we say it is the concerted obedience of many generations, or the 
failure of obedience of many generations made good by the obedience of one, that makes 
Israel obedient to the political and paideutic task she is given. 
3' The problem is recognised by H. H. Schmid `Creation, Righteousness and Salvation' (1973) 
in Anderson 
B. W. Creation in the Old Testament Philadelphia: Fortress 1984,102: `In recent decades the concept of 
creation has been largely ignored in theology. According to the broad communis opinio 
it has been agreed that 
a theology of creation does indeed belong to Christian theology but that 
it must be accorded a secondan- 
position to christology or soteriology. ' 
36 New Testament studies sees Jesus's faith in abstraction from cosmology of Israel and so fideistically or 
morally, rather than the relational-participational view that understands 
it as the function of the adherence 
of Spirit and Father which brings success - glory - 
in the form of a host of sons as I argue here. H. -, '\loxnes, 
Constructing Early Christian Families London: Routledge 1997,32 for example treats `fictive kinship' as 
though it were the opposite of real, because 
biological, kinship. I suggest we should understand fictive as a 
synonym for adoptive, elective. 
A household head can adopt a son, say by raising a freed slave to this 
status, and this elective 
kinship will be cemented by marriage and the arrival of heirs biologically related to 
both parties. On this basis 
fictive kinship means only kin elect, the source of future kin. Elective 
relationships, relationships 
`by faith' are in the long run constitutive of biological relationships. 
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4.3 Creation theology: ecology as middle. 
Colin Gunton argues for the continuing usefulness of the concept of sacrifice. He 
believes that the notion of sacrifice can be supported by an appeal to its derivation `from 
something deep in human nature, of such a kind that it appears to be rooted in a 
universal or near universal feature of our life on earth. '37One problem though, is that 
sacrifice is archaic. We no longer slaughter animals ritually'. So `to call the death of Jesus 
a sacrifice is obviously a metaphor: although there is a death, it is not on an altar. '' 
Metaphor allows us, Gunton argues, to extrapolate from what the ancients did to what 
God does for us. Sacrifice of animals has been replaced by a sacrifice of thanks and 
praise, and yet this represents no diminution of the cost of this sacrifice. 39 According to 
Hebrews, `It is impossible for the blood of bulls and goats to take away sin '. "" Yet blood was 
offered in the Temple precisely because it did indeed, not finally, but yearly, take sins 
away. Of course it is God who removed this sin. We refer to blood as summary 
statement of all those constituents of the world of his creation, bulls and goats included, 
that are adopted and employed by God as the medium by which he effects this 
atonement for Israel. 41 These specific constituents do not have this function intrinsically. 
They are not natural symbols. They have this function within and as a result of the 
history that Israel and her God have shared. They are the private language and 
conversation of Israel and her God, of which gentiles have no knowledge. This 
theological hermeneutic of sacrifice has to be supplied to Gunton's account. 
Sacrifice then is not simply the foregoing of one thing for another. These are not 
natural symbols in a zero-sum economy. It is `not simply the offering of a human life but 
of the concentrated summation of humanity: it is the kind of offering that, so to speak, 
37 Colin E. Gunton `The Sacrifice and the Sacrifices: From metaphor to transcendental? ' in Feenstra & 
Plantinga Trinity, Incarnation and Philosophy 210. 
38 Gunton `The Sacrifice and the Sacrifices' 217. Young F. M. Sacrifice and the Death of Christ London: SPCK 
1975,101-4 believes we can empathise with ancient societies that practised sacrifice. Gunton The Actuality 
ofAtonement 111 and 122, argues that the concept of metaphor is the means by which to understand 
sacrifice as transcendental. Barth Church Dogmatics 4.1 explores sacrifice only briefly, 275 83, because this is 
275 `a form which is now rather remote from us'. This remoteness is of course 287 `only a particular form 
of the problem of time', and thus of the issue of supersession we discussed in 3.1-4. 
39 Gunton The Actuality ofAtonement, 120-5. 
40 Hebrews 10.4 
41 Theories of sacraments represent an unfortunately abbreviated doctrine of creation that does not 
understand that God is able to make all the products of the earth of his creation and serve to nourish and 
build up his community and make it present to himself as his people. In this creation anything will serve as 
`bread', as that means whereby we are made holy and presentable to him and brought into his presence, but 
only that does serve as bread which in a joint history (described as the history of instructor and learner in 
2.1) has been agreed and understood between God and Israel. God and Israel create the symbols in the 
course of their conversation which takes the 
idiom of Israel's learning and increasing participation in the 
life God extends to Israel. 
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longs to offer not only itself but all flesh. That one offering can stand in for the others 
because, in anticipation of the eschatological presenting of all spotless before the throne, 
it takes the representative and random sample of fallen flesh and offers it, through the 
Spirit perfect to the Father. '42 It intends to teach all flesh to present itself to God, by 
inducting it into a new medium, and new currency and form of payment and account- 
giving. `Sacrifice, in this concrete realisation of the transcendental, is the expression and 
outworking of the inner-trinitarian relations of giving and receiving. The inner being of 
God is a taxis, a dynamic orderedness, of love construed in terms of mutual and 
reciprocal gift and reception. If the sacrifice that is Jesus's human life and death is a 
realisation in time of the eternal taxis, then it is indeed universal. ' ' 
God the Father `gives up' his only Son, allows him to be delivered into the hands 
of sinful men. Jesus lays down his life, and... offers his humanity, made perfect 
through suffering to the Father. So it is with the Spirit. As the gift of the Father he 
is the aparchai, first fruits, of the perfecting action of God in Christ. Although, 
under the conditions of the Fall, the sacrifice of Jesus must take the form of 
spilling of blood, that aspect is not of the essence of sacrifice, which is rather to be 
found in the notion of gift. It is the Father's giving of the Son, the Son's giving of 
himself to the Father and the Spirit's enabling of the creation's giving in response 
that is at the centre... It is as a dynamic of giving and receiving, asymmetrical 
rather than merely reciprocal, that the communion that is the triune life must be 
understood. 44 
With all this we must agree. Next we must ask what else must be said in order to say 
this. 
Israel exists in a single economy with the peoples of the world, and with the 
natural world in the form of the land of Israel. On both these definitions Israel makes a 
strong distinction between itself as the people elect and becoming holy, and the world. 
The natural world is the proper location of this work of Israel's political self- 
identification and witness, and provides the biological idiom in which this witness takes 
place. 45 It is the medium that makes sacrifice intelligible. It is the teaching of Genesis 2 
that none of the animals are sufficient for the purpose of friendship with man, that man 
is given the task of stewarding and representing them. On Israel's estimation the gentiles 
are also animals, the helpless functions of their animal appetites. 
46 Yet because Israel also 
shares with the gentiles a complex system of what we may call animal semiotics, she can 
42 Gunton `The Sacrifice and the Sacrifices' 221 
+3 Gunton `The Sacrifice and the Sacrifices' 221. 
44 Gunton The One, the Three, and the Many 225n 19. 
4' C. T. R. Haywood links Israel's sacrifice to her cosmology in `Sacrifice and World Order: Some 
Observations on Ben Sirah's Attitude to the Temple Service, Sacrifice and Redemption' 
in Sykes S. W. 
Sacrzfice and Redemption: Durham Essays 
in Theology Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1991. 
46 Richard H. Bell No one Seeks for God., An Exegetical and Theological Study of Romans 7.78 3.20 Tübingen: 
Mohr 1998,131 `Paul believes that not only are the gentiles like beasts; Jews also 
have become like 
animals. ' 
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bear witness to the lordship of the God of Israel over the nations. This Israel does in the 
terms set out in Leviticus of the atonement of man by animal, in which the man with his 
hand on the head of the sheep recapitulates the relationship of man with the rest of the 
natural world. 47 Man is both one animal among many, in a single ecosystem with them, 
and also the priest who calls and names creation. He is its climax. Israel is the priest of 
the gentile-animals, and Israel puts his hand on their head, for this is the proper 
relationship between them. 
4.3.1 Kill and Eat: Adam's place in the animal ecosystem. 
Sacrifice is an act of selection of one animal from the many animals by which process the 
whole natural and political world is ordered. Killing is just one moment in the intricate 
and multiple processes that define the use man may make of the animal world and his 
own position in it. 48 The social body is formed in selecting and processing animal bodies. 
Such selection takes the form of killing because, like planting and breeding, harvesting 
and processing, killing and eating is intrinsic to our physical presence in the world. Eating 
animals is the way we navigate through the food-chain and moral world. Killing, eating, 
and mating are forms of giving and receiving life, and of making and receiving meaning. 
They bear meaning because the human species lives by means of reaching out, selecting 
and communicating, taking to himself, and killing and eating. In attempting to say why 
the killing of animals plays a part in the worship of the God of Israel the modem 
theological literature of sacrifice addresses the wrong question. 49 It is not the killing, but 
the whole complex action of selecting and taking, that is given to man. In the Law this 
action is given to Israel as the proper and permitted mode for man. We must sow and 
plant, and reap and kill and eat to live. For Israel a proportion of this whole complex of 
mundane action, that includes killing and eating, must be done before God in his temple. 
By it, Israel understands that the creation represents God's hospitality and invitation; her 
action in the world is the means of life he licenses, and by returning to God as gift a 
47 Leviticus 1.4 `He is to lay his hand on the head of the burnt offering, and it will be accepted on his behalf 
to make atonement for him. ' 
48 This must go some way to answering the question of the intelligibility of sacrifice asked 
by N. T. Wright 
The New Testament and the People of God London: SPCK 1992,274 We know that the great majority of Jews 
took part in the sacrificial system, but we do not 
know why... according to what inner rationale was the 
killing of animals or birds thought to effect atonement and 
forgiveness. ' See the discussion of Bruce D. 
Chilton `The Hungry Knife: Towards a sense of sacrifice' in Carroll Al. Daniel, David JA Clines & Philip R. 
Davies The Bible in Human Society: Essays in honour of John Rogerson Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press 1995. 
49 See 3.2.3 and Stanley K Stowers Rereading of 
Romans: Justice, Jews, and Gentiles New Haven: Yale University 
Press 1994,206-13. 
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proportion of the creation he leases to her, Israel demonstrated her progress towards 
competence as custodian of his creation. 
In the Jerusalem temple one lamb is burned, in the morning, and one in the 
evening. It is an unceasing event, perhaps, like the Sabbath, one that generates time. The 
smoke of the lamb, wine, grain cakes, incense and prayers of the worshippers, rise to 
connect earth to heaven as though forming an umbilical cord. "' The sacrifices form the 
Kavod or Shekinah that fills and constitutes the temple. 51 The smoke rises, turns to cloud, 
the clouds gather and water falls on the Land, making the crops grow and animals and 
people flourish. Dew, rain and children are idioms of God's mercy. The Shekinah is both 
God's arrival and the priest's protection from the effects of God's arrival. 52 The temple is 
a sophisticated semiotic mechanism that is able to link divine presence in the temple to a 
physical outworking in the fertility of land and people. 53 Each sacrifice is consumed to 
nothing. But taken together as the single project of the formation of this people, the 
temple sacrifices are not burned to no purpose. If this people does not give up, but 
continues to sacrifice and keep the lamp alight, the bridegroom will find them. The light 
and fire of the old covenant will result in the appearing of the new. It will be 
50 The burnt offering represents the action of heaven's reaching down to earth, by which earth is brought 
into union with heaven and made one circulation and economy with it, the union of man's stewardship of 
his flock with God's stewardship of his flock. The sacrificed lamb is not going on a single journey upwards 
from man to God: Israel is not in a simple sense giving a lamb to God. Israel is returning one of God's 
lambs to God. Israel does this to demonstrate good use of the flock God has entrusted to Israel. 
Husbandry and livestock are the idiom of this single economy (communion) of God with man. The sign 
`lamb' represents this complex asymmetrical reciprocity and stewardship. The lamb becomes fire - 
communion that makes itself visible. The equation of bread (and meat) and body (`This is my body given for 
you') is an invitation to eat what the host provides from the harvest and permitted animals of his estate. 
Bread and world are metonyms. Jesus fills not only bread (the archetypal seed-product), but the whole 
elemental stuff which the cosmos is, so bread represents the whole of the rest of material creation and 
ecosystem. As bread the whole earth goes through man to be re-constituted as itself. See the discussion in 
Douglas `The Eucharist: Its Continuity with the Bread Sacrifice of Leviticus' Modern Theology 15 1999,209- 
24. 
51 According to Douglas Leviticus as Literature 79-80, the book of Leviticus works on complex sets of 
analogies. When the carcass of the slaughtered animal is opened the organs he in a set of relationships also 
used for purposes of theological illustration. The soft inner organs are protected by a layer of fat: every 
opened carcass looks like a figure of eight, the fat separating the top half from the bottom, but equally 
holding the top and bottom together and comprising the whole medium by which they meet. This fatty 
section is the animal equivalent of the layer of cloud that hides the top of mount Sinai from the bottom. 
The Shekinah by which Israel is brought together with God at Sinai, is reiterated in every sacrifice in which 
the fat is set between the top and bottom parts of the animal carcass, so the three-level construction of 
meat on the sacrificial fire reiterates the coming together of God and Israel. The concept of place within 
structure is the key to reading the theology on display in Israelite sacrifice. 
52 David Kupp Matthew's Emmanuel. Divine presence and God's people in the First Gospel Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 1996 asks how the Shekinah can be both the presence of God and the hiding of the 
presence of God. I have argued that apocalyptic should be understood as the process of learning to see 
what goes on in the temple. In 3.1 and 3.5 I prepared 
for the argument of 6.1 that scripture protects us 
from, and prepares us for, the impact of this glory. 
53 See William P. Brown The Ethos of the Cosmos: The Genesis of Moral imagination in the Bible Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans 1999,73-4, and Brueggemann Theology of the Old Testament 54-79 for discussion of the connection 
between divine presence and the fertility of the land. 
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demonstrated that Israel's obedient labour in the place given him in the material world 
will have served in the preparation of this people and the final coming to them of their 
king. The biological nexus will be taken up and adopted by the Spirit for the place of the 
coming together of God and man. 
4.3.2 The temple as microcosm and sign system. 
World ofgentiles as God's task for Israel. 
Israel's natural cosmology is her description of the place for the gentiles, and of the task 
entrusted to her of bringing them to the one God. The world, in the form of the land of 
Israel, is the medium of God's action. The temple represents the land and provides a 
matrix of analogies with which complex theological statements about God's relationship 
to his people and the world he gives them may be made. 54 The tree-shaped Menorah 
joins the idiom of light and flame to that of growth. The light of the Menorah, the smoke 
of incense and the sacrifices compose the cloud of the Shekinah that represents the 
presence of God with his people and the single divine economy he prepares them for. 55 
The temple represents the tree and the garden of the first chapters of Genesis, Eden 
come to Zion. 56 Zion is the highest among the mountains that holds down the forces of 
chaos and sustains the first act of creation of separation of sea from land. 57 It is the 
foundation, corner-stone and navel. Creation continues to be a strenuous work. It 
involves a battle against the forces. 58 `The language of combat, victory and 
enthronement' must continue to appear in any account of the createdness of the world. 59 
The world is in rebellion. Adam has not given the creaturely forces the leadership and 
discipline they need, with the result that they have become unruly local centres of 
recalcitrance that stock-pile power, rather than return it to God. 
'' Samuel E. Balentine The Torah's Vision of IVorship Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress 1999,126-31 
understands the `Covenant as sanctuary building and world building'. Balentine, 
like Fretheim, thinks 126 
`the liturgy of covenant-making can be properly understood as a liturgy of creation-keeping. ' 
55 Fire is analogous to divine creative action. Fire and light relate to the natural processes of growth and 
decay. Below in 4.5.2 I link fire, light and becoming to the cosmology which gives meaning to practices 
involving sacrificial fire and light. 
56 See Brown The Ethos of the Cosmos 133-43, and also Othmar Keel, The Symbolism of the Biblical World: 
Ancient Near Eastern Iconography and the Book of Psalms London: SPCK 1978 112-76. 
37 See J. D. Levenson Sinai to Zion An entry into the Jewish bible Minneapolis: Winston 1985,133-35. 
58 C. E. Arnold Ephesians: Power and Magic: The concept of power in Ephesians in light of its historical setting 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1989,123-34,155 relates the cross and Christ's ascension journey 
as a cosmic military campaign 
by which order is restored to the cosmos. 
59 Levenson Creation and the Persistence of Evil xxv believes that `the language of combat, victory and 
enthronement ... is not given 
its due'. 24 The writer of psalm 74 for example `acknowledges the reality of 
militant, triumphant and persistent evil, 
but he steadfastly and resolutely refuses to accept this evil as final 
and absolute. ' 
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But in the cult of Israel the now-ordered waters of chaos appear here as the 
spring that waters the world. The creation and cultivation of the world, and the building 
and maintenance of the tabernacle are homologous activities. "' The temple radiated 
justice, the very sight of which throws all the (unjust) rulers of foreign peoples into panic. 
The temple is the stronghold that opposes all other strongholds and palaces, polities and 
parties built on or against the land of Israel. " It is also the bench and throne of God, on 
which God sits and invites the Son to sit with him, in the Sabbath act of judgement that 
finds the completed creation good. 62 
In response to the scholarship of Israel's cosmology we may ask a number of 
questions. Do the temple and ritual represent the future creation together with Adam? 
Does the high priest portray Adam, the first and last man, on the Day of Atonement? 63 
The temple is the tree of good and evil and its fruit. 64 The roots of this tree go down and 
its branches reach up like those of the Menorah to fill the world and secure it to the 
heavens. Should we understand the whole line of mankind as single organism, the future 
generations of which might be likened to the branches and the patriarchs to its roots? 
Should we see the man crucified on the tree as the tree of the new and united mankind 
who sums up and recapitulates the being of the whole cosmos? By his resurrection the 
new Adam returns to his place in the garden of the world, its summation and priest. He 
knits together and recapitulates all modes and behaviours to make a single cosmos that is 
alive, beautiful and eternal. Such would be the result of linking Israel's teaching about 
holiness to an Adam Christology. In the next section I link purity and holiness to the 
election of Israel as servant and witness to the holy God. God's faithfulness and Israel's 
obedience result in many sons. There is a reluctance in the literature to say what the 
purpose of purity is. In Chapter 21 suggested that because God keeps her apart from 
60 Brown The Ethos of the Cosmos 141-51 agrees. 
61 Levenson Sinai to Zion 147 `The Temple city complex was thought to be a source of revelation in and 
of itself. ' See Keel The Symbolism of the Biblical World 269-79 for the iconography of the king as temple 
builder and priest. 
62 See 3.6.1. 
63 Bockmuehl Revelation and Mystery 37-8 discusses the Son of Man/messiah as the mystery that is hidden. 
64 Discussion of the relationship of man and tree is scarce. Acts 5.30 The God of our fathers raised Jesus 
from the 
dead, whomyou had killed by hanging him on a tree (10.39,13.29). He was hung up and 
displayed on this tree. 
John 3.14 As Moses lifted up the snake in the wilderness, so the Son of man must be lifted up. Are tree and the 
mountain metonyms for the complete future earth that 
is heaven-and-earth, the glory of the appearance of 
God? Is the curse of the Law, (Deutronomy 21.22) cause or effect? Does Deutronomy tell us that a man 
on the tree pollutes and kills off the tree? Does the messiah 
hung on the tree render the law and temple 
cult barren or even malignant? Does 
`He became sin for us' mean that being hung on a tree he rendered the 
land `sin', barren, extinguishing the continuum of divine action? The tree appears as wisdom and 
its fruit in 
the wisdom literature. By being 
hung on it, does he kill off one version of the tree, change the fruit of the 
tree from evil to good? Is the cross the tree or trees of 
Genesis 2? The man hung on the tree is its fruit. 
Does the man bear the tree, such that it grows 
from him, so he is the continuation of the family line of 
Israel? Is Jesus claiming to be the true tree and fruit, such that present 
Jerusalem is a false tree and fruit? 
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other influences, Israel learns her character solely from him. Her life is a learning from 
him and transformation by him for the sake of the world to which she is his witness. We 
may therefore say that Israel is holy for the world. 
4.3.3 The house that makes the people holy. 
From Neusner, Milgrom, Douglas, Maccoby and Feldman we have five accounts of 
purity and holiness. Purity means readiness directed to the achievement of holiness. It is 
the means by which changes and growth in holiness may be accounted for. Accounting 
for holiness is the means by which growth in holiness is achieved. Purity indicates where 
holiness has been, should be, or is but should not be. It is evidence of the work of the 
generation and regeneration of a holy people. Maccoby summarises purity as the ritual 
proper to the court of the great king. Gaining purity is not something that has to be done 
before a priest may go in and serve. It is the commencement of the demonstration at the 
temple, and thus before the nations, of the holy character of God. G" 
Feldman believes the holiness spectrum is a flexible way to explore the issues of 
classification, holiness and purity. 66 He distinguishes idealist and realist approaches. The 
first focuses on the human ability to classify the world. From this perspective holiness is 
wholeness and freedom from imperfection and anomaly. It assumes stable fixed 
structures or processes in terms of which deviations can be measured. The realist 
approach concentrates on the realities of death and life and is concerned with irreversible 
events less amenable to static structural analysis. " The architecture of the tabernacle and 
camp which classifies space into zones separated by boundaries is the clearest expression 
of the holiness spectrum. 
According to Jacob Milgrom no single theory will cover the entire complex of 
sacrifices. The whole is a matter of ongoing negotiation as Israel progressively refines its 
understanding and frees itself from clumsier and more pagan formulations. 
68 We may not 
insist on too much consistency, for Leviticus, like any biblical book, is a work in 
65 This starting to get ready, though it commences out on the land or in the city, because it is a matter of 
putting things aside things to take to the Temple and going up to the Temple, is all part of the service. Milgrom 
Leviticus Volume 1,485 `If a person sets aside an animal for a given sacrifice the animal becomes 
holy.. 
. when the 
householder wishes to separate the heave offering, he must both form the proper 
intention to do so and orally announce that intention, designating the portion of the crop to be deemed 
holy. ' Sanders E. P. Judaism Practice and Belief 63 BCE - 66CE London: SCM 1992,147-54. 
66 Feldman Biblical and post-Biblical Defilement and Mourning and see Brueggemann Theology of the Old Testament 
650-79 and Childs Old Testament in a Canonical 
Context 84-90. 
67 Philip Jenson Graded Holiness A Key to the Priestly Perception of the World Sheffield 1992,60-79 for discussion 
of Feldman and structuralist approaches to purity. 
68 Milgrom Leviticus Volume 2,1368-71 . 
115 
progress, the work of the oral Torah. The incompleteness of scripture indicates that 
Israel's battle against pagan beliefs was a gradual process. " Central to Milgrom's view is 
his `Priestly Picture of Dorian Gray'. Sin does not scar the face of the sinner because it 
flies from the scene of its occurrence to the temple to take its toll there. "' But even those 
who do not sin are guilty if they have allowed the wicked to flourish and so contributed 
to the pollution of the sanctuary. The sanctuary is holy and awesome because it is 
powerful enough to process away the insufficiencies of Israel. Like any powerful piece of 
machinery, it is out-of-bounds. Because it is utterly pure, it draws to itself the 
insufficiencies from all over the land, and they accumulate here until they are dealt with. 
The sanctuary gathers and holds sin as a filter gathers dirt: this dirt represents the 
cleaning work it has done on Israel over the year. " On the day of atonement it swept 
finally into the centre of the sanctuary through the hilasterion and into oblivion. 
Leviticus is a polemic against the idea that physical impurity arises from the 
activity of demons who must be appeased or exorcised. In Israel, impurity was 
harmless. 72 Purification is neither healing nor theurgy. Lay persons, but not priests, might 
contact impurity with impunity, though they must not delay their purification in case 
their impurity affects the sanctuary. 73 Scale disease is part of a symbolic system that sorts 
anything that looks like death with death. 74 The highly visible, biblically impure scale 
disease, symbolises the death process as much as the loss of vaginal blood and semen. 
Based in the Mishnah's association of skin disease with slanderous gossip, destructive of 
people's reputations and appearances, Kugler suggests `skin disease' represents an 
identity damaged by slander. 75 Ambiguous appearances and false representations in Israel 
69 In 5.4 we shall see Maimonides arguing that it was also a function of the particular gentile 
behaviour it 
had to challenge and oppose. 
70 This is the view of tililgrom Leviticus Volume 1,257-60. 
71 Milgrom Leviticus Volume 1,260 `On the analogy of Oscar Wilde's novel, the Priestly Writers would 
claim that sin may not leave its mark on the face of the sinner, but 
it is certain to mark the face of the 
sanctuary; and unless it is expunged, God's presence will depart. ' 
72 Preuss Old Testament Theology Volume 1,258-9 also believes Israel showed little concern with demons. 
J. D. Crossan The Historical Jesus: The Life of a Mediterranean Jewish Peasant Edinburgh: T&T Clark 1991, 
313-18 suggests demons are representations of foreign, gentile 
forces. 
73 Kugler `Holiness, Purity, the Body and Society: the Evidence for theological conflict in Leviticus' Journal 
for the Study of the Old Testament 76 1997,3-27, argues that Leviticus 
16-27 shows an Israel-wide pervasive 
democratic holiness system, and that holiness, contained within the sanctuary, is 
largely unaffected by the 
impurity of the general population. In Leviticus 1-16 things are 
intrinsically impure, and debate is about 
what goes in and out of the body. 
In Leviticus 16-27 all Israel is holy, any incursion of impurity meets the 
sacred head-on, the violator stands no chance of survival, and 
impurities are fatal to their bearers before 
they can take any sacrificial remedial action. 
74 Milgrom Leviticus Volume 1,44 `The cultic sphere attests a progressive reduction of religious 
impurity 
in all three primary human sources: scale 
disease, pathological flux, and corpse contamination. ' 
7' Kugler `Holiness, Purity, the Body and Society' 25. Neusner 
`Judaism after the destruction of the 
temple' 676 argues that skin 
disease was given a spiritualised, re-accounted to be caused by slander, so now 
it is gossip that makes unclean. 
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are a theological problem. The purity legislation is the means by which those who have 
been victims of slander and false witness, are publicly re-honoured and given as it were a 
new face. The appearance on a body of a skin `disease', the analogical message of `death', 
is used as an opportunity to review the life-renewing power of the God of Israel. The 
concern of this legislation is not in the biological pathology of bodies but in the 
incorporation of all her members into Israel. The forces pitted in cosmic struggle are the 
forces of life and death set loose by man himself through his obedience to, or defiance 
of, God's commandments. " Despite all the changes manifested in the evolution of 
Israel's impurity laws, the objective remains to sever impurity from the demonic and to 
reinterpret it as the divine imperative to Israel to reject as death whatever he does not 
command. 
Murder is the central theme of the purity laws. " All life is inviolable. A small 
number of edible animals are excepted when they are slaughtered properly, their blood 
drained and thereby returned to God. `He wants meat and he has to kill to get it. Man is a 
criminal only if he appropriates the animal's lifeblood. But if he returns it to its divine 
source via the altar he commits no crime. '78 The blood of the purification offering purges 
the sanctuary by absorbing its impurities. The priest eats the flesh of the purification 
offering: impurity does not pollute him as long as he serves God in his sanctuary. The 
fundamental premise of the purity law is that human beings can curb their violent nature 
through ritual means, specifically, a dietary discipline. This will drive home the point that 
all life is shared, even with the animals, and inviolable. The only exception is the meat of 
the animals given by God. Means of meeting the demands of holiness multiplied in order 
to provide for everyone atonement and membership in Israel. The reddish substances 
made cheap blood surrogates in purificatory rites for the scale-diseased and corpse- 
contaminated persons. " The central concern is not to let poverty prevent the very poor 
from bringing some offering: they must not be disbarred from Israel. 
Hyam Maccoby argues that purity is an issue for priests only. 80 Off-duty priests 
and all Israel are in a state of impurity, which we might interpret as `unreadiness', most of 
the time and since the demise of the Temple, all the time. On this basis gaining purity is 
76 Milgrom Leviticus Volume 1,59. 
77 Feldman Biblical and post-Biblical Defilement 139-40. 
78 Milgrom Leviticus Volume 1,736. 
79 MTilgrom Leviticus Volume 1 46 explains that the law-makers interpreted sacrificial rules to foster the 
individual conscience. They ordained that repentance converts an intentional sin into an unintentional one, 
making it eligible for expiation. 
80 MIaccoby, Hyam Ritual and Morality The Ritual Purity System and its place in Judaism Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 1999,9-11. 
117 
not something that has to be done before a priest may go in and serve, but is the first 
part of this service. `Impurity' is the state or moment of starting to get ready to do purity, 
and even this starting to get ready is part of doing purity, part of the temple service. 
Ritual purity has to do with the Temple. 
It is simply the protocol for entry into the palace of the King. The priestly people is privileged to have his residence in their midst, and must consequently comport 
themselves in accordance with the prescribed etiquette... the Israelites have this 
privilege of service in the portals of God... instead of wiping their feet, they must 
cleanse their whole body of impurities which, outside the Temple, have no 
negative meaning ... 
The rest of mankind ... are not unclean in the special sense of Temple-uncleanness; only Israelites can incur this uncleanness, because they are 
the chosen house-servants of God. 81 
This approach allows us to relate purity and holiness to Israel's task of exercising 
hospitality, building the house and becoming the people that can live with the great king 
on his estate and in his palace. God is king, the earth is his property, and its people his 
creatures and servants, who owe their whole being to him. This is the atonement model 
that relates to the doctrine of creation, but which Schmidt believes has been missing 
from modern theology. 82 God owns us, and we are his property. We have been too long 
on our own out on the far fringes of the estate, and need to come out of the field and 
into the house to be refreshed, served and restored. That God is not only king but 
owner is presupposed everywhere in the scriptures. Maccoby, Feldman and Milgrom 
discuss the achievement of purity only in terms of the insiders, as only Jewish scholars 
may. They therefore rely on models of the uncontested sovereignty of God - as king, 
shepherd and father who gives order, shelter, support and nourishment. They do not 
deal, as Christian theology must, with how the outsider can be made an insider, so give 
no account of the cost of this event, or of the violence of the defeat of the powers from 
whom the gentiles must be redeemed. Their account is therefore different from that of 
Janowski and Stuhlmacher (3.7.2), as it is from Levenson's account of the violence 
involved in defending God's rule over rebellious forces that challenge his sovereignty 
over his creation. 
Philip Jenson argues that `Israel existed in the midst of the nations, and some of 
the laws imply that Israel had a distinctive identity in relation to them. Various laws 
81 MIaccoby Ritual and Morality 206. Maccoby believes that the purity teaching is about the cycle of birth and 
death, not merely death, as Feldman and Milgrom argue, 
but he is less successful than either at making 
death or life theological categories that relate to 
God's character and intention for Israel. Maccoby belongs 
at the idealist pole of Feldmann's schema, with none of the 
link to the doctrine of creation seen by 
Levenson. 
82 See footnote 43. It is also the conceptuality of possession, sketched in Chapter 1, and of participation, 
sketched in Chapter 2. 
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reflect this awareness of a distinction between Israel and the nations. "j It is possible to 
extend the parallel to include a correspondence between the three classes of the animal 
world (sacrificial, clean and unclean animals), and the three divisions of the human world 
(priests, Israelites and gentiles). This is evidenced by the alignment between sacrificial 
animals and the priestly class. In the two lists of blemishes those which disqualify a priest 
from entering a sanctuary to offer sacrifice (Lev 21.17-21) are very similar to the defects 
which bar a sacrificial animal from being slaughtered (Lev 22.17-25). 84 
Mary Douglas puts a strong version of an assumption shared by all 
commentators. `The nature of the living God is in opposition to dead bodies. Total 
incompatibility holds between God's presence and bodily corruption. God is living, life is 
his. Other gods belong to death, contagion and decay. '85 Milgrom minimises magic and 
argued that all Israel's effort is now dedicated only to showing that Israel precisely does 
not do, but rather subverts, what the pagans do. A history-of-religion background and 
greater interest in the mechanics of the semiotics convinces Mary Douglas that magic, 
miracle and rite are useful concepts. " She is not convinced that Israel has made herself 
quite free from pagan rites or belief in demons or occult forces and sees no point in 
crediting Israel with unique sophistication here. Milgrom is concerned to show that, 
though the process is not complete, by a successful employment of the semiotics Israel 
has already gone a considerable way in removing herself from what the gentiles do. The 
animals which may be offered as gifts represent those behaviours that have a place 
before God. Those behaviours and animals forbidden have no access to God and may 
not be brought into the temple. 87 
Douglas demonstrates that the organisation of the Temple, its servers and the 
place of the tribes around it achieve a cosmic harmony, and that the same is true of the 
literary composition of Leviticus and Numbers. In scripture and the temple we are 
dealing with a single artistry in two media. The structure of the biblical books repeats the 
83 Jenson Graded Holiness 145. Further discussion is provided by Walter Houston Purity and Monotheism: 
Clean and unclean animals in Biblical Lazy Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press 1993 and M. Haran Temples and 
Temple Services in Ancient Israek an inquiry into the character of cult phenomena and the historical setting of the priestly 
school Oxford: Clarendon 1978. Of these only Douglas' work seems to allow that Israel's cultic performance 
may include parody and deconstruction of the nations. 
84 Jenson Graded Holiness 146. 
83 Douglas In the Wilderness 24. 
86 Douglas In the Wilderness 34,165-6. The following two issues are related: the Scriptures are unfinished 
because never quite self-consistent (there is always an evolution of thought discernible) and the fact that 
concerns Milgrom (but not Douglas) that 
Israel seems never to be quite rid of pagan influences. 
87 Douglas Leviticus as Literature 225 `The noble domestic animals to whom the covenant is extended stand 
opposite the zoo of animal 
kinds not to be eaten or touched'. See also David Bryan Cosmos, Chaos and the 
Kosher Mentality Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press 1995. 
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structure of the sacrifices and rites. 88 Sacrifice is therefore not primarily about killing, but 
about the selection of one body from the many and re-arrangement of it as analogy of 
the relationships Israel is in. Israel is engaged in the process of re-building and 
maintaining this microcosm of her relationship with God, constantly arranging and 
grooming itself back into its place within this relationship. " Processing within the temple 
is one mode, hearing the scroll read is another, seeing the tripartite construction of the 
meat on the sacrificial fire is another. The chapters about physical impurity present the 
body in a series of covers: first the fat covers the organs, then the skin; over the body 
comes a garment; and over the Israelite comes the roof of the tabernacle, and over the 
whole lot is the covenant. 90 Atonement means being covered and sheltered. We can also 
understand this as God weaving together the fabric of Israel when it gets torn, and 
unweaving the fabric that the gentiles have prematurely woven together, separating what 
they have confused. Adam is given animal skins so he is no longer exposed and 
vulnerable; the ark of the covenant (Exodus 30.6) prevents the Land from becoming 
barren or exposed; the high priest's garment represents the heavenly bodies, Israel's 
history and the glory of God, all of which cover and protect the people of Israel. Reading 
and writing, and the resulting scripture too, are simply idioms of weaving and processing 
- their logic is expressivist, not causal. 
' 
Each of these scholars argues that the temple made the people holy. I have 
expanded on this argument to claim that the temple inducts and educates the elect people 
into a new action and economy. This paideutic meta-narrative does not appear to be 
familiar to biblical scholarship, which has therefore explained Israel's action in terms of 
rationalities that are taxonomic or economic, serving purpose unrelated to Israel's witness 
to her God. Theological reason is composed of just such rationales as these, so in some 
sense at least, sociological and functionalist description does not threaten theological 
description. Nonetheless theology has its own work to do from this wide range of Old 
Testament sciences to reveal a gospel. 
88 See Douglas Leviticus as Literature 195,218 
89 See Douglas In the Wilderness 83-101 
90 See Douglas Leviticus as Literature 244. 
91 See 2.7 
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4.4 Israel's diaspora being. 
Israel as God's place for the world. 
The liturgy and service of the temple makes holy the elect people. This work includes the 
teaching and scripture necessitated by exile, by which those away from the holy city 
nevertheless participate in its work. Temple and synagogue are one in a single work of 
scripture and oral Torah in which Israel's witnesses to her God's lordship over the gods 
of the nations. The loss of Israel's land to the gentiles and destruction of the temple does 
not mean that this liturgical service is halted. Rather it leads to an entire reliance, rather 
than as before merely partial reliance, on the medium of synagogue and scripture. 92 
Centralised animal sacrifice ceases, but the cult continues where it had originated, at 
home where Israel meets, eats and teaches. 93 Israelites are properly understood as pure, 
so that what extends from a person, and what one is and does and has, manifests that 
purity. '94 Central to sacrifice is the identity of the host and of the guests who bear him 
gifts. The gifts supply their introduction to the great king. Members of Israel host each 
other, and are to exercise a more expansive hospitality to outsiders that extends to the 
whole world. The gifts borne by members of Israel are first one another, and then all 
other creatures of the world that is the royal estate. Giving meals is the form in which a 
member of Israel makes the other his guest and member of his household, itself part of 
the household of the great King. God's action in circumcision and baptism re-determines 
the world: it transforms it from being contested territory to being entirely his own 
creature and estate, the medium in which his people may be undividedly with him. We 
now have to relate the medium established in circumcision and baptism to what is visible 
to this world, and thus to the related themes of vision and apocalyptic. 
4.4.1 Circumcision. 
I suggested that we interpret the holiness-purity code in terms of the seed and line of 
Israel. We must now attempt to link this strong thesis about the biological idiom of the 
reproduction of Israel to the meeting of God and man in the person of Jesus Christ and 
in the event of the defeat of all other forces. From the cross and right 
hand of the 
Father, Jesus issues the blood and seed of Israel. This pneumatology is a teaching about 
92 For which see Donald D. Binder, 
Into the Temple Courts: The Place of Synagogues in the Second Temple Period 
Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature 1999 and James T. Burtchaell From 
Synagogue to Church: Public Services 
and offices in the earliest 
Christian communities Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1992 
93 According to Berakhot 55a. `Now a man's table atones for him', quoted by Neusner 
`Judaism after the 
destruction of the temple', 670. 
94 See Bruce D. Chilton Pure Kingdom: Jesus' I Tision of God London 
SPCK 1996,123,125. 
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the new mediation of creation. The Spirit baptises and immerses the world in a holy fluid 
environment which only the elect community can breathe. Their breathing and speaking 
will create a creature able to live in this medium with them. How far has Christian 
biblical studies employed this theme? 
Daniel Boyarin argues that rabbinic Judaism opposes Christian insistence on 
transforming bodily Judaism into an affair of the spirit. Circumcision is the idiom of 
sacrifice that forms the body of Israel. The cutting is visible because the community 
watches, and because it has a physical effect. Bruce Longenecker believes Paul 
distinguishes outward physical circumcision and inward circumcision of the heart, so we 
have on one hand the ethnic symbol, and on the other, inner piety. 95 Boyarin objects to 
this distinction. This physical mark is a sign copyright to Israel: this cut on the skin 
means Jewish and makes Jewish. Judaism is a set of physical practices, so to look 
underneath the skin is illegitimate: there are no changes or mechanism there. Boyarin 
argues that Paul's claim to discern a `spiritual' Israel with an inward circumcision is 
meaningless. 96 
A greater interest in the cosmology of Israel presupposed by the purity teaching 
of the Pentateuch would allow us to understand that for Paul and his contemporaries, 
circumcision was a medical operation on the vessels between `heart' and sex organs. The 
ancient world supposed that the various forms of behaviour came from the various 
organs of the body, and amongst these, whether in leading or subordinate position, were 
the sex organs. ' The seed of Israel came out of the `heart', the organ from which the 
pneuma overflows, and overflowed into the sex organs to determine the character of the 
child. The ancient world did not believe the design of the body was complete at 
conception, but that the body needed continual intervention through the earliest years of 
life. It held that a medical-and-moral regime was necessary to turn the wild body born 
into the crafted body of a son and heir. 98 This would make circumcision more like a 
foreseeable adjustment of, or supplement to, the capacities of the body. Circumcisions 
close the channels to organs that produce only animal-gentile behaviour and open the 
95 See Bruce Longenecker Eschatology and the Covenant: A Comparison o f4 Ezra and Romans 1-11 Sheffield: 
Journal for the Study of the Old Testament Press 1991,193, and Dunn The Theology of Paul the Apostle 
454- 
55. 
96 See Daniel Boyarin A Radical Jew: Paul and the Politics of Identity Berkeley: University of California Press 
1994,93-4. 
97 Aline Rousselle Porneia: On Desire and the Body in Antiquity Oxford: Blackwell 1988,13-20 discusses 
ancient physiology. 
98 The case is easy to make for the 
Greek world, more difficult for Judaea. The cosmology of Israel, 
everywhere presupposed 
in the Old Testament and nowhere explicit, is only fragmentarily being brought 
to the surface by Douglas and the comparative 
history of religions scholarship of Israel's ancient Near 
Eastern neighbours. 
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channels to spiritual behaviour of the Pneuma of Israel. The only distinction made by Paul 
and his world was between those circumcisions that succeed at this difficult hormonal 
switch-work and those that do not. Paul would therefore be contrasting the familiar 
circumcision by the community, which starts as a nick on the skin, the effect of which is 
intended to work upwards to alter the connections with a new circumcision which enters 
the lungs, as pneuma, and fills all the organs of the body at once. Its first evidence is a new 
form of behaviour rather than an alteration to the skin. The secret of circumcision must 
then be found outside the body, in the environment from which it breathes, an 
environment altered by the resurrection of Jesus. Circumcision must be related to the 
baptism which brings the character of God in suffering and bearing the world to the 
diaspora condition of Israel. Baptism makes circumcision the condition of the whole 
world and so re-determines the continuum of Israel's action. 
The ancient world had no Cartesian dichotomy of physical and mental. It 
assumed that both the body, and the continuum in which it moved, were full of 
components and forces, and that there was no strong distinction between the two. The 
physical and mental elements were pumped round in one circulation that constituted the 
whole cosmos. " In this single economy the Logos spermatikos, the resurrected body of 
Jesus, available to us as the transforming meta-biology of his holy Spirit, makes our life- 
environment new. 10° Though the Old Man did not foresee it, the New Man becomes 
through the Spirit-assisted normal processes, the rightful heir of the Old Man. It only 
takes the (spiritual) joining of the New Man with the Old Man to make all the old stock 
produce new men. The consumption of animals that belong to other powers was 
understood to make us open to possession by those powers, which could than determine 
the thought and behaviour available to us. 101 This possibility is excluded by Israel's 
circumcision. This is not just a circumcision of the people of Israel, but by the event of 
the cross, a baptism of the world-environment, by which the whole environment 
is 
circumcised to the gentiles. Baptism is the circumcision of the environment. 
It involves 
God's action as Spirit and breath, as spore and power, transforming the old 
body into the 
new, meta-biological, creature. 
99 See the Stoic pneumatology in 5.7. 
100 See 3.2.2 and 4.2.7 
101 See Dale B. Martin The Corinthian Body New Haven: Yale University Press 1995,176-78 and 
209 on `the 
logic of invasion'. 
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4.5.1 The vision theme in New Testament exegesis. 
We must briefly link this spiritual metabolism of the cult to the issues of vision and 
perception. What I have said under the rubric of reproduction about seed and blood 
must also be said in terms of fire, light, sight and knowledge where a similar logic holds 
good. The whole creaturely economy created by baptism serves to produce a single 
obedient creature. The Temple issues knowledge of itself, not only in the form of images 
(eidola, appearances, models) of itself but also as the faculty of vision itself. 
We find in the bible some of the discussion of light, sight, fire and heat that the 
ancient world understood as a single moral and physical continuum. This continuum 
accounted for certain sorts of behaviour and prevented certain others. NT studies, 
though, seems to identify the occasional appearance of this continuum in terms of a 
modern understanding of light, and so as individual exegetical problems. The saying of 
Matthew, that the eye is the lamp of the body is an example. "12 The eye allows light in. It also, 
like a valve, keeps it in so it adds to the heat in your body. It is this heat that also allows 
your body to function as a lamp, giving light and sight out again by which others can see 
and discern, and see who you are. Weak eyes fail to keep your proper spirit and fire in, 
allowing what fire there is inside to leak away so it is at risk of being taken over by a 
stronger alien spirit. So your eyes are bad if they have no light to show, because the fire 
in you is not strong enough to generate any light. "" We are the functions of the 
thermodynamic at work in us - though of course it is not in us, it is us. This 
thermodynamic metaphysic, that relates to the Greek conceptuality of thumos, appears in 
the New Testament as the phenomenon of doxa, presence, glory or light. 
Does this help us with 2 Corinthians 3.18, `and we who with unveiled faces all 
reflect the Lord's glory'? NT Wright believes that `the mirror in which Christians see the 
glory of the lord.. is one another ... when they come 
face to face with one another they 
are beholding as in a mirror the glory itself. ' 
104 Light shines on a mirror and is reflected 
off. These faces reflect light from Christ and like multiple in-turned mirrors keep it 
reflecting back and forth between them. That much is true, but there is more, for which 
102 Matthew 6.23, for discussion of which see Dale C. Allison `The Eye is the Lamp of the Body' New 
Testament Studies 33 1987,61-83. 
103 In the ancient world, light was understood not only to enter eyes but also to 
issue from them, or as 
simulacra that issue from the whole body, so what we receive 
is not a single stuff that we can always call 
light, but the self-presencing of each object in that economy. According to Padel 
In and Out the Mind 42 the 
ancients understood that `Something comes 
into the eye', 61 'Eyes ... are 
involved in two-way traffic. ' See also 
Park R. The Fire in the Eye: Greek Images of the Tragic Self Princeton: Princeton University Press 1992,39-43, 
and Martin The Corinthian 
Body 24. 
104 N. T. Wright `Reflected Glory: 2 Corinthians 3' in The Climax of the Covenant 181 translating 
katoptriZomenoi. 
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the concept of reflection is not adequate. Like the good eye, they receive light, and hold 
it, as a good stove holds its heat. It is then also able to act like a lamp and send that light 
out again. Light makes fire makes more light, with the result that there is more light at 
the end than at the beginning. `Reflect' or `behold as in a mirror' cannot translate this 
growth in light. The Spirit grows light by making believers not only transmitters but its 
co-producers. 
The Christians are light-generating, as long as they recognise one other as 
actualisations of the shining of the face of Christ. There is no strong distinction to be 
made here between the face, the light it radiates or the image it casts. Christ is the face 
that shines its own light with such brightness that it not only reflects off other faces but 
it heats their fire, making it not their fire but his, so it is not merely their exteriors that 
shine Christ's light, but their interiors that host his fire. More than that, it is not only the 
light of Christ's face that reflects off other faces, it is Christ's face that shines through 
and re-figures these faces, creating a family resemblance. Prolonged exposure to him 
makes you look and act more like Christ. Not all fire is the same: the fire you generate is 
as personal to you as your voice. There is both a hierarchy of fire and there is the issue of 
how benign any particular source of fire is. 105 The first point is that there is no strictly 
zero-sum economy of light, so the issue is one of spreading this fire by tending it and 
being custodians and householders of it. The second is that light, fire and glory are the 
possession and function of persons, and function as concepts for the formation of 
persons. 
Richard Hays also discusses 2 Corinthians 3. First there was the old covenant, 
and then there was the new covenant. The new covenant is much brighter than the old. 
But what is cause and what effect here? 
"' `The old-covenant glory did not just peter out 
like a battery-powered flashlight; rather it was done away by the greater glory of the new 
covenant in Christ. '107 The old did not end, it was just rendered redundant: it is the 
comparison with the new that brings it to an end, no failing of its own. Was there no use 
for it any more and so in this sense the one covenant was done away with by the greater 
glory of the other? Perhaps Hays's analogy can be improved upon. Here are two other 
1051: person of dignity would not condescend to take fire 
from a more humble hearth to re-light his own. 
Foreign fire is what Nadab and Ahibu offer in Leviticus 10.1. 
106 Richard B. Hays Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul New Haven: Yale University Press 1989,135 
offers this paraphrase of 2 
Corinthians 3.7 `But if the ministry of death chiselled in stone script, came with 
such glory that the sons of 
Israel were not able to gaze upon the face of Moses because of the glory of his 
face (a glory now nullified in Christ), 
how much more will the ministry of the Spirit come with glory. ' As 
Moses was eclipsed by the intimation of 
Christ, so the sight of the Christ on the cross represent to us the 
utter unreadability and veiledness of 
the intentions of God. 
107 Hays Echoes of Scripture 135. 
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options. When the sun comes up, we are no longer reliant on the oil lamp that gave us 
light all night long: the lamp is not rendered non-functional by the daylight, it does 
continue to add its tuppence-worth to the light of day, though, since no one is concerned 
to tend it, it eventually goes out. Another analogy: the glory of the old covenant was the 
pilot light: when the main burner of the boiler roars into life, it does not extinguish the 
pilot light, but the pilot light now cannot be distinguished from the rest of the flame. The 
old covenant cannot be made out from the new. In each case the relationship between 
the glory of Christ and Moses is not one of either-or, but one which demands a more 
participative logic. The one is the means of the other. 108 The new covenant is the glory of 
the old. The old has worked successfully in that it has brought about the new-and-self- 
renewing covenant: it has created the both the conditions for its success and the occasion 
of its bursting into appearance. The old covenant worked alone, was faithful to its 
purpose, and was vindicated, it has borne fruit, and no longer bears the burden alone. 
Wright assumed reflection in a zero-sum economy of light; Hays assumed that because 
the new is bigger and better than the old, the old is shamed rather than vindicated by 
this. The saying about the eye in Matthew and the discussion of glory in 2 Corinthians 
relate to a single cosmology in which fire, light and vision all function equally as action, 
reception and means of both. Why are these exegetes attempting to understand them in 
terms of reception alone? Does this misreading of Israel's cosmology result from the 
assumption that what is new can only serve to displace what is old? Could such a logic be 
the result of residual supersessionism? Is it not the inevitable result of modem New 
Testament studies, that is of a New Testament studies determined to establish its identity 
in independence of the conversation with other theological disciplines? 
109 
4.5.2 Apocalyptic. 
Fire, light and vision belong with the issue of what is visible in the temple. 
A remark 
from Christopher Rowland illustrates how the issue of vision arises in discussion of the 
temple. `When Paul sees the risen Lord, we may describe it as a vision of a 
heavenly 
being, but within the thought-world of Paul's day that meant the 
drawing-back of the veil 
to disclose that other dimension of reality which was normally 
hidden'. 110 Apocalypticism 
108 In the second case the pilot light enables the main 
flame. In the first case the oil burned by the oil lamp 
is the function of last season's sunlight converted 
into oil by an olive tree. See 5.1 and 6.2 
109 See 4.1 
110 Rowland C. The Open Heaven A Study ofApocalbptic in 
Judaism and Early Christianity SPCK 1982,378 `Thus 
when Paul sees the risen 
Lord, we may describe it as a vision of a heavenly being, but within the thought- 
world of Paul's 
day that meant the drawing-back of the veil to disclose that other 
dimension of reality 
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requires an ontology which does not simply oppose presence and absence, but uses 
biological description and an account of the development of an educated audience to 
determine the modalities of God's action. "' It is rather the case that in a non-modern 
cosmology vision is the function not of the one doing the looking, but of the one looked 
at, who must release vision of himself before anyone may see him. Vision is not a matter 
only of the reception of light, but of the giving of light as the giving of authority. You 
can only see the lord when you are in his court and thus in his favour. 
Fire and light belong together to the ancient world's metaphysic of becoming. 
They are the idiom in which things come to be and pass away again. 112 The total 
processes of nature, that come-into-being and pass-out-of-being again, were regarded by 
the ancient world, and conceptualised most conveniently for us by the Stoics, as fire and 
as spirit. 113 Fire, heat and light are not simply about vision and knowledge, but constitute 
the whole medium of the natural and moral world. In Israel the temple sacrifices drove 
the single economy of people, the land and its products, producing the cloud of the 
which was normally hidden. ' 318 `Entry into the garden was... the exposition of the Scriptures... There was 
great responsibility resting upon the student of the Scriptures.. it was a potentially dangerous exercise 
which could have dire consequences for the unwary. ' Bockmuehl Revelation and Mystery 117 `Much as in an 
apocalyptic, even the visionary revelation of `mysteries' does not come `out of the blue', but is mediated by 
a meditative exegesis of Scripture passages - be it Genesis 1, Ezekiel 1 or Isaiah 6. ' 122 `The exposition of 
the merkabah (Ezekiel 1) was explicitly permitted only to mature and experienced rabbis working in camera; 
similar restrictions applied to other passages. ' 
1i1 For accounts of biblical apocalyptic see for example John J. Collins The Apocalyptic Imagination: An 
Interpretation of the Jewish Matrix of Christianity New York: Crossroad 1984, Haywood `Sacrifice and World 
Order' in Sykes Sacrifice and Redemption and Margaret Barker `Beyond the Veil of the Temple: The High 
Priestly Origins of the Apocalypses' Scottish Journal of Theology 51,1998. 
112 `Fire' is what the cosmos most essentially is. Though this fire remains fire it also devolves into other 
elements. Fire gives birth successively to air, to water and to earth, but does so without ceasing to be fire: 
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The lower spheres of the cosmos represent either the presence of the furthest of these 
from pure fire itself, 
or the presence of these elements in increasing degrees of mixture. 
The cosmos simply occasionally returns 
to being what it most essentially is, as though it periodically cleans 
itself up. Fire seeks to return upward 
towards its origin: even mixtures of the other elements that we see in the growth of other entities such as 
plants seek upwards towards their origin as fire 
does. All this becoming is what being does, without ever 
ceasing to be immutable. See K. F. Johansen 
A History of Ancient Philosophy London: Routledge 1998,329, 
and G. E. R. Lloyd Polarity and Analogy: 
Two Types of Argumentation in early Greek Thought Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 1966,236-7. 
113 The issue of whether we can use Stoic thought to discuss Israel's practice arises 
because, for the sake of 
academic convenience, we 
deal only in discrete intellectual systems (Stoic, platonic, neoplatonic), rather 
than understanding these merely as 
formal versions of a continuum of folk beliefs and practices and a 
common sense cosmology of the ancient world. 
This is not a single cosmology to be sure, but sets of 
practices and beliefs with 
family resemblances. 
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Shekinah that functioned as their common medium. This was not an autonomous system 
that could be described by biology alone, but determined by the God of Israel who 
moves his people on to holiness, a project in which all the processes of biology must play 
their part and by which they would also be redeemed. Fire, heat and light equally 
represent the moral component of this continuum. Being in someone's view allows you 
to see (only) what he sees, and seeing something amounts to admitting it and giving it 
approval. There is no light as such, but only the light and vision exercised by some 
authority, and the set of objects admissable to it. Seeing is the function of respect-paying 
to some authority by which you are granted an audience, a vision. An angel or 
apocalyptic appearance in the temple of a figure from Israel's scriptures refers to a 
characteristic of God or moment of the action of God in Israel's history. With a more 
developmental conception of light or fire, that understands it as act of giving and 
receiving authority and being, New Testament scholarship would be able to link the 
vision of apocalyptic to the issue of the community that has been taught it and brought 
up in it that I argued for in Chapter 2.14 
4.6 Biblical scholarship on Israel's cultic action. 
I have argued that the temple represents Israel's liturgical work of worship of the one 
God and comprises that complex set of activities that build the people of God's 
household. The building that stands on Zion, and the image of it displayed in every 
synagogue, is the house of God to the extent that it contributes to this project. While it is 
no longer controversial to understand all New Testament theology, Paul's included, as 
temple theology, there remains the question of how far New Testament scholarship has 
been able to see the temple as Israel's liturgical labour and performance, before the 
world, of her office as her Lord's under-labourer. 
In Chapter 21 introduced the conceptuality of participation as resources for 
discussion of paideia and eschatology. In this chapter I have asked whether the 
scholarship of biblical exegesis, theology and (political) philosophy employs such a logic 
of participation, that would allow it to talk about incorporation and transformation, and 
so to follow the claim of Israel's eschatological political cosmology. I have asked whether 
biblical studies has found the means to account for transformation. Can it represent 
11 4 Bockmuehl Revelation and Mystery 113 `If therefore the exposition of Torah constitutes an event of 
revelation, it may not come as a great surprise that the rabbis even employ 
language reminiscent of the 
fiery Sinai theophany in describing the study of Scripture. ' This allows us to say that that scripture is closed 
to gentile eyes, not for their punishment only, 
but also for their protection. 
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Israel's claim to be the mediator of the transformation of the material-biological world 
from autonomy to creaturehood? We have asked whether the literature that discusses 
Israel's temple cult is willing to understand it as theological and liturgical work that opens 
a new and wider modality of action. I have tried to show that this literature has not yet 
adequately engaged with the themes of sacrifice, of sacrificial fire and light, or with the 
conceptuality of clothing, covering and tabernacle that I related to atonement. It makes 
too little of the conceptuality of baptism and circumcision that should be related to the 
eschatological re-determination of the environment, and too little of the writing, binding 
and weaving that, for Israel, conceptualise the growth and thickening out of relationship. 
Accounting for the becoming of this holy people requires a thermodynamic metaphysic 
able to relate light, heat and seeing to growing and coming into appearance. A concept of 
elective biology is required to demonstrate that sons are born to Israel in the mixed 
media of biology and adoption, in which the material processes of the earth are taken up 
by the Spirit. Can biblical scholarship avoid setting spirit in opposition to body, or 
biology to moral and meaningful action? 115 Must it rely on a dichotomy of biology and 
culture made problematic by a univocal modern concept of presence and representation, 
being and its reflection? I have suggested that modern biblical exegesis lacks the 
conceptuality of performance that I sketched in Chapter 2 and which I will relate to the 
public practices of paideia represented by non-modern political philosophy in Chapter 6. 
I have suggested that it makes Israel's ritual, liturgy, sacrifice and temple problematic for 
this reason. I have asked whether biblical exegesis gives adequate account of the 
responsibility of scripture to the community it forms, and of the (asymmetrically) co- 
constitutive relationship of scripture and that community. Can it concede that scripture 
instructs and forms the people of God? 
It may be countered that it is not the task of biblical or New Testament studies to 
discuss the meaningfulness of their subject matter outside the text, but that this is rather 
the job of systematic theology or hermeneutics. It is the task of systematic theology, 
in 
conversation with the other disciplines of the university representing the various claims 
of the economy of modernity, to discuss the meaningfulness of these 
biblical texts and so 
there to perform the evangelical task of hearing and, under God, to repeat 
God's word to 
our own society. This brings us to the 
issue of which models and metaphors to adopt to 
this purpose. I have suggested that this 
hermeneutical task must be continually re- 
subordinated to the doctrine of 
God who is for us. The question of the status of biblical 
115 Funkenstem in 5.7 asks why Christianity has not made more use of the stoic metaphysic which 
does not 
create this dichotomy. 
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language 
- its models and metaphors - is not to be settled by a distinct discipline of 
hermeneutics to which the political and theological nature of biblical statement can be 
referred. It is intrinsic to the theological task of making the doctrine of God obediently 
evangelical. This can be done only by the more convincing performance of theology, 
including what might be called typological interpretation that belongs to a logic and 
ontology of participation. The question is not which metaphors we should adopt in 
talking about the person and work of God. Rather it is the task of theology to 
commandeer every modern concept in turn and bring it under the discipline of scripture 
and the doctrine of the church. Thereby we may see that the action of God in Israel is 
the mediation whereby, through baptism, even we moderns may be made properly 
present to each other. Israel, in the person of Jesus Christ, is our lesson, teacher and 
supervisor. So I have come to the uncontroversial conclusion that there must be more, 
and more robust, interaction between biblical studies, and political and systematic 
theology. There must be a biblical theology. 
Chapters 3 and 4 have argued that Jesus makes a better performance of the world 
than does the world. It puts in a fallen and failing performance, he a perfecting and 
enduring performance. He does this world-performance necessarily in the face of the 
world and against the world. He does it on the cross. He is God and man. He is man. We 
are not yet man. Man is the creature, servant and friend of God. We are not yet this. 
Jesus can do us better than we can do ourselves. We cannot do anything that Jesus 
cannot repeat and do better. He can take away our claim to have done something new 
and unrepeatable that would put us decisively beyond God and make us autonomous. He 
can put in a performance of greater virtuosity that shows that all our doing is just a 
failure of his doing. He mimics and portrays us, both in our present truculence and 
misery, and in the glory that we will receive from him. On the cross he plays us as we are, 
and as we will be, with him. These chapters have offered an account of atonement that 
does not rest on a choice between models that requires a resultant separate work of 
hermeneutics and epistemology, with further separate discussion of the appropriateness 
of such models for today, and thus of the issue of time and modernity. 
116 Rather I have 
attempted to provide a theology of time 
in which time is what God provides for us. God 
ushers us into his time. He 
brings his servant-community up into the skill of receiving 
116 The contributors in John 
Goldingay Atonement Today London SPCK 1995 and John T. Carroll & Joel B. 
Green The Death of Jesus in Early Christianity Peabody: Hendrickson 1995 
intend to give an account of the 
atonement, and then a separate account of 
the atonement for us today. 
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time and giving his time. His time describes and contains the time of modernity. These 
chapters have prepared us for Chapter 6 in which our claim to be the knower and 
measurer, because the actor and creator of our world, is dethroned. 
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Chapter 5 
Mediation and history 
This discussion of being and becoming has indicated the centrality of mediation. The 
modern West tells the story of a loss of mediation and loss of anything outside the all- 
present being of the economy of modernity. It tells this story as though man had 
succeeded in creating his autonomy. ' The Church may tell such a story of collapse and 
loss only as one moment in its larger confession of the economy of God. A story of a fall 
can be told only as warning, and as witness to God who overcomes this fall and creates a 
proper freedom for his creature. 
5.1 Paideia. 
I will now lay out two contrasting versions of history and economies of time. One of 
these is broadly the history the West tells of itself, a history of secularisation and growing 
autonomy from God. The other is a salvation history in which, despite itself, modernity 
also has its part. This is of course not new. What I call the economies of time are the two 
cities described by Augustine which I shall discuss in the final chapter. 
To situate the discussion of the loss of mediation I must set out its context, and 
do so by presenting this context as an ethic. The object of all human doing is the 
formation of a people. Theology is the claim that participation in the talk of Father and 
Son is the end and guarantee of all public discourse. As commentary on what is said, 
theology, and in conversation with it, philosophy, is therapy and discipline to this end. 2 
1 See 3.6.2. 
2 See Pierre Hadot Philosophy as a Wlay of L fe Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1995, and Martha C. 
Nussbaum The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics Princeton: Princeton University Press 
1994, who make the case that philosophy is therapy intended to serve formation, though these two authors 
understand this formation in individual rather than corporate terms. Political philosophy represented 
by 
Quentin Skinner The Foundations of Modern Political Thought Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1978 is 
notionally at least about positive freedom and the formation of sociality through concerted public action 
and by means of state-building, that itself forms a public character 
(sensus communis). Moral philosophy, on 
the other hand, represented for example by Jerome B. 
Schneewind, The Invention ofAutonomy: A History of 
Modern Moral Philosophy Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1998, describes a negative (formal) 
freedom, that understands that the wise man must retire from the fray of public life and action to theory 
and contemplation. Ian 
Hunter Rival Enlightenments: Civil and Metaphysical Philosophy in Early Modern Germany 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2001, argues for ethical philosophy as service to political 
philosophy. 
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Such a philosophy, in conversation with theology will relate to the world, and thus to the 
discourse of science. It will relate to the law, as a set of propositions about what that life 
could be, and is a set of skills by which to regulate talk about that life in order to move 
towards it. This leadership does this by creating law to educate this people. This 
leadership, which we could also call the state, must be held to this paideutic task, and 
criticised, in particular, when it does not give a lead. This leadership of the project of the 
formation of a people is the proper object of law. It is the task of critical philosophy to 
respond to law, and to articulate for the law the problems arising in the course of this 
project. Philosophy and criticism must understand themselves to be in dialogue with law 
and on law, and to remind the state that it is to teach and to lead by encouraging certain 
discourse and limiting others. 3 Reason and enlightenment are about the ongoing task of 
leading that project and judging that leadership. 4 Philosophy, which we can also call 
criticism, must understand itself to be in dialogue with law to remind the state that its 
mandate is to teach, lead and enable. The university is then the place in which professors 
of law - philosophers - dispute about ends and means - ethics-and-law-making - in 
order to refine their own performance as trainers of leaders and legislators. The Church 
is at different moments participant in, leader and critic of this project. 5 Legislators are 
commentators on public speech who indicate the bounds and direction of good speech 
by modelling good action and ruling out whatever action does not contribute to it. The 
end of the law is not to rule a vast number of actions out, but to bring about a large 
number of competencies: it is speech-therapy designed to bring the whole people into 
speech. 
Most cases of speech can be handled on the floor of the market. The cases the 
market cannot handle it passes up to law. Law passes the hardest cases up again to 
philosophy. But what happens if philosophy does not refer its conclusions back to the 
speech of the lawcourt, and back again to the whole speech of the market of public 
3 In The Contest of the Faculties Kant abolished any sense that philosophy is subordinate to law, or that law is 
to be understood as the education of a people and enlargement of its imagination. He detached philosophy 
from any responsibility other than to itself. 
4 Robert R. Williams Hegel's Ethics of Recognition Berkeley: University of California Press 1997,21 finds that 
`Recognition names not only a structure of intersubjectivity but also a teleological process in which 
freedom is progressively mediated and realised. This process proceeds in the direction of an increasing 
recognition of freedom and an increasing realisation of freedom. The state is supposed to complete this 
process of freedom and recognition as its telos. ' ýtichael N. Forster, Hegel's Idea of a Phenomenology of Spirit 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1998,294 believes that we must judge paideia, which he calls `law and 
purpose historicism' as `philosophically indefensible, merely one of the more seductive and persistent of 
the many philosophical damp squibs developed during this period... (n10) `the perpetuation in a modified 
guise of recently discredited Christian theological 
dogmas'. 
5 On the question of whether the state is part of the Church's responsibility see Oliver O'Donovan The 
Desire of the Nations 193-242 and Reinhard Hütter 
Suffering Divine Things 166-8. 
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discourse? 6 In the belief that there was no control on talk about the world, Socrates gave 
up talk about the world to concentrate on the education of legislators.? In giving up the 
world he gave up the vocabulary and medium in which all action takes place. He took the 
world away from the polis, with the result that explanation becomes a referring even-thing 
back to an ideal earlier state before the first event. In the same way Kant brought to an 
end the subordination of philosophy to law. Law was no longer understood as the 
education of a people-8 As a result philosophy understood only that it is to rule on 
thought, never on public action. It became an all-forbidding law for which the only 
reason is pure reason. 9 Philosophy must service the speech of the community that 
employs it, but the philosophy that disdains to attend to the speech and hopes of an)- 
community cannot do this. 
Modernity identifies religion as separate from ethics, the discussion of ends. It 
supposes that we all know what end has been agreed upon, and have now only to 
concern ourselves with weighing the options for getting there. The modern concept of 
religion belongs to this idea that there is one single end and all talk is only about how. 
Theology should refuse this definition and identify religion as talk about ends, assume 
open discourse about what the ends are, and insist that there is no meta-discourse that 
can settle this for us. Then we can say that religion is a matter of the good performance 
of talk about ends. It is not to be reduced to reaching agreement so the talk can stop, but 
at getting better at the give-and-take of converse, so the talk can grow, become a good of 
6 In 6.3 I will suggest that it is intrinsic to possession of power that the powerful are not aware of what they 
are doing and are as likely as anyone to protest their powerlessness. 
7 Schneewind The Invention ofAutonomy 534. According to Xenophon `Socrates broke with his predecessors 
by attending to a new set of issues. He did not dispute as they did, about the cosmos and the nature of 
things in general. He asked instead about human affairs. ' 
8 Hochstrasser T. J. Natural Lain Theories in the Early Enlightenment Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
2000,196-7 In The Contest of the Faculties Kant `suggests that nothing but confusion and argument would 
result from trying to deduce normative principles from empirical materials (ie intellect from the realm of 
sensations). For Kant the jurist's approach willinevitably be that of trying to deduce general principles 
from the law of the land, whereas properly it was the role of philosophy to identify the background a priori 
principles of moral philosophy. While the state required the lawyers to make the current 
law codes their 
proper object of study, philosophy should be freed from such restrictions. Philosophy served the cause of 
truth, whereas the other three faculties existed to serve the utility of the government. 
' Gillian Rose Dialectic 
of Nihilism Post-Structuralism and Law Oxford: Blackwell 1984,11-24 
describes `Reason' as a tyrant that 
refuses the possibility of there being anything other than 
itself to which it has to be responsible. I have 
argued that reason (which in Chapter 2I referred to as commentary or articulation) 
is agreed upon by the 
parties as a subsidiary work to the work of 
improving their performance. 
9 Charles Taylor `What is wrong with Foundationalism? ' in Mark Wrathall & Jeff Malpas eds. Heidegger, 
Coping and Cognitive Science Essays in 
honour of Hubert L Dreyfus Volume 2 Cambridge: MIT Press 2000,133 
argues that Kant formalised the strong 
form-content distinction made by contract theory, for which what 
matters is not the good society, 
but just meeting the procedural requirements of consent. lall ethical 
discussion is in the idiom of the will, without reference to positive content, making 
it a matter of form, not 
content, unhooking right 
from any substantive good. 
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its own and open space for other goods to emerge. 10 Our talk is then both preparation 
for and already good performance of life in common. 11 
Religion, or practical philosophy, is the science and skill of talking about ends, as 
a means to developing the ability to tell the difference between ends. It must always refer 
itself to the world, and receive comment back from it, so religion and world are in a 
single conversation, in which each passes judgement on the performance of the other. 
Our academic talk therefore must understand itself as a commentary on the whole 
economy of bodiliness that constitutes the world. It should concern itself not only with 
the formation of the intellective soul, but also with the speaking to and hearing of many, 
and enabling of many in hearing and speaking. Religion means the development of the 
skills of good practice. 12 
5.1.2 Historical criticism and the modern state. 
A quite different definition of religion was proposed by Hobbes and Spinoza. Religion is 
the opposite of secular. Secularity is the term for the determination of an elite to make 
the state the sphere of their autonomy. The state would then not be the project of the 
formation of plural acting-and-enabling but a closed economy and property of a clique. 
This re-definition of religion created a sphere of tight control over public discourse with 
the intention of extinguishing disunity and disagreement and bringing about acquiescence 
10 O'Donovan The Desire of the Nations 281 `Modern society has striven to totalise speech. ' 283 `The 
communities of discourse do not interact to construct a catholic vision of the common good. They 
conglobulate into would-be philosophies which are both sectarian in outlook and totalitarian in pretension. 
The term `ideology' best expresses this meltdown of the democratic idea, an implosion of critical speech 
upon itself in which the very act of speaking is crushed beneath the ambitions speech is made to serve. 
Self-posited speech destroys its own point and collapses into silence. ' 
11 Until the eighteenth century the concept of rhetoric dealt with all the issues of performance. Public 
speech was not reckoned to be easy, so it was taught and learned. Schneewind `The Divine Corporation 
and the history of ethics' in Richard Rorty, J. B. Schneewind & Quentin Skinner Philosophy in History: 
Essays 
on the Historiography of Philosophy Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1984, does not relate the good to 
freedom and or to a sense of the development and growing up into freedom and maturity of the agents 
within the `Divine Corporation', nor define goodness further as goodness 
for a range of specific ends 
which require choices. Frederick C. Beiser The Sovereignty of 
Reason: The Defense of Rationality in the Early 
English Enlightenment Princeton: Princeton University Press 1996, does not relate `reason' to reasoning 
together, converse, public talk and the skills of the development of public talk. 
Reason therefore for him 
never appears as faith doing what 
it must do to remain faithful - taking instruction, learning to think. 
Reason for Beiser appears to be precisely not tradition, inspiration or Scripture. I have defined reason as 
what these three do together. 
12 The case for theology as the mode of the truly public 
life is made in Chapter 6. Hadot Philosophy as a 11 , "ay 
of Lfe 32 `Christianity was presented as a philosophia, a way of 
life in conformity with the divine Logos, as 
the Middle Ages developed, one witnessed a complete a 
`total separation' of ancient spiritual exercises, 
which were no longer considered a part of philosophy 
but were integrated into Christian spirituality, and 
philosophy itself, which 
became a `simple theoretical tool' at the service of theology, an ancilla theologiae. ' 
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and unity under the state. 13 Within this new sphere, desire and imagination are under the 
control of authorities who do not refer their authority to the project of public speech and 
formation, and are not themselves subject to the discipline of public speech. 14 
Subordinating the Church to this type of state means subordinating talk about ends to 
talk about means as they relate to an end that is not only non-negotiable but of which no 
public expression is allowed, so subordinating all speech to the penalties of the civil 
power. 15 Such a state rests on the belief that the Church has no regulative or 
governmental function over groups and public persons, but was to govern only the 
individual solitarily-16 It represents the determination to drive together all the hol) 
questions of the practice of a good life, and to give them technical solutions, which 
together we call political economy, or politics and economics. 
Historical biblical criticism has its origins here. Like the philosophers, the biblical 
scholars made a claim to autonomy which involved reading the bible without its 
formative community, the Church, and without the formation of any community as its 
purpose. 17 The rationale of this type of biblical studies is no longer obvious. A more 
13 Steven Nadler Spino. Za: A Life Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1999,272 argues that `Spinoza's 
ultimate interpretation is to undercut the political power exercised in the Republic by religious authorities. ' 
See John Milbank Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason Oxford: Blackwell 1990,17-20 for a similar 
argument. Hunter Rival Enlightenments 27 argues that `By replacing the Aristotelian anthropology of man's 
rational and social being with an Epicurean conception of man as a passion-driven self-destructive being, 
and by using a voluntarist theology to exclude theo-rational conceptions of justice from the civil domain, 
the civil philosophers literally (Hobbes) or in effect (Pufendorf) identified natural law with the commands 
of the civil sovereign. ' 
14 Religion ceased to be public discourse and became instead private discourse and the private sphere. It 
divided the world into the two spheres of public and private such that even the public sphere was absorbed 
into the private sphere. The sphere of politics became the private function of a small group, and the 
leadership that had been the function of the formation in conversation of a whole people, became the 
property of that group, and government a clerisy and technocracy. See Wannenwetsch `The political 
worship of the Church'. 
13 Hunter Rival Enlightenments 26 argues that `rather than restricting religion to the private sphere in order to 
effect the de-sacralisation of politics, Leibniz, Wolff, and Kant all attempted to receive a secular equivalent 
for religion - in the form of their own natural theologies - through which they 
hoped to provide a moral 
basis for a resacralised state. ' 
16 Amos Funkenstein Theology and the Scientific Imagination from the Middle Ages to the Seventeenth Century 
Princeton: Princeton University Press 1986,17 argues that `The view of the state as a human artifact 
through and through rather than as a natural product of a built-in inclinatio ad societatem, though it had never 
before been defended so radically and systematically, replaced pure natural law traditions. ' 
17 See Kant Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason 6.112-14. Levenson `The Hebrew Bible, the OT and 
historical criticism' S. E. Fowl & L. G. Jones Reading in Communion: Scripture and Ethics in Christian Life 
Grand Rapids, Michigan Eerdmans 1991,47, argues that `For historical criticism is the form of biblical 
studies that corresponds to the classical liberal ideal. . . 
Like citizens in the classical liberal state, scholars 
practising historical criticism of the Bible are expected to eliminate or minimise their communal 
loyalties, 
so see them as legitimately operative only within associations that are private, non-scholarly and altogether 
voluntary'. Deconstruction of claims 
in the bible was a way of deconstructing the political claims of 
political hierarchies and law. Jonathan 
I. Israel Radical Enlightenment. " Philosophy and the Making of Modernity 
1650-1750 Oxford: Oxford University Press 2001,258-74,447-56 indicates some of the history of the 
political imperative that 
drove this early modem secularising biblical hermeneutic. I have tried to indicate 
the difficulty of discussing Israel's cult 
for a modem biblical studies that does not allow itself the 
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constructive approach understands law, philosophy, exegesis and theology to be in 
conversation with one another. The two tasks of reading the world and of reading the 
bible both require exegesis, and concepts, and doctrines. 18 In each of these disciplines 
what is said must be related to the whole history of what has been said, of continuity 
with the tradition, and of internal and external consistency. It is a matter not only of 
what the biblical exegetes say they find in the biblical texts, but about what theologians 
say all previous generations of exegetes have said, and about what philosophers say about 
the language they both use. If left to their own devices the exegetes would be making a 
claim to immediacy. But the philosophers and theologians, as long as they understand 
themselves to be in conversation with the exegetes, together function as the control on 
exegesis. The biblical exegete uses concepts kept in serviceable order by the philosopher 
and provided by that keeper of the thesaurus of the tradition, the theologian. 19 
The bible is the commentary on and technique of navigation through all the 
forms of writing and institution-building that make up the world, and their re-direction 
to the formation of the community of God's witness in the world. Scripture is itself 
already exegesis. Scripture is exegesis of the world. So scripture is first the subject of 
exegesis, not first its object. Exegesis of scripture is subsidiary to Scripture's work of 
reading the world. This work of world-reading is not merely a looking at the world, but 
bringing various worlds into confrontation. The end is not to look at the world merely to 
see it without engagement, but to join in conversation with it. 
To read the bible is to be equipped with a new means by which the world may 
make itself visible to us. This biblical apparatus provides the bandwidth that amplifies 
our attention span so we may perceive the world as sets of regularities, so each creature 
can be made out in its own segment of time, and thus seen in the wholeness of its life- 
cycle. It allows us to trace the web that unites act and its vindication and so to see 
relationships in their completeness and redemption. It picks up the linguisticality of the 
conceptual resources for talking about practice, performance, parody and public witness. 
It does not have 
those resources because modern exegesis understands itself to be autonomous from 
doctrine (the tradition 
of an ecclesial community) and philosophy (public political responsibility). 
18 See Gerard Loughlin `The Basis and Authority of Doctrine' in Colin E. Gunton ed. Cambridge Companion 
to Christian Doctrine Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1997,42 `Scripture and tradition were 
transformed into history and experience', and Bayer Gott alsAutor Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 1999,10 
`All 
drei Dimensionen (Geschichte, Philosophie, Poesie) gehören zusammen, dürfen sich nicht von einander 
isolieren und damit sich selbst absolut setzen. ' 
19 Kant Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason 118-22 presents a quite different account of this 
relationship. `Ecclesiastical 
Faith has the Pure Faith of Religion for its Supreme Interpreter' 121 `There is, 
therefore, no norm of ecclesiastical 
faith except Scripture, and no other expositor of it except the religion of 
reason and scholarship (which 
deals with the historical element of Scripture). And, of these two, the first alone 
is authentic and valid 
for the whole world, whereas the second is merely doctrinal' 
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world and so understands it not as a thing without speech but as complexes of 
conversations. It does not merely see it but hears it, is heard by it and interacts with it. It 
shows us the world as history and therefore as the place for humans, the animal with 
history and therefore with a future. Inasmuch as biblical studies understands itself to be 
alone before the text, able to take in everything at once as though it were all at once 
present like an illustration, it misidentifies the end. It abstracts the time in which the 
thing is, so it sees only a flat field without event or interactivity. 
5.2 Enlightenment as immediacy. 
The project of the economy of modernity is to see, and see through the obstacles to 
seeing. It is a claim to pure knowledge that understands that it must do without practical 
knowledge, and become purer and clearer by ridding itself of all considerations of the 
practices and means of knowing. It is the claim to dispense with the whole population of 
intermediaries, the elect people, that God has appointed to steward and husband us into 
knowledge. It understands all discussion of the medium of knowing as unnecessary 
restraint that prevent it gaining an immediate knowledge. 2° It has shunted the question of 
how into a number of special domains, variously aesthetics, politics or technical expertise. 
It tolerates no plurality, crowds, complexity, or range of time-scales, nor the non-linearity 
and asymmetry of the dual agency of God with man. It is the attempt to do entirely 
without consideration of performance and to go directly to the object, by dealing only in 
the conceptuality of immediacy. It promises to free us from the tutelage of another, to 
provide a cheaper grace that gets to the object faster, doing so at the expense of being 
able to say what the object is it wants to get us to. It wants to get us there without our 
being altered or matured by the process. 
The enlightened are only enlightened because they sit at the summit of the 
writhing world. But equally they are unenlightened because they do not know what 
everyone in the heap beneath them knows, that the world is a thing of conflict, a matter 
of pushing forward, acquiring leverage, accruing the capital and wherewithal to see purely 
20 Garrett Green Theology, Hermeneutics and Imagination: The Crisis of Interpretation at the End of Modernity 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2000,54 argues that Kant characterised `leading reins' as 
illegitimate restraint, while Hamann countered that Kant 
(contradictorily) made immaturity `self-incurred', 
blaming the nation for a tutelage forced on it by the self-appointed guardian and exploiter, 
Frederick. 
Ingolf U. Dalferth Gedeutete Gegenwart: Zur Wahrnehmung Gottes in den Erfahrungen 
der Zeit Tübingen: Mohr 
Siebeck 1997,147 argues that Hegel `wies darauf hin, daß der scheinbar totale 
Seig der Aufklärung ein 
Pyrrhussieg war, der nur dazu geführt hat, 
daß der Gegensatz zwischen Theologie und Philosophie in 
Gestalt der Entgegensetzung von Glauben und Wissen 
`nun innerhalb der Philosophie selbst verlegt 
worden ist'. ' 
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and be enlightened. 21 There cannot be universal enlightenment because this vision is 
achieved only by expending the poor: the poor can see what we cannot - chiefly that we 
are exploiting them. Our view, being incomplete, is false and no enlightenment. '--' 
Modernity is constituted by the belief that it merely receives what is there without 
contributing to 1t. 23 We can command the object of our vision, but cannot be held 
responsible for it, for it is purely object. Modernity claims that looking is a simple act of 
reception, and thus of passivity, that has no constitutive impact on us and for which no 
training is required. 24It claims that knowledge is effortless vision, that everything can 
equally well be seen through anything, and that there is no requirement to discover a 
proper implicit order. All knowledge is just a beatific vision of the object. We can see 
right through to the very object utterly without interference of any intermediaries. But it 
is not so. Looking is an idiom by which we interact with the world, and impact on it. 
I have indicated that there is still a non-Kantian a posteriori philosophy of 
technique that deals with all the issues of how. 25 Theology is a form of this practical 
knowledge. It insists that knowledge is not instantly visible, that the body is more than 
the eye, that things have to be learned and worked for, and that there is an inevitable and 
proper toil of translation. I argued in chapter 2 that all our knowledge and world is 
mediated to us. Everything we see, we see through the skills honed by many generations, 
and in their generations these people always remain the media of all our seeing. Seeing, 
and the apparatus of reading and literacy we have built on it, does not represent the 
21 See Hegel Phenomenology of Spirit B. IV. a 194-6 on the different knowledge and consciousnesses of the lord 
and bondsman. 
22 We may say that the Church succeeds in making the best claim to universality and catholicity. It is the 
real university. It knows what the university does not, that knowledge is inseparable from work and the 
overcoming of resistance. With the concept of the bondage of the will, the Church knows that knowledge 
is not all known, is closed and that it is we who prevent it from becoming open. 
23 Robert W. Jenson `On the Renewing of the Mind' in Essays on Theology of Culture Grand Rapids: Eerdmans 
1995,167 argues that `To knowledge for which sight is the metaphor, the response or solicitation of the 
other is not constitutive. In the final version of Greek reflection, which became the theology of all late 
antiquity's cults, this ideal of knowledge is paradigmatically and foundationally instantiated in Aristotle's 
Unmoved Mover under various aliases. This God is a sheer act of vision, wholly agent and not at all 
sufferer, receiving and expecting nothing from what is seen - if, indeed, it is acknowledged that anything 
other than itself comes within its purview. -The organ of truth, 
in the classic tradition, is the `mind's eye', 
knowledge is theoria, seeing'. 168 `When the Enlightenment revolted against theology in the name of reason, 
it thus revolted also against philosophy as anciently practised, since it was theology by which that practice 
was now carried on. Thus in the Enlightenment's understanding and practice of reason, the countervailing 
factor [talk and hearing] is gone. Reason becomes what even Aristotle did not make it: sheerly the 
individual's ability to see the truth. ' 
24 It also claims to project the time and space in which there may be objects, and so to constitute the object 
it sees. 
25 In Chapters 1 and 2 we related being (and thus objects) to affordance. The thing-in-itself is a paradox: if it 
is a thing it is a tool and a `for-a-purpose', not a 
`for-itself or `in-itself. Thus pure knowledge (pure reason) 
is not about all that most purely 
is, but about control of, commentary on and correction of practical 
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whole range of bodiliness, but only one part of that range. It is the result of the 
remembering of some skills and promoting these to our dominant vocabulary whilst 
pushing into the background other skills and modes of embodiment. 26 
The concept of honour allows us to relate being to vision. Any power broker sees 
us because he allows us to come into his view. He allows us to see what he sees as he 
sees. All those who pay court to the power broker contribute to making him the man he 
is. It is only by virtue of our looking up to him that there comes to be an orientation 
schema of up and down which is second nature to the population brought up within 1t. 27 
Our looking and seeing has a history; the history forms a continuum which acts as the 
medium of our action. Every sort of looking is a certain mode of deliberately seeing 
some persons and overlooking others, while forgetting that this is what we are doing. All 
this pure and immediate seeing is refusal of mediation. But it is not at all what it claims. 
It is not the absence of mediation. It is the mediation of that concept of man whose 
body-language our society has internalised. In Chapter 6I will argue that this power 
broker is the executive arm of the many autonomous domains that constitute the 
economy of modernity. 
Leadership is the ability to describe what we do in terms of its paideutic effect, 
and to do so successfully, so people follow us. The state is therefore the activity of 
adducing reasons for what we are doing that relate to the project of the formation of the 
body. '-s Reason and rationality serve as the accoutrements of our display, the tools and 
knowledge. Practical knowledge is about all that mostly purely is, for all that is can and must be regarded 
and examined as an affordance, as a tool, as a thing. 
26 The Western nominalist reading of Augustine mistakes the order of knowing (the heuristic purpose) for 
the order of being. It confuses the articulation, that is the means and method of learning, for the end, which is 
relationship with and knowledge of God. The vocabulary of vision, counting, and `clear and distinct ideas' 
may be properly employed as the means to improve on our performance, which I introduced in Chapter 2 as 
`articulation'. Such a vocabulary of counting and vision has its proper place as the instruction that promotes 
the development of the learner, taking him on from stage to stage, by introducing a new lesson as he is 
ready for it, and which he has learn before passing on to the next. Understood to refer to the possibility of 
an immediate vision of the end and possibility of the abolition of mediation, the vocabulary of vision and 
enlightenment is disastrous. But understood as the means by which learner and instructor articulate the 
means to improve the learner's performance, it has a proper function. We must therefore understand all the 
claims of vision, of clear and distinct ideas, and of enlightenment, to have their place only with discussion 
of contemplation and beatific vision through liturgical mediation, introduced in 3.5.2 and represented in 5.3 
below by Aquinas. 
27 Martin Jay Downcast Eyes., The denigration of vision in twentieth century French thought Berkeley: University of 
California Press 1993,49 attributes the `rationalisation of sight' to the `increasingly formalised and distant 
social space of the courtly societies of the era... elaborate courtly rituals of 
display devised to mark the 
articulations of social hierarchy'. 
28 John H. Yoder The Priestly Kingdom: Social Ethics as Gorpel Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press 
1984,158 argues that `If the ruler claims to be my benefactor, and he always does, then that claim provides 
me as his subject with the 
language I can use to call him to be more humane in his ways of governing me 
and my neighbours. 
The language of his moral claims is not the language of my discipleship, nor are the 
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tokens by which we amplify our gestures. 29 When used together the concepts of power 
and aesthetics serve to account for the magnificent redundancy of much of our 
performance. Where there is no proper account of performance as the whole medium of 
our being, the issues of aesthetics and power appear to be stray ends. I suggest that if we 
hold together aesthetics and power with the other concepts to which I have drawn 
attention, they contribute to the proper description of our action as complexly reciprocal 
creaturely action, allowing a theological account of the action of God and man together 
in the medium of God's provision. The claim of pure knowledge is to see off the other 
man's medium, refuse his help in coming to know him and so come to know him 
without his cooperation, violently. It is to decide that the other person's medium should 
only be understood as threat which must be rebuffed. The claim of modernity to exert its 
own pure vision is a claim to see past Israel, the medium of God, and impose on Israel 
our own medium. So the claim is to see the objects and purposes of God's imagination 
and desire, even though, without the scriptures that are Israel's own self-commentary, we 
have no medium of imagination by which we could identify these as those objects. 
The ancients conceptualised the givenness of limits as the weaving of the fates. 30 
Without the scriptures as source of its imagination, modernity has no concept of law and 
no means of conceptualising givenness or of accounting for otherness. It does not 
understand that the action of others leaves us only certain room, not an absolute 
freedom. On the other hand, it does license us a freedom with definition. Modernity 
understands only that we weave ourselves - and thus we have no means of saying that 
we do not like what results. 31 
standards of his decency usually to be identified with those of my servanthood. Yet I am quite free to use 
his language to reach him. ' 
29 MIacIntyre is aghast at the cynicism represented by Goffman in Interaction Ritual. Alasdair McIntyre After 
Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory Second edition London: Duckworth 1985,115 `he goal of the 
Goffmanesque role-player is effectiveness and success in Goffman's social universe is nothing but what 
passes for success. ' Maclntyre is right in saying that we regard him for his particular (institutionally- 
determined and therefore objective) expertise (such as that of the sportsman at his sport), but Goffman is 
also right in insisting we also recognise him for the charisma and elan that converts him into the object of 
emulation, a natural leader outside his institutional role. In 2.1 and 2.7.1 1 said that play within the game is 
informed by speech in the form of commentary and a range of para-game considerations and activities. 
30 See Onians R. B. The Origins of European Thought about the Body, the Mind, the Soul, the World, Time and Fate 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1951 349-51. 
31 Early Christian studies though has a more mature understanding of power than New Testament studies. 
The early Christians rewrote the definition of power and manliness (virtu) by out-performing the Roman 
definition of manliness by the practice of asceticism, continence and self-control. The more sophisticated 
hermeneutic of Early Christian studies, conscious of the issue of rhetoric, persuasion and the possibility of, 
by suffering, winning a world, employs the concept of performance and understands power as the modality 
of knowledge. See Frances Al. 
Young Biblical Exegesis and the Formation of Christian Culture Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 1997 for an example of the concept of paideia at work in exegesis, see Ellen T. 
Charry By The Renewing of Your Mind : The Pastoral Function of Christian Doctrine New York: Oxford University 
Press 1997 for the concept at work in doctrine. Denise K. Buell Making Christians. Clement ofAlexandria and 
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Modern theology has let all the conceptuality of reciprocity and recursivity drift 
out of the safekeeping of theology and philosophy, to become the technique claimed by 
the sub-Hegelian sciences of theory, sociology, anthropology, and gender that know 
nothing of theological paideia. Without this conceptuality we do not realise that all our 
theological autonomy is moved by the tectonic shifts of the conceptualities of the 
tradition, in slow but constant change under pressures that it is our specifically 
theological task to identify. Theology must be a matter also of theo-logic, of logic and 
method, which of course must not be divorced from the theologic, so God-talk does not 
become method as such. 32 Without the resources for talking about excess of human 
acting over and beyond the true and the good, theology cannot be science, with a proper 
respect for the sheer exuberance of the world. It must recover the discipline to allow talk 
of the world for its own sake and become more than merely morality. Without logic it 
cannot discern which moments demand truth discourse, which right-and-wrong 
discourse and which performance discourse - with the result that everything it says risks 
becoming trivial. 
I have argued that the state was once a public project but, from the seventeenth 
century, became an autonomous sphere and the possession of a clique not in constitutive 
relationship with the whole conversation of society. It is a story of how there was once a 
united world of practical philosophy, then a fall and the division of the world into three 
separate domains of exegesis, philosophy and theology. What right do we have to tell 
such a story? It can be told only as a heuristic and as warning of what would happen if 
we did not obediently do the duty of caring for the theo-logic. It is not to say this is the 
history, but that this would be the history if we do not apply ourselves to the task we are 
set. 33 
the Rhetoric of Le<gitimacy Cambridge: Princeton 1999 and Elizabeth A. Clark Keading and 
Renunciation: 
Asceticism and Scripture in Early Christianity Cambridge Princeton 1999 show the 
idea at work in early 
Christian studies, their hermeneutic derived via Foucault and Kojeve from Hegel's use of the concept of 
performance. 
32 Hegel argued that all sciences have histories, and that a law or 
logic is needed to control the telling of 
their history within any history of mankind. He believed that we will be 
defined by the gods or forces of 
`nature' until, by re-negotiating the concept of nature with the 
life sciences, we can proceed beyond the 
Stoic cosmology of `nature', a nature made absolute and unreachable 
by Kant's epistemology, but within 
which Schleiermacher was content to 
build his religion of inwardness. 
33 The story of the fall has its place within the sum of 
doctrines, which themselves have not only a 
doxological (truth) function but also a paideutic function in the formation of the community that can praise 
God. The Son who does the Father's work has the right to tell the story of the fall such that 
it is a story that 
only refers to a threat vanquished. 
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5.3 The seventeenth century collapse of mediation 
The seventeenth century saw the collapse of mediation. 34 This is the story that 
determines who we moderns are and what place we occupy. It is the story of how action 
came apart from nature, humankind from creaturehood. I have said that an ontology of 
intermediary duties, powers and media allow us to understand human action as nested in 
the world of other creatures, and so to understand that action creates and is created by 
character and capabilities, and creates and is created by an environment and world. The 
economy of modernity replaces such Aristotelian accounts of intermediaries with notions 
and practices of immediacy. From the seventeenth century on mankind was distinguished 
from nature and separated from it, and ceased to be either an animal or a creature. The 
culture-nature split was the invention of the concepts of nature and culture, the latter 
seen as separation from a God-given creaturely place. Nature ceased to be the place 
prepared for us, and became instead the triumphant mechanical world-picture. It is the 
claim of Weber that the story of desire, and the work of imagination has out-worked 
itself, and is coming to be replaced by rationality, which will fill the world and leave no 
place for narrative or imagination. 
When histories become too successful they succeed only in showing their 
inevitability. A history that attributes a breakdown to one historical moment 
problematises how we recover from that breakdown. 35 Gerard Loughlin offers a 
discussion of the loss of authority of Christian doctrine. Christian doctrine is lost because 
it is heard only within an alien metaphysic: the void, the absence of mediation, inveigled 
itself into the role of effective mediation of Christian doctrine and consequently its 
subverter. 36 This void was the Stoic-Epicurean metaphysic which taught that space is 
uniform and empty and nothing in it needs mediation to be present to us. Appropriation 
of Stoic and Epicurean themes in the Renaissance brought about the displacement of 
34 MacIntyre After Virtue 228-9 argues that `It was in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that morality 
came generally to be understood as offering a solution to the problems posed 
by human egoism and that 
the content of morality came to be largely equated with altruism. 
For it was in that same period that men 
came to be thought of as in some dangerous measure egoistic 
by nature; and it is only once we think of 
mankind as by nature dangerously egoistic that altruism 
becomes at once socially necessary and yet 
apparently impossible. ' Similarly Funkenstein 
Theology and the Scientific Imagination 72 suggests that `Only in 
the seventeenth century did both trends converge 
into one world picture: namely the Nominalists' passion 
for unequivocation with the Renaissance sense of the 
homogeneity of nature - one nature with forces to 
replace the many Aristotelian static natures. 
' 
35 Stephen N. Williams Revelation and Reconciliation: A Window on Modernity Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press 1995,7 points out that the story of the loss of mediation told by 
Gunton and Newbigin does not 
demonstrate that anything has become inevitable or that man has thereby lost responsibility 
for his acts. 
36 See Loughlin The Basis and Authority of Doctrine', 44-46. 
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the Aristotelian metaphysic with which Christian doctrine had been in conversation. 37 
Michael Buckley holds this Epicurean metaphysic responsible for belief in the void of 
infinite Euclidean space. 38 Loughlin uses Buckley, Frei and Amos Funkenstein to argue 
that scripture needs the mediation of the doctrine of the Church. Texts and scripture are 
not all of the same sort, or immediately readable, but require a process of learning. 
John Milbank and Nicholas Lash try to determine when the dissolution of the 
mediation of doctrine began. 39 Did the process start in the seventeenth century, or 
earlier, with Scotus in the fourteenth or Aquinas in the thirteenth century? Colin Gunton 
understands Buckley to argue that Aquinas's form of analogy, the `erection of theological 
structures independently of christology and pneumatology' was the underlying cause of 
modern atheism. "0 Gunton believes Aquinas made the assumption that two sorts of 
knowledge have access to the same being of God, such that one form of knowledge is 
immediate and the other mediate. It is no surprise when the doctrine that demands work 
is replaced by the one that does not, the expensive version by the cheaper. But Lash 
points out that the cheaper version, the `classical doctrine' of God, is of course not 
knowledge of God but of the logic of knowledge of God, a retrospective demonstration 
of the proper use of concepts. Aquinas understands that there must be a propaedeutic to 
prepare the reader for the knowledge of God that was to follow. The First Part of the 
Summa intends to prepare us to read the doctrine of God as Father, Son and Holy Spirit, 
set out in the Third Part. It is not another way of teaching what the third part teaches, 
but of giving readers that conceptual competence with which they may embark on the 
real work. 41 There is a pure knowledge of God, a philosophy and beatific vision: the 
question is who has the righteousness and readiness to embark upon it. Loughlin argues 
that `the Summa is really no more than grammatical notes upon the Church's reading of 
scripture, being entirely determined by the scriptural story... first and last a narrative of 
the Word. '42 
37 Funkenstein Theology and the Scientific Imagination 39-46. Declination conceptualises every movement as 
entry into new never-before-entered space, every thing is a new thing, everything confined within its own 
time-cell. In this metaphysic there is no responsiveness or relationship, and therefore no cause-and-effect. 
The Latin concept of absolute property may be related to this atomist conception of the thing without 
relation. 
38 Michael J. Buckley, S . 
J. At the Origins of Modern Atheism New Haven: Yale University Press 1987,47-50. 
39 John Milbank `Only Theology Overcomes Metaphysics' in The Word Made Strange 41-48; Nicholas Lash 
`When did the theologians lose interest in theology? ' in Marshall, Bruce Theology and Dialogue: Essay- in 
Conversation with George Lindbeck Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press 1990. 
40 Gunton The One, The Three and The Many 138-9, cited by Loughlin. 
41 Charry By The Renewing of Your Minds 134-5 makes the same point for Augustine. 
42 Loughlin `The Basis and Authority of Doctrine' 45. Alasdair T\TacIntyre Three Rival Versions of Moral 
Enquiry: Encyclopaedia, Genealogy and Tradition London: Duckworth 1990,140-1,162,169 makes a similar 
argument for Aquinas. 
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Lash and Milbank want to show that Aquinas understood that the knowledge of 
God has to be obediently performed in worship and in the continuous practice of the 
writing and re-writing of doctrine. 43 We need to practice speaking about God, but 
speaking about God is the only practice we get; by God's faithfulness our speaking may 
improve. Writing such a Summa was a dynamic, ongoing and even liturgical act, an 
unceasing procession around the locii, such that every point is mediated by every other, so 
writing theology is a practice of obedience, not an act that intends to bring the exercise 
to an end with a final statement. Milbank argues that Aquinas understands each science 
to bring its fruit to theology, and philosophia is what all this theologically obedient science 
amounts to. Theology is the organising principle for other sciences, the science of 
sciences, and philosophia is the practice of this theology. But are there levels and hierarchy 
of different sciences? Lash asks whether Milbank is not trying to turn all knowledge into 
theology, and to do away with other sorts of knowledge which would threaten the real 
claim of theology. 44 
Loughlin argues that the fourteenth century collapse of mediation means that all 
text becomes featureless, uniform stuff. As all being is the same, so is all knowledge of 
being, so there is crisis about how to tell one sort of text from another and how to read 
any particular text. He connects Frei and Buckley's discussion of text as performance and 
learned, mediated and mediation-making praxis, to the discussion by Lash and Milbank 
of whether philosophy has its own separate realm. 45 Buckley shows that Lessius, for 
example, employed the argument of Cicero in On the Nature of the Gods to attempt to 
make scripture comprehensible to those who had newly rediscovered Stoic and 
Epicurean deism. 46 To do this Lessius separated scripture from that doctrine which 
represented the Church's deliberation on centuries of reading scripture. Modern biblical 
hermeneutics derives from these Stoic and Epicurean-addressed apologetics of Lessius. 
The thought that the texts of the bible and of the Church can simply be handed over and 
away to some non-taught other, originates in the via moderna belief that the knowledge of 
43 Lash When did the theologians lose interest in theology? ' and Where does holy teaching leave 
philosophy? Questions on Milbank's Aquinas' Modern Theology 15 1999 433-444. 
44 Lash `When did the theologians lose interest'. Milbank replies in `Intensities' Modern Theology 15 1999, 
445-497. See also Hadot Philosophy as way of life 107 With the advent of medieval scholasticism however we 
find a clear distinction being drawn between theologia and philosophia. 
Theology became conscious of its 
autonomy qua supreme science, whole philosophy was emptied of 
its spiritual exercises which from now on 
were relegated to Christian mysticism and ethics. 
' 
45 This is the issue of natural theology, of whether there are two gods, one known in and by what is, a god 
of the Greeks, known 
by nature and indistinguishable from nature, and the other the God of the 
theologians, in charge of his own mediation, and yet who commandeers and transforms the grammar not 
only of `divinity' but of 
`nature' too into the grammar of creatureliness and triune Creator. 
46 Buckley At the Origins of Modern Atheism 40-5,54-5. 
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God is available apart from God's own conceptual mediation of it. The via moderna had 
abandoned a complex ontology in favour of a univocal ontology, in which God was one 
being among others, and therefore object for the same immediate knowledge. 47 If all 
being is the same, there need only be one sort of inquiry to say what being any particular 
thing has. This defines theology and philosophy in opposition to one another, 
respectively as knowledge that does, and knowledge that does not, require mediation, 
and allows a stand-off between them to emerge. 
Aquinas' achievement did not succeed in preventing the impoverishing ontology 
of the via moderna. Failure to appreciate Aquinas's Summa as part of its obedient ongoing 
doxological training and character formation work, left the Church's liturgical action 
vulnerable to analysis in terms of the Stoic-Epicurean metaphysic of absolute absence of 
relation and mediation, and so to dissolution. 
The result of the collapse of mediation is that being is substance, all the same, 
and all measurable. There was a proliferation of measure: everything became infinitely 
divisible. When all being is of one sort how can one being be distinguished from another, 
except by pure `measure'? The concept of time is the result of the division and 
aggregation of this univocal being. The result, argues Eric Alliez, is that time measures 
being univocally, and sorts it into heaps, and this heaped being has become capital - 
money. 48 This univocal ontology distinguishes between all being on one hand, and all 
relationship, structure, similarity, likeness, analogy, language and symbol on the other. 
The media of relationship - measure, time, money - float free in a void that we term the 
market-place. 
What is the status of this story of the collapse of mediation? Is the loss 
irrecoverable and the problem insuperable? Or is it the case that offering a history of the 
loss of mediation is a proper part of the redemption of that loss? The mediation is not 
lost but remains the possession and work of God, and has never been the possession of 
man apart from God. In the form of Israel, God always provides this mediation to the 
world. Nothing has been made impossible by a fall 
in history, but confessing this story in 
the context of the eucharist is part of the process of our 
learning our salvation. So the 
question that ends this section is who can tell this 
history? Western being has no right or 
47 Loughlin `The Basis and Authority of Doctrine' 46 explains that `Once the univocity of concept and 
language had been established, analogy and metaphor belittled and God conceived as 
but another, if 
unique, `extended' thing 
(res extensa) it was only a matter of time before Ockham's razor was used to 
remove an unnecessary 
hypothesis. ' 
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means to tell a purely secular history. It has nothing it could ground this history in, no 
independent witness to hear this history and acknowledge it as truth. The Western 
history is itself about the abolition of any Other who could be such a witness. God, and 
in the eucharist his servant, is able successfully to tell a story that accounts for the fall 
without repeating it, and in telling the story to supply the being that would otherwise 
remain missing. This servant is the world-bearing Word who returns to God. 
5.4 Law and Accommodation. 
I argued in Chapter 2 that the law is the instructor of the elect community. Its purpose is 
to drive the community on to holiness. Without that purpose the law is merely 
purposeless restraint on, and compromise with, the world. The concept of 
accommodation represents the loss of this concept of law and its control on salvation 
history, and its replacement of a law without teleology. The story of the collapse of 
mediation confined to a Platonist metaphysic serves to make the fall timeless, making it 
not a story but a cosmology of upper and lower realms. But there are other metaphysics 
that must also be attended to, for modernity is a function of Epicureanism and Stoicism 
as much as of Platonism. Under a Stoic metaphysic there is no issue of a collapse from 
one nature to another. Attention to other metaphysics, therefore, would enable us to 
reduce the extent to which modernity thrives on its story of its estrangement from God. 
Funkenstein asks why the Church did not make more use of the Stoic cosmology that 
would have prevented the dualism which allowed the Epicurean void and atomism to 
become the determinative metaphysic and hermeneutic. 49 As the practices of mediation 
were hollowed out, Israel and the Church ceased to be considered self-reflective agents 
of mediation. Israel's practice was divorced from her teaching, the meaning of her 
sacrificial practices was lost and with it all understanding of her status as critic of the 
world of the pagans. Israel came to be understood as just another example of primitive 
practice. Israel's sacrifice was understood by Western anthropology as one of the many 
commutations of (human) sacrifice, and of the social contract that mediates and controls 
violence by state-building. 50 
48 Alliez, Eric Capital Times: Tales from the Conquest of Time Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1996, 
13 refers to money as `capitalisation or the 
futuristic conquest of time', and believes that money `is never 
anything but a certain usage of time'. 
49 Funkenstein Theology and the Scientific Imagination 43. Funkenstein continues 72 `Only in the seventeenth 
century did both trends converge 
into one world picture: namely the Nominalists' passion for 
unequivocation with the 
Renaissance sense of the homogeneity of nature - one nature with forces to replace 
the many Aristotelian static natures. 
' 
50 Levenson represented this approach in 3.7.1. 
147 
According to Deborah Shuger, Augustine found Israel's sacrifice a difficult 
issue. " Augustine believes that `[I]t befitted God to request sacrifices in earlier times; 
now, however, things are different, and he commands that which befits this time. '52 
Augustine believed that the law was handed over to Israel in instalments as Israel became 
ready to receive them. `In question was the wisdom of the sacrificial ritual in ancient 
Israel. The pagans ask: If they were not good, why were they instituted? And if they were 
good, why were they abolished by a new dispensation? ' Pagan polemics are directed not 
at the idea of the one God, but at the notion of God acting arbitrarily. Augustine replies 
that the process of history is not arbitrary. Like the cosmos, its parts need not be 
intrinsically beautiful, but need only fit together to make a beautiful whole. 53 
Maimondes taught that the action of the gentiles is directed against Israel. God 
opposes polytheism throughout all ages: it is Israel's task to be his witness and to endure 
the trials of world history. 54 Maimondes demonstrates that every allegedly irrational 
precept of the law is a countermeasure to some practice of the culture of the archetypal 
gentiles, the `Sabeans'. There were one-to-one inverted correspondences between each 
precept and the pagan counter-instance. The fact that the reasons for certain 
commandments have been forgotten is testimony to the success of divine teaching. God 
uses contingent elements within nature to change it, and sacrifices are elements of the 
polytheistic mentality used to transform this mentality by degrees. In The Guide to the 
Perplexed Maimondes holds that every precept may be seen as both a commandment of 
reason and a commandment of obedience. Maimonides' elaborate accommodationist 
interpretation entered late scholasticism, and Shuger believes, inspired the first 
comparative studies of religion. 55 
'' Deborah K. Shuger, The Renaissance Bible: Scholarship, Sacrifice and Subjectivity Berkeley: University of 
California Press 1994,223. 
52 Augustine Epistulae 138.1.5. City of God Book 10.5 (quoted by Shuger, 378) `For if he had not wished the 
sacrifices he desires (and there is only one, the heart bruised and humbled in the sorrow of penitence) to 
be 
signified by those sacrifices which he was supposed to long for as if they gave him pleasure, then 
he 
certainly would not have prescribed their offering in the old Law. And the reason why they 
had to be 
changed at the fitting and predestined time, was to prevent the belief that those things were objects of 
desire to God himself... and to make us realise that what was required was what they signified. '.. `Hence the 
meaning of the text, `I desire mercy rather than sacrifice, ' (Hosea 6,6) 
is simply that one sacrifice is 
preferred to another; for what is generally called sacrifice is really a sign of the true sacrifice. 
Mercy is in 
fact the true sacrifice. ' 
53 Augustine continues, Epistulae 138.1.5, `It befitted God to request sacrifices in earlier times; now, 
however, things are different, and he commands that which befits this time. He, who knows better than 
man what pertains by accommodation to each period of time, commands, adds, augments or 
diminishes 
institutions... until the beauty of the whole history, whose parts these periods are, unfolds 
like a beautiful 
melody. ' 
54 This is the argument of Funkenstein Theology and the Scientific Imagination 237. 
55 Shuger The Renaissance Bible 83 argues that John Spencer On the Ritual Laws of the Hebrews (1685) attempted 
to give every precept a precise 
historical rationale so by demonstrating the time-boundness of every biblical 
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I argued in Chapter 4 that Israel's statement of the law is response to pagan law- 
systems. It is driven by confrontation with the pagans, so may not be explained by simple 
reference to nature or the requirements of biological survival. The law is the work of the 
tutor who prepares Israel for each new lesson. 56 But the accommodationist schema 
dichotomises the concepts of law and time so it is the mere passing of time that 
determines when the law must change to accommodate change. There were different 
rules and laws for different times: sacrifice had been legitimate for ancient Israel, but 
God had since made a new law, so now it was not. 
Funkenstein believes that the patristic and medieval explanation of Israelite 
sacrifice led, during the Renaissance, to a `search for correspondences and concordances 
of legal, religious and political institutions that express the qualitas temporum and hence 
that sixteenth century legal historicism may itself have been inspired by the traditional 
Christian explanation of sacrifice. '57 Renaissance legal theory came with developmental 
theory: primitives have simpler and more savage laws, law develops the morals of 
nations, societies move on and up a single developmental path, and as they do the law 
needs to change to impose a regime of greater civility. Shuger takes up Funkenstein's 
discussion of accommodation. The belief that God's law first allowed sacrifice and later 
abolished it, resulted in the idea that laws change with their societies through an 
inexorable process of time. Shuger finds Grotius collecting examples of sacrificial rites 
with all the anthropological glee of Frazer, all understood as variations on commuted 
human sacrifice. 58 Study of the change or development of laws is the beginning of 
anthropology, and discussion of sacrificial substitution in the context of Roman law 
became discussion of property rights, economics and anthropology, the search for a 
mankind that was worthy of the law. 59 
Shuger distinguishes between God as mediator (rector) and as owner (dominus). As 
rector God is responsible for justice and for the purity of the whole language and medium 
of relationship. The medium belongs to the whole population; all its interaction takes 
institution he hoped to combat Jews, Catholics and `fanatics'. Rather than relate what Israel did to any 
intention of hers to refute the pagans, Spencer tried to reconstruct the primitive mentality to which Israel 
had been assimilated, and saw her laws as attempts to wean her from the Egyptian religion. 
56 The argument of 2.1 and 6.1. 
57 Funkenstein Theology and the Scientific Imagination 241. 
58 Grotius De Satisfactione Christi (1617). Shuger herself believes (83) that `the essential rites and narratives of 
Christianity embody the logic of blood sacrifice and originate within an archaic episteme.. penetrate behind 
the civilised veneer of western ideology to its violent hinterground'. 
59 Adam Kuper The Invention of Primitive Society: Transformations of an Illusion London: Routledge 1988 traces 
the origins of anthropology to nineteenth century 
historians of law. The pedigree is traced further through 
the Scottish enlighteners by MacIntyre Three Rival I ersions of Moral Enquiry 177-89; and via Montesquieu 
and Herder, back to Grotius. 
See also Hochstrasser Natural Law Theories 4-37. 
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place within it. The owner (dominus) can forgive or remit a debt that is owed privately to 
him. The creation is God's property. Yet his creation consists of the many persons 
whom he has given a stake in the economy of his creation. For their stake he does not 
act as though he were alone, and simply remit debt. G° God is wrathful as rector, because 
something that is his has been refused not to him alone, but to all the members of his 
economy to whom, as the creatures of God, it also belongs. It is his task to reinstate or 
supply the purity of the medium of the world. But Grotius represents a transition from 
one understanding to the other. `God is no longer rector - constrained by the law, which is 
(the law of) what he has done, but dominus who may dispose as he will'. G1 This is defined 
in terms of `now', a `now' that cannot be measured against earlier decisions, for there is 
no medium of accounting in which to do so, no set of his promises that can be quoted 
back to him by which he may also be held to account. Under the influence of Roman 
law, dubbed natural law, in the early modern era, the Aristotelian suspicion of the right 
of exchange over use gave way to an absolute right to control one's person and property. 
This movement was the anthropological complement of voluntarist theology: humans 
best exemplify the image of God when exercising unrestricted sovereignty and property 
rights. 62 
The result of this loss of law is that the whole economy of Israel's action - 
sacrifice - is no longer recognisable as parody and demythologisation of the nations and 
so is understood instead as an act of propitiatory violence. Israel was accused of doing 
precisely what her deconstructive mimicry of them accused the nations of doing. The 
loss of law as hermeneutical medium resulted from the loss of the law as paideia. 
Sacrifice has no basis in human sacrifice. 63 Girard and Milbank argue that the death of 
Christ is the end of sacrifice but because their understanding of sacrifice is not derived 
from Israel's own teaching but, from some more general account of violence, it is no easy 
matter for them to show this. The appearance of sacrifice as problem stems 
from failure 
60 I introduced this issue in 1.2. O'Donovan From Irenaeus to Grotius 792 argues that `The intelligibility of the 
doctrine turned on the understanding that God acted as the ruler of the universe, and the atonement was 
an `act of justice'. A ruler, like a creditor, is free to 
forgive, unlike a judge entrusted with the administration 
of a law. But a ruler, unlike a creditor cannot simply waive the right, 
but has responsibility for upholding 
justice for the whole community. ' 
61 Shuger The Renaissance Bible 70. Gunton `The Doctrine of Creation' in Gunton, ed. Cambridge Companion to 
Christian Doctrine 151 indicates the via moderna origins of this move. 
62 Cavanaugh `The City - Beyond Secular Parodies' 
in John Milbank, Catherine Pickstock, Graham Ward 
eds. Radical Orthodoxy: 
A New Theology London: Routledge 1999, finds that, for Aquinas, Adam's right of 
property was based on 
dominium utile, justified by its usefulness to society in general. See Cavanaugh 187, 
195 and Milbank Theology and 
Social Theory 12-13 on this voluntarist anthropology of rights. 
63 I have argued against Levenson in 3.7.1. See also 
Milbank Theology and Social Theory 392-8 and `Stories of 
Sacrifice' Modern Theology 12 1996 . 
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to realise that Israel is the community that can correctly read the scriptures as the 
deconstruction of the gentiles - as violence. 64 The meaning of all Israel's ritual and 
sacrificial action is given by its place in the conversation of God with God. 
5.5 Law and philosophy. 
I have argued that when we discuss history we must make clear who is telling this history, 
and whether they are qualified to tell it because they are party to it. 65 History cannot 
endlessly be told without the regular work of conceptual commentary. There must be 
alternation between history and law, law and history, never one without the other. 
David Novak believes Judaism and Christianity are both response to 
commandments from God. `The ultimate fulfilment of human personhood, both 
individually and collectively, lies in a future and universal redemptive act by God, one as 
yet on the unattainable historical horizon'. 66 Duty, practice, ethics, faith, dialogue and 
ritual are all required to retell the story of which you are part, and to keep the 
commandments, to keep in balance being Jewish and doing Jewish. Wyschogrod argues 
for the total historicity of the Torah. It contains no natural law: Israel's election is the 
primary event and the giving of the Torah a secondary event. There is no element of the 
observance of the Law, but merely what Eisen calls the misvot of nostalgia, stories about 
being Jewish, or how it once was to be Jewish. 67 Judaism is the set of people telling this 
evolving set of stories about this people, without reference to a non-negotiable givenness 
of the Law. What is the relationship between the bare fact of the transmission of a 
tradition that changes, perhaps out of recognition, over time, and the unchanging 
content of the Law? Is Judaism just a telling of this history, such that secularisation is an 
equally valid part of Jewish history? Is secularism a meaningful concept for Judaism? Is 
Judaism no more than a religion? Novak finds `Wyschogrod's biblicism and effective 
subordination of the Torah to the Jewish people are not adequate to the genuine 
dialectic 
between grace and merit, election and obligation. '68 
Leo Strauss argues that, because it was for an elite only, the medieval Jewish 
enlightenment was a much more successful enlightenment than that of the eighteenth 
64 I argued in 3.7.3 that `violence' is simply a synonym for `gentile world'. 
65 In 3.4.1-2. 
66 David Novak Jewish-Christian Dialogue: A Jewish Justification New York: Oxford University Press 1989, 
140. 
67 Michael Wyschogrod The Body of Faith: God in the people of Israel San Francisco: Harper & Row 1989,137. 
Arnold A1. Eisen Rethinking Modern Judaism : Ritual, Commandment, Community Chicago: University of 
Chicago 
Press 1998,169-84. 
68 Novak Jewish-Christian Dialogue 243. 
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century. The medieval enlighteners `were not concerned with spreading light, with 
educating the many to rational knowledge, with enlightening. They constantly impress on 
philosophers the duty to keep rationally recognised truth secret from the unchosen 
many. '69 There cannot be a general enlightenment. Christian discourse of love and 
spirituality has resulted in the disappearance of talk of paideia and law. Reason now 
knows no relationship to law, virtue, habitual action, or work, but has become a hyper- 
spiritual and narcissistic affair. 70 What caused this dialectic of enlightenment, by which 
this education and liberation became a binding and captivity? 71 Christians have 
abandoned the task of law, reason, enlightenment and leadership, and therefore have 
abandoned the state. But when the (Christian) discourse of love ceases to oppose reason 
and is re-integrated into practical philosophy, law and enlightenment, it will take up the 
task of leadership again. 
Gillian Rose believes that `Judaism itself is best understood as a political and 
theological tradition, not as an ethical one. '72 
The desire to conceive of law and coercion as absolutely distinct from the good 
and the community (already encountered in the uncoupling of Hellenism and 
Hebraism) represents one of the main ways in which modern Jewish thought 
participates in a methodological and substantive divorce which characterises the 
development of modern philosophy in its separation of ethics from the social 
analysis of the ways in which authority is legitimised. 73 
In this divorce the Jews provide the teleology and ethics in the form of scripture, while 
the Greeks or Romans are understood to provide the reason, institutions and 
69 Leo Strauss Philosophy and Law. - Essays Towards Understanding Maimonider and his Predecessors (1935) 
Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society 1987,111. n2. 
70 Strauss Philosophy and Law 111. n2. `By contrast, the intention of the eighteenth century Enlightenment 
was `the rehabilitation of the natural through the denial (or limitation) of the supernatural; its achievement 
however was the discovery of a `natural' foundation, which is anything but natural, but rather is the residue, 
as it were of the `supernatural'. By the beginning of Modernity, the extreme possibilities and demands that 
had been discovered, out of the natural and typical, by the originators of the religious as well as the 
philosophical tradition had become self-evident; in that sense they had become `natural'. Consequently they 
are no longer considered extremes in need of a radical explanation; instead, they themselves serve as a 
`natural' foundation for the negation or reinterpretation not just of the supernatural but also and precisely 
of the natural and typical. In contrast to ancient and medieval philosophy that understands the extreme on 
the basis of the typical, modern philosophy... understands the typical on the basis of the extreme. In that 
way the `trivial' questions of essence of virtue and whether it can be taught are ignored, and the extreme 
('theological') virtue of love becomes the natural (`philosophical') virtue. In the `radicalised' critique of the 
natural ideal of courage, the virtuous character of courage as such is formally denied... Only the 
history of 
philosophy makes possible the ascent out of the second and `unnatural' cave into which we have 
fallen (less 
through the tradition than through the tradition of polemic against the tradition) into the first, `natural' cave 
that Plato's image depicts, the ascent from which, to the light, is the original meaning of philosophising. ' 
71 That enlightenment caused a captivity is the argument of Theodor W. Adorno & Max Horkheimer 
Dialectic of Enlightenment New York: Herder & Herder 1972. In Chapter 6I ask how this liberation 
became a 
binding, and suggest that theology must address the question of the captivity of man. 
72 Gillian Rose Mourning becomes the Law Philosophy and Representation Cambridge: Cambridge University' Press 
1996,86 `Rabbinic Judaism rests on the study of the Law, Talmud Torah: it rests not on the devastation 
but on the growth of the self in knowledge. 
' 
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implementation of power. Judaism tells us what the end is, while Greece and Rome 
provide the conceptual means and actual practices of government. But Rose insists 
against Kant that Judaism does provide the wherewithal to implement the law, and the 
law does address itself to the formation of a community. 74 The law therefore in its 
actuality means full mutual recognition, `Spirit'. Israel is not only a project, but the means 
of its implementation. 75 
The Western political tradition has been formed by reading the history of Israel. 
This tradition believes that the scriptures are open to us, that we can clearly make Israel 
out in them. The West has set out to copy Israel, surpass Israel and leave her behind. All 
the political, constitutional construction of the West represents our engagement in 
Israel's project, but without Israel, building where it understands Israel to have failed. It 
claims that Israel must be seen through and seen past so that we gentiles can make our 
own start. 76 We do not allow conversation with her, and she is not allowed to host our 
learning. We have to learn without her. It rules out the people provided to be our hosts, 
intermediaries, instructors and medium of our learning. It rules out the whole middle 
world of persons. But if gentile vision had not succeeded in making Israel its object the 
Western tradition would have been labouring in vain and would have succeeded neither 
in following nor overtaking Israel. 
An account of the Western tradition will relate doctrine, law and critical 
philosophy. It requires a positive ethic of the sort I set out at the beginning of this 
chapter. The enlightenment attempts to establish clarity to see what is there, without 
setting out anything positive about what could or should be there. Philosophy and 
criticism that simply reproduce the enlightenment in this aspect offer no ethic and no 
lead. Criticism is part of the process of self-correction, but without intending to go 
somewhere it is purely a reactive and negative impulse and, Strauss argues, an escapist 
one. Such criticism is not able to identify its real target. The target should not be this or 
that set of ideas, but practices in the world, criticism of which involves setting out 
alternative practices. A philosophy that learns from Jewish philosophy will not separate 
73 Rose Mourning becomes the Law 86. It is therefore not the case that Hebrews think only narratively or 
mythologically, and Greeks logically. 
74 The claim made by Kant Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason 6: 125,166. 
75 Rose Mourning becomes the Law 72-5 `Spirit' is the shorthand term for the situation of all parties' systematic 
failure to recognise each other. The law is the falling towards or away from mutual recognition, the triune 
relationship, the middle, formed or deformed by reciprocal self-relations. 
76 Kant Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason 6: 127 We cannot therefore begin the universal history of 
the Church (inasmuch as this history is to constitute a system) anywhere but from the origin of 
Christianity, 
which as a total abandonment of the Judaism 
in which it originated, , grounded on an entirely new 
principle, effected a total revolution in 
doctrines of faith. ' 
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ethics from the construction of authority, nor from the analysis of the success of that 
project. We have seen that Judaism represents the rebuke that Christianity does not have 
a law or means of implementation. It is therefore prey to an alien and pagan ethics of 
will, a Constantinian and individualist temptation. All agenda, construction and 
assessment of progress belong under the rubric of law. Learning is the mode in which 
social and political life may come into being. It proceeds by making mistakes, risking 
action, and then by reflecting on its unintended consequences and then risking further 
action, and so on. 77 
Is Israel a polity, ethic, philosophy or religion? Which of the characteristics of the 
nations may she be ordered under? I have suggested that the question has to be asked 
but answer in these terms refused in favour of a theological account. I argued in Chapter 
3 that Israel's identity is a matter of the determinative relationship in which she is the 
elect servant of God. Such a definition has no relation to definitions of good shared with 
the gentile world, and yet it must challenge and converse with the definitions that 
compose this world in order to claim that world. Israel must (1) receive her definition 
from her God and (2) be defined in opposition to the world and by the world. Both are 
necessary in order that she be the work of God for the world. I have asked whether the 
history of the West represents the reduction of the difference between Jews and gentiles, 
and suggested it is a difference that is yet to be established, and that it is the work of 
God. 
5.6 Motion and emotion. 
Next in this discussion of the collapse of mediation we must treat the dichotomy of 
motion and emotion. 78 This involves the issue of time which appeared in Chapter 4 
under the concept of suffering (cross) and as the question of whose time and economy 
of time (resurrection). It relates to the question of whether Israel may be contained 
within the modern economy of time or can resist it with her own resources. The concept 
of motion refers to the continuum of movement of which the world is made up. 
79 The 
total movement of this continuum is a function not only of the individuals that presently 
compose it, but the movement of all previous generations too. In the course of the 
seventeenth century though, emotion ceased to be an aspect of the motion that coursed 
77 This is the argument of Rose Mourning becomes the Law 38. 
78 See 6.3.2 on Kantian critique as mutation of classical dualist cosmology. 
79 Protestant theology has tended to offer only a univocal account of the individual will, in a vacuum, 
without adequate consideration of time or others. 
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through and constituted the world. It became instead what happens within. 80 Restoration 
pietism made emotion an individualistic concept. Without trinitarian mediation, Christian 
doctrine became locked into a cosmology that referred everything to that sealed 
container the soul, with the result that each person cultivates, not the world given to us 
by God as task, but his own soul, which is a whole world to itself. The consequence has 
been the discourse of sentiment and subjectivity. Coleridge, Schleiermacher, and the 
most recent of the affective theologians, Rene Girard, vainly tried to establish that we 
occupy and ourselves constitute a continuum of emulation and envy, of motion and 
emotion. 81 A Platonist metaphysic divided the Christian doctrine of Spirit between 
motion on one hand, and emotion on the other, distinguishing the inner emotions of the 
individual from the public interaction of persons, reducing action to either psychology or 
politics. What fitted neither of these categories was conceptualised as spirit, which is 
what gave each age its specific character and drove one age to succeed another. The 
conceptuality of inside and outside belongs to one discourse, that of individualism, and 
that of the continuum of movement and passion belongs to another. We must use both, 
and not subject emotion and motion to that dualist cosmology that attributes priority to 
the individual soul over the world of many persons. 82 We should keep two definitions of 
the soul in operation. One of these must be the microcosm that participates in the 
continuum of the movement of the cosmos, and the other the paideutic articulation that 
serves our public performance. Our discussion of our own soul or self should be 
understood to serve this paideutic articulation that serves our being for other persons. 83 
80 See Garber `New doctrines of the body, its powers and place' and James `The passions in metaphysics 
and the theory of action' in Daniel Garber and Michael Ayers eds. Cambridge History of Seventeenth 
Century 
Philosophy Cambridge 1998,553-623,913-51 . 
81 Desire as will without imagination has no content. The recovery of the modality of 
how is the modality of 
desire and emotion which together constitutes a continuum and world. It is an emotion-world, and thus a 
sea of all movement. Cause (touch, push) is not the only mode. Emotion is the missing third term of the 
tripartite soul which is not only intellect (reason) and will. Emotion (plurality) makes a third term. 
Will 
alone does not make desire but requires a thesaurus of desires, a list of what 
is desirable, and many 
accounts of what is good which compete from which to choose. A univocal account of the will 
does not 
answer the question of how much, how much more than the other man who wants that same thing. 
In 1800 
Ricardo invented a multi-level account of will as a cascade of will-units - marginal preference - that always 
find their own relative place, and as `economics' his account has succeeded 
in displacing others by driving 
them into minority discourse of, for example, religion. -Modern theology continues to operate on a 
metaphysic of will that sees the single man standing alone 
in a void of mediation before his God. Such a 
univocal conception of the will relates only to a situation 
in which notionally we can have whatever we 
want without foregoing anything. 
82 Bernd Wannenwetsch `The political worship of the Church' Modern Theology 12 1996,278 argues that `the 
Church's worship of God is the overcoming of political antinomies, the most 
important of which is that 
between public and private. ' 
83 For the seventeenth century abandonment of these in 
favour of the soul as internal to the individual, see 
Isabel Rivers Reason, Grace and SentimentA study of the language of religion and ethics in England 1660-1780 
Volume 2 Shaftesbury to Hume Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2000; Frederick C. Beiser 
The 
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The seventeenth century discussion of passions has become the modern 
discussion of time. Modernity believes that the individual gives and receives nothing in 
his encounter with his peers. He does not suffer either gain of being or loss of being 
from them. I said in Chapter 1 that the result of denying ourselves the conceptuality of 
ontological credit and debt is that we are utterly unable to say what it is we suffer, lack or 
inflict on one another. Suffering that is not identified as the impact on us of specific 
groups of others becomes simply fate, and in the economy of modernity this fate appears 
as time. Time is a debt that is unrelated to any action in the world, either our own or 
anybody else's. Temporality is the question of what change is undergone. We must relate 
this to the question of who inflicts change on whom, and who is master of whom. The 
question of time is, whose time is it? It is the question of who can measure and out- 
measure whom? God's time for man and being for man is not what man inflicts on God 
or what God must suffer involuntarily, but is God's determination to be for man and 
with him. Time must be understood not as non-personal substance (or equally, absence), 
but as the action of God who has time for us. 84 Only thus is it a question about God's 
condescension to suffer and bear us, to take our weight, be measured (and timed) by us. 
The modem concept of time represents our refusal to allow the continuing 
personhood of the persons of the past. The refusal to understand temporality as debit 
and credit of being, makes all being the same. Time is then only what passes without in 
any way effecting what is. These two concepts of fleeting time and unchanging being 
constitute the economy of modernity. 85 Hegel complained that Christianity was being 
reduced to mere pietistic soul-talk and subjectivity that reproduces a dualism of 
intellectual and sensible realms. 86 Spirit, the concept of God at work in the world, 
Sovereignty of Reason: The Defense of Rationality in the Early English Enlightenment Princeton: Princeton University 
Press 1996,139-40,165-71; Susan James Passion and Action: The Emotions in Seventeenth Century Philosophy 
Oxford: Clarendon 1997; Raymond Martin and John Barresi Naturalization of the Soul- Self and Personal Identity 
in the Eighteenth Century London: Routledge 2000; Michael Losonsky Enlightenment and Action From Descartes 
to Kant. Passionate Thought Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2001. 
84 The oneness and indivisibility of space (infinitely and uniformly divisible) we associated with Newton is 
the concept of the oneness, simplicity and indivisibility of God. The concept of space derives from that of 
spirit: it is a displaced pneumatology. Newton's space is all-equal, absolute sameness, identity, endless 
divisibility and multipliability of all things equally and so the abolition of difference. Time (= the 
uniformity of time) represents the idiom of spirituality in the economy of Modernity. 
85 We can ask whether Modernity is any more than a shrill discourse of the accelerating rate of change that 
results from the separation of time from event and teleology. 
86 Alan A1. Olson Hegel and the Spirit: Philosophy and Pneumatology Princeton: Princeton University Press 1992 
36-52,151 explains that Hegel was concerned that theology was being taken over by a conception of Spirit 
reduced to mere subjectivity. This subjectivist reduction was particularly pronounced in christology in 
which Christianity is reduced to an emotivistic mystery cult focused on the personality of Jesus. 
Schleiermacher encouraged this subjectivism by failing to address adequately the content implicit in the 
trinitarian conception. Hegel therefore opted for `speculative pneumatology as the centre of his system, 
since it was his conviction that only Spirit, considered in its fullness, could reconcile without compromise 
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without theological conceptual maintenance work, slowly separates under the pressure of 
the idealism of the tradition, reverting to serve a dualism between body and spirit, and 
between physics and metaphysics, teleology and human action. We have to ensure that 
our theological concepts remain in touch with the biological, chemical and physical. In 
this way it can refer to the world and be scientific, and science can be brought into 
conversation with teleology, so discussion of human action is kept in conversation with 
what is. 87 Without reference to the work and ends of God we have no way of 
distinguishing between needs and desires, or means of discerning the proper necessity 
laid on us. Our action and our knowledge successfully refer only when we receive them 
obediently as gifts that give us our place in the purpose of God. 
5.7 Recovery of metaphysics as political task. 
The belief that we are post-metaphysical and that knowledge is unproblematic is an 
indication of how securely we have set ourselves within a one-world economy. I have 
indicated that this claim to be one is a function of the claim to include all, to be plural 
and comprehensive. This oneness is a function of many worldviews and metaphysics that 
constitute an illusory plurality. Christianity is an address to all metaphysics that cooperate 
in this single economy. These metaphysics are the languages of the nations of the world, 
and the gospel speaks all languages to speak to all nations. 88 The theological task involves 
interaction with the metaphysical tradition to identify competing orientation schemas, 
contest them and play them off one against the other. I have argued that theology must 
faith and knowledge. ' Welker, Michael God the Spirit Minneapolis: Fortress 1994,289 `Hegel is correct when 
he notes with sadness that the `speculative consideration and knowledge of the nature and activity of spirit 
has declined.. in recent times, even to the point of losing even a vague notion of it'. ' `Spirit' is what nature 
and morality made together before being divided by Socrates. 
87 Dietrich Ritschl The Logic of Theology: A brief account of the relationship between basic concepts in theology London: 
SCM 1986, calls for a theology that can engage in a more energetic conversation with the whole range of 
metaphysics, which requires a more Trinitarian, less dualist theology. 51 `Over against the (Augustinian) 
restriction of theology to the relationship between God and humanity (or the soul) there were constant 
serious attempts to think in terms of the triangle God-humanity-nature. ' And similarly D. W. Hardy `Christ 
and Creation' in T. F. Torrance The Incarnation: Ecumenical Studies in the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed 
Edinburgh: Handsel Press 1981,100 points out that `Our inherited presuppositions cause us to read the 
Gospel in thoroughly mentalistic and moral terms, giving most attention to Jesus' self-consciousness and 
intentions, rather than in spatio-temporal, physico-chemical, biological and socio-cultural terms. ' 
88 I presented these metaphysics as orientation schemas in Chapter 2. For four centuries and more the 
critical and sceptical effort of philosophy has been directed solely against ontology, meanwhile our 
everyday practices, without ontology as the conceptuality of participation by which we could recognise 
them and unthink them, are lost, mired in the habits of criticism itself become ontology. Because we have 
not cultivated the conceptuality by which to see our everyday action as determined by our own history-, our 
everyday habits have become to us a nature. Norbert Samuelson The Death and Revival of Jewish 
Philosophy' Journal of the American Academy of Religion 70.1 2002,121 argues that `lost of the concerns that 
characterised pre-twentieth century philosophy have moved to disciplines other than philosophy... the 
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respond to, and where it is required in correction, employ a dualist metaphysic which 
allows us to distinguish one economy from another, and to say that what we presently 
have is not yet what God intends for us. And I have argued that theology must also 
respond to and employ a non-dualist metaphysic which does not contrast body and mind, 
material and spiritual, but which allows that there are modes of bodiliness, and that some 
constitute a better performance of bodiliness than others. God intends for us that 
performance that brings us from poorer modes, through richer modes, into one 
economy with him. Since this economy is the work of the Holy Spirit, we should call this 
most bodily performance `spiritual'. 
There is therefore no abdication from the work of metaphysics. The 
enlightenment has not removed this responsibility from us. Ian Hunter argues that there 
was not one but several rival enlightenments, each with its own abjuration of ontology 
and its replacement by an anthropology of its own. 89 There is `no sharp break between 
these philosophies and Christian theology, and no epochal shift from a religious age to a 
secular "age of reason". '90 Milbank argues that there must be an ongoing metaphysical 
task. Doctrine must not become constrained by a metaphysic that dichotomises inner 
and outer space. Being and space must be kept complex-91 Milbank argues that neither 
Augustine nor Plato need result in interiority. '- Frederick Bauerschmidt argues that, in 
his thinking on the trinity, Augustine understands persons to be constituted by relations, 
but when thinking about language he retreats to an Aristotelian position in which signs 
places today to master this art are departments of mathematics, linguistics, cognitive sciences and the life 
sciences, not departments of philosophy. ' 
89 Hunter Rival Enlightenments 23-4 `In Pufendorf s natural law we discover a political anthropology of man 
as creature whose violent passions threaten his capacity for sociality, thereby necessitating the creation of a 
sovereign power capable of imposing the rules of sociability as law. Leibniz's practical philosophy, however, 
is grounded in his platonic `monadology', treating man as an intellectual soul capable of participating in the 
divine intellection of the substance, and thereby perfecting himself through contemplation. Following 
Pufendorf s footsteps, Thomasius' quasi-epicurean anthropology of passional man necessitates an ethics of 
self-restraint and a jurisprudence of sovereign command. Finally, in Kant's anthropology of man's dual 
intelligible-sensible natures, we encounter a further elaboration of the metaphysical homo duplex driving 
Kant to construct an ethics and politics in terms of man's self-purifying recovery of his self-governing 
rational being. ' 
90 Hunter Rival Enlightenments 25. 
91 John Milbank `Sacred Triads: Augustine and the Indo-European Soul' Modern Theology 13 1997,461 
argues that `properly speaking, there are no internal spaces: an internal space is only a fold which can be 
unfolded and so re-externalised. Every inside can be penetrated because we really remain always on the 
outside: we go inside a house, because the outer walls fold inwards, while remaining strictly speaking 
exterior. ' I argued in 2.7.1-3 for this complex space that is the function of alternation, recursivity and of 
persons therefore. 
92 See Milbank `The Soul of Reciprocity Part One: Reciprocity Refused' Modern Theology 17,2001,337 and 
Catherine Pickstock `Music: Soul, City and Cosmos after Augustine' in Milbank et el Radical Orthodo. )9% In 
his discussion of `Inwardness' Charles Taylor Sources of the Self 132-40 refers to the inwardness of Plato and 
Augustine to mean something more like the gathering and re-grouping of forces in order to articulate your 
performance and so improve on it. 
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refer to essences (denotative), not relations (connotative), in a correspondence rather 
then a coherence account. In Chapter 2 we encountered such a `mirror' view of language 
in Augustine's belief that words are labels that correspond to things in the world. We said 
that this did not account for the processes of learning or the time-tensed character of a 
world of persons and plurality. Stoics on the other hand, with a cosmology in which 
tension and becoming are central, refer a word to the sentence in which it is set, so the 
sentence, not the word is the unit of sense. Milbank wants Augustine to extend the stoic 
account of language from the trinity to all language and so replace a metaphysic of 
substance with one of relation -a non-dualist Stoicised Christian theology. 93 Funkenstem 
also asks why Tertullian's defence of the corporeality of God, which is close to biblical 
spirit and Stoic pneuma, did not strike deeper roots in Christianity. 94 Bauerschmidt thinks 
Funkenstein is correct in seeing the difficulties of a logic `in which connotation entirely 
supplants denotation and a metaphysics that emphasises flux and tension over 
substance. '95 The Platonism of the Forms involves the belief that things separate out to 
their original places above and below. Platonism also understands, however, that time 
represents the flow of being. It is not therefore a simple metaphysic of emanation and 
return, but one of many perichoretic modes of movements. It is the sum of this 
movement (round and round, down and back up) that we name time. Milbank argues 
that Plato and Augustine understand all these flows not as separating out to create ever 
deeper interiority, but as melodic, contrapuntal and harmonising circles and periodicies. 
96 
I argued in 2.6-7 that there is not one time, but many warring times. 
We must 
therefore say again that there has been no collapse of mediation. 
Modernity and 
postmodernity are no more than these two beliefs first 
in the steady coming into being of 
new time, and secondly in the singleness of time. They are the conceptual equivalent of 
what previous ages knew as spirit. This myth of a single, seamless and 
inexorable time, 
the protological ontology, understands us to be both pushed and pushing 
forward, out of 
the ground of dead materiality, up into the air of new open space. 
But it is our 
theological task to subject this monad time to theological criticism. 
In our discussion of 
secularity, the collapse of mediation and of modernity therefore, 
it is not a matter of 
preferring one metaphysic, metaphor or model. It 
is about responding to and 
93 See Bauerschniidt `The Word Made Speculative? ' Modern Theology 15,1999,420; 
Milbank The U ord Made 
Strange 89-90. 
94 Funkenstein Theology and Scientific Imagination 43. 
9' Bauerschmidt `The Word Made Speculative? ' 421. 
96 A clearer version of 1M-lilbank's argument 
is made for example by Wolfgang Iser The Range Of Interpretation 
New York: Columbia University Press 2000,102-3. 
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transforming all such pagan cosmologies and metaphysics. 97 Philosophy must be 
understood as theology's own practice of self-regulation and language-maintenance. The 
problem is not excessive Platonism or Aristotelianism, nor is the object the achievement 
of a Christian worldview or metaphysic. There are many competing paganisms and 
Christianity is in conflict with them. Christian theology is even, according to Bayer, `a 
science of conflict'. 98 
5.8 Law and scripture as resource of imagination. 
Scripture is the resource of imagination and desire. The Church reads this resource in 
order to cultivate desire by the practice of epiclesis. This way it can give a more theological 
definition to the concepts of emotion, passion and time, and recover the full action of 
the body and of the otherness of others. This will involve rethinking being and entities, 
not as something alien to us, but as our own (plural) action, product, and frame and 
platform of future action. Modernity can discern no difference between Israel's scripture, 
doctrine and law, and all Western writing and institution-building. For modernity all 
writing is equally constitutive of desire and telos. Scripture read apart from the obedient 
community, without relation to its being as the word of God, becomes merely writing, a 
set of licences and permissions that describe and defend a closed and autonomous 
economy. Writing rendered anonymous and infinitely capable of division into units is the 
most freely exchangeable form of writing. Denominated into units small enough to 
permeate everywhere, such writing acts as that universal medium of reconciliation the 
economy of modernity knows as money. Without scripture there is no law, and without 
law there is no concept of givenness or otherness. The disappearance of the concept of 
law, of scripture as the address of God to man, is the story of accommodation to human 
autonomy and the disintegration of law and scripture into the mere marking of 
successive ages, the passing of that time which is the currency of modernity. 99 The 
attempt to say that Israel has no place in the West or that the West has taken its ethics 
and self-identity not from Israel but from some other source purely its own, is an attempt 
97 In Chapter 6I argue that theology must confront not only the dualism produced by the complex history 
of the interrelationship of Aristotelianisms and Platonisms, but the non-dualist discourses of Epicureanism 
and Stoicism that account for the concept of nature that supports the economy of Modernity. 
98 Oswald Bayer `Theology in the Conflict of Interpretations - before the text' Modern Theology 16 2000,501. 
99 Rose Dialectic of Nihilism 131-70 makes this argument 
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to make the economy of modernity safe from the threat of the economy of the one 
God. 100 
The bible is a work of imagination and a resource for the imaging of possible 
futures. The claim of the scriptures of Israel is that they are about God only because God 
is not only their speaker but their first hearer, reader and performer. The scriptures have 
their reception, implementation and confirmation in him. On this basis alone can the 
bible be properly read as literature of the development of the imagination and desire of a 
people. Indeed all Western institution-building can equally be understood as a work of 
imagination, for politics, contract-making and conventions of autonomy claim to open 
and enable a future. The category of literature is therefore essential for the scriptures. But 
equally essential is the category of history, talk of the world in terms of the truth of what 
has been. 101 The bible is reducible neither to imagination nor to history - nor even to the 
two together. The law makes a third term. The difference between literature and history 
is the same as that between the imagination of Israel and the imagination of the gentiles, 
for whom the future means just more of the past, history without purpose or end. 
Theology understands that Israel is in charge of the work of imagination, knowing that 
she will use her own resource of her history with her God to that end, not the wish-lists 
of the nations. As the one elected by God, she is the guarantor and medium that there 
will be a future for the nations - not in their history - but in her history, the history the 
one God shares with her. Exploration and recovery of the past is the whole idiom of the 
future. By the exercise of grief and lament our expectations may be expanded and we 
may come to know that there is such a thing as a future. In this future, the past is no 
longer past, but is rather opened and sustained in life, and itself becomes alive and life- 
generating. 
We have dealt with the scriptures as mediation under the rubrics of history, 
literature and law. We must alternate between them, never one without the other. We 
must tell the story, then discuss its grammar and the concepts used in it. There is no 
talking about history without subsequently making clear who is talking, who it is that is 
telling that history and is able to tell that history because it is one to which they are party. 
100 Rose Mourning becomes the Law 86 argues that the `desire to conceive of law and coercion as absolutely 
distinct from the good and the community... represents one of the main ways in which modern Jewish 
thought participates in a methodological and substantive divorce which characterises the 
development of 
modern philosophy in its separation of ethics 
from the social analysis of the ways in which authority is 
legitimised. ' 
101 In 3.5.3 Perdue and Balentine argued that scripture ceased first to be law, and then to be history, and 
that it has become instead merely imagination, `narrative'. In 3.4.2 we saw 
Fowl, Wright and Hays argue for 
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History cannot be obediently told without regular interruption by commentary-work, 
which clears away the conceptual debris and allows the history to continue. History is the 
building together of relationship: the work of criticism and judgment, and the conceptual 
ancillary work of philosophy is a necessary part of this building. I set out the charge 
made by the economy of modernity (most explicitly by Spinoza and Kant) that Israel was 
incapable of self-government and thus unfit for any wider leadership role. I have said 
that Israel is the leadership of the West. Only Israel in the person of her Messiah, by the 
exercise of her scripture and law, can read the whole entity and action (writing) of the 
West. Israel can read this Western being as the transformation of the gentiles by baptism 
into constitutive association with the people of God's election. Israel interrupts and saves 
Western being from succumbing to utter captivity by imagining and witnessing to it what 
it could be within the economy of the one God. The proper basis of such an account is 
theological, one which relates it to the account-giving and receiving of God by God. 
constitutive narrative at 




The economy of the one God 
The worship of the one God constitutes the economy of God for man. Israel is brought 
into this economy to be God's witness for us. Israel represents liberation for us from 
other alien imperatives and economies. Rival gods, the world, our mundane practices and 
modernity must all feature in our account of the God who is for us. 
6.1.1 Scripture as orthopaedic. 
The preceding five chapters have provided a hermeneutic of the scriptures of Israel. I 
argued that God brings Israel into agency by the process of learning and sanctification 
led by the temple creation liturgy. The action of priests and worshippers in Israel is 
integrated into the economy of God's action. I have argued that performance is 
accompanied by commentary. What Israel sees in the Temple at Jerusalem she sees 
because she is taught to participate in it as action. Sacrifice, and the teaching and worship 
that offer commentary on it, are simultaneous, one not prior to the other. Though it is 
subject to the usual processes of public discourse, Israel's cultic action does not allow 
itself to be interpreted in terms that Israel has not adopted for the purpose. It is not 
available to the sight of those outside Israel. ' The question of who can read the scriptures 
is also the question of who can read Israel. 
God is the guarantor that it really is his Law that Israel has. The Law is 
instruction and a process of joint target-setting that enables assessment of compliance 
and implementation. In addition to converse and narrative, the Law takes the form of 
propositions. Since those party to them, know them, they are able to develop a 
shorthand for these propositions. As a result scripture is full of complex summary 
statements unreadable to outsiders. Israel and her God together share the knowledge that 
Israel will grow until she is able to act and move with ease within the territory 
determined for her by God. Because Israel knows this, she can say that she is not yet 
1 See 4.5 for discussion of vision in exegesis; 5.2 discusses political claims made by employment of the 
concept of vision. 
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what she will be. This is what she does in confessing her failure and sin. The concept of 
sin is meaningful only to this people under this instruction and discipline. ' 
Building on the argument of Chapter 2 we can say that scripture is the learner's 
articulation of the lesson she receives from her instructor. This lesson can only be read in 
partnership with Israel, by the baptised community given the Spirit by the obedient Son. 
He transforms our movements into hers. Scripture is the orthopaedic tool by which a 
new set of practices are taught. It is the set of protocols which learners must learn to 
internalise, so the Word of God becomes their own mind and word. The single intention 
of the law is to propel its students towards adulthood and to the stature of Jesus Christ. 
The process of the production of the holy people is not finished. Judgement and 
discernment of progress is part of the process of refinement. If the law itself has become 
disordered it can no longer order people into the place right for each, but has the effect 
of stalling our growth. Then the law, good and necessary to us at one specific stage, 
would hold and constrict us just when we should be released and encouraged forwards. 
The law designed to build us up, itself needs be maintained. The law is effective as long 
as the instructor is present to the learning community in the person of the Spirit. 
Separated from Christ, it cannot do this, but when the garment of the Law is worn by 
Christ it takes its form from him and is able to give us his stature. 3 
Scripture is the screen and visor by which we are protected from the brightness 
of the Word. Like the veil with which Moses protected those who saw him, scripture acts 
as the screen that lets the brilliance of God filter slowly through to us, gently promoting 
our growth, rather than allowing it to blaze out to endanger us. Scripture protects us. It 
represents the gentle not-all-at-once-ness of the Word of God. 4 The action of Israel that 
we have received in the form of scripture and eucharist topples the alternative 
constructions of the gentiles, and prevents the world knitting itself together into any 
form other than the form of Christ. It is the one action that keeps the world open, telling 
us that the Messiah is not here, and that what the world presently is, is not the end. 5 True 
reading produces the transformation of the readers, so hermeneutics is ethics, the reading 
of people into the Church. The spiritual sons of Abraham are the ones who can tell the 
story of Abraham. Their narration of the action of God is witness to their paternity. 6 
2 See 4.1 
3 See 5.1.2 on the mutually constitutive relation of law, exegesis and doctrine. 
4 In 3.5.2 we saw that rabbis and the early Church took care to introduce scripture to learners only as they 
were ready for it. 
5 The point made by Farrow in 3.1.2. 
6 See 3.2 
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6.1.2 Scripture as clothing and dressing. 
Jesus holds the life of the generations of Israel. Scripture is the clothing by which he 
holds them, and the process by which he prepares them one for another. He is the agent 
by which this clothing changes from external cladding (scripture) to internal structure 
(bodiliness). The patriarchs are bound up to each other in the web and fabric of the Son. 
His being raised - from them - is the guarantee that they are sealed in him and that his 
call will raise and assemble them.? His resurrection makes them all present to him. Only 
in him, by his Spirit, will they become present to each other. These many generations of 
Israel are made present to us only in the mode of scripture. The Son wears them bound 
about him, as the garment of scripture. 8 They are not immediately present - resurrected 
- either to each other, or to us. They are hidden from each other in different pockets of 
time, held together only by their one Lord. They look forward to the day of Christ. Then 
the Spirit will raise them and make them present to the Father as the body of the Son. 
Their resurrection and perfection is dependent also on us. For scripture to become the 
full resurrected presence of Israel we have to be grown and raised as readers and 
members of Israel, such that we can read them, return their presence to them and have 
our presence returned to us by them. Our being found obedient is the moment at which 
their waiting is over and we will be brought together in one assembly. 
Scripture prepares us. To this end it protects us, and in stages removes this 
protection from us. The resurrection has already raised this protection from one of our 
number. It is his unity, and his unity with the Father, that effects the unity and efficacy of 
scripture. The patriarchs are presently mediated to us as one single instantiation of Israel, 
the co-presence of the whole company in the one person, Jesus Christ. As one and 
complete, he is the arrival of the many. We are being trained to perceive and receive this 
host in him, the one they have sent ahead. They are present to us as the fabric of the 
scripture. Within the fabric of this tabernacle we grow from smaller and simpler into 
larger and more complex dimensions, each preparing us for the bigger space beyond 
it, 
where God and his hosts wait-9 When this enclosure has become our own 
body and 
7 In 4.1.1 I argued that he is raised from them. Their bonds -'death' - 
fail to hold him. 
8 See 4.1.3 
9 The literature of apocalyptic (4.5.2) suggests that Yahweh lets himself through 
into the tabernacle once a 
year as the high priest, or once a 
Sabbath, so our eyes get accustomed to him. 
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clothing, it will give way to bring us immediately before one another because before 
God. '° 
In Chapter 41 suggested that Israel is the proper reader of the written self- 
commentary of the West. Israel is able to pick up the script the West regards as its own 
and weave it into Israel's own script, to make one new garment. On the cross Jesus takes 
the world's script away from the world, undoes it, and out of it writes a new and living 
script. He takes away the gentile mind and there establishes the mind of Christ, the 
history and law of God and his people. The scripture of Israel constitutes the new mind 
for this new people. 11 It is the case law that determinates the modes of behaviour by 
which its members may grow into relationship with one another. Familiarity with these 
cases and the keeping of the first level rules is the means by which a new public mind 
and sensus communis comes into being. This is the basis for the development of those 
further levels of rules and a community able to deduce new rules, which in turn is the 
means of opening for each other a future. 
6.2.1 Writing and immediacy. 
What I have said in terms of the theology of Israel I must now say again in the terms of 
the Western philosophical tradition represented by the discussions referred to in Chapter 
2. The apparatus of visualisation, of which writing is part, makes things appear and gives 
them their presence. It takes from the ousia of those behind, thereby putting them 
behind, and gives to those up front, thus bringing them to the front and giving them 
greater being. 12 The Western modern economy of being can only replace one 
by another 
and thus is a failure to sustain all. Theology must say that another action than this zero- 
sum modern economy of immediacy and visualisation 
is available to us through Israel. 
To say this, theology must identify the habits of which the world consists, and argue 
that 
they represent a failure of being. It can identify writing, representation, and the whole 
apparatus of intellect as a way in which we 
fail to return to each other the being that God 
gives us for one another. All the modern practices of writing and representation 
represent one - impoverished - mode of 
being for one another. 
Another habit and mode we have encountered is that of the microcosmic 
modelling and maintenance that related to 
Israel's political and cosmological claim. By 
10 See 1.2.2 on the tragic-biological hypostasis and 2.7 on place. 
11 If the scripture of Israel is the mind of 
Christ it is also the answer to the question of the psychology of 
Jesus - one of the phantoms pursued 
by (supersessionist) New Testament studies. 
12 In 1.3.1-2 1 suggested we need to provide such a 
debit and credit account of being. 
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contrasting the modern schema and economy of representation and writing with Israel's 
schema and economy of animal semiotics we may recover a sense of the whole action of 
the body. The schema of writing suggests there are two worlds, the world of presence 
and the world of writing that reflects it. But the world is not divided into a world of 
bodiliness and a second world of writing (representation). Israel's economy of action can 
liberate us from the modern schema and economy of action. A single world is being 
brought into being, and this is a statement of the doctrine of creation. 13 
Modernity has a dualism of substance and representation. It has no account of 
time as plural action. Modernity makes invisible the recursivity of time. It represents a 
particular tunnel vision, along with the way we police one another's observance of this 
tunnel vision, and so represents the particular idiom in which we assert our hold on one 
another. We believe that our predecessors have no effect on us, that we are simply 
pushed along by the outward unidirectional flow of time. The hermeneutics of modernity 
understands text not as relatedness and wovenness, but as object on a flat surface visible 
to all. I have argued that our place is woven and written for us, and only co-written by us. 
The new hermeneutics of narrative has not yet brought home that our public being is a 
function of other people's weaving and writing, not merely a function of the will of the 
individual. It is the work of society to model and imagine for itself new spaces, places 
and idioms of relatedness. The whole effort of society is to imagine what is not yet. It is 
the task of leadership, by the exercise of imagination, to open places that allow us to 
grow and become. Scripture is the education of desire through imagination: it weaves 
and writes us a place and part in the household of God. 
6.2.2 The apparatus of formation. 
In order to find a theological hermeneutic that will faithfully represent the address of 
God to the world we must now attempt to relate the scriptural hermeneutic sketched in 
6.1 with a general hermeneutic. 14 We have seen how writing (representation) has, in large 
13 I argued in 5.1 that reason should be understood as public conversation, oriented to 
form a people and 
bring that people into one conversation about the good. Writing and reasoning, 
in which we must include 
the rationality we call economic rationality, is to serve and commentate on this public 
doing. Its purpose is 
neither to form an autonomous realm nor to become the whole and only possible 
idiom of the realm of 
public doing. 
14 John Webster `Hermeneutics in Modern Theology' Scottish Journal of Theology 51 1998 distinguishes 
between a general hermeneutic (represented by Jeanrond) and a special or theological 
hermeneutic 
(represented by Watson). A general or universal hermeneutic is a set of descriptions of social human action, 
bodiliness and co-presence of the sort offered in Chapter 2. 
Webster plumps for Watson's theological 
hermeneutic (309-11). Theology must provide and defend the hermeneutics that is required by its subject 
matter. This much 
is true. But theology must also go on to the offence, and set out to show the limits of 
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part, come to function as a synonym for being in the economy of modernity. This 
discussion enables us to say that scripture is an orthopaedic interface, a covering and 
body prepared for us. Scripture is both software, and the hardware that opens and reads 
that software and makes it determinative of the body of the Church. This writing - 
scripture - opens us to and builds us up into a new action and being. That writing that 
takes its lead from the scriptures of Israel can be understood as two dimensions that 
open three dimensions to us. These three dimensions must open a further dimension, of 
time, and so open an n-dimensional world. 15 The scriptures of Israel are a set of 
instructions the second instalment of which does not become visible until the first 
instalment has been executed. Each set of instructions is addressed only to other 
subsequent yet hidden sets of instructions. They become active only given eventualities 
that cannot be anticipated. 16 There is no viewpoint from which the bible can be seen all 
at once. The previous level of instructions acts as the operating system for the next. In 
every case they act as the mechanism which opens and makes visible, not a set of 
propositions, but another and further set of variables, dimensions and affordances. 17 We 
are therefore not the first reader of the bible. Rather each instalment of instructions 
realises itself as the obedient body of the reading community. Each set of instructions 
therefore is reader and installer of each subsequent set of instructions. Scripture is not 
only speech but also the hearing and receiving of its own speech, and the giving of the 
next utterance that responds to the efforts of the learner. 
These instructions lay down a new set of pathways and circuitry that produces a 
people with the mature behaviour of Israel. This people is able to receive God's time 
from him, to open it to the world, and from the world to return it to God again. 18 I said 
any general and therefore worldly hermeneutics. It must deconstruct them by pointing to the histories from 
which they arose to demonstrate that these do not have the necessity that they claim. Theology is not 
engaged in a work of providing answers to questions asked by other disciplines - no correlation method 
here - but it must hear the world (and so let its interlocutor give some account of itself) and hear it better 
than the world hears itself, because theology does so hopefully, and therefore with higher ambitions for the 
world than the world has for itself. 
15 I related learning to being drawn from simpler to more complex dimensions in 2.1. and related these 
dimensions to affordance within environments in 2.4. 
16 This is to employ the conceptuality of affordance within environments I introduced in 2.4, and the 
concepts of discursivity (the alternation involved in conversation) and recursivity (by which we query any 
claim of any account to be the single settled version of what has been) introduced in 2.6. 
17 Scripture is an `inscription-making device for a visualisable result'. It makes mankind visible and readable 
to the new mind of the Christian community. Imaging technology does not see what is inside. That would 
return us to the radical dualism of Descartes' dichotomy of inside and outside. Imaging technologies are 
expressivist - they constitute their object 
into an image for us. We develop the skill of readings such 
analogical representations as representations of wholes. Don Ihde Expanding Hermeneutics: Lisualism in Science 
Evanson: Northwestern University Press 1998,160 argues that `instrumentation is a complex inscription- 
making device for a visualisable result. 
' 
18 We discussed these in 2.4 and as circumcision in 4.4.1. 
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in 2.1 that the learner and supervisor together articulate the steps and units by which the 
learner can progressively achieve the fullness of the action of the game. We learn to 
improve on our performance by analysing it in progressively simpler idioms and 
dimensions. I related scripture to this skill of articulation and analysis of our habitus, and 
called it orthopaedic. I have linked scripture to the project of the formation of a people 
which I related to the whole modern action of institution-building, and the Western 
economy and entity that results. Only for this holy people would there be a world 
(interface and environment) distinct from them, one which could respond to them as to 
a steward set over it by God. This community is being drawn in to the n-dimensions of 
the inexhaustible economy of God. This economy of God appears as two economies or 
two dimensions, of bodies and ideas, things and writing, in order to develop the 
competence and readiness of this new community for the further economies God has for 
it. 
God is the first knower. He is the first reader, both of the world, and of all texts 
in it. 19 He is the new testament and witness. He can open or hold closed. He can open, 
and break off pieces to nourish us with. We must submit hermeneutics to the doctrine of 
God as judge and as knower to show that all our knowledge is knowledge under licence. 
It can be revoked, from a distance, without our realising. God is not distant from his 
word, but it is immediately with him so this king can close a gate at the other end of his 
land simply by a nod. With the bible we have the whole world in our hands, entirely 
present to us in microcosm. 2° Yet, without him, we are without means to see what it is. I 
argued in 2.4 that we are in reciprocally-constitutive relation with our environment, 
which is itself the history of our economy of being, present to us as entity. We can be 
identified apart from this economy of being only by the God who is able to read and 
transform our history and thus our economy. We can be raised from it only by him. He 
can give us a new and larger place within the eschatological economy. 
19 Christopher Seitz Word Without End. " The Old Testament as Abiding Theological Witness Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans 1998,11 argues that `Historical-critical methods and hermeneutics of assent will stand outside 
and fail to grasp that God 
is reading us, not we him. ' 
20 David S. Yeago `Jesus of Nazareth and Cosmic Redemption: The Relevance of St. Maximus the 
Confessor' Modern Theology 12 1996,182 finds I\Iaximus making a claim similar to one 
I have made above: 
`The cosmos, then is a sort of 
bible, and the bible is a cosmos, each at once concealing and revealing the 
Logos. ' 
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6.3 Accounting for resistance to the speech of God 
In order that our speech become theological it has to move from talk about God to talk 
about the world understood as God's world. Then it has to return again to God-talk. 
Truthful talk about God is a good practice which can turn other practices to the good. 
Practices constitute the field from which ideas emerge, and ideas the field from which 
practices emerge. The purpose of our discussion is not the ideas themselves, but how 
these ideas aid us to articulate and improve our practices. We must not attempt finally to 
move beyond talk of practices, persons and their objects, for then what we say would 
serve only to distinguish and separate the spiritual from the material. It would be 
dualising and spiritualising, and would result in our failure to know the world as the 
single creative work of God. 21 
The world addressed by the Word of God is not one. It is in itself many words 
and claims. The Word breaks up this world and commandeers and re-gathers these 
words to give them a new place and employment within the circulation of his economy. 
God's words return to him and are commissioned by him for us again. In the person of 
the ascended God-man who sits at the right hand of the Father, man returns this Word 
from the world to God. In him all the speech of the world is caught up in the speech the 
Father receives again as his own. The world makes the claim to be one. The doctrine of 
the one God says it is not the world but God who is one. I have argued that a number of 
accounts must be present in any attempt to talk about the world. We cannot simply say 
what the world is, or what modernity is. Theology must be aware of the range of 
conversations to which it must remain committed, for its task is to make such 
conversations feel the challenge to their autonomy that theological discourse represents. 
All theological statement intends to make statements about the world properly complex 
to prevent every would-be definitive statement of the world until the world is reconciled 
with its Lord. 
21 We must therefore offer three accounts in parallel: 
1. a PERSON-PERSON account. 
2. a PERSON-THING-PERSON account, which is also a PERSON-WORLD-PERSON account. 
3. a GOD-MAN-\\'ORLD-CREATION-\ 'ORLD-MAN-GOD account. 
The `object' in the term GOD-OBJECT-GOD 
is the term GOD-WORLD-MAN, in which form God prepares us to 
take our place in the scheme MAN-CREATION-GOD. 
Ritschl D. The Logic of Theology, 151 complains that the 
development of a trinitarian 
doctrine of creation in terms of the threesome GOD-HUMANITY-NATURE and of 
new creation was supplanted 
by an Augustinian restriction of theology to God and humanity (or the soul). 
The `Greek' person-person schema lacks a world, and remains 
ideational. With less than three terms, 
theology cannot remain theological. 
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One moment in our account of the speech of God must include the resistance 
met by the Word. This resistance is both us, the many, in our all reluctance, and it is the 
opponent, whose grip holds us bound as a single undifferentiated entity. The Word of God 
must break the grasp of this single opponent on us before we, the many, may even start 
to hear this Word for ourselves. All the would-be plurality of the world is sham, and 
serves only to produce a single homogenous entity that obliterates all particularity. It 
holds us captive. But it is our action that creates this captivity. The Word of God 
therefore addresses first two parties - Satan and his world; then three parties - Satan, 
the world and us, and finally, with the defeat of Satan, two parties again - the world and 
us. We can be distinguished from the world only when Satan is defeated, and he is beaten 
only when the world can be distinguished from us and we from it. Only then do we cease 
to be everything, and become instead creatures who are given our place by God. 
6.3.2 Epistemology as political claim. 
Kant did not concede that the Word is met by resistance. The limits he outlined for 
theology suppose that we are as individuals already able and ready to hear the Word of 
God and that the world is a place of peace in which every such claim can be freely heard 
and weighed. A trinitarian theology must meet this Kantian theology and anthropology 
with an account which says that the world must first be released 
from the grasp of this 
opponent. It must be released from the compulsion that creates this single 
demonic 
economy of being. This being must be addressed both as not yet one and as not yet 
many. The world is nothing but opposing forces, one outcome of which 
is that they 
enforce a premature unity and uniformity that prevents the emergence of 
the man and 
anthropology that Kant hopes for. This world 
declares itself one, complete and 
autonomous. The address of God interrupts this world, and reveals 
it to be not 
autonomous, inviolable or one. 
The economy of modernity claims to be one, and to 
be one without God. It 
denies it hears or receives anything that is not itself. It therefore claims that the 
Word of 
God has given way to the secular word of man, and 
has been proved to be just one of its 
own many words. It is therefore not enough to talk as modern 
theology does only of 
God's Word, without going on to account for who can 
hear and receive this Word. It is 
in its reception and return that this Word 
becomes act and creates an economy of speech 
and action. We must account 
for the reception of God's Word in terms of the defeat and 
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re-deployment of other rival words. God is able to recover his Word from the world and 
from whatever interloper attempts to withhold it from him. 
The world of the economy of modernity claims to be a single being, a hen kai pan 
and deus sive natura. This protological and monist world-claim demands that what 
knowledge we have of God meets the criterion it sets for certainty. It believes that we 
have God, as we have the world, without the mediation of God or any other creature, 
but as our pure object, passively and immediately before us. Modernity is an economy of 
vision based on a non-touch cosmology, according to which we are as serene and 
detached as Olympians, completely able to survey and command all that is. This claim is 
the result of a development in which criteria for knowledge of God became criteria for 
the knowledge of the world. God must first take away from us this world that we know 
unequivocally and immediately, in order that we are saved from becoming the totality we 
claim, and that the world is saved from us. 
We need to indicate that this protology has its own history. It is itself a story. In 
the Timaeus and Republic Plato described a hierarchy of being, at the top of which were 
the Forms or Ideas, and at the bottom, the miasma of this life. In this cosmology the 
upper intellectual realm constitutes oneness as such. All that belongs to the intellect rises 
to this upper realm, while all materiality and formlessness sink down to form a morass 
without unity. The upper realm has all reality, action and unity; the lower reality has only 
the reality, action and unity which the upper realm lends it. In the Timaeus the two were 
indissolubly one cosmos, a totality in which the world and man and god together 
constituted a single divine being. Subsequent neoplatonic developments introduced more 
complex layers and ladders of intermediaries, a chain of being. Plato's was the most 
systematic version of the world's description of itself as this single being. It therefore 
rightly featured in the Christian account of the world, was responded to, condemned and 
corrected against the totality of Christian doctrine and the ongoing liturgical work of the 
Christian confession of the triune God who creates something that is not himself. 
In the Republic the lower realm had a negative description as that which had no 
strong reality or unity. In the course of the philosophical tradition however, and 
particularly under the pressure of the positive Christian description of the world, this 
lower realm became the realm of experience and the empirical. In the medieval period, 
the vision of God was the purpose and object of all knowing. 
But with the loss of the 
liturgical mediation of knowledge that we discussed in 5.3, this object of our vision 
ceased to be the God who makes 
himself object for our sake. It became ever more firmly 
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the empirical object of the senses and the world, until the beatific vision became simply- a 
vision of the world understood as an object that could play no part in our coming to 
know it. The upper realm was all form, number and oneness itself. But in the course of 
centuries of complex Christian and Islamic appropriation and development of neo- 
platonic and Aristotelian traditions, the lower realm came to take its definition from the 
upper. The result was that by the end of the seventeenth century what was empirical 
came to have an unproblematic oneness and unity. What was once the lower realm that 
had no unity, became the criterion of unity. As, with the decline of theological mediation, 
God became more distant and decreasingly the agent of his own mediation, the lower 
realm of the object of the senses loomed larger until it eclipsed the upper realm 
altogether. The upper realm disappeared as realm, but the tradition did not abandon this 
dualist up-and-down cosmology. Rather what had been the upper realm became method, 
the rule of the knowing subject. The world that corresponded to this subject became the 
criterion of oneness and certainty. Now the knowing subject represents the upper realm, 
while the world is no more than a reflection or hypostasis of the being of this demonic 
knowing subject. 22 
The economy of modernity believes it knows its world. It admits to a theory of 
perception. It does not admit to an ontology. It believes it has left behind all questions of 
the mediation of being - that is of how to get from the lower sphere to the upper, from 
sense impressions to knowledge of unchanging forms and of divinity. It believes that it is 
post-metaphysical. But we can see that its very own action of knowing is that upper realm. 
It is that realm as action, rather than as object. As such the modem knowledge that sees 
through and pushes aside all mediation remains indissolubly part of the one indivisible 
cosmology in which the upper sphere knows - intellects - the lower. The modern 
epistemological constitution, far from being an escape from this dualist cosmology, is a 
continuation of it. Action, chief of which are knowing and uniting, continues to represent 
that upper realm. Knowing is the whole mode of action. The lower realm is defined as 
being quite without action and unity. Modern epistemology and cosmology is dualist. 
Yet, since it cannot concede that there is anything outside itself, it is monist. 
Christian theology must respond to this metaphysics-become-epistemology. 
Theology requires a set of protocols which control the claims of knowledge. It identifies 
the claim to immediate knowledge as a theological claim, in the sense that the Platonic 
22It makes no difference whether we say that the world is the lower realm (object), and we (subject) are the 
upper realm that looks down on 
it, or whether we say that our knowing power (subjectivity) is the (hidden) 
basis and platform on which the world is present to us. 
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cosmology represents a presocratic theology. Christian theology must say that man does 
not know God where God does not give himself to be known. Equally importantly, it 
must say that man does not know the world, where God does not give the world to be 
known. This latter claim is missing from modern theology taken in by the mock modesty 
with which science has relinquished the claim to have knowledge of God for the 
apparently more limited claim to have knowledge of the world. Just as in the Platonic 
cosmology the intellect or sphere of theory knew and mastered the lower realm, so the 
modern practices of perception do not allow that anything could resist being known by 
the knowing subject. In Platonic cosmology the upper and lower realms made one 
cosmos and one being, so the knower is not finally different from what it knows. It is 
precisely this belief of the Western tradition, that it has, by its theory of perception, 
escaped ontology, that keeps the Western tradition firmly within this cosmology in which 
the divine knows the earthly and, by its being known, the earthly confirms this self- 
perception of the divine, and the two make a single entity and god. 
The world we now claim to know makes a claim to unity that is derived from this 
protological ontology. The object status of the world is the reflection of our status as 
intellect and subject. We know the world because it is brought into being precisely by our 
knowing. We have a non-mediate knowledge of it. When the question of God is raised 
we seek a non-mediate knowledge of God as just another object-in-the-world. Does he 
have existence or give this sort of empirical evidence of himself? 23 The two spheres of 
the Intellect and Sense, now the Subject and his Object, have drawn the world into two 
poles and swept away all complexity and reciprocity of relation to leave a clear floor 
between them. The question of the otherness of God - of there being something outside 
this totality - has become only the question of our 
knowing and the perpetual labour of 
the confirmation of our status as subject. The subject of the economy of modernity does 
not accept external discipline or receive his place and purpose from others. He does not 
find them authoritative for saying who he is, for his inner self is prior to such an external 
world, and external restraint is inimical to his being. In this economy we are each of us a 
god and participate in the god. 
The economy of modernity claims totality. This timeless being produces new 
social and ideological configurations but is itself unchanging. 
Its whole action effects to 
clear away a whole world of complexity and intermediate relations and replace 
it with a 
23 This basis is not true even of knowledge of things in the world. We have a use-knowledge of the things 
of the world, and this use-knowledge 
is the mode in which we may come to appreciate that the creatures of 
the creation of God have an existence 
independent of us. 
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concept of vision and immediacy. Theology must challenge this world and world-belief. 
Theology is a complex time-tensed account of the world, dualist in that it maintains a 
now and not yet, an account of two spheres, aeons or cities. It teaches that there are not 
two types of knowledge - taught (doctrine) and non-taught (immediate) knowledge, but that 
all knowledge is taught and mediated. It teaches that only God knows in the non-mediate 
non-taught way in which the economy of modernity assumes it knows. 
The economy of modernity understands its whole action as the exercise of 
subjectivity and choice. From the correct belief that we can choose which persons and 
authorities to acknowledge, we have moved on to think we may choose whether or not 
to acknowledge others and their authority at all. Following the collapse of the complex 
medieval account of being and beings, a distinction arose between two sorts of knowing 
that distinguished between knowledge of the other mediated by the other, and immediate 
knowledge. On the one hand was worship - acknowledgement of the otherness of an other 
- and on the other knowing - objects, nature. This distinction became a dichotomy, of worship 
and science. It prevents us moderns from understanding our own action of knowing as a 
disguised form of worship. Nature is what moderns acknowledge as other, precisely as it 
is non-responsive. Our knowledge of it is not reciprocal and thus not mediated, and the 
modem personality is both threatened and secured by its utterly non-personal quality. 
Modernity which does not acknowledge the many forms of being and otherness 
makes a fatally simple contrast between scientific and fideistic knowledge, between 
scientific and religious language. It believes that worship - respect of some givens, 
acknowledgement of something other - is an activity which is elective, and which we 
could refuse altogether to concede, if we wished. The manyness of these givens and 
others is not acknowledged as duty or task. Instead only two imperatives are recognised 
- the cultivation of one's own subjectivity, and the acknowledgement of nature necessary 
to allow the cultivation of that subjectivity. Modernity has wiped away the many 
intermediate worships by which we could acknowledge the otherness of others and 
return to each their specific and particular difference. By acknowledging no specific and 
particular others or givens we make ourselves indistinguishable 
from the totality and so 
demonic. 
The triune God is social. He is in himself all sociality and otherness. He is already 
one and complete, without us. 
He can also therefore make others other, and make their 
otherness resistant to assimilation 
by us. Their status as his creatures prevents them from 
being the object called into being by our knowing. Confession of this triune 
God is 
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acknowledgement of his ability to make others other, and complete without us and apart 
from us, and thus it is the possibility of acknowledging the particular claims of others. 
We must look for the origins of this Kantian distinction between language and religious 
language. We can do this by recovering a complex ontology, epistemology and ethics all 
subject to the discipline of eschatology. 
The One (hen kai pan) claims to be prior and basic, the source and arbitrator of 
manyness. The less public that claim is, and the less it appears as a theological or political 
claim to a mon-archy, the more determinative the One is. This One is most effectively total 
when it does not appear as one claim amongst others in the miasma of many words that 
overlie and conceal what timelessly is. The question of the One is the question of power. 
Who has power so securely that they can prevent the question of power from coming to 
public expression? Such a power is exercised by the subject of the economy of 
modernity. He effects to prevent the action of others, and prevent this from becoming 
explicit. He can remain innocent about his action and never understand that he creates 
the captivity in which others are bound, and he bound with them. 
We need to think again about the relationship of unity and action. Aristotle 
understood that thinking remains in the service of action. Out of every action arise 
considerations of how to do better, and of which actions are better than others simply 
because they involve greater virtuosity. The end of all action is public life. 24 Our peers 
judge our action, and everything we do is directed to improving our performance before 
this public. Our action and theirs together serves to increase the total sociality. All action 
aims to grow the market of public and therefore political life. Aristotle realises that being 
must also mean action, and that there are different sorts of action over different 
periodicies. An account of action requires an account of the reciprocal relationship of 
action and the character and capabilities that enable it and derive from it. Action appears 
within a perichoretic hierarchy of action, good action, social action and politics. Part of 
the purpose of truth statements is to improve our performance, so we can make more 
and better truth statements. All speech and thought is for the sake of doing, and doing 
better, which means a more social and public doing. What we do determines what we 
want to do; it gives us our character, which in turn determines our desire. Action occurs 
24 For the argument that sociality is the highest goal of all our action, see Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 
1094a-96a. We prepared for this section in Chapters 2 and 5. Martha C. Nussbaum The Therapy of Desire: 
Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics Princeton: Princeton University Press 1994, and Pierre Hadot Philosophy 
as a way of life Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1995 represent therapy as private practice. Richard 
Bodeüs The Political Dimensions ofAristotle s Ethics Albany: State University of New York Press 1993 and 
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in this series: action(s) , character , desire - action(2). Here we have an antidote to the 
ontology described by Plato. This ontology is less adept at conceptualising change 
because it understands only that ideas belong to an upper realm of ideas, and that 
beneath them is just one form of being - nature. It is therefore also an antidote to the 
economy of modernity that is a function of this protology in which the manyness of 
ideas is mere appearance, beneath which all is really the same, not many but one. 
6.4.1 Christianity as discipline. 
We can now answer this question: What does the doctrine of God do? We can say that 
theological knowledge instructs us in the better performance of the worship of God, and 
that worship of the one God is the means to sociality. This exercise of the intellect is in 
the service of the growth of the Christian community elect to that doxological practice 
that witnesses to, and even begins to participate in, the real sociality of the Father and the 
Son. It allows us to see that any theological talk will dualise and separate the one creation 
of the one God into autonomous economies of upper and lower until it is controlled by 
another theological talk that understands thought to be in the service of the formation of 
the one action, sociality and body created by the Father and Son. One theological 
discourse must discipline another. Theology that does not challenge the priority of 
thought over action will accept the modern dichotomy of religious and non-religious 
knowledge, knowledge and faith, and be content meekly to occupy the house of private 
morality and spirituality that Kant awarded to religion. 
The purpose of action is sociality and therefore politics. Civic or political 
philosophy assumes with Aristotle that man is intrinsically social, and that the 
achievement of more sophisticated sociality is the end and purpose of politics. It also 
provides a positive ethic. Moral philosophy on the other hand, the philosophy of the 
subject, is the philosophy of the individual who is defined in contrast to society, 
understands himself to be threatened by it, and requires a (negative) freedom from it, a 
formal ethic. It assumes that man is first natural and only subsequently and 
problematically social. Moral philosophy, as the philosophy of subjectivity, represents a 
giving up on life together, and so a failure of public and political life. It does not 
understand politics as sociality, hospitality and mutual formation, but as a technique 
for 
controlling the threat posed by other people. Kant believes in a self-imposed and self- 
Wallach John R. The Platonic PoliticalArtA study of Critical Reason and Democracy University Park: Pennsylvania 
State University Press 2001 argue that this private practice is in the service of public life. 
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interpreted discipline, and rules out the discipline imposed by others. He allows public 
discourse no part in constituting our desires and character. Trinitarian theology 
understands that God is social in himself, and that his creatures, who receive all their 
definition from him, will become social. According to the economy of modernity we 
have to struggle alone to establish our social being on the basis of our natural being, because 
we are the functions of this dens absconditus called `nature', that has abandoned us to sort 
out the problem of sociality in isolation. 
If we accept the argument of Strauss and Hunter that the eighteenth century 
enlightenment represents a giving up on political enlightenment and the public sphere, 
what took its place? 25 Schneewind shows that the public sphere was handed away by 
Shaftesbury, Hume and Smith to the discourse of passions and natures. 26 The discourse 
of withdrawal, Stoic and Epicurean apatheia and akrasia, became the mode of discourse of 
the public square. The language designed for retreat from public responsibility became 
the whole vocabulary of public responsibility. Economics became the mode of politics. 
Economics is a moral discourse disguised as a discussion of nature. The Stoic and 
Epicurean vocabulary of which it consists was expressly intended to justify flight from 
the world and to disable formative public choice. It is in Aristotle's sense profoundly 
anti-moral. It purports to be a form of talk about nature, a pure physics, but is rather the 
theology and politics of the protological ontology which understands the play of nature 
and passions merely as the miasma of plurality. I have argued that theology has to stay in 
discussion with Plato and Aristotle. Stoicism and Epicureanism represent a third and 
fourth discourse that Christian theology must also respond to. The Stoic and Epicurean 
deus absconditus, represented only by an empty space crossed by elements, or plenum filled 
by forces, does not interact or permit any world or history. All four ancient, or rather 
timeless, theologies must be challenged by the Christian doctrine of the triune God and 
the Christian practice of praying for release from these rivals. 
6.4.2 The purpose of theological statement. 
I have said that the world claims to be one, and that theology must show that 
it is many. 
But theology must also say that this manyness is no real plurality, but amounts just to 
that single entity, the world held by, and indistinguishable from, the opponent of 
God, 
25 Ian Hunter Rival Enlightenmentr Civil and Metaphysical Philosophy in Early Modern Germany Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 2001,25-8, and for Strauss see 5.5. 
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that is addressed and opposed by the Word of God. 27 The rival word of the economy of J 
modernity resists being named and brought to the surface. We are dealing therefore not 
merely with ideas and ideologies, but with sets of movements with extremely long 
periodicies that determine the modality and effect of our action, by which our action 
functions to give away our particularity to a single being and entity. This demon may be 
so distant that he does not appear to be a discrete figure of a king or god, or so close that 
he is not separate from us but constitutes a single economy coincident with our whole 
world. 
The modern anthropology is an ontology without account of time. It releases 
man from the tension between this world and the world to come and has made the 
transcendental city of not yet the basis for the present city of sure and certain knowledge 
of the world. He is already the man of `not yet'. Kant has solved and dissolved what he 
took to be a problem, but should have taken to be a task. He understood time as 
problem and abolished it, so we live not between two times, but in a two-aspect space, in 
which the space of sensation is set within the space of intellect that must be presupposed 
in order that there be a space of sensation. The upper realm of the Timaean cosmology 
has become the subjectivity, and thus the mastery, of the knower of the world. 28 The 
Kantian subject denies that the action of others constitutes his world. He intends his 
world to be an inert thing of nature, not a loud bustling place composed of many agents 
with which he is in an economy of response. ' As long as this core claim of the priority 
of nature is not challenged, other disciplines subordinate themselves to the claim of 
economics to be the first science of being. An insufficiently trinitarian theology is always 
liable to become a vehicle for this protology, with the result that it becomes a religion of 
interiority that effects to hollow out public discourse. Theology is a mode of political 
hermeneutics, a practice of interrupting the simple statements the world makes about 
26 See Schneewind The Invention ofAutonomy 171-83,285-309, and Isabel Rivers Reason, Grace and Sentiment. " A 
study of the language of religion and ethics in England 1660-1780 Volume 2 Shaftesbury to Hume Cambridge 2000, 
114-52 for discussion of this move to interiority. 
27 I said in the Introduction that we must give an account in which we are not distinguishable from the 
world or it from us and that this single entity that cannot sustain particularity or plurality, theology must 
conceptualise as `the Opponent'. The Word of God opposes this entity and distinguishes and releases us 
from it. 
28 See Seung T. K. Kant'. c Platonic Revolution in Moral and Political Philosophy Baltimore: John Hopkins 
University Press 1994. Farrow D. Ascension and Ecclesia Edinburgh: T&T Clark 1999,168 argues that Kant 
represents a philosophical chiliasm (Kant's own description of Lessing) in the tradition of Joachim of Fiore, 
a fully realised eschatology and anthropology- (and thus which is not eschatological at all) against which 
Foucault protested, see Chapter 1. 
29 We have discussed this economy of response in terms of Anselm's single fabric of being, of Janowski's 
`Tun-ergehen Zusammenhang', and the affective continuum, that understands us to be not only- actors but 
sufferers of the continuum of movement. 
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itself by which the world always seems to want to close itself down, and of providing 
complex statements that keep the world open. Theology is a work of intercession 
(epiclesis) or advocacy, of calling on the Holy Spirit to give the world more time. Theology 
is a mode of politics and Christianity the best mode of politics because the God of Jesus 
Christ is our ruler and under his rule we may flourish. 
This requires several other claims. One is that Christians participate in the rule of 
the one ruler. Another is that political talk is inseparable from ethics talk, and ethics talk 
from political talk. 30 A third and larger claim must be made, one that was once a 
commonplace of Platonic philosophy. This is, that politics (the polis) and ethics (what to 
do) and psychology (talk of our soul, emotions and religious inclinations), and cosmology 
and theology, all relate one to another. These claims represent a range of tasks for 
theology. We will start with the first. 
Christianity has taken up some of the resources of political thought provided by 
classical republicanism. For this vanished tradition the ruler does much more than rule: 
he is a model and a teacher, and the law is a resource of positive description of what is 
good. 
I have distinguished between ideology that can be named and ideologies so 
successful and normative that they have ceased to be ideologies and have become modes 
of our action too mundane to be dignified with a name. Such actions hover beneath the 
threshold of our intellectual attention and inveigle their way into us so that they became 
the only thing we can do, creating self-reinforcing circles of action that we cannot escape. 
We do not think them, we do them. If we cannot escape them, they may be said to have 
a demonic character, and then we can say that it is not we who do these actions but they 
do us. They determine our action, while giving us the illusion of freedom. Without the 
conceptual means to distance ourselves from them, they are all we can do. It is the task 
of Christian theology to render these practices visible for the first time. Politics is 
therefore the bringing up to the surface, to publicly responsible discourse, all those 
nameless practices in which our modern normality consists. Politics is therefore not one 
domain amongst others, but the task of naming the powers and constraints that operate 
on us, because we operate them on one another. It is our task to 
drag the hidden and 
constrained up into the publicly responsible discourse of voluntarism and will, politics 
and ethics. It is our task to name the powers. Then we can, 
for the first time, exercise our 
will and approve or repent of them. Only Christian theological statement about the 
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victory of Christ can do this, the first task of politics. It can do this because it talks about 
our captivity and bondage, and it is able to do so because it witnesses to a captivity, 
brought to an end. The end of this captive mind is the beginning of a free and public 
action - politics - in Christ. 
We are therefore wrong to protest that we do not hold power unless we are 
elected to it. All of us already wield power over one another. The purpose of the 
Christian concept of sin is to winkle us out from behind our declaration of our 
innocently non-political status. Theology has to show that it is no one other than 
ourselves who, by myriad everyday acts, create complexes of action, vocabulary, rules 
and institutions which allow certain forms of behaviour and inhibit others and so enforce 
on others modes of personhood. When these modes give rise to forms of agency not 
under authority, they exert a stolen but real power that enforces crushingly sub-human 
forms of personhood. Those crushed by them may properly identify such modes as false 
gods and ask for their release: they can even in the name of the God of Israel address 
them as demons and have them driven out. Theology is therefore first interested in 
flushing out the rulers and authorities of this age from their cover in the mundane 
imperatives of modern men. It is not Caesar who is the enemy, for behind this or that 
political regime is an amorphous collective that refuses authority. Behind this figure is 
nothing other than disobedient Adam, the sum of our own recalcitrance, that originates 
not in individuals but in long generations and traditions and so in humanity as a whole. 
The purpose of all talk of rule is to show that we are the ruler who is dethroned. The 
purpose of the doctrine of God is to confess that we are not God, and to put in our 
hands the means to call him. 
Theology is not Christian theology until it can give some account of the bound 
and involuntary situation of man. Satan must be named and thrown out before man 
becomes free enough even to hear the word of God. It is crucial to the health of the 
university that it admits discussion of the recalcitrance and deviousness that form the 
context of our knowing. Christian theology must represent publicly the closedness of 
human knowing that is intrinsic to the real complexity of human motivation, a 
complexity that the concept of the individual disallows. Christian theology must exercise 
a proper scepticism about the world and about man. It must ask whether 
it is we 
moderns who are ever hearing but never understanding, and ever seeing but never perceiving. 
We 
have true knowledge of the world because a good God has made a creation that is good 
30 O'Donovan The Desire of the Nations gives a historical sketch of the political framework as preparation 
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for us, not deceptive - what may be known about God is plain to them since God has made it plain 
to them. But this requires a moment in which we are disciplined and warned, and when 
this warning is not heard our thinking becomes futile, our minds are darkened so that, 
since we have not thought it worthwhile to retain the knowledge of God, he has given us 
over to a depraved mind, with the result that nothing is plain to us. The oppressive 
unchallenged assumption of modern theology is that we already have a free and mature 
mind and are already entirely capable of choice. It is not true, and it is not merciful to 
insist it is. 
We must emphasise the intrinsically political purpose of the doctrine of God. We 
need to show that it is not enough that theology talks as though the human already had a 
will and freedom - the discourse of voluntarism. It must also talk about the absence of 
will and the captivity of will - the discourse of sloth, compulsion and delusion. We must 
recover from non-modern Christian theology the resources to talk about a will and 
freedom that may come into being as a result of Christ's victory. We must learn from it 
how to name the powers and so proclaim faithfully a liberating gospel of the defeat of 
the usurper and the rule of the one God. 
In order to bring the whole world into the domain of existing political discourse 
there must therefore be at least three accounts. In one of them (1) we are victims, in 
another (2) we are masters and, as the mode of our mastery (3) we play the bystander. In 
this third account we abjure public and political responsibility to conceal ourselves 
behind complex ideological constructions about the constraints on us. We disguise 
ourselves as victims better to promote our claim to autonomy. But this is only an 
apparent autonomy, for in it we are caught trying to carry off an unsustainable claim. 
Our task then is to reintroduce political discourse where it has been squeezed out, and 
we do this by arguing from the first theologically. Theology is the politics that says that 
God is king, that there is authority that is given, external to us. Recognition of this 
authority is the beginning of our politics and the possibility of public well-being. 
God- 
talk is given to the Christian community in order that this community prevent the world 
from making hubristic anthropological claims. Theology is the control on the 
discourse 
of anthropology. It tells us that we do not know man, that man 
is not ours but the 
possession and work and secret of God. Only a long, slow lesson 
from God and about 
God will provide us with any information about man who is the creature of 
God. We 
may come to know others only as they are entrusted to us, given to us on 
leasehold and 
for an ethics that is to follow. I am presenting politics and ethics together. 
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we are responsible to God for their well-being. When we fail to know them in this 
custodial way they are taken away from us and protected from us. Social science can only 
make an ideological claim which effects to create the creature it claims to know: it cannot 
recognise anything that is not a function of its own projection, and thus it is not able to 
know any creature at all. Christian theology says that God has made himself available to 
us to appeal to. Only in Christian speech is there a figure who is available to us as object 
of knowledge because he gives himself to be known, while utterly unknown and 
uncomprehended by us and who, in all our knowledge of him, remains the master. Only 
this theological discourse removes from us all our modern pretension not to be implicate 
in any form of authority of others, the better secretly to keep in play our claim to be 
master. 
6.5.1 God is king and judge. 
The Christian gospel announces that God is King, Jesus is Lord. Talk about God is our 
response to the declaration by the God of Israel of his kingship: he is the ruler of our 
rulers, and he is our ruler. That is to say that his rule over us is both mediated by 
intermediary holders of power, and is immediate. His word, and that of his body that 
participates in it, warns the rulers and political authorities that their authority is held from 
God, and will be assessed by him. The Word of God declares war on authorities that do 
not acknowledge the kingship of God. Theology obedient to this word must be done in 
the face of those political authorities, and often against their resistance. 31 We have to go 
out to name those illegitimate entities, centres of authority and modes of personhood 
that exercise a hidden power over us. These are then cosmological-political authorities - 
the spirit of this world and rulers and authorities in the heavenly realms. They represent 
the cosmological consequences of the failure of Adam to take up the office of 
stewardship given him, and his resultant failure to keep the power and energies of the 
cosmos in their proper order. This cosmological language represents the consequences of 
the sloth of humanity that has as yet no will. 32 
God is king and God is judge alone. God liberates us from the temptation to be 
our own judges and masters. Because God holds these offices exclusively we cannot 
31 O'Donovan The Desire of the Nations 93 seems to contrast political and cosmological (`Jesus' preference for 
addressing the demonic rather than the colonial oppressors... ') but the point is rather that many of these 
authorities are not yet visible in any realm of political discourse - and must be named and called to account 
by public and therefore prophetic theological statement. 
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seize and hold them ourselves. 33 We are free from the compulsion to rule and exert an 
absolute and tyrannical power. That God alone is judge over us is the guarantee that 
there will be justice, both for us and also for those who have been denied justice by us. 
Critics of the forensic atonement have asked by what right God brings us to court to try- 
us as sinners. But it is we who have exerted our right against each other, and against 
God, in an all-against-all, in a competitive open field. This field is the assembly in which 
not only every agent puts himself forward, but every agent is there to judge between 
every other, and deny them all what he awards to himself. This assembly is a court in 
which each attempts to give judgment and vindicate his own right, appealing to all others 
to do so whilst simultaneously attempting to deny them the right to oppose his own 
claim. 34 We are in the assembly by the very action of our own self-promotion. It is this 
that makes the assembly a court in which our right and rule is tried: we put ourselves 
there by intending to exert a rule over all others. 35 
But such a statement, that God alone is judge, is not sufficient. God does not 
intend to be alone in exercising judgement and authority. He intends that we also come 
to learn this action and exercise it with him and under him. He intends that we come to 
find his action good, to be informed by it and come to share it. The end and purpose of 
his judging is that he brings us up into the office and work of judges. God gives us an 
action. It is an action that is intrinsically his and which will always remain his, yet which 
he does not will to be his such that it is not also ours. This new action must be 
understood both as servanthood and as leadership. We must understand this not only as 
an action given, but also as an action only loaned to us, held by us only as long as we 
exercise it with him and under him. In the event that we do not grow into its proper use, 
32 The writer of the letter to the Ephesians 2.2 mentions `the ways of this world and the ruler of the 
kingdom of the air' and 3.10 `rulers and authorities in the heavenly realms. ' Philo mentions logoi, aretai, 
angeloi, daimons, psuchai, ideai, eikones, sphragides, paradeigmata. 
33 O'Donovan O. & O'Donovan J. L. Irenaeus to Grotius 14 quote Theophilus of Antioch making this point 
in `To Autolycus': `Accordingly, I will pay honour to the emperor not by worshiping him but by praying 
for him. I worship God who is the real and true God, since I know that the emperor was made by him. 
You will say to me `Why do you not worship the emperor? ' Because he was made not to be worshipped 
but 
to be honoured with legitimate honour. He is not God but a man appointed by God, not to be worshipped 
but to judge justly. For in a certain way he has been `entrusted with a stewardship' (1 Cor 9.17) from God. 
He has subordinates whom he does not permit to be called emperors, for `emperor' is 
his name and it is 
not right for another to be given this title. Similarly worship must be given to 
God alone. ' 
34 This argument is made by Rose Dialectic of Nihilism: Post-Structuralism and Lazy 11-15. 
35 The modern division and separation of powers distinguishes the law-court from a 
(parliamentary) 
assembly, and these from the more obvious contest of the marketplace or 
battlefield. Isaiah 2.13-14 The 
Lord takes his place in court; he rises to judge peoples. The Lord brings an indictment. We are in court because we are 
in an assembly in which all nations, regimes and rulers assert themselves over all others, and over the 
God 
of Israel. O'Donovan's Christus 
Victor theology shows that the medium is initially in our possession, but 
Christ commandeers it and transforms it into his medium - for us. As such it is a 
demonstratively non- 
modern theology: it does not allow an epistemology to 
function in ignorance of the doctrine of God. 
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he takes it away from us again, and the shreds of what we learned remain only to baffle 
us and make us believe we know something when we know nothing. 
The rule of the people of God - the Christian commonwealth. 
God intends to admit new members to the council and assembly of heaven. 36 Thus 
assembly will then govern a combined kingdom of heaven and earth, in which we will be 
not divine, but for the first time properly human, creatures made holy. 37 This assembly is 
gathered as an earthly ecclesia that inducts its members into the skill of judging. Part of 
the skill of judging is the skill of advocacy, the office of defence counsel, that puts the 
case for mercy. These trainee judges - the saints - must be taught the skills of entering a 
plea, interceding, prayer. They must learn to argue on behalf of those who are not yet holy 
that a little more time is needed, and on behalf of the oppressed to argue that their 
release come now. They must be able to say `Have mercy on us - give us a little more 
time', and `Come Lord Jesus - give no more time to the oppressors'. These advocates 
must be able to say which plea is at any time appropriate. The new Christian action is 
that of the members of the assembly that God gathers around himself. 38 This training 
starts as the exercise of self-government of the Church. 39 The people of the world will 
come to this assembly of saints for justice. 
Christians are elect to serve and to take care of the world entrusted to them. 
They are to exercise oversight. They are to put the case to the Lord their God for mercy 
and justice, and together pray to him to exercise the power of binding and loosing. 40 The 
Christians are held responsible for the least of these, and are subject to a more severe 
judgement when they lose even one of them. 41 The whole Christian body is elect to this 
36 Miller P. D. `Cosmology and World Order in the Old Testament: The Divine Council as a Cosmic- 
Political Symbol' in Israelite Religion and Biblical Theology Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press 2000,425-440. 
37 I am not in favour of the language of deification that for example Marshall tolerates in `Justification as 
Declaration and Deification' International Journal for Systematic Theology 4.1 2001,3-28. 
38 In Mark 6.7 the disciples are appointed the judges of the twelve tribes of Israel , and 
in -Mark 11.17 
(Isaiah 56.6-8) Israel is the judge of the earth who brings justice for the nations. Jeremy Thomson `The 
Conflict-Resolving Church' 113,193-6, argues, in agreement with Yoder, that the Church must regard 
these instruments of judgment and discipline as Caesar's and not employ them. In reply we can say that 
courts are not bound to be the wicked instruments of a wicked Caesar or Constantinianism. But even when 
they are this, we are told in Romans 13 that we are to take advantage of the discipline lashed out on us by 
God's (unrighteous) servant by understanding it as God's discipline for our benefit. It is no concern of ours 
that this servant will also receive his discipline from God for over-stepping the mark. 
39 O'Donovan The Desire of the Nations argues in his Chapter 5 that the Church' is (1) a gathering community 
(2) a suffering community (3) a glad community and (4) a community that speaks the words of God. It is 
prophetic in that it addresses the world, and its speech includes prayer (petition) and laying on of hands. 
40 Matthew 16.18,18.19. 
41 Paul for example is able to say in Acts 18.6 that he is clear of his responsibility and that the blood of his 
listeners is therefore upon their own heads. He declares 20.24-26 that he is `innocent of the blood of all 
men' because he has completed `the task the 
Lord Jesus has given' him. 
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work. 42 But of course the Christian body is not yet obediently at work. Teaching and 
leadership must presently be limited to those appointed specifically to teach and prepare 
others. The only purpose of the appointment of some to particular offices in the church 
is to prepare the whole church to exercise this single office. When Christ is all in all even 
the most modest members will be made able to play their part and receive their proper 
honour. 43 In the same way, authority in the Church is in the service of the Church's 
authority over the world. It is to participate in its Lord's work of releasing the world 
from all the alien authorities - other gods - that presently divide and hold it captive. All 
Christians are members of this parliamentary and juridical assembly which speaks the 
truth, teaches and enables truthful public speech, practises justice and praises God for his 
justice. All are citizens in a commonwealth in which all will grow up to the fullness of 
Christ. 
The ecclesia is the body responsible for the education and sanctification of this 
community, and through this community of the world. It nurtures and is nurtured by a 
body of tradition from which it creates legislation, and assembles as a law-court which 
judges individual hard cases. Right-judging and right-doing is the proper action of the 
new people. It involves coaching them in the action of right speech and public speech. 
They see God judges rightly and they say so: they learn to praise God for the generosity 
and finesse of his practice of justice. The Christian community is being trained up to a 
range of offices that serve a single end. The singleness of this end, and the oneness of 
this assembly, offends the separation of powers that under the modern constitution are 
understood to be incompatible. 44 
42 1 Corinthians 12.4-11,28. `There are different kinds of service but the same Lord. To this end God has 
appointed first apostles, second prophets, third teachers, then workers of miracles. ' 
43 1 Corinthians 12.24 `But God has combined the members of the body and has given greater honour to 
the parts that lacked it. ' 15.35 With what kind (part) of body world they come? ' 15.42 `The body that is 
sown is perishable (because it is a part), it is raised imperishable (because it is a part integrated into the 
whole)-it is sown a natural body, it is raised a spiritual body. 
4+ Bernd Wannenwetsch `The political worship of the Church' Modern Theology 12 1996,278 argues that the 
Church's worship of God is the overcoming of political antinomies, the most important of which is that 
between public and private, polis and oikos. Plato and Aristotle understood politics to be based upon the 
distinction of public and private: in the polis the free rich male citizen can find the fulfilment of his life, 
whereas the oikos, though necessary for the polis, is the realm of (unfree) labour and the maintenance of the 
means of life. `Thus the concept of politics is highly exclusive and parasitic, resting on the basis of the oikos, 
which is at the same time conceived and dismissed as a restricted area for lower human beings such as 
women, slaves, artists and so on. ' 279 He argues that `The first important political impact of the new 
evolving Christian community was the de-totalising of politics. ' This brought to an end the exclusion of the 
oikos and realm of nature from the polis. `The first urban Christians described their common 
life not only in 
terms of family language (as was usual for religious communities) but also in terms of political 
language. ' 
`The Church's `self-designation as ekklesia associates the original Greek political meaning of the notion as 
the voting assembly of a polis'. `Worship includes in full participation all the representatives of the 
debased 
oikos: women, slaves, children and so on. 
' Hütter R. Suffering Divine Things 147-70, especially 163-4 `Church 
as `polis' and `oikos'. ' Milbank 
Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason Oxford: Blackwell 1990,432 
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Leadership of the project of the formation of a people is the proper work of the 
Christian community. 45 The Church may identify and address leaders as leaders, 
regardless of the legitimacy with which they are understood to have come to such 
position. They can address anyone as a leader even though such a person may protest 
that they hold no formal position and cannot be held to account. Leaders must be held 
to this paideutic task of nurturing law and public discourse to educate this people. They 
must be criticised in particular when they do not give a lead. The Church must, therefore, 
not give up on the state. It must model the lead that the state must give to the people, 
and model the openness of public political discourse. It does not long to take away the 
task of ruling from the state, to do it better, but always to encourage leadership, on such 
a broad definition, to grow in confidence and competence. 
6.5.2 Theological response to the modern separation of powers 
The Christian political tradition represents one side of a conversation. The gospel is in 
conversation and confrontation with pagan thought. Modernity is pagan, and pagan 
thought must be the other half of the conversation - or rather not pagan thought but 
pagan practice, the practices of captivity, sloth and compulsion. Pagan practice cannot be 
opened to us by pagan thought alone. Rather it is only the scriptures of Israel that can 
reveal pagan thought to us as pagan, as that which is present temptation to us, and. 
indeed as our own present practice. The bible is not the scriptures of the West, but of the 
Church, and the Church is only the leaven of the West, not the West itself. The Church 
is the secret that God holds hidden from the world. 
The pagan practices most constitutive for modernity are represented by the 
political philosophy of the ancient world rediscovered in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, which Kant formalised into the modern political-and-epistemological 
separation of powers. This is the effective scripture of the modern West. It has brought 
`The church did not succeed in displacing politics `and as a result politics returned, yet in a virulent form 
unknown to antiquity. ' 
4' O'Donovan The Desire of the Nations 26 replies to the charge that such Christian leadership would be not 
only Christendom but Constantinianism, the exercise of an utterly illegitimate authority. In Wyclif and the 
Franciscan poverty tradition O'Donovan has found a non-Constantinian definition of authority and 
dominion. 16 In this tradition `Human justice depends upon God's sanctifying of our relations to material 
possessions. Political right must spring directly from the charity to God and neighbour which the gospel 
imparts; ius must flow from the fountain-head of iustitia. Only the righteous (elect, forgiven, sanctified) can 
have a full title to `dominion' -a word, which in the manner of the period, embraces the two notions of 
property and jurisdiction. ' Only the righteous can hold property Wyclif argues: thus they do not hold it so 
much as hold it in trust, employ it for another. We can therefore say that any possession and any right to 
exercise leadership is entirely a spiritual possession and right. This possession and remains that of the Spirit, 
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about the division and reduction of public discourse into the techniques of our 
withdrawal into ever smaller spheres of selfhood. The West attempts to lay- aside the 
tools by which the canonical status of its own history can be reversed. We must ask 
whether in response God has withdrawn the scriptures from the West, with the result 
that the bible is quite closed to us, held closed by God. Yet the Christian work is, by use 
of the bible as diagnostic political instrument, to re-reveal to the West its intellectual 
sources and with them to challenge the practices that, by the endless process of division 
driven by the modern separation of powers, seek to stay invisible and normative. Now 
we can relate the political to the epistemological, to link the defeat and dethronement of 
the usurper-judge to the commissioning of the creature who participates in the justice- 
giving action of God. We can link the defeat and dethronement of the autonomous 
knower to a new licensing and empowerment of an obedient creaturely knowing. 
6.5.3 Political theology and philosophy. 
Other than by the mediation of God, not only is knowledge of God not attainable; 
knowledge of the world of God's creation is not knowable. It is his and not ours. It takes a 
long course of education even to come to realise the difficulty of acquiring knowledge of 
this world. There are plenty of resources for the conceptualisation of this difficulty and 
of the task of the purifications required by this course of education. 46Plato offers a 
course of education which aims to teach us that we do not know what modems are sure 
they do know. He teaches that we must start to step out of such knowledge and divest 
ourselves of such worldly wisdom. The early part of the philosophical life teaches us to 
re-examine what we are too certain of. The Socratic or Platonic education prescribes 
instrumental action that has to be adopted in order to begin to sense the barriers there 
are between us and true knowledge so that we are no longer under the dictatorship of a 
mere world view. 
The political philosophy of the Laws of Plato demands that all citizens are taught 
and monthly rehearse their laws and constitution. 47 Athenians are free because they are 
under law. They do not suffer the alien authority of dictatorship because they obey this 
and he can withdraw it from his ministers. God can remove the authority extended to us, and 
he can do 
this without our noticing, to leave us with nothing. 
46 See Seth Bernadete Plato's Laws. The Discovery of Being Chicago: University of Chicago Press 2000,42-53 
for a recent exposition of the epistemology that belongs to Plato's political philosophy. 
47 Plato Minos and Laws. We need not democracy (for the demos is the mob) but nomocracy. 
Menexenus 
238c (954) `For a polity moulds its people; a goodly one moulds good men, the opposite bad. Therefore I 
must show that our ancestors were moulded 
in a good polity, thanks to which they and the present 
generation - amongst them these men who 
have died - are good men. ' 
188 
intrinsic authority. Philo of Alexandria points out that Jews already do this every seventh 
day. On the Sabbath they read, learn and rehearse their constitution and law. Their la-, v 
includes a definition of the full status of a man very like the one Aristotle sets out in the 
Nicomachean Ethics. By learning it they have become a people of great virtue, who exhibit 
the self-control that is the basis of all life in a polis and which the Greeks wish to 
emulate. 48 They know that the law intends first to teach. It is a bank of resources of 
description of the good, and only subsequently for the adjudication of what is good in 
each case. Without such a resource of description - and without the cultivation and care 
this resource requires - we have no means of saying what particular thing we want and 
will be satisfied by. In the original republican tradition we find that generosity is the 
defining characteristic of the justice or righteousness of the great man. The modern 
definition of justice is negative: it involves not getting in another man's way and making 
restitution when you do. The positive classical definition of justice involves giving the 
other man your wisdom, encouragement and support. Such a benefactor must act with 
the same generosity as the gods, giving rulings, counsel, instruction and justice. Justice- 
giving is a mercy. 49 He is not to leave his people idle and listless but must share out 
offices and give them work to do. All this extra-large definition of justice is part of the 
generosity of the man brought into being by the law and by vigorous public contest of 
the good. 
6.6 The two economies. 
This brief discussion of paideia and Platonic political philosophy has prepared us for the 
argument of Augustine in The City of God. Augustine is responding to 
Cicero's De Re 
Publica. 50 Cicero believes that the respublica, public affairs, are the affairs of the people, 
and that where there is no justice, the virtue which must underpin all 
fair dealing in 
society, there can be no law or right (ius); where there 
is no law, there is no common 
interest, no commonwealth, and a rabble, but no people. 
Cicero says that the tyrant is a 
model of the vice of injustice, of being above the 
law, lawless. Such a leader cannot be a 
model of justice. Under him there can be no just society or politics. 
The very existence 
48 See Philo Life of Moses 2.2,2.5,2.187 on the philosopher-king who 
is a shepherd of his people (1.150). His 
subjects imitate him. The shepherd and 
horticultural analogies are commonplace in ancient political 
thought. 
49 See for example Seneca De Clementia 1.5.7 and De Beneftis 
3.18.1,4.12.5. 
50 See Schofield `Epilogue' in Rowe & Schofield The Cambridge History of 
Greek and Roman Political Thought 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2000,666-671, and O'Donovan 
Irenaeus to Grotius 161-163. 
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of the community, is made impossible. 51 Cicero argues that in its earliest days Rome met 
the criterion of agreement on justice. Augustine disagrees. 52 True justice did not flourish 
in Rome's heroic days because Rome worshipped many gods and thus many 
incompatible accounts of virtue, right and justice. So, following Cicero's argument, there 
was no community agreement on justice, and thus no justice. Only God's nation, the polis 
that rules and combines heaven and earth, counts as a people in Cicero's sense, for only 
in this heavenly city is there the agreement, and obedience to it, which underpins 
justice. 53 This, argues Augustine, makes the heavenly city a better community. 
Augustine argues that the church is the nation, the exemplary nation, the model 
for all other nations. 54 We should not let `nation' be defined as it has been in the modern 
period by territoriality, but must understand the concept of nation to refer to a particular 
regimen and form of life. So, for example, the nation and regimen of industrialists 
overlaps to some degree with that of financiers and with that of opinion-makers: each 
such mode of sociality is supported by sets of codes, practices and disciplines. All 
members of each fraternity have an idea of what its members do and do not do. 
Inasmuch as modern political science does not understand that nations compete for 
intellectual resources in the form of definitions of what is desirable, it rules out 
discussion of what is worth doing. It has not appreciated that we are all driven to seek 
what is better as present public discourse -'earthly glory' - believes it is better, and that 
everyone has some idea of what it is to be successful and, within the context of earthly 
glory, can usually tell a better performance from a poorer one. Augustine says that being 
a member of any nation or regime demands constant re-appraisal of precisely which 
virtues are worth pursuing, and which should be discarded in order that some of these 
virtues really are attained. His definition of a regime does not require that we already 
agree on what is good, or insist, as Cicero and Kant do, that we must make the move 
that, because I think it is good for me, I must be asserting that it is good for everyone. 55 
Augustine starts from the assumption that we all compete. We pursue glory. Then he 
refers to the retrospective discovery that heavenly glory is better than earthly glory, not 
least because it lasts longer. This may be hidden to everyone on earth because on earth 
'1 Cicero De Re Publica 3.43 Cicero On the Commonwealth and On the Laws edited by James E. G. Zetzel 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1999,75. 
52 Augustine City of God 19.21 translated H. Bettenson, Harmondsworth: Penguin 1984,881. 
33 Augustine City of God 19.24, Penguin 890. 
5 Augustine City of God 19.17, Penguin 877. 
5' Kant's categorical imperative (Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals 4.421 `Act only 
in such a way that 
you can at the same time will that your maxim should 
become a universal law') was first Cicero's De Of ciis 
3.26-7,52. 
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the effort of competing for earthly glory does not allow us to see that there is a better 
nation - and in it superior glory - available to us in the kingdom that unites earth to 
heaven. Augustine's political philosophy relies on eschatology because this enables a 
more consistent pursuit of the logic of political philosophy. 
Augustine contrasts two regimes and modes of being human. These are in 
themselves definitions of what it is to be human, and they are training regimes that 
intend to develop each of us to the full status of that mode. Augustine is contrasting two 
modes -a short-term mode and a long-term, or rather eternal, mode. There is nothing 
wrong with the short-term mode, other than that it is partial and eventually comes to an 
end. That there is an endless variety of short term modes is a good thing. The eternal 
mode is full, perfect, and does not come to an end. Indeed it is this mode that supplies 
life to the short term modes, did they but know it. Only those who participate in the 
eternal mode can see that all others are merely partial. With very great caution they can 
say that the partial forms can be seen, by the pure man only, as anticipations of, and 
witnesses to, the complete form. These (pagan) training regimes intend to improve our 
performance at acquiring a range of goods. They constitute so many wonderful ways of 
failing to get started on the process of learning the (heavenly) mode. But only 
retrospectively can it be seen - by the new mind - that all (pagan) modes were poor 
modes of what God does perfectly for us, and which the gospel is witness of. At a 
conceptual level at least, there is a recognition that Christianity and paganism - that is all 
men - are aiming at one thing. They are aiming at how to be a man. Christianity, 
Augustine argues, shows that the way to be a man is to be a son of the God of Jesus 
Christ. It not only shows this, but brings it about, through participation in the Spirit who 
brings such sons into being. To this end Christianity commandeers and discards all other 
regimes. All kingdoms claim some small share of earth, but one kingdom, that of God, 
comprises the whole of earth and heaven in a single combined regime. Buy into this 
kingdom and you will inherit the best of the rest anyway. All other nations don't know 
what hope is because they cannot conceive of taking us further than the best of mankind 
already is. Christianity however intends to take us way beyond what already is, to God. 
This, for Augustine, is political philosophy on theological definition. It is political 
philosophy done properly. 
A people is a people because they have a unity. But they do not bestow this unity 
on themselves. Their unity comes from outside them, from God. If they are just a demos 
without law, then they are a rabble not a people, each seeking to make himself the one 
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who is over all others. Not until this people are ruled by the theological monarchy of one 
God can there really be a demos, democracy and koinonia. 56 Christianity is the better way 
to do politics. It is a better performance, that marks all other ways as self-defeating by 
raising the definition of politics to life with God in this God's Spirit. 
From Platonism we learn that absolutely nothing of the fullness of this world as 
the creation of God is available to us from the impressions of our senses. Without being 
tutored by the teacher we can only be oblivious to the fullness of this world, and exist in 
an infinitely impoverished version of it. Plato said we have fallen into a deep crevasse in 
which we have only very poor refractions of a reality far above us. 57 Down here we 
suffer from a reality deficit. By a process of paideia some few of us can return to that 
reality, learn it and come back to educate the rest of us in it. Christianity says that one 
man has been raised from the cave, and has come back to us. He has come back as the 
Spirit, that is, in many gentle modes that I have called law (instruction) and teacher, and 
the many other material modes that I discussed in Chapter 4. Strauss argued that 
modernity had abolished the metaphysics of the good and the project of paideia, but held 
onto criticism, which now functions as a vicious practice of disowning all resources of 
tradition and law. 
So now we can say that what is significant about modernity is not that modern 
man has turned away from God, but that his turning away has been commandeered by 
God and made into God's action, so that even in his turning away man's action is taken 
from him and turned to his own eventual good. Just where man believes that he has 
succeeded in being most his own man, and is on the point of becoming Satan, his 
ambition is prevented. Modernity is an aeon which suffers from a deficiency of reality. It 
is just not very real. It has been put into receivership, but the receiver is keeping it ticking 
over by short-term loans of reality. It has become, despite itself, just a front for the 
purposes of God. God has made modernity an instrument of his mercy - albeit that for 
the sake of his own safety this must be kept well hidden from every modern. 58 
'See Augustine City of God Book 19.14 `The order and law, earthly or heavenly, by which government 
serves the interests of human society. ' 
57 See Plato Phaedo 111 c-114c; Republic books 6-7. 
58 We can therefore argue that the term `modernity' only has meaning in theological statement. O'Donovan 
The Desire of the Nations 57 argues that theology invented the concept of the state as a local area of paideutic 
performance requiring leadership with which the 
Church must stand in conversation and confrontation. 
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6.7 The variety of theological tasks. 
We have now made plain the political character of the immediate epistemological claim 
of modernity. We have gathered resources to ask whether the turn from Christianity 
towards other options, is accompanied by God's turning and hiding his face from us, and 
so is the result not only of our failure, but of a failure that God has inflicted on us. The 
Christians must be able to pass this judgment of modernity on to modernity, or they will 
suffer the punishment due to modernity. But the Church has failed to take up its role as 
watchman, and so the indivisible witness to the indivisible God has been unaccountably 
divided between the several jurisdictions set out under the modern separation of powers 
which declares that religion is not politics. This judgement that the Church has failed to 
pronounce on the West, the Western Church is itself now suffering. The secularisation 
thesis must be countered by the theological caution that the God of Israel does not 
intend this generation to hear him, so does not say anything it can hear. We have 
hardened our hearts, with the consequence that he has hardened our hearts. 
I have argued that re-stating the public and political purpose of the doctrine of 
God is not about recommending a particular political constitution. It is about insisting on 
the complexity of theological statement in which several accounts are kept in parallel. 
Which account has to be given now depends on the particular predicament of the world, 
to which the Church must respond with harder or softer judgment. We must say that the 
being that resists the Word of God is nothing but the product of our own action. The 
division of this being into the two economies of nature and will is the whole precept of 
modernity. It claims that once payment has been made to the first economy of nature, 
we are free to enter the second of absolute freedom. We pay what necessity demands, 
and are then quite free. We have seen that the possibility of restricting and excluding 
some choices is the basis of real choice. This second economy of utter and indeterminate 
freedom has no memory and allows for no growth of character. It believes that religious 
discourse is a voluntary and inexplicable binding of ourselves when we could and should 
be utterly free, and, further, that acknowledgement of difference - which I have called 
worship - is an elective matter, which we should avoid and which only religious people 
unaccountably take on. But every member of the economy of modernity is engaged in 
paying worship to unfreedom - necessity - in order briefly to enter the economy of 
freedom understood to lie behind it. This division between two economies divides us 
again between each of the proliferating jurisdictions created by this dialectic of nature 
and absolute freedom. 
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In this regime of the autonomous jurisdictions of economics, politics, culture, 
psychology and the still deeper recesses of subjectivity, we have no responsibility for the 
formation of the subjectivity of the other. We owe merely a general and formal duty not 
to make any positive or paideutic claims, or to teach or participate in the other. This 
regime makes choice the first and most binding imperative. However without a set of 
publicly-arrived at skills and criteria for the prioritising and formation of choices, such 
choice represents only absence of choice. Without this discourse our claim to subjectivity 
is unchallenged. By definition it represents opposition to the whole discourse and 
vocabulary within which the acknowledgement and prioritisation of any otherness may 
be made, and any explicit and local claims could be heard as address and obligation. 
When we have absolutised choice we never have to hear any specific claims. Culture - 
which is a discourse of will - is the whole vocabulary of the economy of modernity. 
Culture means characterless unbounded choice, that does not foreclose on any other 
choice, and so is as easily reversed as made. Plato insisted that some will rule over others. 
These others will then at least have the dignity of having a ruler to blame. His dominion, 
our subordination and this hierarchy of being is the outcome of all our doing. But Kant 
wants to go much further than Plato and say that we may all be a ruler, all autonomous. 
Kant therefore represents the hubris and collapse of this hierarchy. By denying that there 
is any status differential, this arrangement now appears not as top-down but everywhere 
alike. It is everywhere, and no longer appears anywhere, with the result that the hierarchy 
is hidden. We are entirely complicit in this arrangement. We cannot therefore say that we 
wish to be other than it, and cannot therefore shake our fist at it or plead to be released 
from it. 
All the plurality and culture open to us in this economy represent a celebration of 
our absolute will and subjectivity which leaves us without the means to acknowledge any 
other world not made by this will and subjectivity. Our autarchy and totality would be 
threatened by the existence of any other economies of being. 59 We say there is no God, 
and there is no issue of `God' because we ourselves are that god. Our enlightenment is 
only complicity to conceal the discourse of protest by which we could be dethroned, 
freed and transformed from a demonic to a creaturely status. This is the reason for 
acknowledging the claims of other systems that represent other forms of being, other 
59 Loughlin `The Basis and Authority of Doctrine' 42 argues that `It is a paradox of postmodern culture that 
its pluralism obscures a deep homogeneity: a universal reason no less socially constructed and rhetorically 
maintained than those supposedly overcome, yet more 
insidious and ferocious because the condition of the 
very pleasures of postmodern pluralistic society. 
This "reason" is the material law of the market-place, 
predicated upon the metaphysical concept of the 
Void. ' 
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priorities and thus other `gods'. The economy of modernity has given up the apparatus 
by which we could name or recognise anything that could dethrone us and distinguish us 
from the demonic totality claimed by the economy of our action. 
The economy of modernity is the function of an anonymous high god who does 
not intend to save us from being the prey of the contending jurisdictions. The oneness of 
this One allows a merely apparent manyness and so a merely apparent politics that will 
eventually be taken away by the reversion to oneness. This manyness is only the play of 
the natures and passions and the miasma of plurality. Recovery of the conceptual 
possibility that there may really be many gods, authorities, priorities, demands, creatures 
and worlds is necessary to rid us of this totalitarian monism. It is the contribution of 
trinitarian theology to allow us to say that one is what the Father and the Son are. 
Oneness is exclusively their characteristic, and making their creatures one and one with 
themselves, is what the Father and Son do. The oneness and manyness of the trinitarian 
God is the guarantee of the possibility that sociality, public life and politics constitute a 
real, and not merely a temporary and ultimately illusory, manyness. 
We must therefore say both that the world is many, and that it is one. It is one 
over and against us, and hold us captive. And worse still, we are one with it and complicit 
in this captivity. By declaring that we are held in bonds, the Christian gospel holds out 
the hope that we can be distinguished from these bonds and that we will be made 
distinct both from the cosmos and from the claim to be its maker. I have asked whether 
our theology demolishes this dichotomy between religious and non-religious discourse, 
and whether it turns back to rid us of that distinction by showing the self-proclaimed 
world of freedom and secularity as religious, superstitious and bound. I have suggested 
that theology involves saying that there must be no simple account of what modernity is, 
or culture is, or the world is. Theology is a series of duties. Amongst them is the duty of 
preventing the world from coming to any peace until its redeemer comes, and of replying 
to the world in compassion with that therapeutic statement that will serve as antidote to 
each specific self-inflicted injury. 
This thesis has compared two events. In one the opponent of the Word of God 
puts his hand on us, locking us into a circuitry in which we can only ever repeat his 
action. It is an event that this opponent does not succeed in sustaining. The second is the 
event in which the God of Israel puts his hand on man and keeps it there, training and 
leading him into wider and more complex forms of action, so man can reply to God and 
freely be with him. The God of Israel brings man into being by himself initiating man's 
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responses. He plays Adam until Adam can, with God's assistance, play himself. This act 
does not merely go out from God, but also freely returns to him in response, in a self- 
sustaining exchange. It creates a time of its own which cannot be interrupted by any 
other, and so is eternal. The trinitarian community is the source of the community of 
Israel. It receives Israel again as a true performer of the life of the trinitarian community. 
The economy of the God of Israel therefore outlives the economy of the opponent. The 
former has eternal life, the latter does not. An account of the God of Israel must include 
an account of his opponents in order that it be an account of their defeat. The rival gods, 
the world, our mundane practices, time and modernity, must all feature in our account of 
the God who is for us. 
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